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ABSTRACT 
A LOSS OF WILL;
“ARMINIANISM,” NONSECTARIANISM, AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY’S MORAL PROJECT, 1626-1890
By
Russell D. Kosits 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2004 
The concept of “the will” dominated American moral psychology for nearly three 
centuries. To posses a will was, among other things, to be made in the image of God and 
to have moral responsibility. College textbooks, as tools of moral inculcation, conveyed 
this moral psychology from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century. During the 
first decades of the twentieth century, however, the topic of will was being increasingly 
de-emphasized in psychology textbooks. By the end of the 1930s, American psychology 
had “lost its will” entirely.
What explains this “loss of will” in American academic psychology? From a 
perspective internal to the discipline of psychology, one might argue that the shifting 
emphasis toward non-mentalistic, behavioral explanation (i.e., “behaviorism”) may have 
been to blame (or credit). Yet, a broader historical case can be made that long-standing 
intellectual trends or “impulses” in American colleges may have also played a significant 
role. This dissertation examines these trends as manifested in four leading textbooks, 
each arguably the best representative of its era: William Ames’s (1629) Marrow of 
Theologv, Jonathan Edwards’ (1754) Freedom of the Will, Thomas C. Upham’s (1869) 
Mental Philosophv, and William James’s (1890) Principles of Psvchologv. This analysis
xm
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suggests that the concept of will was already in serious trouble (even “lost”) well before 
the twentieth century.
One of the trends that may have eventuated in the loss of will was the 
nonsectarian impulse that came to characterize American higher education beginning in 
the eighteenth century. Put baldly, sectarian formulations of the Christian story 
supported a robust psychology of will while nonsectarian formulations appear to have 
undergirded less robust moral psychologies.
Another factor is what I have called the “Arminian impulse” in American moral 
psychology. A radical shift took place in this textbook discourse during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, a shift from a Calvinistic psychology of will which embraced 
(theological) determinism to an “Arminian” psychology of will which rejected 
determinism. This process of Arminianization was intended to strengthen and elevate the 
concept of will. Ironically, however, the effect was to weaken the concept, at least in 
mainstream academic American psychology.
XIV
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INTRODUCTION
Explaining the “Loss of Will” in American Psvchologv 
In the late 1800s, American psychology took a decidedly scientific turn.' The 
“New Psychology” of William James (1890/1981), John Dewey (1884), and others 
enthusiastically embraced the experimental and physiological emphases of European 
psychology while, with equal fervor, it eschewed the perceived theological obscurantism 
of the indigenous psychological tradition. Indeed, in the years preceding the 
establishment of the first American psychological laboratory, many thinkers insisted that 
such a methodological realignment would be essential if  psychology in America were to 
escape its “medieval” bondage and make the “.. .transition fi-om the orthodox to the 
scientific stand-point” (Hall, 1879, p. 100).
At century’s end, this methodological change was very nearly complete. Having 
established new laboratories, psychology departments, joumals, and a professional 
organization, the New Psychology emerged victorious. Having escaped the alleged 
backwardness of the indigenous tradition, American psychologists looked back with 
pride. In the process, however, they also minimized their historical connectedness to the 
American tradition. James McKeen Cattell, for example, famously argued that “the 
history of psychology here prior to 1880 could be set forth briefly as the alleged chapter 
on snakes in a certain natural history of Iceland— ‘There are no snakes in Iceland’”
’ The following material (pp. 1-4) was presented in somewhat different form at the 34* annual meeting of  
Cheiron: The Intemational Society for the History o f the Behavioral and Social Sciences, held in Eugene, 
Oregon in June 2002. The title o f the paper was “A Loss o f Will: Science, Virtue, and Freedom in 
American Psychology.”
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(Cattell, 1898). Clearly, as Cattell saw it, there was no psychology in America before the 
New Psychology.
New Psychology^ rhetoric therefore intimated complete independence from the 
indigenous tradition. Not surprisingly, then, as American psychologists began to write 
histories of their discipline in the early twentieth century (e.g., Boring, 1929; Murphy, 
1929), they also attached very little importance to the indigenous tradition (Ash, 1983). 
This trend continued. Indeed, historians of American psychology have so often 
uncritically recapitulated New Psychology rhetoric that a “canonical” discontinuity story 
dominated twentieth century historical scholarship (Richards, 1995, p. 2). American 
psychology before William James was simply nonexistent. It followed that the New 
Psychology owed nothing to it, nor borrowed anything from it.
Fortunately, there has been movement away from this misrepresentation of the 
history of American psychology. In 1939, Jay Wharton Fay^ wrote a book entitled 
American Psvchologv Before William James. This book essentially served to refute 
Cattell’s assertion by cataloguing and briefly summarizing the psychological output of 
American thinkers before William James’s (I890/I98I) ground-breaking textbook The 
Principles of Psvchologv. As such, it served mostly as a call to future scholarship, rather 
than a definitive treatment. Fay’s call was all but ignored for decades (cf. Roback, 1964). 
Recently, however, a growing number of works of scholarship in the “new” history of
 ^As a relatively recent discussion on the Cheiron LISTSERV indicates, a detailed study o f the phrase 
“New Psychology” would imdoubtedly reveal complex and multiple usages. In this paper, I use the term 
“New Psychology” in a way Dewey (1884) used it (at least on a connotative or implicit level), to capture 
the confident belief that emancipation from the methodological obscurantisms o f the past and commitment 
to the experimentally- and physiologically-oriented European methodologies o f  the fiittire would throw 
“great light upon psychical matters.” (p. 281)
 ^Although Fay’s book was a call (of sorts) to futtire scholarship, Richards (1995) notes that "Even 
Fay.. .did not challenge the New Psychology's revolutionary rhetoric, claiming it shared only the name 
'Psychology' with what had gone before" (p. 2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
psychology (Furumoto, 1989) have examined, to varying extent, certain connections 
between the indigenous tradition and the New Psychology (e.g., Coon, 2000; Daston, 
1982; Evans, 1984; Fuchs, 2000; Leary, 1987; O’Donnell, 1985; Pickren, 2000; Richards, 
1995; Wetmore, 1991; Zenderland, 1998). In this dissertation, I hope to offer a further 
corrective to this “tradition of neglect” in the history of psychology (Fuchs, 2000).
To this end, this dissertation examines one particularly striking continuity 
between the New Psychology and the indigenous tradition: treatment of the topic of “the 
will” in American college textbooks. The will, or that part of the psyche typically 
associated with choices (particularly moral choices), had been a central concern of 
Christian theologians and philosophers since Augustine, and, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, had been a particularly important theme in American psychological 
thought for more than 250 years (Fiering, 1981, Guelzo, 1989, Guelzo, 1999b). Given 
the New Psychology rhetoric of discontinuity, however, it is somewhat surprising to find 
that the will continued to receive attention in New Psychology textbooks until the 1930s. 
The great majority of New Psychology texts^ had chapters on the topic early in this 
period (i.e., 1890-1919); in the 1920s, fewer texts had such chapters, and finally in the 
1930s the topic was dropped altogether.^
A fairly “random” sample o f 35 introductory textbooks, taken from the University o f  New Hampshire 
Dimond Library, spanning from 1886 to 1964, reveals a clear pattem. The earliest o f  New Psychology 
college textbooks tended to continue the American mental philosophy tradition o f containing a multi­
chapter section dedicated to the topic o f the will. In the years 1900 to 1919, 100% o f the texts I sampled 
continued to have a chapter on the will (or, in one case, "Action"). In the period between 1920-1929 
approximately 50% of the textbooks had chapters on the will. 15% of the texts during the 30s contained 
chapters on the will, and, after 1939, none o f the books sampled contained chapters on the topic.
 ^For further confirmation dating the “loss” in the 1930s see Gilbert (1970). This absence o f interest in the 
will has largely continued in mainstream academic psychology. In a consideration o f 10 randomly chosen 
current introductory psychology textbooks, none contained the terms "will," "volition," "choice," or "self- 
determination." The term "free will" was mentioned in three texts, but only in the context o f  obligatory 
discussion o f the less-prestigious and dated humanistic or existential psychologies. There has been a 
revival o f  interest in will-related topics in the professional literature, however. PsychlNFO, academic 
psychology's leading search engine, indicates that the term "volition" was added as a subject term in 1988,
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Previous Scholarship on the Loss of Will
Scholars have noticed this loss of will, but have not attempted to articulate a 
sustained explanation for this loss, particularly in the context of American intellectual 
and religious history. Fiering (1981) contrasted the situation at seventeenth century 
Harvard, where “questions concerning the nature of the will probably engendered more 
debate.. .than any other topic in moral philosophy,” to the situation of the early 1980s, 
noticing that . .most of modem psychology seems to do quite nicely without any 
concept of the will at all. So profoundly has human psychology and psychological theory 
changed that talking about will is something like talking about bodily humors and the 
four elements in medical physiology” (p. 104). Yet, because Fiering’s work focuses on 
seventeenth century Harvard, he does not explore when or how this loss occurred.
James Deese (1990) has affirmed that “no topic has more completely disappeared 
from modem psychology than that of will.. ..the will has disappeared from official 
psychology” (p. 295), and John Pahl (1992) asserts much the same thing:
Studying “the will” today is a bit like studying “the humors.” With a few notable 
exceptions, the idea of a discrete human will has been relegated to the intellectual 
dumpster, along with bloodletting by leeches, phrenology, the arc reflex, and any 
number of archaic conceptions of human action and motivation, (p. 163)
Still, neither Deese nor Pahl attempt to offer sustained explanations of how and why the 
topic was lost to modem psychology, although Deese does clearly see that the old
and the term "self-determination" which, PsychlNFO indicates, is used for "free will," was added in 1994. 
Searching for "volition" as a subject or a "key concept" produced 630 hits, while the term "self- 
determination" revealed 639 hits. By way o f comparison, the term "attitudes" produced 46,197 hits 
(limiting the search from January 1994), and the less-well-established area "emotional states" (term added 
1977), produced 6006 hits (since January 1994). Clearly, the revival is still a minor occurrence in the 
discipline. Nevertheless, an in-depth look at this "retum o f the will" vis-a-vis the older approach would be 
an interesting endeavor.
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concept of volition had theological overtones, and did not seem to fit in the deterministic 
context of the new scientific psychology. Similarly, McReynolds (1990) noted that 
. .concern with the faculty of will has faded in contemporary psychology” (p. 144), 
although he did note an increasing emphasis on “the personal-control metaphor.” 
Explaining this loss was not McReynolds’ goal, either.
Gilbert’s (1970) brief essay, “Whatever Happened to the Will in American 
Psychology” notes that “in contemporary textbooks of psychology, the discussion of 
concepts such as purpose, will, volition, and ‘freedom of will,’ has become disreputable. 
The topic of will virtually vanished from psychological textbooks in the 1930’s” (p. 52). 
Gilbert seems disappointed by the loss of the “venerable concept” of will, and thought it 
“astounding.. .that thinking about the will for over 2500 years should have been 
fallacious.” Still, this essay concerns itself more with twentieth century developments 
and the possibilities for restoring the concept to psychology, particularly through 
“personology.” The essay does not attempt to offer a detailed explanation of why the 
concept may have been lost in the American context in the first place.
Allen Guelzo (1999a) has noted that there has been a “retum of the will” in the 
last 20 years in American thinking. Although he does not explicitly state that there was a 
loss of will, the essay certainly implies it, and suggests that the rise of deterministic 
thinking in the nineteenth century and the failure of pragmatism in the twentieth were the 
leading causes of this loss. Nevertheless, the essay is not intended to offer a detailed 
explanation or description of this implied loss. It is therefore the purpose of this 
dissertation to describe and explain this “loss of will” in American psychology.
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Explaining the Loss of Will: Two Theses
This dissertation offers two overlapping but distinguishable theses or explanations 
for the “loss of will” in American psychology. Each thesis centers on a particular 
“impulse” which operated in a particular sphere. The first thesis (which we might call a 
historical/sociological thesis) is that there was a “nonsectarian impulse” in American 
colleges which contributed to the loss of will. The second thesis (which we might call an 
intellectual/theological thesis) is that there was an “Arminian impulse” which 
increasingly came to characterize American psychologists’ notions of moral agency.
This impulse, ironically, also contributed to the loss of will.
Loss?
First, however, I need to justify the use of the term “loss” to describe the gradual 
disappearance of the topic of will from introductory psychology textbooks (and their 
precursors). An issue that this dissertation addresses is psychology’s ability to consider 
human beings as moral agents. I assume that this is a worthwhile goal for psychology, 
although I do not assume that everyone will share this assumption. Yet, even for those 
who do not think that psychology should have anything to do with morality may 
(legitimately, I think) find their position actually strengthened from what follows.
An assertion that is harder to contest, I think, is that the loss of the concept of the 
will was indeed a loss of psychology’s ability to think of human beings as responsible 
moral subjects. From the days of Augustine, Western moral discourse centered on the 
notion of a faculty of will. Since at the time of the loss of will no alternative concept was 
offered, and since the burdens of responsibility and moral agency had previously rested 
upon the belief in the validity of the faculty, the loss of the faculty was, by consequence.
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the loss of psychology’s ability to consider moral agency in any coherent way. This is 
not to say that moral considerations did not seep into twentieth century psychology: a 
cursory knowledge of the history of American psychology contradicts that assertion. 
Neither does this mean that twentieth century psychology did not have moral 
implications. It simply means that psychology had lost its will to explicitly and 
intentionally consider human beings as moral agents.
There were (and are) good reasons to drop moral considerations out of 
psychology. Morality is an inherently sectarian or individualistic affair, and real-world 
science (i.e., science performed by individuals with diverse moral predilections) is 
incapable of determining which, if any, moral view is right. Nevertheless, the well- 
known problem with “morality-free” psychology is that the moral (and, relatedly, 
political) presuppositions of the psychologist (particularly those in the “softer” side of the 
discipline) inevitably seep into their scientific productions. Our selection of worthwhile 
subjects of study is perhaps the best example of this (e.g., sex roles, divorce, child abuse, 
prejudice, parenting styles, “homophobia,” sexism, etc.). So, although there are good 
reasons to drop moral considerations from psychology, it turns out that in the end it is an 
impossible task. Yet, by prohibiting the explicit consideration of morality, psychology 
remains subject to moral “seepage” and is therefore bound to the (frankly) dishonest 
practice of presenting morality-driven “results” as if  they were “objective” facts. One of 
the purposes of this introduction is to show how we ended up in such a conundrum, and, 
of course, how this process was related to the loss of will.
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Personal Biases
Historical scholarship is, of course, subject to “moral ‘seepage’” as well, and I 
would be dishonest and inconsistent if I were to portray myself as a neutral reporter of the 
facts. I write with my own “sectarian” biases. This dissertation focuses on four major 
college “textbooks,” each representing a different era. One way to discuss bias is to 
report on my own feelings about each author. Working backward, I feel a great deal of 
empathy and respect for William James. As one trained in empirical psychology, I 
sympathize with James’s project to approach psychology scientifically, and further, as 
one with philosophical inclinations, I also appreciate James’s sensitivity to and mastery 
of philosophical issues. I also admire James’s existential courage. Yet, I am critical of 
the “Arminian” and nonsectarian impulses (concepts that I will explain below) that I find 
in James’s writing. Still, I admire James’s willingness to face the moral dilemma to 
which the Arminian impulse inevitably leads a would-be empirical psychologist.
Thomas Upham, the great American antebellum mental philosophy textbook 
writer, is my third author. I admire Upham’s orderly approach to psychology, his careful 
consideration of the great philosophers of the Enlightenment (particularly the Scots), and 
his apparently sincere piety. Still, as is the case with William James, I am critical of the 
Arminian and nonsectarian impulses that I find in Upham’s writing, which, I think, 
introduce a degree of inconsistency within his own thought. Even more, unlike William 
James, who seemed to sense (intellectually and existentially) the problems associated 
with the “Arminian” impulse, Upham seemed much less critical of this assumption. I do 
not fault him for this, however, for that may have been one of the chief biases of his era.
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My second author is Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth-century American 
Congregationalist and Puritan theologian, pastor, philosopher and interpreter of the “First 
Great Awakening.” As a committed member of a Presbyterian church community, I am 
sympathetic with Edwards’ Calvinism, and admire the way in which he carefully 
considered and engaged the intellectual currents of his day from that vantage point. As I 
have mentioned above, I am critical of the “Arminian impulse,” and there was perhaps no 
better critic of this impulse than Edwards. Because of this sympathy, I run the risk of 
appearing uncritically “pro-Edwards.” That is not my intention. This dissertation is 
written for a diverse audience (i.e., not written primarily for my faith community, 
although I do hope that some members of that community read it), and I have therefore 
attempted to avoid making “sectarian” arguments. The goal is to open discussion rather 
than close it. Therefore I attempt to make my case on rational grounds, all the while 
acknowledging (with William James) that “reason” is never neutral.
Still, I believe it is possible to make the case that one can be “objective” without 
being “neutral,” by being willing to consider both sides of the story, to hear things which 
contradict one’s own thesis, and to avoid uncritical and hagiographical veneration of 
one’s own subjects (Haskell, 1990). Although I am sympathetic with Edwards, I do also 
actually argue that Edwards contributed to the loss of will in American psychology by his 
(perhaps unwitting) implicit advocacy of the nonsectarian impulse. Further, while I 
certainly share a distrust of the “Arminian impulse” with Edwards, I also hope to show 
that one need not be a Calvinist to share this distrust. Indeed, I am inclined to think that 
anyone fully embracing both American psychology’s moral and scientific projects may 
actually be inclined to agree. But we shall see.
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Finally, the dissertation begins with the British Puritan and author of the long- 
running (at Harvard and Yale) sectarian textbook The Marrow of Theology by William 
Ames. Aside from the fact that Ames wrote a “systematic theology” text (always of 
interest to Presbyterians), I find Ames interesting because of the unabashed sectarianism 
of his production. As such, Ames articulates a system of theology that today perhaps 
only a few could embrace, yet he still represents an era when sectarian pursuits were not 
considered antithetical to the pursuits of higher education. At the end of this dissertation 
I very briefly consider the question of whether the pluralistic academy may be able to 
achieve its ends by allowing a bit of “sectarianism” within its walls.
The “Nonsectarian Impulse”
Although religious sectarianism has not had much to do with scientific 
psychology in America, sectarianism was, actually, quite good for moral psychology.^
The dissertation begins with a close consideration of the sectarian theology textbook used 
at Harvard and Yale in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, William 
Ames’s Marrow of Theology. Although this text did not have a sustained examination of 
exclusively psychological considerations as we have come to expect today, it did make
® The term “moral psychology” is given a twofold definition in the Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophv: 
“(1) the subfield o f  psychology that traces the development over time o f moral reasoning and opinions in 
the lives o f  individuals (this subdiscipline includes the work o f Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Carol 
Gilligan); (2) the part o f philosophy where philosophy o f mind and ethics overlap, which concems all the 
psychological issues related to morality.” In this dissertation, the term “moral psychology” is used in a 
sense closer to the second definition given above, although neither definition fits perfectly. A definition of 
moral psychology that might better apply to the usage in this dissertation would be, “the systematic 
description and explanation o f appropriate and inappropriate moral action, from a psychological vantage 
point, with a particular concem for moral agency.” The phrase “appropriate and inappropriate” is 
important in this regard. The moral psychology described in this dissertation always assumed (even in the 
case o f William James— see section on “naming the object”) that there are right and wrong ways o f  acting. 
The more sectarian formulations tended to possess a clear view o f what is morally right and they tended to 
be associated with correspondingly rich, detailed (although not necessarily sophisticated or scientifically 
accurate) moral psychologies. The phrase “with a particular concem for moral agency” deals with the fact 
that the moral psychologies considered in this dissertation all considered human beings as responsible 
moral actors. This stands in contrast to contemporary psychology, which tends to downplay agency.
10
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heavy use of the concepts of will and intellect throughout its discussion of the nature of 
God and salvation. Indeed, it is a central contention of this dissertation that it was the 
specificity and particularity of Puritan theology (such as that contained in Ames’s text) 
that sustained and explained the concept of the will in Puritan institutions (i.e., Harvard 
and Yale). As we shall see, the concept of will simply made sense in the context of 
Puritan theology. Other contexts, as we shall see, would be less friendly to the concept.
Nonsectarianism, on the other hand, turned out to be bad for moral psychology. 
As George Marsden (1994) has explained, nonsectarianism was the standard response of 
denominational colleges to meet the challenges of plurality in the eighteenth and 
particularly the nineteenth century. Throughout the time period studied in this 
dissertation, this “diversity” was largely Protestant. In order to avoid tensions between 
theological camps, colleges took a “lowest common denominator” approach to faith, 
stressing those aspects of religion which all parties could accept. The problem with this 
approach was that the very particularity and specificity that had sustained the coherence 
of the will concept was gradually eroded. Originally, the concept of will was sustained 
by specific assertions about God, about right and wrong, and about redemption. 
Nonsectarianism, or the desire to articulate a theology and morality that all could 
embrace, therefore led to a more watered-down version of Protestantism. In the chapters 
that follow, it should become clear that the deity of William Ames, for example, is a 
more carefully defined God than the deity of Thomas Upham’s mental philosophy text. 
Yet compared to William James, Upham was the “sectarian.” As the elements of the 
psychology of will were eroded, so too did the concept of will erode.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The “Arminian Impulse”
The term “Arminianism,” strictly speaking, refers to a sixteenth-century offshoot 
of Dutch Calvinism which, among other things, took issue with the Calvinist belief that 
faith in Christ could only take place at God’s initiative. In order to avoid the conclusion 
that God is evil, the decision to believe must ultimately he a matter of a person’s 
autonomous will. As we shall see, both Ames and Edwards were stalwart challengers to 
the Arminian doctrines. What I am calling the “Arminian impulse,” however, is a much 
broader concept than simply the ability of individuals to believe in Christ. William 
James (1890) concluded his discussion of the freedom of the will with an expression of 
this “Arminian impulse” (see chapter 12 for a full explication). James argued that a free 
act is a “strictly underived and original” act (p. 579). The Arminian impulse, then, is the 
desire to find some uncaused, underived “efficiency” or ability to do morally good things 
in the world. Indeed, the Arminian impulse questions the goodness (or badness) of 
actions which arise from any cause other than the autonomous and self-determined will 
itself. As James argued, a person may be “a child of the sunshine,” (p. 548) who does not 
need to exert effort to do good things. The inclinations of such a “child” are in good 
order, and incline toward good things. Yet, this child can really take no credit for his 
effortless goodness because he was bom that way. The “hero and the neurotic subject,” 
on the other hand, is capable of the greatest virtue because they must find the resources 
for virtue within themselves alone. Only the hero who transcends nature (e.g., the normal 
cause and effect of desire and inclination) is traly virtuous.
This impulse is most easily contrasted with the sentiment expressed in Ames’s 
(1968) theology text, in which he argues that God is Efficiency itself, pure and
12
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unencumbered “working power,” the only source of moral good in the world. Any good 
found in the creature is “derived,” i.e., finds its roots not in a self-determined will but in a 
gracious dispensation from Goodness. Further, since this Goodness works through 
secondary causes (e.g., desires, inclinations, upbringing), the goodness of the creature 
does not need oppose nature. Even a “child of the sunshine” can be morally virtuous in 
this world. Indeed, it is the child of the sunshine who is most virtuous because this child 
inclines toward nothing but the good.
What does this have to do with the loss of will in American psychology? First, 
the Arminian impulse implies a narrower definition of will. In the psychology of 
William Ames, the concept of “will” was quite broad. All of the effortless yet virtuous 
inclinations and desires of the child of the sunshine would be expressions of that child’s 
will. In the Arminian universe, however, will is only exercised when there is some sort 
of moral conflict and effortful choice to be made. Effortless activity may resemble the 
actions of the will, but is not will. The Arminian impulse might be inclined to say that 
the child of the sunshine therefore never actually needs to exercise the will, or, if he does, 
the activity of the will is simply consenting to what is already underway. So, while one 
approaches things of will (and therefore moral agency) in very broad terms, the other 
narrows the domain of will considerably. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this fact is 
found in Upham’s (1869) textbook Mental Philosophy. Upham famously challenged the 
traditional scholastic division of psychological faculties (i.e., intellect and will), arguing 
that the soul is composed of three distinct faculties, intellect, sensibilities and will. The 
first volume of Mental Philosophy focuses on intellect alone. The second volume (the 
volume that would have traditionally been dedicated to will) was divided between
13
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sensibilities and will. About 65% of that volume was dedicated to the topic of 
sensibilities. The domain of the will was visibly shrinking.
Second, the Arminian impulse, by insisting that the moral “contribution” made by 
the will be entirely uncaused and “original” had two implications for the psychology of 
will in America. First, it implied that increasing the sphere of deterministic explanations 
for conscious experience would require a further shrinking of the volitional “sphere.” 
Secondly, it implied that the will (insofar as the will had been considered by “Arminians” 
to be a morally consequential something) is simply not susceptible to scientific analysis. 
So, if psychology is to be a science, psychology simply cannot study the Arminian will. 
As we shall see, William James (1890) did both of these things with the concept of will. 
He severely restricted the “domain” of free moral choice, and then declared that this 
domain was outside of the purview of psychology. And, so, in some sense, the “loss of 
will in American psychology” took place before the concept was dropped from 
psychology textbooks, and this loss was directly related to the Arminian impulse to 
define will as an uncaused and “original.. .contribution in the world” (11.579).
A More Detailed Examination 
of the Nonsectarian Impulse in American Colleges 
Having briefly summarized the two “impulses” which, I believe, contributed to 
the “loss of will” in American psychology, I would like now to turn back to the first 
thesis: that the “nonsectarian impulse” tended to undermine moral psychology. This 
thesis deserves closer attention because it is an historical and sociological argument that 
contextualizes the moral use of textbooks in American colleges. It is, therefore, more of 
a “top down” thesis, i.e., based upon previous historical and sociological scholarship that
14
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has to do with secularization of education in America. The second thesis (that the loss of 
will can be explained in part by the “Arminian impulse”), by contrast, is more of a 
“bottom up” thesis, i.e., one that seems (to me at least) to emerge from the texts 
themselves.
A Closer Look at American Psychology’s Enduring Moral Project
To begin, the history of the will in American psychology provides a unique 
opportunity to develop Graham Richard’s (1995) thesis that American psychology 
possesses an “enduring moral project.” Richards’ highly suggestive article demonstrates 
specific links between late-nineteenth century Protestant “mental philosophers” Noah 
Porter and James McCosh, and their respective proteges, George Trumbull Ladd and 
James Mark Baldwin, each of whom became leaders in the New Psychology.
Specifically, he shows how certain elements of the moral agendas of Porter and McCosh 
were manifested in the “New” psychologies of their students.^ This dissertation expands 
upon Richards work not only by extending his basic insights, but also by historicizing the 
“Old” psychology, i.e., describing the evolution of psychological thought in America 
prior to Porter and McCosh, situating this thought in its rich religious and institutional 
context.
 ^Nevertheless, Richards' article, like the other scholarship exploring links between "Old" and "New" 
psychologies, does not attempt to historicize Porter or McCosh by taking into account the rich theological 
and philosophical tradition in which they stood. So, for example, while it is undoubtedly true that New 
Psychology textbooks were a "translation into more secular terms o f the same ethical concerns which 
pervade mental and moral philosophy," (Richards, 1995, p. 13), historicizing Porter, McCosh and the 
nineteenth century mental and moral philosophy tradition reveals their work also to have been a 
"translation into more secular terms" o f the dogmatic theological tradition which preceded theirs. Indeed, I 
contend that the "translation" from the theological tradition o f the seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
America, to the nonsectarian (but still broadly Protestant) mental and moral philosophy tradition beginning 
in the late eighteenth century was the decisive change, ultimately leading to the loss o f will in American 
psychology. In other words, the loss of will began well before the advent of the New Psychology.
15
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Further, the concept of ‘the will’ is an ideal starting point for a more detailed 
investigation of American psychology’s moral project. The will had always been a 
particularly crucial part of American psychology’s moral discourse: for three centuries, 
the concept was almost always discussed within a moral or theological context. The 
nineteenth century distinction between mental and moral philosophy is a good example of 
this. Mental or “intellectual” philosophy closely overlapped with epistemologieal issues 
and dealt with topics such as logic, intellect, and reasoning. Moral philosophy, on the 
other hand, focused upon the emotional side of the mind: passions, affections, and, most 
importantly, the will. By implication, will was by nature a “moral” faculty of mind. It 
will become clear that this linkage between will and morality was equally clear in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well. It is not surprising, then, that when the 
New Psychologists entered into discussions of the will they understood that they were 
entering moral territory. When John Dewey (1884), for example, sang the praises of the 
New Psychology, he indicated that because the New Psychology focused on the will it 
was an “intensely ethical science.”
It is important to affirm and acknowledge that there are other possible approaches 
to studying the textbook treatment of the will in college textbooks used in American 
colleges. In this dissertation, I examine key texts as reflecting American historical 
developments. In view of the heavy European borrowings of the authors examined in 
this dissertation an alternative approach would be to look at these texts with a 
Europeanist eye, concentrating on the distinctively European flavor reflected in these 
texts. This approach would have taken me in a very different direction. Instead, I
16
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attempt to tie the story of the loss of will in American psychology to the intellectual, 
religious and institutional history of America.
Richards argues that American psychology’s moral project continues to this day, 
particularly in the sub-disciplines of developmental and social psychology.* Although 
this contention is, I believe, true, one should not conclude that the loss of will was of little 
significance to American psychology. Given the centrality of the will to American moral 
psychology before and during the New Psychology, the loss of will in American 
psychology must have significantly altered this moral project, even if  the developing 
fields of developmental and social psychology did inherit the moral mantle of American 
moral and mental philosophy. Although this is beyond the scope of this dissertation, one 
difference is that both developmental and social psychology seem to lack a concept of 
agency, but rather portray people as shaped by a variety of biological and social 
determinants.
It seems possible that William James and others tried so desperately to preserve 
will because they sensed the possibility and importance of its loss.^ I also attempt to 
assess the significance of the loss of will, the mechanisms leading to this loss, and, 
assuming that American psychology’s moral project is here to stay, what these factors 
might suggest for the recovery of psychology’s moral voice.
To speak of American psychology’s enduring moral project is to raise certain 
questions regarding, at a very specific level, how the moral project of psychology was
Hunter (2000) makes a similar observation, arguing that developmental and educational psychology are 
cmcial (although ultimately ineffective) contributors to the contemporary moral education o f children.
® See Coon (2000) for an analogous argument concerning James's reticence to let go o f the notion o f soul.
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effected. And, on a more abstract and general level, what, precisely, constitutes the 
moral?
American Higher Education, Textbooks, and the Transmission of Moral Culture
American higher education has always sought the moral formation of its students. 
From seventeenth century Harvard’s goal to train the student to “ .. .consider the main 
End of his life and studies, to know God and Jesus Christ...” to Charles Eliot’s late 
nineteenth century “secular” Harvard, which aimed to shape the character of its students 
through the formation of mental faculties, American colleges have taken the moral 
formation of students very seriously (Marsden, 1991, p. 41,188).
On a general level, the college textbook (particularly the theological or 
philosophical text) was a key vehicle for the transmission of morality in American 
colleges, and represents an excellent and convenient record of the evolution of this moral 
discourse. Crucial to the topic at hand, moral discourse in textbooks always touched 
upon psychological considerations. From a moral perspective, the central “faculty of the 
soul” in these college texts was the will. In the seventeenth century, for example, 
William Ames (whose text Marrow of Theologv was used at Harvard), claimed that will 
was at the center of Cod’s redeeming activity: “the will is the proper and prime subject 
of.. .grace” (Ames, 1629/1968, pl59). In the eighteenth century Jonathan Edwards 
(1754/1985) agreed, stating in his Freedom of the Will (used as a text at Yale), “All 
virtue and religion have their seat.. .in the will...” (p. 133). Hutcheson’s Short 
Introduction to Moral Philosophv (1747/1969), a text used widely in American colleges 
during the late-eighteenth centiuy, also agreed that morality was particularly linked to the 
will, while intellect was more properly dealt with in “Logicks and Metaphysicks” (p. 4).
18
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The will continued to receive the attention of the ablest American minds of the late- 
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century (Guelzo, 1989). Late in the nineteenth century, 
at Harvard, “preeminent among the psychological faculties to be cultivated was the 
individual w ill...” (Marsden, 1994, p. 188). Even into the twentieth century, “New 
Psychology” textbooks espousing evolutionary theory and experimental methodology 
continued to address the topic of will, placing the topic at (or near) the end of their 
textbooks, as tbe culminating topic (e.g., James, 1890).
So far, then, we have argued that American colleges had attempted to shape the 
character of their students, had used textbooks to that end, and had in the process relied 
heavily upon the concept of the faculty of the will. This leaves unanswered an abstract 
but important question: what, precisely, constitutes the morality involved in this project?
I hope here to outline a more general answer to this question before explaining how these 
generalities apply to the specificities of the American situation.
Morawski (1992), agreeing with Graham Richards, argued that introductory 
psychology texts have “ .. .served as moral guides, ‘fact’ books, and advice manuals on 
the self and others” (p. 162). Still, her analysis differs from Graham Richards’
(described above) in that it deals more closely with what precisely constitutes the moral 
in psychology textbooks. Drawing upon tools of textual analysis, Morawski finds 
morality in the “.. .complex social arrangements... between psychologist and readers, and 
between readers and everyone else...” (p. 161), particularly in the way textbooks 
construct the “subjectivities” of the readers. I agree that this construction of subjectivity 
is a crucial part of morality.
19
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The emphasis on subjectivities does not, however, go far enough in answering the 
constitutive question concerning morality. Rounding out the pictures provided by 
Richards and Morawski, Hunter (2000) offers further insights into the constitution of 
morality by changing the question. Whereas Morawski’s textual analysis looks at the 
way “authorial voice” aims at constructing the subjectivities of the reader. Hunter’s 
sociological analysis looks at the requirements for the successful formation of character.
In short. Hunter argues that the formation of character always takes place within “moral 
cultures.” These cultures teach a particular (as opposed to vague or general) and sacred 
(although not necessarily religious) content, which clearly articulates a given “morality.” 
Morality is not only “a complex body of prohibitions and warrants through which social 
life is ordered and sustained,” but also includes an “underlying and implicit vision of 
reality” (p. 15). Character, which is the goal of moral instruction, is the “embodiment” of 
these ideals. To put the matter a bit differently, Himter complements Morawski’s 
formulation; character formation, i.e., the inculcation of Morawski’s “subjectivities,” also 
requires objectivities, i.e., specific “visions of reality” which explain these subjectivities.
Hunter is very careful to argue, however, that character is not a matter of 
individualistic attaimnent, but rather requires social embeddedness, or community. 
Because moral cultures are always social arrangements, they provide the crucial 
opportunities for praise or chastisement, which make their particular moral vision 
weighty. We might say, then, that character is always formed within moral cultures, 
which, in turn, always join content and community.
These combined insights provide a useful fi'ame for understanding the nature of 
psychology’s enduring moral project. Although subjectivities are a crucial part of moral
20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
formation, so too are objectivities. Further, these two factors are always embodied in 
some community. When theologians, philosophers and psychologists wrote 
psychological discourse in textbooks (and when college educators used these texts), they 
articulated (to varying extent) morally binding visions of reality (or what I am calling 
“objectivities”) meant to transform not only individual subjectivities, but the 
subjectivities of entire, specific moral cultures. They were, in short, attempting to 
transmit moral culture. As Morawski said of New Psychology textbooks, they “engaged 
in the project of shaping what is humanly possible and desirable” (Morawski, 1992, p. 
168).
Hunter’s approach, by stressing the sociological requirements of character 
formation, provides insights that may help to answer questions that a textual analysis of 
texts alone does not. Morawski admits that “it is difficult to assess the function of 
psychology textbooks” largely because little scholarship has been done on the topic. She 
ponders, “Have they made a difference to the discipline or to people’s lives, and if  so, in 
what ways?” Later again Morawski says, “We know little about.. .how seriously [the 
texts] were taken by instructors or students...” The notion of moral culture helps to 
answer both questions. If we understand the moral goal of college textbooks as 
attempting to transmit moral culture, a full understanding of the impact of texts will take 
content and community into consideration. There must be a consistent social structure 
that reinforces the content within which textbook readers live and move and have their 
being. So, although the precise effect of texts cannot be known, we can investigate the 
extent to which moral discourse of textbooks was part of a larger community of moral
21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discourse. This can augment our sense of the vitality of the various moral cultures that 
will be assessed in this dissertation.
By focusing on college textbooks, however, I am focusing on the “content” of 
moral eulture, and intentionally de-emphasizing the “community” aspect, i.e., the ways in 
which the moral ideals expressed in textbooks were institutionalized and enfleshed within 
a given college community. But again, I do not want to ignore this important aspect of 
moral culture. There are two ways in which I plan to address the issue of moral 
community. First, existing scholarship provides a fairly clear picture of the evolution of 
academic communities in American colleges, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
body of this dissertation. The overall trend, from the close-knit and highly regulated 
model of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the more independent models of the 
nineteenth century (Bledstein, 1976), suggests that the communal aspects of character 
formation tended to change considerably.
The second way in which we can gain insight into the nature of moral community 
is, ironically, by considering what the texts themselves have to say about community.
The pattern here is fairly clear. The seventeenth-century textbook that is analyzed 
(Ames’s Marrow of Theologv) has a great deal to say about it. The late nineteenth- 
century textbook that is analyzed (James’s Principles of Psvchology) has very little to say 
about it at all.
Answer to Pluralism, Challenge to Moral Psvchologv: The Development of a 
Nonsectarian Moral Culture in American Colleges
The fact that communities became less paternalistic as the nineteenth century 
progressed does not mean that college educators had abandoned their moral goals.
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Instead, a nonsectarian impulse developed in the United States in response to the realities 
of pluralism which conceived of moral community in increasingly broad terms. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, most colleges wanted all evangelical 
Protestants to be pari: of the collegiate community. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
colleges were havens for all Protestants. The ever-widening pattern continued. Today, 
colleges desire everyone to be a part of the collegiate moral community, as evidenced by 
the contemporary stress on “diversity.” But this project necessarily was (and continues to 
be) incompatible with the specific and particular moral objects of any one particular 
sectarian community. In any given manifestation of this impulse, a moral object would 
need to be articulated which would be acceptable to the big group. As the group got 
bigger, the moral object got fuzzier. And, as I will argue below, the evolving and 
dissolving moral object, which had historically been an important part of the psychology 
of volition, weakened the psychology of will.
The task of shaping character in American college students has historically been 
complicated by another crucial characteristic of American higher education: its public 
nature. Even seventeenth century Puritan Harvard, although closely linked to the church, 
was actually created by the civil magistrate. Therefore Harvard sought to train leaders 
for both churchly and civil service, and had a board of trustees evenly divided between 
clergy and magistrate (Marsden, p. 39, 40). Given the rather homogeneous goals of 
church and state in seventeenth century Puritan New England, this dual emphasis did not 
create any serious crisis in the moral agenda of the college. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, however, the moral project of American colleges was complicated. 
What moral perspective should be transmitted? A Puritan one? Anglican? Methodist?
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As I will argue below, the solution to this problem, which began to he articulated in the 
eighteenth century, marks the beginning of the loss of will in American psychology.
Pluralism is not a “problem” unique to the twenty-first century. Indeed, since 
colonial times, pluralistic realities have characterized the American experience. 
Nevertheless, at the very earliest stages of colonial development, there were significant 
departures from this pattern. For our purposes, a very significant departure from this 
pluralistic pattern was early- to mid-seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay, and its 
college. Harvard. Harvard was an “isolated and strictly controlled environment,” 
(Marsden, 1994, p. 44) which offered an unabashedly sectarian curriculum. The 
quintessential expression of this sectarianism was the fact that William Ames’s textbook, 
The Marrow of Theologv, still considered an excellent systematic expression of Puritan 
belief (Bremer, 1995, p. 22), was required reading.
As the seventeenth century closed, Puritan dominance in Massachusetts dissipated 
(Bremer, 1995), and denominational diversity grew across the colonies. Some strict 
Calvinists, like Cotton Mather, bemoaned this growing diversity. Believing that Harvard 
College was slipping away fi-om orthodoxy, they supported the establishment of Yale 
College in 1701. Just twenty years later, Yale rector Timothy Cutler made the decision, 
unimaginably horrible to Calvinists, to convert to Anglicanism. Yale responded to the 
threat of theological disagreement by making strict subscription to the Westminster 
Standards requisite for all faculty members (Marsden, 1994, pp. 52-53). About the same 
time, other denominations were establishing their own colleges, and dealing with the 
problem of denominational difference in more irenic ways—often, for example, having 
members of other denominations serving on their boards of trustees (p. 57). In short.
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American higher education could no longer assume the theological and denominational 
homogeneity of its constituents, and had to devise ways of dealing with this diversity.
In the eighteenth century we find the first leanings toward the solution to the 
problem of pluralism that would, by the mid-eighteenth century, dominate American 
higher education. This solution is well-summarized by the 1754 Advertisement for the 
new King’s College (Columbia);
“.. .there is no Intention to impose on the Schollars the peculiar Tenets of any 
particular Sect of Christians; but to inculcate upon their tender Minds the great 
Principles of Christianity and Morality in which true Christians of each 
Denomination are generally agreed” (Snow, 1907, p. 56).
George Marsden (who is my leading source on the history of American colleges and 
universities) highlights this very passage as “the creed that in substance would be 
repeated at almost every such college for the next two centuries” (Marsden, 1994, p. 58). 
So, while the desire to avoid “the peculiar Tenets of any particular Sect of Christians” 
was worlds away from Yale, which (as noted above) was now requiring faculty to 
subscribe to a specific creed, other schools, such as the new colleges in Philadelphia and 
New York would lean toward the nonsectarian approach. In the 1760s, even the 
Presbyterian College of New Jersey would begin to move from the highly sectarian New 
Divinity of Jonathan Edwards’ followers (Kuklick, 2001), and embrace a less sectarian 
approach to moral inculcation through the enlightened ministrations of its new president 
John Witherspoon.
Implementation of this nonsectarian program would require a new kind of 
textbook—one that would not, of course, rely on specific creeds or traditions of biblical
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interpretation, but would rather utilize a method^^ that would allow members of different 
denominations to agree upon the basic parameters of the moral life. Early on, this 
method would be found in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment, an early expression 
of which was found in the widely adopted moral philosophy text of Francis Hutcheson, 
adopted at King’s, Philadelphia, and Rhode Island in the eighteenth century (Snow,
1907). Witherspoon’s Princeton lectures were also based heavily upon Hutcheson’s 
method (Witherspoon, 1982). Hutcheson (1747/1969) argued that a knowledge of the 
self was a crucial starting point for moral inquiry, “We must.. .search accurately into the 
constitution of our nature, to see what sort of creatures we are; for what purposes nature 
has formed us; what character God our Creator requires us to maintain” (p. 2). Instead of 
taking our main cues from scripture, Hutcheson reasoned that because God had created 
human nature, we “must expect to find in our structure and frame some clear evidences, 
shewing the proper business of mankind...” (p. 3, emphasis mine). This movement from 
creed to the philosophical introspection of our own “structure and frame” would be 
widely adopted after the Revolutionary War, and, by 1830, would completely dominate 
textbooks utilized at American colleges (Marsden, 1994, p. 91).
The importance of the move to “nonsectarian” methods of moral reasoning is not 
a new discovery. Indeed, the theme is central in Marsden’s (1994) The Soul of the 
American Universitv. The novel application of this insight in this dissertation is that this 
eighteenth and nineteenth century decision on the part of American educators proved 
decisive for the trajectory of psychological thought in America that ultimately led to the 
loss of will at the hands of the New Psychology. Moral cultm'es seek to shape
This may be considered an early stage of the development o f the "shared method" o f the "psychological 
regime," articulated by Hunter (2000, p. 10).
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
subjectivities through the articulation of certain objectivities, embedded in particular 
communities. The nonsectarian impulse was to widen the moral community. This 
widening of the community necessarily altered the articulation of the moral object, 
which, in turn, altered the corresponding subjectivities. As I will argue below, one of 
these subjectivities was the will.
Puritan Particularitv, Story, and the Sustenance of a Vital Moral Psvchologv of Will
I leave the full explication of the Puritan psychology of will to Part I, in which the 
theologieally-centered psychology of William Ames is discussed in detail. At this point I 
simply hope to demonstrate that seventeenth eentury Harvard was able to sustain a 
coherent psychology of will because of a sectarianism that inculcated a particular 
subjectivity by marrying a particular objectivity to a particular community. These three 
elements of moral culture were glued together by the Puritan story.
Beginning with Puritan objectivities, we turn to the basic contours of the Puritan 
story, particularly with an eye on the ways in which this story sustained interest in the 
will. Using the Westminster Shorter Catechism'* as a guide, the Puritan Story may be 
reduced to three essential elements: Direction, Divinity, and Duty.
The issue of “Direction” is taken up early in the catechism, immediately after 
asserting that the “chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever.” The 
catechism then asks, “What rule hath God given to direct us how we may glorify God 
and enjoy him?” (emphasis mine). The answer, consistent with Reformation theology in 
general, was that the Bible “ .. .is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy 
him.”
" The Westminster Shorter Catechism, a concise 107-question summary o f the Puritan faith, was presented 
to Parliament in 1647, and officially endorsed in New England in 1649 through the "Cambridge Platform" 
(Bremer, 1995).
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Regarding “Divinity” (which was the Puritan word for “theology”) the Puritan 
story, like the Protestant, and even Christian story in general, was a story about God and 
creation, about fall and redemption, and about judgment and glory. The details of the 
story, however, were uniquely Calvinistic. Because of Adam’s fall, the catechism stated, 
human beings had lost the ability, the inclination- the will to “know, obey and submit” to 
God rightly. Yet, God had mercifully elected some to be delivered out of this “estate of 
sin and misery” through a “Redeemer.. ..the Lord Jesus Christ.” A crucial part of this 
redemption was “effectual calling” (which Ames simply refers to as “calling”), whereby 
God renewed the stubborn and faithless wills of the elect through the Holy Ghost’s 
application of the preaching of the gospel to the lost soul. Reflecting the scholastic 
distinction of will and intellect, the catechism stated that “God’s Spirit” works by 
“enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing our wills.” This 
process of effectual calling, which included the rebirth or regeneration of the wicked will, 
was a subject generating endless Puritan theological energy, resulting in seemingly 
innumerable pages of theological prose.
Finally, the Puritan story was about “Duty.” Question 39 asked, “What is the 
duty which God requireth of man?” The answer, “The duty which God requireth of man 
is obedience to his revealed will.” The catechism went on to say that this revealed will 
was “at first revealed to man” in “the moral law.” This moral law was then summarized 
in the Ten Commandments and the “first and greatest commandment,” which was “To 
love the Lord your God with all our heart, with all our soul, with all our strength, and 
with all our mind; and our neighbor as ourselves.” The Puritan story therefore was more 
than doctrine and direction, but also contained an ethical code that shaped notions of right
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behavior, and, more saliently, further dramatized the problem of will. This drama was 
found in the subjectively-appropriated tension between the uncompromising demands of 
the moral law, and the moral weakness of human beings due to the fall. That is, the 
difficulty that the Puritans experienced in obeying the Ten Commandments and in loving 
God and neighbor was, to great extent, the problem of will to the Puritan mind. Even for 
those whom God had effectually called, the Puritans insisted, “sin and misery” still 
impeded their progress as Christian pilgrims. In short, Puritan doctrine and ethics 
energized and sustained the topic of will as a subject of serious inquiry in the seventeenth 
century.
This Puritan story, which constituted a large part of the content of the moral 
culture at Harvard, did not, of course, stand alone for the individual to appropriate on his 
or her own. The catechism insisted that the benefits of redemption were to be 
appropriated in community, i.e., in partaking of the “ordinances” of God, which included 
the public hearing of the word of God and the public partaking of the sacraments.
Further, the inculcation of this story was assured by a highly integrated Puritan society. 
Before arriving at college, children would have typically been catechized (with the same 
theology)'^ at home and at church. This highly regulated environment would have been 
maintained after moving to Harvard. A rigorous schedule of study and worship was 
devised, specifying times and days for particular classes, meals, prayers, and worship.
All seven days of the week were planned in advance (Snow, 1907). All of this was 
performed under the close supervision of the college rector and tutors. Although we 
cannot be certain of the extent to which this schedule was implemented, the fact that such
This is a unique aspect o f seventeenth century Harvard: the moral culture o f this college was, arguably, a 
microcosm o f the broader moral culture. The more difficult task o f  the eighteenth century was to create a 
moral culture amenable to an increasingly diverse group o f Protestants.
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
schedules were devised is a strong picture of the type of moral culture envisioned by the 
college leadership.
The centrality of story in binding together subjectivity, objectivity and 
community, which, in turn, sustained the psychology of will, suggests several questions. 
What would happen to the psychology of will when the story which had traditionally 
sustained that psychology is lost? Is the notion of will transferable to other mythologies? 
If so, which?
Illustration of the Nonsectarian Thesis: Puritan Particularitv, Nonsectarianism, and the 
Fading Ohject of Volition^^
Having gained some conception of the Puritan story, and its correlative 
subjectivities, objectivities, and communal substructure, it is perhaps appropriate to put 
some flesh upon these theoretical bones by illustrating the way in which the 
“objectivities” of moral culture evolved during the period in question by focusing on the 
four texts that are analyzed in this dissertation. To do this will require a bit of 
background on the relation o f subject and object in Western psychology.
Historically, the psychology of will had two basic and fundamental elements. 
First, on a very general level, the psychology of will, like all Western introspective 
psychology, was concerned with the relation between subject and object. One of the 
most striking features of a James, or a Locke, or an Edwards, or an Upham is how often 
they use the word “ohject” in the context of their psychological theorizing. For example, 
performing a word search on James’s Principles, the word “object” appears
The following material (pp. 30-38) was presented in somewhat different form at the 35* annual meeting 
of Cheiron: The Intemational Society for the History o f the Behavioral and Social Sciences, held in 
Durham, NH in June 2003. The title o f the paper was “Naming the Object: The Stmggle for a Nonsectarian 
Moral Psychology in American Colleges, 1754-1890.”
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approximately 900 times. The only words that appear more frequently are those related 
to thought (thought, thoughts, think: well over 1000), those related to feeling (feeling, 
feel, feelings: well over 1000), and the word “mind” (which also appears over 1000 
times).
A fundamental belief of the introspective psychological tradition therefore seems 
to have been that the human mind is ever beholding, conceiving, evaluating, 
remembering, perceiving, thinking about or willing.. .some object. Thomas Upham 
(1869), the leading antebellum American mental philosopher, spoke for the whole 
tradition when he simply stated (repeating Thomas Reid), “every act of the will must 
have an ohject” (Upham, 1869, p. 487).
The second characteristic of the psychology of will as it was manifested in 
American history was that the most salient objects of will were typically moral objects.
It is true that psychologists of will did discuss more mundane volitions (and objects), 
such as walking (e.g., Edwards, 1754), to make theoretical points. Yet the topic of “the 
will” was seen as a psychological foundation for human responsibility, and was sustained 
by shared cultural standards of right and wrong. Psychologists of volition therefore 
regularly drew upon culturally accepted moral objects of volition in constructing their 
models of the mind.
The fact that, historically speaking, the psychology of will seemed to require 
shared commitments to certain moral objects suggests another question. What would 
happen to the psychology of will when would-be psychologists (and the communities 
they represent) have difficulty specifying or agreeing upon particular moral objects? If it 
is not clear what we ought to will, does it make sense to speak of “will” at all? I will
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argue that it did indeed become more difficult to “name” moral objects in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century American academy, and the psychology of volition suffered as a 
consequence.
College Texts as Methodological Means to Nonsectarian Ends. To illustrate these 
assertions, I will briefly refer to the four textbooks which constitute the subject matter of 
this dissertation. Each of these texts was arguably the leading “psychology” text of its 
era. For background, I will begin with William Ames’s (1629/1968) Marrow of 
Theology, a heavily sectarian textbook used in sectarian colleges (seventeenth century 
Harvard and eighteenth century Yale) which clearly “named the object” of volition. The 
seeds of the difficulty in naming the object are seen in Jonathan Edwards’ (1754) still- 
sectarian but also “Enlightened” Freedom of the Will. The difficulties are magnified in 
Thomas Upham’s (1869) best-selling antebellum textbook Mental Philosophv, and, most 
clearly, in James’s (1890) Principles of Psychology. My goal here is to offer examples of 
the evolving (and dissolving) object of volition.
The Efficient Object of William Ames’s Marrow of Theologv. For the purposes 
of background, I would like to begin this exploration of “naming the object” with what 
Marsden has called ‘‘the textbook on theology at seventeenth-century Harvard” the 
Marrow of Theologv by William Ames. Briefly, Ames’s text was devoted to particular, 
sectarian theological concerns, and also clearly named the object of volition.
Ames (1968) defined theology as “the doctrine or teaching of living to God” 
(I.i.l), and argued that this “living to God” can be further divided into two parts, faith and 
observance. Faith, which Ames understood as an act of will, must, he argued, have an 
object. And, not surprisingly, Ames argued that God is the object of faith. Ames spends
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considerable time not only naming this object, but describing it in detail. For all of God’s 
“objective” attributes, Ames saw a correspondingly appropriate “subjectivity”. For 
example, Ames spent a great deal of time considering God’s “efficiency,” or his 
unencumbered and unhindered power to achieve whatever he desires. God is 
“omnipotence in action.” In view of this intimidating and awesome object, a 
consideration of God’s efficiency made Ames (1968) conclude that God is “the proper 
and adequate object of faith” (I.vii.54).
In sum, then, William Ames’s text, used in the context of a particular sectarian 
moral community, clearly named the moral object of volition. The will, although not a 
term of precise psychological signification, was the subjectivity corresponding to the 
awesome objectivity of the efficient Puritan God.
A Sectarian Object in Jonathan Edwards’ Nonsectarian Freedom of the Will. 
Jonathan Edwards, who wrote the leading American book on the topic of the will in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century, had studied William Ames at college (his copy of the 
Marrow is available for perusal at Yale). He was an ardent defender of a variation of 
Ames’s Puritan theology and wrote his book as a refutation of a theological position that 
Ames despised, Arminianism. In 1754, he published his Freedom of the Will, which 
was subsequently used as a textbook at Calvinist colleges such as Yale and Dartmouth, 
and influenced nearly all American works on the topic of the will for the next 100 years.
While Ames’s Marrow of Theologv was a positive statement of Puritan theology, 
Edwards’ text was more negative.. .a refutation of a particular theological error. But 
there was another, even more relevant difference between Ames’s and Edwards’ books. 
The style of Edwards’ text was decidedly more secular (Guelzo, 1989). Whereas Ames’s
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Marrow is peppered with Scriptural proof texts, Edwards, in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment, took a strongly philosophical and rational approach to debunking 
Arminian psychology. As traditional treatises on the will had been exegetical, this was, 
arguably, a significant step in the secularization process. Relatedly, while Ames’s text 
was “preaching to the choir,” i.e., it was used primarily by Puritans for the training of 
Puritan clergy and professionals, Edwards’ text was directed to a broader audience. 
Edwards’ argument therefore intimated that the truth about the will was primarily a 
matter of reason and common sense rather than a precious truth to be preserved by a 
particular community of believers.
There can be no doubt, however, that Edwards used these “secular” means to 
sectarian ends. Edwards openly admitted to being a Calvinist, and, when he named the 
sectarian moral object, he made recourse to Scripture rather than reason in doing so. 
Edwards argued that human beings should possess a “sincere willingness to love Christ 
and choose him as his chief good,” and that “these holy dispositions and exercises...” 
should be “the direct object of the will” (pp. 313-314).
In sum, Edwards’ text was a transitional text built on the premise that a 
nonsectarian method could be used to achieve sectarian ends. When it came to “naming 
the object,” however, Edwards still fell back on traditionally sectarian methods. Elis 
nonsectarian and enlightened method was insufficient to his sectarian ends.
The Diffused Object in Thomas Upham’s Mental Philosophv. Thomas Upham’s 
theological training was in the shadow of Jonathan Edwards. Edwardsean theology 
strongly influenced the founding of Andover Theological Seminary, where Upham 
attended 1818-1821 (Salter, p. 4), some sixty years after Edwards’ death. Five years after
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graduating, Upham published the first edition of what would become his best selling 
textbook Mental Philosophv, which, according to Salter (1986), . .went through an
astounding fifty-seven editions” between 1826 to 1899 (p. 12).
Upham’s goals, reflective of the Scottish Enlightenment, were broader than those 
of Ames’s and Edwards’. Elis goal was to provide a complete view of the human mind, 
based not upon sectarian dogma but upon the Baconian method of induction. 
Nevertheless, reflecting his theological heritage, Upham (1869) argued that God was the 
greatest moral object. Among the variety of intellectual and moral objects is the most 
“pleasing and even enrapturing” object that one can contemplate, “the Supreme Being” 
(11.74). Two points are relevant here.
First, Upham tried to show that humans are so designed (for God-centeredness) 
by making an argument from analogy. Upham argued that God had designed the mind 
with an inclination to love family, country, and humanity, among other things. If it is the 
case that we have love implanted toward these comparably lower entities, Upham 
thought, then surely we must also love the infinitely great being. The fact that Upham 
presupposes quite a bit in this argument is, I think, evident. Not surprisingly, Upham, 
like Edwards, also quoted the Bible to back up his claim that love of God is naturally 
implanted in the human heart. Once again, when it came to naming the moral object of 
volition, the neutral methods of the Enlightenment came up short, and Upham was forced 
to draw upon considerations derived from other sources.
Second, reflecting the nonsectarian nature of the mental philosophy textbook, it is 
not surprising that the God of Upham’s mental philosophy was generally a less specific, 
less sectarian God. As mentioned above, Upham (1869) speaks of God in Mental
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Philosophy most often as a wise designer of the human mind... and much less 
emphatically about the specific attributes of the divine nature. Upham’s God was also 
more palatable to a broader audience because he assured his readers that God would 
never violate their free wills (11.248).
In sum, then, Upham named a more palatable, more diffused, less sectarian moral 
object of will, but still needed to go beyond his Baconian method to do so.
The Disappearing Object in William James’s Principles of Psvchologv. William 
James, like Thomas Upham, can be considered not only an American psychologist, but 
also an American religious figure. As Louis Menand (2001) has recently stated, James 
“worked most of his life to defend simultaneously held worldviews—^modern science and 
religious faith” (p. 75). Menand is not, of course, alone in this opinion. As such James 
deserves to be considered (and has been considered) in the context of American religious 
and institutional history.
Living in an age in which traditional Protestantism was crumbling among elites, 
one of the ways that James tried, perhaps unwittingly, to maintain vestiges of the old 
religious order was by placing a strong emphasis on the will in his Principles of 
Psvchologv.
We can approach the way James (1890) “named the object” by examining his 
distinction between a healthy and obstructed will. In the healthy will, “the vision should 
be right and.. .action should obey its lead” (11.546). In an “obstructed will,” the person 
sees the good, but does otherwise. He thought that an “inward hollowness” follows 
“habitually seeing the better only to do the worse” (11.547).
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Yet James was not as clear about what “the better” was, as compared to Upham or 
Edwards, for example. James frequently made a distinction between lower, bodily 
motives and ideal motives, clearly preferring the latter to the former. He thought that 
“objects of passion, appetite, or emotion—objects of instinctive reaction...” possessed 
the greatest power to move the will, while the ideal objects possessed relatively little 
power to move the will, particularly because these objects are “foreign to the instinctive 
history of the race” (11.536). Given this biological and evolutionary conundrum, James 
argued that ''the essential achievement o f the will... ” was to “...ATTEND to a difficult 
OBJECT and hold it fast before the mind" (11.561). By doing so, a human being could 
ensure that the morally right thing was done. Yet James avoided getting too specific 
about what the morally right thing to do was.
Although James hesitated to name the moral object of volition, he certainly did 
believe in the importance of these objects. In his chapter on the perception of reality 
(which deals with the topic of belief), James quoted at length from an article he had 
originally published in The Princeton Review in July o f 1882. In the article James argued 
that human beings possess certain subjectivities that require commensurate objectivities. 
A philosophy of life worthy of adoption is one which provides an “Object.. .to press 
against” (11.312-313), i.e., an object that corresponds to our subjective experiences.
For James, successful theoretical systems make predications of the universe 
which comport with the “powers” and sentiments which all humans possess. Primitive 
Christianity was successful because it was an “ .. .announcement that God recognizes 
those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely overlooked...” (II.314).
So too the Renaissance affirmed our aesthetic sensibilities, the Reformation our
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experiences of “faith and self-despair,” etc. James thought that no existing system could 
fully explain all of our “powers” or sensibilities. Nevertheless, in order to explain the 
variety of human subjectivity, James took a stab at naming an object sufficient to the 
task. “The perfect object o f belief, ” James argued, "... would be a God or ‘Soul o f the 
World, ’ represented both optimistically and moralistically (if such a combination could 
be), and withal so definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal experiences 
should be sent to us by Him in just the very way in which they come’’ (11.317). James did 
not think that this perfect object of belief had yet been articulated, but he was certain that 
he would embrace it if it ever were.
Although James’s subjectivities reflected the post-Protestant culture in which he 
lived, James presumed in this argument that these subjectivities were universal. Still, his 
utilization of the nonsectarian introspective methodology which he inherited was, I think, 
more honest than that of his American forebears. Unlike Edwards and Upham, James did 
not presume that he could name a universally acceptable moral object based upon his 
reasoning or his conscious experience alone. He did not try to smuggle in some form of 
the Christian God through reason or experience. Yet James did do some smuggling of his 
own by assuming that his subjectivities were universal.
Unaware perhaps that he was smuggling a culturally-derived subjectivity into his 
psychology, James did not explicitly reflect on the newness of his experiment: could such 
a subjectivity be preserved without its historically corresponding objectivity? Possessed 
of a subjectivity heavily indebted to a Protestant past, yet dispossessed of an adequate 
object of faith to sustain and explain that subjectivity, William James and the New 
Psychology bet that they could retain the one without the other. Yet, as I mentioned
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earlier, this subjectivity, i.e., the will, precious to James and others, was largely lost to 
mainstream psychology in the 1930s, just as the objectivity, precious to Edwards and 
Upham, was lost to the New Psychology in the 1890s.
Terms and Definitions 
In order to understand what follows, a few simple definitions of terminology are 
in order (see Fiering, 1981; and Guelzo, 1989, for further information). Sometimes 1 use 
the terms “voluntarist” or “voluntarism,” which are opposed to the terms “intellectualisf ’ 
or “intellectualism.” These terms were used heavily by scholastic philosophers of the 
will (Fiering, 1981), although the terms continued to be used by “Great Psychologists” 
such as Wilhelm Wundt (Danziger, 2001). These terms represent alternative positions on 
the determination of the will. The basic intellectualist position is that the intellect is the 
decisive element in volition, and the will slavishly follows its dictates. The basic 
voluntarist position is that the will is not a slave to the intellect, but rather sometimes 
actually moves in a direction opposite to the intellect: “1 know 1 ought to, but...” These 
are, 1 repeat, basic positions. The best policy is always to consider thinkers individually, 
because sometimes voluntarists may initially appear as intellectualists, or vice versa. Or, 
perhaps, sometimes thinkers may actually have a little of both in them (like William 
James). 1 should note in passing that either position may be used in a deterministic 
system, but that advocates of libertarian fi*ee will tend, 1 believe, to prefer intellectualism. 
This is because we seem to have a degree of control over our thoughts, while we do not 
seem to have direct control over our passions or inclinations. One other point is in order 
as well. The intellectualist/voluntarist distinction was used heavily when the soul was
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understood to have two faculties. It becomes trickier to apply the terms when dealing 
with tripartite divisions of the soul, such as is the case with Thomas Upham.
The other terms that I frequently use are “com patib ilisf“incom patibilisfand 
“libertarian.” These terms are commonplace in contemporary discussion of free will 
(McFee, 2000; Williams, 1980). The issue here has to do with one’s viewpoints on the 
relation between freedom and determinism. By “determinism” I mean the idea that all 
events, including psychological events, have a cause. Incompatibilists get their name 
because they think of freedom and determinism as necessarily antithetical terms, that is, 
freedom means freedom from  the forces of determinism. Technically speaking, there are 
two kinds of incompatibilists, as defined here. One kind is the “hard determinist” who 
argues that all things have a cause and therefore free will is impossible. I do not 
frequently use this term in the dissertation because none of my authors were hard 
determinists. The other kind of incompatibilist is the “libertarian” who argues that all 
things are not determined, i.e., that there is some “wiggle room” (a la James) in the 
universe that allows for choices that are not simply part of the chain of cause and effect. 
Because determinism can be transcended, the incompatibilist argues, freedom is a 
possibility. Finally, the “compatibilisf’ argues that that freedom and determinism are not 
in tension with each other. A free act is an act done according to one’s own will or 
desire, even though this will or desire is subject to determinism. If one does what one 
wants to do then one has acted freely. Sometimes the term “soft determinist” is applied 
to the compatibilist position, but I rarely use this term since I find it potentially 
misleading.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Finally, two theological terms need to be defined, Augustinianism and 
Pelagianism (I attempt to define other theological terms as I go along). Within 
Christendom there have historically been (at least) two basic answers to the question of 
how a human being may act morally; the Augustinian approach, and the Pelagian 
approach. Perry Miller (1939) argued that the Augustinian impulse, which receives its 
name from the late and early 5* century theologian Augustine, characterized the 
Puritans but was not limited to Puritans. It was in Puritan times conveyed in theological 
language, but. Miller argued, the “temperament” or “mood” was primary. This mood 
sensed the depravity of the human condition, the hardness and struggle of human life, and 
disdained any attempt to ignore or minimize the sin and misery of the human condition. 
Miller stressed God, sin, and regeneration as the main currents of Augustinianism.
The Pelagian impulse, named for the theological rival of Augustine, was much 
more sanguine about human abilities. Augustine biographer Peter Brown (2000) notes 
that Pelagius was a moralist who de-emphasized the depravity of human desires and 
impulses. Unlike Augustine who paid close attention to the subtleties and hypocrisies of 
human motivation, Pelagius saw obedience to God’s commands as an external, merely 
behavioral affair. Pelagian morality, ignoring the subtleties o f human motivation, 
therefore saw moral activity as non-problematically attainable. Corresponding to the 
Augustinian emphases on God, sin and regeneration, the pillars of Pelagianism might be 
Man, ability, and self-determination. When this Pelagian impulse is fully affirmed, the 
Puritan paradox (i.e., humans have and do not have ability to act morally) can be 
considered lost.
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As we shall see, particularly in the context of Thomas Upham’s text, Mental 
Philosophy, Enlightenment philosophy, which placed strong emphasis on human ability, 
leaned in a “Pelagian” direction. In a post-Calvinistic context such as early nineteenth- 
century America, however, the Enlightenment, and the Pelagianism that it implied, could 
never be embraced in this regard without reservation or inconsistency. Upham wavers 
uncomfortably between the Calvinistic language of dependence and the Enlightenment 
language of human ability. The advent of the New Psychology was momentous in that it 
finally rejected the assumption that God (or some other less well-defined spiritual force) 
could be expected to intervene mysteriously in human action. Yet, the assumption that 
humans ought to behave morally was not yet discarded. Correspondingly the New 
Psychology of James can be found wavering between a simple Pelagian faith in human 
ability, and the desperate and anxious sense that human behavior is fatally determined by 
an impersonal and mechanistic universe.
A potentially confusing aspect of the following dissertation is the way in which I 
seem to indiscriminately move between the terms Arminian and Pelagian. Theologically, 
this is an improper thing to do. Arminianism, properly speaking, held (and holds) that 
God’s grace is needed in order to believe and to behave morally, but that it is the human’s 
decision whether or not to cooperate with this “prevenient” grace. Pelagianism was a 
more radical position which denied that this grace was needed. Humans possess the 
ability to do good. Although my usage of the terms is not always precise, I do attempt 
to retain these shades of meaning. For example, when Upham speaks of human ability 
without mentioning the grace of God, I will often use the term Pelagian to describe that
Although Brown (2000) typically portrays Pelagius in these terms, he does interestingly note that 
Pelagius thought that this was the case for baptized individuals. Therefore, one could argue that even 
Pelagius thought that grace o f  some sort was needed, but only at the very beginning o f life.
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kind of assertion. Further, keep in mind that my use of the term “Arminian” is quite 
broad, as I have mentioned above. I usually use the term to describe the “Arminian 
impulse,” or the desire to find some “strictly underived and original [moral] contribution” 
within ourselves (James, 1890, p. 579).
On The Selection of Texts for This Dissertation 
This dissertation must be considered a preliminary investigation of an extremely 
complex topic. Early on in this research, I spent some time trying to ascertain precisely 
what college texts were used in American colleges before the twentieth century, and 
which of these are actually relevant to the loss of will. My leading source for this 
analysis was Louis Franklin Snow’s (1907) The College Curriculum in the United States, 
valuable not so much for its analysis of the evolution of the American college curriculum 
but rather for its transcriptions of important seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth- 
century documents cataloguing textbook usage in American colleges.
For the sake of convenience and simplicity, I have, in this dissertation, divided the 
history of textbook treatment of the will into four periods, with one textbook chosen to 
represent each of the four eras. A complete analysis of this topic, however, would require 
a more nuanced periodization, and, obviously, a consideration of more texts. What 
follows is an initial sketch of a more adequate periodization, a very brief consideration of 
potential texts that could be analyzed, and a rationale for those texts I have selected.
Period I: The Heyday of Dosma: 1636-1714. It is my initial impression that 
dogma “reigned” at American colleges until the eighteenth century, when a Protestant 
form of “Enlightenment” thinking became dominant. The leading theology textbook 
during this time period, as mentioned several times above, was William Ames’s Marrow
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of Theology. This text therefore suggests itself as the best representative of this time 
period. Another text worth analyzing would be the lesser-known theology text of 
Johannes Wollebius (1626/1965) Compendium Theologiae Christianae. This text was 
used at American colleges for approximately the same duration, even outlasting Ames at 
Harvard. Additionally, college students were also exposed to the Westminster Shorter 
Catechism, which I have utilized above to provide a quick summary of Puritan belief and 
its relation to will.
Although theology was central at Harvard and, after 1701, at Yale, other kinds of 
textbooks dealing with the will were used. Norman Fiering (1981) analyzed several Latin 
ethics texts. Unfortunately, the translations that Fiering used are not available (personal 
correspondence), but Fiering’s treatment does deal with issues related to will. Also, 
Henry More’s (1690/1930) ethics text, the Enchiridion Ethieum was translated in the late 
seventeenth century. Fiering sees this text as transitional, so it too should be considered 
in the future. I feel comfortable skipping these early moral philosophy texts at this point, 
however, because they do seem to have been critically appropriated, always subordinated 
to Puritan theology. The new moral philosophy of the Enlightenment, however, was 
designed to effectively replace theology (Marsden, 1994).
Fiering (1981) also mentions that Physics texts contained treatment of the will. 
With this in mind I hope, in the future, to take a close look at Charles Morton’s 
(1687/1940) Compendium Phvsicae, (an English text used by Harvard students between 
1687-1728), and other available works. Also, two Logie texts used during this time have 
recently been republished: Morton’s A Logick Svstem, and William Brattle’s 
Compendium of Logiek, along with an analysis of the use of these works (Kennedy,
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1995). This is quite exciting given that no one has yet attempted to explain the 
“Aristotelian and Cartesian Logic at Harvard,” and its connection to contemporary issues 
in the study of Logic in Europe. Both of these logic texts seem to deal at least 
superficially with the topic of will, and so seem worthy of brief mention.
Selecting a date for the close of this first period is of course a bit arbitrary, but I 
have chosen the fairly standard 1714, the year that Jeremiah Dummer donated a large 
collection of “New Learning” textbooks and the year when the Enlightenment is said to 
have arrived in New England (Evans, 1984).
Period II: Enlightenment. Orthodoxv. and the Creation of Nonsectarian Moral 
Cultures: 1714-1777. The arrival of crates of books, of course, does not constitute the 
actual arrival of Enlightenment thinking in America. The books first needed to be read, 
and the weight of the new ideas fe lt by a new generation of American thinkers. Two 
famous Yale students did just that, Jonathan Edwards, a Calvinist, and Samuel Johnson, 
for whom the new learning occasioned his conversion to Anglicanism and Arminianism. 
Both would become ministers, and both would write works dealing with the topic of the 
will. The second text I have chosen for this dissertation is Jonathan Edwards’ (1754) 
Freedom of the Will, which was to become the crucial text in the unfolding American 
drama. His text was read by students at Yale between 1761-1777 (Snow, 1907), and its 
publication spawned a century of debate within Calvinistic circles (Guelzo, 1989). 
Further, Edwards’ text continued to shape important American works in mental and 
moral philosophy well into the nineteenth century. Freedom of the Will was also an 
expression of Calvinist resistance not only to Arminianism, but also to the optimistic
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assumptions of the Enlightenment, two “movements” which would gain a great deal of 
steam in America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Johnson’s (1752) much more humble accomplishment, the Elementa 
Philosophica, was read by only a handful of college students at King’s College in the 
1750s and 60s (Humphrey, 1976). Yet it also represents a committed Christian’s attempt 
to appropriate Enlightenment thinking to the service of a somewhat different version of 
the Christian story. It would be interesting to examine the ways in which variations of 
the Christian story may have resulted in differences in the ways the Enlightenment was 
appropriated. Nevertheless, because this is a relatively minor text, I have put off 
examining it at this point.
Two other nonsectarian texts are very worthy of future consideration. When 
Johnson stepped down from the presidency of King’s college, Francis Hutcheson’s 
(1747) A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophv^^  began to be used. The text was also 
utilized at Philadelphia (Perm) and Rhode Island (Brown). So, although not an 
indigenous product, Hutchison’s work was arguably the first serious introduction of 
Enlightenment moral philosophy into American colleges and therefore was a harbinger of 
things to come. The lectures in moral philosophy of Princeton president John 
Witherspoon (1982), which he “composed shortly after his arrival in America in 1768”
(p. 2), are also very worthy of consideration, as Witherspoon is often credited with 
bringing the Scottish Enlightenment (particularly Hutcheson) to America. I have made 
the difficult decision of excluding these texts because my third text, Thomas Upham’s
The records I have examined do not specify which o f Hutcheson's two moral philosophy texts was used. 
The other possibility is his two-volume A Svstem o f Moral Philosophv (1755). I suspect that Hutcheson's 
Short Introduction was used, not only because o f its length, but because William Smith's description o f the 
mythical college o f Miriania, which recommends Smith's Ethics, was published in 1753, two years before 
the longer ethics was published.
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Mental Philosophv can be understood as an American appropriation of these Scottish 
ideas. Still, a fully adequate account of the loss of will in American colleges should take 
at least one of these texts into account, probably Hutcheson.
Other relevant and varied texts used during this time period include Puffendorf s 
(1735) The Whole Dutv of Man According to the Law of Nature, Wollaston’s 
(1724/1974) The Religion of Nature Delineated, Fordyce’s (1754/1990) The Elements of 
Moral Philosophv, Clap’s (1765) An Essav on the Nature and Foundation of Moral 
Virtue and Obligation: Being a Short Introduction to the Studv of Ethics: For the Use of 
The Students at Yale-College, and, of course, John Locke’s (1690) An Essav Concerning 
Human Understanding. Finally, natural philosophy texts began to be used heavily during 
this time period, titles including Maclaurin’s (1748/1968) An Account of Sir Isaac 
Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries, Martin’s (1738) The Philosophical Grammar: Being 
a View of the Present State of Experimented Phvsiologv, or Natural Philosophv in Four 
Parts, and Helsham’s (1767) A Course of Lectures in Natural Philosophv. These texts 
appear to be devoid of interest in the will, which is significant by way of contrast to 
seventeenth century physics texts which did consider the will. Perhaps “the Arminian 
impulse” described above (which tended to see will as something that transcended nature) 
contributed to the exclusion of will from the new physics.
Although the overall trend in the eighteenth century was toward nonsectarianism, 
other, more theological texts continued to be used at colleges. Edwards’ student Joseph 
Bellamy’s (1750) text True Religion Delineated was used at Princeton until the early 70s, 
while Ames and Wollebius continued to serve Yale and Harvard. The period comes to an
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end when Ames is finally removed from Yale’s curriculum around the time of the 
American Revolution, in 1777 with the arrival of President Ezra Stiles.
Period III: The Revolutionarv Era: 1777-1800. Also worthy of future 
consideration is the intellectual change taking place during the Revolutionary War. We 
can consider the end of William Ames’s run as “the” theology textbook at Yale as the 
starting point of this period. Both events were significant for the history of the will in 
American universities. In the previous period, despite the move to form a nonseetarian 
moral culture, theology and Enlightenment appeared to be fairly equal concerns at 
American colleges. During this period theology continued to be taught at Yale through 
the Catechism, and at Harvard through Doddridge’s (1763) A Course of Lectures on the 
Principle Subjects in Pneumatology, Ethics and Divinity. However, these sources for the 
teaching of theology were, in the case of the catechism, less well developed, and in the 
case of Doddridge, seemingly more scholarly and less dogmatic. Further, theology was 
no longer taught on Saturdays (as the tradition had been for over a century), being 
replaced by discussion of “chronology and history” (Snow, 1907).
This apparent decrease of interest in theological issues at Yale and Harvard was 
accompanied by an expected but dramatic increase in interest in politically oriented texts. 
Montesquieu’s (I748/I989) The Spirit of the Laws. Vattel’s (I758/I883) The Law of 
Nations, or. Principles of the Law of Nature. Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, and Burlamaqui’s (1783) The Principles of Natural and Politic 
Law began to be used at American colleges. Most dramatically at Yale, Montesquieu 
appears the same year Ames disappears. It seems that these political texts did not lay 
great stress upon the individual will, but I need to explore this in greater depth.
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Regardless, there does appear to be a kind of movement toward political concern during 
the era of the Revolutionary War, and a small but potentially revolutionary change in the 
way theological issues were approached. This is consistent with May’s (1976) assertion 
that “in the last quarter of the eighteenth century many Europeans and Americans turned 
their attention from religious and philosophical argument to political revolution” (p. 88). 
My somewhat arbitrary endpoint of this period is the publication of Witherspoon’s 
lectures for the general public in 1800 (Witherspoon, 1982, p. 52).
Period IV: Between the Wars: The Great Scottish Awakening: 1800-1865. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Americans were emerging from a prolonged period 
of cultural flux (Noll, 1987). As reflected in the college curriculum, the nation was 
emerging from a period that was comparatively less concerned with theological issues, 
and more concerned with political. The religious, political, and philosophical future of 
the country was imcertain. Yet, the revivals beginning to sweep the nation at the end of 
the eighteenth century revitalized American Christianity in the nineteenth, in an Arminian 
direction. Collegiate philosophy also experienced a well-known injection of life through 
the conservative Scottish wing of the Enlightenment, the so-called Scottish Common 
Sense Realism of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. Reid’s (1785/1969) Essav on the 
Intellectual Powers of Man and (1788/1969) Essav on the Active Powers of Man began to 
serve as the basis of college lectures, and Stewart’s texts Elements of the Philosophv of 
the Human Mind, and The Philosophv of the Active and Moral Powers of Man were even 
more popular. The Scottish epistemology provided assurance that the natural and moral 
worlds could be known through the faculties of soul. This approach, by basing moral 
assertions on purportedly universal dictates of consciousness, provided the kind of
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irenicism that an increasingly diverse, yet still predominantly Protestant nation needed. 
The topic of the will was addressed in the texts discussing the “active powers” of man.
In addition to these Scottish texts, American clergy/college educators began to 
write their own versions of intellectual and moral philosophy textbooks. Begiiming 
slowly at first, with the publication of Thomas Upham’s (1826) Elements of Intellectual 
Philosophv. the number of American texts proliferated. One such textbook. The 
Elements of Moral Science by Brown’s president Francis Wayland (1837/1963) sold 
137,000 copies in thirty years (Persons, 1983, p. 204). Although several American texts 
could be analyzed, such as Upham (1834), Day (1838), Tappan (1840), Rauch (1840), 
Schmucker (1842), Bledsoe (1845), Mahan (1846), Winslow (1850), Alexander (1852), 
Wayland (1854), Hickok (1855), Bowen (1855), Haven (1857), Upham (1861), Hazard 
(1864), Whedon (1864), and Rush (1965), 1 have focused on the last version of Thomas 
Upham’s oft-edited and widely adopted text Mental Philosophv. Since there may have 
been no more widely adopted textbook between 1830 and 1860 (Salter, 1986), and since 
Upham himself represents the nation’s movement from Calvinism to Arminianism 
(having had the traditionally un-Calvinistic experience of “entire sanctification” under 
Methodist perfectionist Phoebe Palmer sometime near 1839; Noll, 2002).
It might also be interesting to briefly address The Federalist, which was taught at 
American colleges during the early part of this era. For this, Daniel Walker Howe’s 
(1997) chapter title on the “political psychology of the Federalist,” would be helpful.
Another important appropriation o f Scottish thought by an American clergyman is Asa Burton's (1824) 
Essays on Some o f the First Principles o f Metaphvsicks. Theology, and Theology. Technically speaking, 
howeyer, this was not a college textbook. Burton's work is important to consider as background to Upham 
(Fay, 1939; Kosits, 2002c).
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Period V : The Post-Civil War Era and the Deconstruction of American Mental 
Philosophv: 1865-1890. As the nation rebuilt following the Civil War, the indigenous 
mental and moral philosophy tradition began to be dismantled. Although the traditional 
mental and moral philosophy course continued to dominate American curricula, a small 
group of radical young thinkers was beginning to challenge the adequacy of the 
traditional approach. These thinkers, such as Hall (1874) and Dewey (1884), were 
beginning to sound the praises of European advances in physiology and were challenging 
American thinkers to embrace this “New Psychology.” The cutting-edge department of 
philosophy at Harvard actually began teaching the radical new science, while 
simultaneously retaining its old-time mental philosopher named Francis Bowen 
(Wetmore, 1991). Surely these were troubling times for the Old Psychology.
Although textbooks based upon the old model continued to be written (Bascom, 
1869; Champlin, 1870; Munsell, 1871; Hopkins, 1862, 1873), some old-schoolers, as 
Karen Wetmore (1991) has shown, attempted to build bridges. The best example of this 
approach was Princeton’s James McCosh (e.g., 1881). His textbooks were a curious 
blending of physiology, evolutionary thinking, Scottish Common Sense Realism, and 
biblical Christianity.
Nevertheless, proponents of the New Psychology began to publish their own 
texts. Dewey published his in 1886, Ladd in 1887, and McCosh’s student Baldwin 
published his text in 1889. They were setting the stage for the publication of the work 
that would seal the victory of the New Psychology, and seal the final demise of the Old.
Period VI: The Intenselv Ethical Science: 1890-1930. The work to which I am 
referring, of course, is William James’s (1890) The Principles of Psychology, which is
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the final work analyzed in this dissertation. James’s work covered much of the same 
psychological territory as the older mental philosophy textbooks, but approached the 
topic with a deep respect for European experimentalism and physiology. The fact that 
James addressed traditional moral concerns should not surprise us. Advocates of the 
New Psyehology went to great pains to demonstrate that their new science did not 
challenge traditional moral beliefs (Pickren, 2000). More to the point, John Dewey 
(1884) had assured his Andover Review readers that the New Psychology would be an 
“intensely ethical science” because it laid great stress upon the will. Dewey was certainly 
right. New Psychology textbooks (e.g., Royce, 1903; Angell, 1904; Pillsbury, 1911; 
Calkins, 1914; Woodworth, 1921, and Carr, 1925) indeed continued to discuss the topic 
of the will, locating the topic at or near the end of their textbooks, the culminating 
psychological topic, as the indigenous mental philosophers had before them. These 
chapters continued to manifest a deep concern for moral issues (Kosits, 2002a).
Although I have ended this dissertation with William James’s text, it seems clear that a 
more complete picture will include a careful consideration of these other texts as well.
Period VII: Loss. The topic of will was gradually dropped from introductory 
psychology texts in the 1920s and 30s. For this reason it would make sense in the future 
to examine the textbooks of the 1920s and 30s that did not include chapters on the will, 
examining the ways in which they differed from those that did.
Explanation of the “Jeremiadic” Structure of the Dissertation
To summarize the preceding section, I have selected four textbooks from among 
the many that could potentially be considered. These four texts, I believe, sufficiently 
(but certainly not exhaustively) capture the basic steps in the evolution of American
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discourse on the topic of will. Nevertheless, I have skipped long periods of time in the 
process, and have assumed a degree of homogeneity within periods. Therefore, my 
conclusions are at this point tentative.
I have chosen to structure this dissertation after the format of the Puritan jeremiad. 
The jeremiad was a kind of sermon that was preached in late seventeenth century New 
England in response to a perceived apostasy on the part of colonists. Since the Puritans 
believed that their colony had a covenant with God (i.e., God would bless them for their 
obedience, and chastise or, ultimately, reject them for their disobedience), Puritan 
ministers such as Harvard president Increase Mather (1685) would preach sermons 
encouraging the people to return to the old paths and warning them of the judgments that 
would follow if they did not repent. Since the Biblical text used in many of these 
sermons was from Jeremiah, these sermons are now called “jeremiads” (Bercovitch,
1978; Bremer, 1995; Elliot, 1994).
The jeremiad, like all Puritan sermons, had three basic parts. After opening with 
a quote from the Bible, an “Explication” or summary of that text was first given. The 
next section was “Doctrine” which was a relatively brief statement of the lesson or 
lessons to be learned from the text. These lessons were often warnings. The doctrine 
was frequently subdivided into “propositions” or “reasons.” The third and final section 
was the “Application,” which attempted to articulate how the doctrine was to be fleshed 
out and put to use in the contemporary situation.
In brief, then, the first three chapters which portray William Ames’s views on will 
as expressed in his Marrow of Theologv constitute Part I or the “Explication.” Ames’s 
intent was to provide a concise summary of Biblical teaching. The “text,” then, of this
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“sermon” is the entire Protestant Bible, and the explication of this text is William Ames’s 
book. The “Doctrine” portion of the dissertation is Part II, an analysis of Jonathan 
Edwards’ Freedom of the Will. Edwards, like Upham was a Puritan, and would have 
endorsed the general assertions of Ames’s system. Edwards’ concern was to show that 
the Arminian view of free will and moral agency was incoherent and morally dangerous, 
and that the old-style Calvinism of Ames and others was indeed the rational and moral 
option. The “Doctrine” of Freedom of the Will, then, was that Arminianism needed to be 
rejected and Calvinism embraced in order to uphold reason, common sense, and morality 
itself.
As mentioned above, Edwards’ “jeremiad” both contributed to and was prophetic 
of the loss of will in American psychology. As a contributor to the loss. Freedom of the 
Will manifested some of the tensions that were inherent in the New England Jeremiad. 
Since New England Puritans believed they were constructing a “city on a hill,” the 
spheres of church and state overlapped a great deal. The ambiguity of the jeremiad 
therefore concerned its audience. Was it directed to the church (i.e., like-minded people 
within one’s own sect) or the state (i.e., everybody in the broader society)? As I will 
discuss in more detail below, Edwards’ (1754) text was not written for Puritans only or 
even for Calvinists only. He thought the topic of will demanded the attention of 
“Christians, and especially of divines” (p. 133). Since he was not preaching to his own 
sect only, then, he needed to adopt a nonsectarian method to accomplish his purposes.
He therefore adopted a more “secular” and “Enlightened,” rational approach (Guelzo, 
1989). Yet, as I mentioned above, the nonsectarian approach may actually have
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contributed to the will’s demise. The use of the jeremiad to structure this dissertation 
thus serves to ironize Edwards’ contribution.
In 1953, E.G. Boring said that “the ancients of American psychology were not the 
prophets” (Fuchs, 2000, p. 5). Contrary to this, the jeremiad format also serves to 
highlight the ways Edwards was prophetic. The most explicitly “prophetic” statement 
uttered in Freedom of the W ill was “‘Tis manifest, that Arminian notions of moral 
agency, and the being of a faculty of will, cannot consist together” (III.7.14). He also 
repeatedly said that the Arminian notion of moral agency and free will (overlapping 
concepts) “shuts itself wholly out of the world” (II. 1.5). Edwards’ thesis suggested an 
irony; that Arminian notions of moral agency and volitional freedom which were 
intended to elevate the status of the will actually elevated it so much as to remove it from 
reality. The Arminian will itself was, he seemed to be implying (and sometimes even 
explicitly stating), a fiction.
Still, Edwards did not foresee the ways this “fictional” will might manifest itself; 
and this lack of foresight is interesting not because he should have “seen it coming” but 
because he very well might have had he been a little less dismissive of his opponent’s 
positions. As I argue in chapter 4 (following Paul Ramsey), Edwards tended to rush into 
refutation without fully considering his opponent’s positions. This tendency is 
particularly evident in the case of his refutation of Thomas Chubb, the British Deist. 
Chubb utilized an approach to the topic of “motives” and the separation of psychological 
faculties that would be similar to Thomas Upham and others. Ramsey argued that 
“Edwards’ real contention against Chubb should be that he separates too completely the 
faculties of will and understanding” (p. 76). In other words, Edwards did not provide a
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sustained critique of the way faculty psychology may be used to forge a strict separation 
of will from motive, the very thing that led to the “shrinkage” of the will under Upham 
and James.
The “Application” part of the dissertation considers the psychology of will found 
in Thomas Upham’s (1869) Mental Philosophv and William James’s (1890) Principles of 
Psvchologv. Situated in the application portion of the jeremiad structure implies that 
these texts are susceptible to criticism as examples of “Arminianism.” This is only 
partially true. Arminianism, as mentioned above, was, properly speaking, a Dutch 
offshoot o f Calvinism. Arminianism found its most “successful” expression in nineteenth 
century American Methodism, the fastest-growing denomination in the United States 
during that century. Is it proper to characterize Upham or James as “Arminians” in this 
sense? Properly speaking, no. Although Upham espoused a form of holiness theology 
that had Methodist roots, he remained a Congregationalist his entire life, and so probably 
would have identified himself as a Calvinist (Noll, 2002). James did not explicitly align 
himself with any Christian denomination. Yet, I think that both Upham and James are 
expressions of the “Arminian impulse” described above. This impulse to find original 
efficiency within the self seemed to be a chief concern of Edwards (1754), who 
continually denounced any position that seemed to posit a “sovereignty of the will”
(IV. 13.7). As Ames had said, efficiency to do good is of God only, and he would permit 
none to steal his glory.
Nevertheless, we find expressions of the belief in undetermined and autonomous 
efficiency in both Upham and James, and I take these as expressions of an “impulse” that 
pervades their entire psychology of will. For both Upham and James, freedom and moral
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virtue require that an act be wholly one’s own. In Upham’s (1869) system this was 
possible because God had given to man . .as an attribute of his own nature, an amount 
of real efficiency suited to the limited sphere which Providence has allotted him .. ..There 
is no accountable existence without power...” (1.274). Further, although a gift of God, 
the exercise of that efficiency was entirely one’s own. God would never and could never 
violate it. Similarly, James (1890) argued that “ .. .our autonomy in the midst of nature 
depends on our not being pure effect, but a cause...” (1.447-448), seeing the free acts of 
the will as “the one strictly underived and original contribution which we make to the 
world!” (11.579). So, although not Arminians, both Upham and James did possess the 
“Arminian impulse.” The major goal of the chapters to follow is to show how this 
Arminian impulse shaped the moral psychologies of Upham and James, and how it 
contributed to the loss of will in American psychology.
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PART I: EXPLICATION 
WILLIAM AMES’ MARROW OF THEOLOGY
“God therefore uses means not because of any lack of power, but because of the 
abundance of bis goodness; be communicates a certain dignity of efficiency to bis 
creatures and in them makes bis own efficiency more perceptible.”
William Ames, Marrow o f Theology, (I.IX.6)
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I
The notion of a faculty of will emerged in the context of the Christian story of fall 
and redemption (Arendt, 1978; Guelzo, 1989; cf. Irwin, 1992). This was true of the story 
of the faculty of the will in America. In New England (particularly Massachusetts Bay), 
of course, the prevailing version of the Christian story was Puritan. Further, since the 
“major players” in this story of the will in the American academy after Ames were New 
Englanders (two of three lived most of their lives in Massachusetts) and products of New 
England colleges (Edwards of Yale, Upham of Dartmouth and Andover Seminary, James 
of Harvard), it is not surprising that (at the very least) vestiges of the original myth may 
be found throughout the entire history of the tradition. We might therefore say that the 
story of the will in America is, at least in part, a Puritan story.
If we would desire to understand the nuances of the Puritan story in the American 
collegiate context, there is perhaps no better place to start than William Ames’s Marrow 
of Theologv. “one of the great works of Puritan systematic theology” (Bremer, 1995, p. 
22). Although Ames was not “American” (he never set a foot in the New World), he had 
hoped to move to Massachusetts and may have assumed the Presidency of Harvard if he 
had. Nevertheless, his Marrow became ''the theology textbook at Harvard,” (Marsden, 
1994) and was utilized in American colleges of Puritan descent until the time of the 
Revolution (Snow, 1907).
If we would approach this history of the loss of will in American psychology as a 
Jeremiad, we must start with an “explication.” As noted in the introduction, the 
explication portion of the Puritan Jeremiad centered on a particular biblical text. For our
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purposes, we may consider the “text” of this jeremiad the entire Protestant Bible, and 
Ames’s Marrow a Puritan exposition of the Bible’s major themes, particularly the nature 
of God, of Humanity, of Redemption, and of the Church. The Marrow is literally filled 
with references to the Bible, and, consistent with the biblicism of the Puritan movement, 
Ames attempted to provide scriptural support for every doctrine he taught. In my 
quotations of Ames, therefore, I have often left in his own scriptural “proof texts,” so that 
this Biblically-centered approach will be evident. Although Ames was systematic and 
rational, he clearly believed that his system had Foundations in the very mind of God.
Ames’s systematic approach to theology was strongly influenced by the logic of 
Peter Ramus, a seventeenth century French convert to Protestantism. Ramus defined 
himself against Scholasticism, teaching “ .. .that all things based on the authority of 
Aristotle were overelaborate and artificial” (Sprunger, 1972, p. 15). “Ramist” logic 
purported to be an approach “more akin to natural reasoning” (p. 15) than the artificial 
scholastic approach. Due to Ramus’ Protestantism, his logic was embraced at 
Cambridge, where Ames received his education. Veneration for Ramus can be found in 
the Marrow. Yet, as Ames biographer Keith Sprunger accurately noted, “In actual 
practice Ramism often became primarily a method of organization discernible by its 
famous dichotomy” (p. 15). Ramus argued that a topic was best approached through 
dichotomization. Ames fully embraced this approach. So, theology, for example, was 
understood by Ames to have two parts: faith in God, and Observance. God, in turn, is 
reduced to “sufficiency,” and “efficiency.” The efficiency of God is manifest in
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“creation,” and “providence.” This tendency of Ames to dichotomize nearly everything 
is evident in the following three chapters of this dissertation.'^
The topic of will permeates the Marrow of Theologv. so much so that the entire 
book could be summarized as a story about two wills. On the one hand is the will of God 
which created, sustains, and governs all things. This infinitely glorious God seeks his 
own glory not only by making his own nature known through nature and scripture, but 
also by unfolding a drama of redemption that highlights his power, justice, and mercy.
On the other hand is the will of the human person. Although first created with a will that 
submitted to the divine will, humanity through the fall of Adam lost this will to God- 
centered good. In the fallen condition, humanity despises and avoids the things of God. 
Salvation, then, is the story of how God redeems certain members of the human family 
through a radical reorganization and restoration of their wills.
In Puritan thought, will was not a term of precise psychological signification. It 
was, however, a meaningful term psychologically, having to do with the impulsive or 
active powers of humanity. Inclinations, desires, affections, choices, and habits were all 
subsumed under this umbrella of the faculty of the will. (An analogy today might be a 
term like “cognition,” which subsumes more specific psychological phenomena such a 
perception, attention, memory, language and thought). This breadth and imprecision is 
explained by the fact that Puritanism was not interested in psychological niceties for their 
own sake. It was concerned that the direction and tendency of one’s entire being was a 
God-ward tendency. The term “will,” then, although broad in its psychological 
signification, did have a precise ethical signification. To be endowed with will was to be
For a more careful consideration o f how “Ramist” logic influenced Puritan thought, see Eusden (1968) 
and Miller (1939).
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
made in the image of God and to therefore be obligated that one’s own being conformed 
to the Will of its creator. I will argue that the very breadth of the concept of the faculty 
of will was one of its strengths, and that subsequent attempts to give will a more narrow 
and precise meaning may have been part of the concept’s undoing.
The explication of Ames’s text contained in chapter 1-3 is detailed. The reader 
may at times wonder what all that theology has to do with a history of a psychological 
construct. To ameliorate this reaction, I have throughout the first three chapters 
attempted to be explicit about how the topic of the will is related to the various 
theological details found in The Marrow of Theology. Still, perhaps the most important 
insight to grasp from these chapters is that the concept and psychology of will in the 
earliest textbooks used in America was surrounded, sustained, and even submerged by a 
thick, detailed story about the nature and purpose of the universe. The preservation of 
that sectarian story (or some other such story) ensured the preservation of the faculty of 
will. Yet the experiment of American higher education (and the enlightenment in 
general) was to see if the faculty of will could be preserved without relying on any 
particular sect’s story. (Indeed, the experiment of the enlightenment may have been to 
see if the will so extracted could become the story itself, but that would be a paper in 
itself). Moving from Ames to Edwards to Upham and to James, we will find that “the old 
story” becomes less sharp, less detailed. All authors assumed that they lived in a moral 
world, and that their wills had something to do with their own conformity to the demands 
of that moral world. Yet the increasingly diffused stories made the nature of those moral 
worlds less clear, and the introduction of other increasingly persuasive Enlightened and 
naturalistic stories made the old moral world seem to shrink. In the process, the will
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itself grew smaller and more diffuse. In Ames, then, we find an author describing a story 
largely forgotten, but a story that was nevertheless able to sustain a concept such as will. 
“All that theology” made a big difference.
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CHAPTER I
GOD’S EFFICIENCY AND MAN’S DEFICIECY
Ames’s Marrow of Theology divides into two Books, reflecting the Puritan belief 
that the Bible taught two main things. As the Westminster Shorter Catechism put it: “The 
scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God 
requires of man.” Book One of the Marrow therefore deals with the doctrines that Ames 
understood the Bible to teach (“faith”) and Book Two deals with the “duty God requires 
of man,” or “observance.”
This chapter is a commentary on roughly the first third of Book One, which 
serves to dramatize the problem of will. The reader is introduced to the Object of Puritan 
theology: a God of staggering power and unwavering purpose. The “first cause” of 
whatsoever comes to pass, this God is the source of all good in the world. Therein lay the 
rub for humanity—any good that the creature would perform would be a derived good. 
Further, God had also foreordained that even the derived goodness of humanity would be 
lost through an historic fall from grace. Adam ate the fmit and thereby led humanity into 
an estate of sin and misery. Release from this captivity to sin would be a human 
impossibility.
The Nature of Theologv
When describing the nature of theology, Ames declared that, “theology is the 
doctrine or teaching of living to God” (I.i.l). Unlike other types of knowledge that derive 
from “human inquiry,” and “can be developed through sense perception, observation.
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experience, and induction” (I.i.3), theology is given by God through the revelation found 
in the Bible. This thoroughgoing Puritan biblicism pervades the Marrow and is an early 
example in this work of the Puritan sense of human weakness and absolute dependence 
upon the Other. In this worldview, the Puritan shuddered at the consideration of life 
apart from God. “Living,” Ames declared, “is the noblest work of all...,” and the highest 
form of living “is that which approaches most closely the living and life-given God,” or 
“living to God” (I.i.4-5). Ames’s summary of how humanity lives to God incorporates 
the principles of action, teleology and the source of human righteousness and strength: 
“men live to God when they live in accord with the will of God, to the glory of God, and 
with God working in them” (I.i.6). The only life worth living is the God-centered life.
Given the importance of practice, or living according to God’s will, Ames 
asserted that “the first and proper subject of theology is the will” (Li.9). Rather, than 
being a merely “speculative discipline” that fills the mind but leaves the heart unmoved, 
the theology of the Bible moves men toward their “final end.” The Puritan story was 
profoundly concerned with the way human beings responded to the living God. The 
center of human responsiveness was the will.
Since the revelation of God found in the scripture is so all-encompassing, it 
touches upon all other realms of inquiry: “ .. .there is no precept of universal truth relevant 
to living well in domestic economy, morality, political life, or lawmaking which does not 
rightly pertain to theology” (Li. 12). Indeed, the theology of the Bible is a philosophy of 
life, providing a “guide and master plan for our highest end” (Li. 13). The theology of the 
William Ames sought to organize and explain all of life, to orient the self and society to
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God. As Ames’s theology aimed at the reform of the self, it was strongly oriented toward 
the human will, understood as the center, the “heart” of human beings.
In “The Division of Parts of Theology,” Ames dichotomized theology into faith 
and observance, giving a litany of Scriptures from the Old and New Testaments to 
illustrate the basic idea that God requires both belief and obedience. These two are 
separable analytically, but not in practice. On the analytical level, Ames utilized the 
scholastic division between the first act (which has to do with being) and the second act 
(which has to do with the operation or working of the first; Eusden, 1968, p. 78), Ames 
argued that there is an “order of nature” in that faith, the first act, which is an “inborn 
principle of life” (I.ii.5) serves as the source for observance, the second act. In the case 
of true faith, however, the two “are always joined together” (I.ii.4), and in this 
conjimction Ames argued that faith itself is an act of will. Even at this early stage, Ames 
affirms that human ability to do good is derivative. Faith is not a matter of human 
willpower, but a gift, an “inborn principle.” The issue of human ability pervades the 
history of the concept in American psychology.
The First Act: Faith as an Act of Will
It is in the context of his discussion of faith that Ames first begins to unpack his 
assertion that the will is the proper subject of theology, arguing that faith itself, when 
biblically understood, is most centrally an act of will (although the understanding is 
involved). We also clearly see in this context what will is for: belief in God. Generally 
speaking, Ames defined faith as “the resting of the heart on God.. .so that we may be 
saved from all evil through him and may follow all good.” Faith is an “act of the whole 
man,” as opposed to a merely intellectual or volitional activity. Although belief typically
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involves “an act of the understanding as it gives assent to evidence,” the will must also 
“embrace the good thus proved” by the understanding in order for Biblical faith to be in 
place. The Puritans were ever worried about merely “speculative knowledge,” following 
Paul’s assertion that “knowledge puffs up.” Filling the head with the “light” of theology 
could only be justified by the attendant “heat” of the inflamed will. Implied in this belief 
that the intellect may “prove the good,” and yet the will not follow clearly breaks from an 
intellectualist understanding of will, which asserts that will is “blind” and always follows 
the dictates of understanding (Fiering, 1981).
True faith, then, because it actively embraces and rests in God, must be 
understood as an “act of the will.” To put the matter in biblical language, Ames argued 
that “faith is a receiving. John 1:12, ^5 many as received him, or who believe’’ (l.iii.l). 
Further, “although faith always presupposes a knowledge of the Gospel, there is 
nevertheless no saving knowledge in anyone.. .except the knowledge which follows this 
act of the will and depends upon it. John 7:17, 8:31, 32; 1 John 2:3” (l.iii.4). So, the 
understanding provides an object to be believed, God, as presented in the gospel, and the 
will embraces the object through faith. For the precious objectivities of the Puritan faith, 
there were always corresponding subjectivities. Paradoxically, only after this act of will 
is the mind endued with “saving knowledge” (l.iii.4). Prior to the will’s involvement, 
after all, the would-be Christian only possesses speculative knowledge. “True Christian 
faith which has a place in the understanding always leans upon divine testimony, as far as 
it is divine. But it cannot be received without a genuine tuming of the will towards God” 
(l.ii.5). Similarly, faith is not aimed at God as a mere abstraction, or “as he is considered 
in himself’ but “as we live well by him” (l.iii.7).
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Ames also insisted that faith, based as it is upon divine testimony, rests upon a 
more sure foundation than other kinds of knowledge, which relies upon the fallible 
foundation of human reason. “Faith is not more uncertain and doubtful because it leans 
on testimony alone, but rather more certain than any human knowledge because of its 
nature. This is so because it is brought to its object on the formal basis of infallibility— 
yet because of imperfection in the inclination [habitus] from which faith flows, the assent 
of faith often appears weaker in this or that person than the assent of knowledge” (I.iii.6).
Ames portrayed faith in terms that he supposed all could understand. The faith 
whereby the Christian trusts God is “true and proper trust” (l.iii.l3), which involves a 
leaning upon and relying upon God. Ames believed that all people have faith in 
something, if not God, then “wisdom, power, friends, and their own riches” (l.iii.l 3).
The trust placed upon God is intimate, consisting of union with God, and far exceeding 
merely speculative knowledge, “since faith is the first act of our life whereby we live to 
God in Christ, it must consist of union with God, which a mere assent to the truth 
concerning God cannot effect” (l.iii.l8).
Furthermore, this union and surrender cannot achieved through speculative 
powers, but through the giving of the self to God through an act of will, “...he cannot 
make that surrender through any assent of the understanding—only through a consent of 
the will” (l.iii.l9). Ames noted that the idea that faith belongs primarily to the intellect 
contradicts the experience of the faithful, which is that “certainty of the understanding 
may be lacking in some at times, even though they have truth faith hidden in their hearts” 
(I.iii.22). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the act of trust takes place in the will 
apart from any contact with the understanding, rather faith “is a single virtue and brings
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forth acts of one quality throughout, not partly of knowledge and partly of the affections,
1 Cor. 13” (l.iii.l3). Further, though true faith always inflames the human will, it cannot 
be produced by the human will, but rather finally depends upon “the operation and inner 
persuasion of the Holy Spirit. 1 Cor. 12:3, A^ o one can say Jesus is Lord except by the 
Holy Spirit” (l.iii.l 2). The Puritan paradox of ability and inability is illustrated well in 
this tension.
The Awesome Object of Human Reception
Since God is the object of faith, Ames then moves to discuss God, which is 
crucial to understanding Ames’s psychology of will. Although the will is the “proper 
subject of theology” (Li.9, italics mine), this subject has meaning only in relation to its 
proper object. Just as Augustine “discovered” (Arendt, 1978; Guelzo, 1989) the will in 
the context of Christian theology, so too Ames’s psychology of will is infused with 
vitality and takes shape vis-a-vis the Christian God.
Ames’s theology is always concerned with preserving a sense of the greatness of 
God and the relative weakness and contingency of the human condition. This concern is 
very clearly manifested in Ames’s discussion of God’s essence. Although God, “as he is 
in himself, cannot be understood by any save himself’ (I.iv.2), he has nevertheless 
condescended to reveal himself “in a human way” through the scriptures (I.iv.4), which 
are geared toward “human comprehension” (I.iv.5). The scripture is infallible and from 
God, yet God intentionally “has revealed himself to us.. .from the back, so to speak, not 
from the face.. .He is seen darkly, not clearly, so far as we and our ways are concerned. 1 
Cor. 13:12, Through a glass darkly, after a fashion” (I.iv.3). The revelation of God in the
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holy scripture nevertheless is sufficient for living: “what has been revealed of God 
suffices us to live well” (I.iv.7).
Just as faith is a unified act of intellect and will that receives the Holy object, 
there are two aspects of God’s person which serve as the foundation or “pillars” of faith 
(I.iv.9). Using the Ramist approach, Ames dichotomizes the knowledge of God into 
sufficiency, which is God’s “quality of being sufficient in himself for himself and for us” 
(I.iv.lO), and efficiency, or the “working power” which is “that by which he works all 
things in all things. Eph l A \,H e  who works all things...''' (I.vi.l). In this portrayal of 
God, as we shall see below, the Harvard student was confronted with a God who does 
whatever he pleases, who is never fhistrated, and is therefore always most happy or 
“blessed.” The Harvard student, as we shall see, was confronted with Will itself.
The Sufficiencv of God: Essence, Subsistence, and the Ontological Basis of Will 
The sufficiency of God, which, again, is “his quality of being sufficient in himself 
for himself and for us” (I.iv.lO), is the “first reason” (I.iv.l 1) that the will receives or 
trusts in God. As he is wont to do, Ames dichotomizes this sufficiency into God’s 
essence and his subsistence, or his triune “manner of being” (I.iv.l2). In terms of 
essence, God is “absolutely the first being. Isa. 44:6, I  am the first and the last; besides 
me there is no god..." From this reality, three things follow. First, “God is one and only 
one” (I.iv.15), second, “...God exists of himself...” (I.iv.16), and, third, directly relevant 
to the issue of will, “ .. .the quality which is called passive is not in him” (I.iv.l 7).
To accommodate human weakness, which cannot understand God in “one act of 
comprehension” (I.iv.l 8), God’s nature is explained in scripture as “consisting of many 
attributes” (I.iv.l 8). As we might expect of Will itself, these attributes are “God’s act—
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single, most pure, most simple” (I.iv.20). Ames then lists ten propositions that describe 
the necessary correlates of the fact that the attributes belong to God himself. Although 
many of the attributes of God derive their “names” from humans who are the imago del, 
they belong first to God in their substance. The attributes of humans are derived from 
God (I.iv.22). Further, unlike human beings, the attributes of God “do not diminish or 
grow” (I.iv.23). The properties in human beings that are similar to the divine attributes 
are imperfect, but the attributes in God are “divine perfections” (I.iv.25).
The supremacy of God is further evidenced by the fact that scripture declares that 
God is a spirit who has “life in himself’ (I.iv.36). “Hence the chief title of God, by which 
he is distinguished from all idols, is that he is the living God...” (I.iv.37). Ames, always 
eager to draw the practical conclusion, argued that since God is “the fountain of all life,” 
faith “rests in God alone,” the “fountain” of life (I.iv.38). In addition to being the author 
of life, which God shares with the creature, God possesses properties that he does not 
share with the creature (I.iv.39). God is infinite, i.e., “beyond any limitation of 
essence...” (I.iv.43), immeasurable, incomprehensible (i.e., without boundary; I.iv.46) 
and therefore omnipresent (I.iv.47), eternal “without beginning and end...” (I.iv.48).
The purpose of these incommunicable properties is to show “.. .how great God 
is ...” (I.iv.40), once again exalting the divine and humbling the human. Ames argued 
that these qualities of God have practical, subjective implications. God’s 
incomprehensibleness, for example, lifts faith to look for more than just a “measure of 
blessedness to be communicated by God, but an immeasurable glory” (I.iv.45). Since 
God is eternal, faith “apprehends eternal life in God” (I.iv.49). In other words, the will is 
moved to embrace certain aspects of salvation by the appropriation of the Puritan
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understanding of God’s nature. What is more, the reaction of the human will is in this 
context normative, i.e., the will ought to react to God in this way. There is an appropriate 
and normative subjectivity corresponding to God’s awesome objectivity.
These considerations are relevant not only to the human will, but also to God, 
who also possess faculties of will and understanding. God has properties “through which 
he is said to work.” These include “all the properties of essence and quantity, namely, 
simplicity, immutability, eternity, and immeasurableness” (I.iv.50). The properties are 
“conceived” in a dichotomous way: as “faculties” and “virtues which adorn the faculties” 
(I.iv.51). So, in this way, God himself can be understood as possessing “understanding 
and will” (I.iv.52). The fact that the omnipotent God also possesses these faculties has 
subjective implications, because “faith leans on the one who knows what is needful for us 
and is also willing to supply it” (I.iv.52).
The aforementioned properties “of essence and quantity, namely, simplicity, 
immutability, eternity, and immeasurableness” (I.iv.50) apply to the faculties of 
understanding and will in God. Thereby, the uniqueness of the divine understanding and 
will vis-a-vis humanity is starkly highlighted. God’s understanding is simple, “without 
composition, argument or classification. Heb. 4:13, All things are naked and open to his 
eyes ” (I.iv.53), unchangeable, “Acts 15:18, Known to God are all his works from before 
all ages” (I.iv.54), eternal, neither beginning or ending, and infinite, “because he 
perceives the whole truth of and reason for everything...” (I.iv.56). Similarly, the will of 
God is “single and totally one in him” (I.iv.58), unchangeable, “because he always wills 
the same and in the same manner. Ps. 33:11, The counsel o f the Lord remains forever” 
(I.iv.59), eternal, because he does not begin to will what he did not will before, nor cease
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to will what he willed before. Mai. 3:6,1 the Lord do not change'' (I.iv.60), and infinite, 
because it has no outward limitation” (I.iv.61). In this scheme, “virtue” in God is 
understood as “the perfection of the understanding and will; wisdom, holiness, and the 
like are virtues of this sort in God” ( I.iv.63), and this virtue is understood as a “readiness 
to act” rather than “an inclination distinct from faculty and action” (I.iv.64).
Since the human will and understanding by definition do not possess these 
incommunicable properties, it follows that human faculties necessarily lack the virtue that 
God possesses. So while humans share will and understanding because of their 
relationship to God, human will and understanding are by nature limited. Yet, as always, 
the human will and understanding take comfort in the nature of God’s faculties, “...faith 
has a firm foundation because it leans on God, the possessor and author of all perfection, 
blessedness, and glory” (I.iv.67).
The subsistence of God has to do with God’s tri-unity, or the Christian account of 
God as a Holy Trinity. In this context, God is understood as three subsistences, each with 
relative properties (I.v.l). Consistent with the orthodox understanding of Trinity 
accepted across all denominations, God’s essence, described above, is one, but is 
“common to the three subsistences.” Consistent with Ames’s stress on the activity of 
God, he focuses on those aspects of the Trinitarian formulation that focus on activity 
within the Godhead. The relative property of the Father “is to beget” (I.v.l 2), while the 
relative property of the Son “is to be begotten” (I.v.l 3), and the relative property of the 
Holy Spirit “is to be breathed, to be send forth and to proceed from both the Father and 
the Son...” (I.v.14).
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Just as is the case of the Father and the Son, “life, understanding, will, and power 
are everywhere attributed” to the Holy Spirit, “...along with all acts proper to a person.” 
Practically speaking, since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit alike are all understood to be the 
one God, and each person of the Trinity participates in a unique way in the gift of 
salvation, the Triune God again appears as a divine objectivity with a requisite human 
subjectivity, as an worthy object of faith, “...in every way sufficient to impart salvation to 
us. For all love, grace, and those things which pertain to living well come from the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 2 Cor. 13:14” (I.v.24).
So, in Ames’s theology, human will and understanding find their ontological roots 
in God’s nature. As human beings acknowledge, worship and submit to this Will, they 
come to understand their own wills, and to experience their will’s transformation.
The Pure and Unencumbered Will: The Efficiency of God 
After having explained the sufficiency of God, consisting in God’s essence and 
subsistence, Ames turned to discuss the “efficiency” of God, or the “working power of 
God” which is “...that by which he works all things in all things. Eph 1:11, He who works 
all things. ..” (I.vi. 1). In order to avoid the charge that God is dependent or reactive in 
any way, Ames asserted that “the effecting, working, or acting of God, insofar as they are 
in God in action, are not other than God himself...” (l.vi.2). In fact, God’s great 
independence and power is evidenced in the fact that “he works all things in all things, 
because the efficiency of all things depends upon the first efficient cause not only in the 
matter of their substance but also in the matter of all their real circumstances...” In other 
words, all things that manifest efficiency, or the ability to bring about particular results, 
ultimately receive their efficiency from God. He turned to Lamentations for scriptural
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support of this idea, “Lam. 3:37, 38, Who says something and it exists, i f  the Lord does 
not command it? Out o f the mouth o f the Most High do not evil and good proceedT'
Ames notes that this assertion that God is the first cause of all things does not imply that 
God somehow is the source of imperfection in the world. He developed this idea in more 
detail when considering the fall of Adam and the origin of human evil.
Ames dealt with the “meaning” of the efficiency of God in light of God’s essence 
and subsistence, of which I will deal with God’s essence here. Regarding the essence of 
God, efficiency pertains to God’s omnipotence (I.vi.5). God’s power, when abstractly 
“considered as simple power” is part of God’s nature “as a being” and therefore is “prior 
to his knowledge and will” (I.vi.6). When considering the “execution of God’s 
efficiency,” however, power must be thought of as following God’s knowledge and will, 
quoting Psalm 115 and 135, ‘‘'Whatever he pleases he does’’ (I.vi.7). So, the “order” of 
these things in God is first power (considered as a simple power), then knowledge, then 
will, and then efficient power (I.vi.8). This “efficient power” of God is the same as the 
“effectual will” of God. This makes the will of God, “as the effecting principle,” to be 
the “the cause of power.” Ames calls this “effecting will” of God “omnipotence in 
action” quoting Psalm 33:9, “He commanded, and it was done...” (I.vi.9). In view of 
this omnipotence of God, “by which he is able to effect all things which he wills or could 
will” (I.vi.l 1), Ames thought it appropriate that the Old Testament would refer to God as 
“mighty God,” and “God all-sufficient,” and “The Lord Almighty,” etc. (I.vi. 12).
Jealously guarding against the idea that God may have “active power,” which 
would imply that “God is passive and moves himself to act,” Ames asserts, “God is rather 
most pure act” (I.vi. 13), and that the “very essence of God is that power which makes
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him powerful.” God is pure act and pure power (I.vi. 14). The only time it is proper to 
speak of active power in God is from the lowly position and perspective of human beings 
who come to experience and leam the power of God, learning to say along with Christ, 
“a// things are possible with God" (I.vi. 15).
Limited only by possibility (I.vi. 16—God’s will cannot “involve a contradiction, 
either in God or in created things. 2 Tim. 2:13, He cannot deny himself’', I.vi.17), God’s 
omnipotence can be dichotomized into “absolute power” and “ordaining or actual power” 
(I.vi. 18). Absolute power, Ames argued, “is that by which God is able to do all things 
possible although they may never be done...” (I.vi.19), while ordaining power is that by 
which God “not only can do what he wills but actually do what he wills” (I.vi.20), 
quoting supporting scriptures such as Psalm 115:3- “But our God is in the heavens: he 
hath done whatsoever he hath pleased.”
God’s Decree and Counsel
Conceming tlie “exercise of God’s efficiency,” Ames argued that the “decree of 
God” came first (I.vii.l). This decree is God’s “firm decision by which he performs all 
things through his almighty power according to his coimsel” (I.vii.2). This decree always 
“involves counsel” (I.vi.8), which is “as it were, his deliberation over the best manner of 
accomplishing anything already approved by the understanding and the will” (I.vii.9). 
Unlike human judgment, this counsel does not rely upon fallible “inquiry.” God’s 
superiority is evidenced by the fact that God doesn’t ask questions, do research, or leam 
to reason. Nevertheless, there is something akin to human thought in God which Ames 
calls “deliberation.”
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Three things “concur” in the divine counsel (I.vii.ll). First, the purpose of each 
decree is always the glory of God. Second, the “mental conception of that end” (I.vii.l) 
is always involved, which is an “idea” that is the “highest perfection of reason.” This 
conception is the “exemplary cause of all things to be done” (I.vii.l 3). In this manner of 
speaking, Ames appears to be speaking “intellectualist” language, i.e., the primacy of the 
intellect in the determination of volition. In other words, the will of God appears to 
follow the understanding of God. Ames seeks to quickly change this initial impression, 
however, in two ways. First, the term “ideas” may lead to a misunderstanding of God, so 
Ames compares God’s “ideas” with human ideas. In people, ideas are formed as a person 
interacts with “things themselves,” which “exist first in themselves and then come into 
the senses of men and finally to the understanding, where they can form an idea to direct 
a subsequent operation.” In God, however, things are known “by genesis” and are 
therefore “first in his mind before they are in themselves” (I.vii.l5). God’s mind does not 
come to know “things themselves” but is rather the cause of all things to be known.
The possibility that Ames has an intellectualist view of God is further challenged 
in the context of Ames’s discussion of the “division of divine knowledge.” The 
“knowledge of simple understanding” in God “refers to all possible things” ( I.vii.25, 
italics mine), while the “knowledge of vision” is “the knowledge of all future things” 
(I.vii.26). These two knowledges are related to the sufficiency and efficiency of God: 
“The things which God knows through the knowledge of simple understanding he knows 
by his all-sufficiency, but those things he knows through the knowledge of vision he 
knows by his efficiency or by the decree of his own will” (I.vii.27). In other words, God 
may know all contingencies (or “all supposed conditions” as the Westminster divines put
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it) but this “knowledge” is not effectual (i.e., does not issue in decree) until his will is 
added to it. This is analogous to his discussion of faith discussed above, which is 
distinguished from “speculative” knowledge by the engagement of the will. Once again, 
we find ontological basis for Ames’s psychology of belief.
The distance between divine and human knowledge is further accentuated by 
Ames’s discussion of “middle knowledge,” whereby “hypotheses” that might somehow 
determine or precede God’s decree are excluded, because these would posit “that events 
will happen independently of the will of God,” and also “makes some knowledge of God 
depend on the object.” Again, God’s absolute will and independence are maintained, and 
the contrast between the omnipotent and “effectual” will of God is contrasted with man’s 
impotence and inefficacy.
The third thing that “concurs” in the divine counsel is “the intention and 
agreement of the will” (I.vii.ll) or, put another way, the “good pleasure” of God 
(I.vii.32). This good pleasure may be defined as “an act of the divine will freely and 
effectively determining all things” (I.vii.32). Ames further asserts that God’s will is free, 
“because whatever it wills it wills not by necessity of nature but by counsel” ( I.vii.34). 
Further, since the will of God “depends on nothing else” (unlike the will of humans and 
angels, which depend ultimately upon God), God’s will is “most free, completely and 
absolutely free” ( I.vii.35). There is further no necessary connection between God’s 
nature and his “outward acts.” Unlike his inward acts which are necessarily connected to 
his nature, there is no “natural necessity” determining outward acts, only “preceding 
choice.” So the will of God is self-determined when it comes to outward actions. God’s 
accomplishes all that he desires. “This will is effectual, because whatever he wills he
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effects in his own time; neither is there anything not done if he wills it to be done” 
(I.vii.37).
In terms of causality, God’s will reigns supreme, causing all occurrences in the 
world. “The will of God is therefore the first cause of things...” (I.vii.38). Yet, 
constrained by nothing, the will of God “as it works outwardly does not presuppose the 
goodness of the object...” (I.vii.38). Indeed, “properly speaking, therefore, there is no 
cause of God’s will” (I.vii.39, italics mine). “Here it is rightly said that God wills one 
thing to exist in order to produce another. But it cannot be said that one thing is properly 
a cause whereby the will of God is moved internally to appoint the other thing” (I.vii.40). 
In other words, God does not react to creaturely happenings. Creaturely happenings are 
an expression of God’s will of decree. Indeed, God reacts not even to himself. Since 
God wills “all things together and at once in only one act” it is improper to think of God’s 
“willing of one thing” to be “the efficient cause in him of his willing another.”
Although it is undoubtedly true that God wills “many things which will not take 
place except upon some antecedent act of the creature” Ames insists that God’s will still 
“does not itself properly depend upon the act of the creature.” As the first cause of all 
things, even the act of the creature is subject to the will of God. The will of God, 
proceeding from God’s “omniscient, omnipotent, and infinitely blessed nature,” is starkly 
contrasted with man’s will, which, in its imperfection and lack of power is sometimes 
reduced to a “woulding” (I.vii.42). Ames challenged the notion that God’s will can 
change depending upon the action of the creature on the grounds that it “makes the will 
of God mutable and dependent upon the act of the creature, so that as often as the act of
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the creature is changed God’s will itself is changed” (I.vii.43). Opposed to this, every act 
of humanity is ordained by God (I.vii.44).
God’s will extends beyond the determination of human action. “God’s will 
determines all things without exception: the greatest, the least, the contingent, the 
necessary, the free” (emphasis mine). He goes on to list a number of scriptures to show 
that God determines the hearts of men, purportedly chance events, the falling of sparrow, 
and all created things:
The Scripture shows this with respect to all kinds of things.. .Concerning Pharaoh, 
Exod. 13, where God disposed all things that he might move Pharoah to follow 
and overthrow the people of Israel, nay, he hardened him that he might follow 
them, still Pharoah and Israel worked freely. Likewise in the selling of Joseph, 
wherein all things happened freely and contingently, God determined it according 
to his own will. It is the same with the very heart of man [scriptures]. With a 
man killing another by chance, Exod. 21:13. With the lot cast into the um, Prov. 
16:33. With sparrows falling to the ground, with all the hairs of a man’s head. 
Matt. 10:29, 30. With the lilies, the flowers, and the grass of the earth. Matt. 6:28, 
30. And finally with all created things. Job 38; Ps. 104; Isa. 45:7; Jer. 14:22. 
(I.vii.44)
If this list of scripture references was not enough to convince his readers, Ames further 
argued that God’s determination of all things is logically necessary, for “if  God did not 
determine all things, his will would not be the first cause simply and universally. Those 
who think otherwise must necessarily presuppose two first principles or more than two.
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which is plainly far from all truth” (I.vii.46). Since it is impossible that there be two first 
principles, it must be affirmed that God is this principle.
The will of God is unlike the knowledge and power of God. In knowledge, God 
“knows all things that are to be known,” and in God’s power, he “can do all possible 
things.” Both of these aspects of God’s nature are therefore “stretched forth beyond 
those things which actually have been, are, and shall be.” God’s will, however, concerns 
only what “he judges should be willed.” So, in knowledge God can be said to be 
omniseient, and in power God can be said to be omnipotent, but in will God cannot be 
called “omnivolent.” God wills only those things that come to pass (I.vii.47). But, “In 
whatever God wills he is universally effectual; he is not hindered or frustrated in 
obtaining what he wills. For if he should properly will anything and not attain it he 
would not be wholly perfect and blessed” (I.vii.48).
This discussion might have lead some of his readers to conclude that the Puritan 
system was a form of hard necessity. Ames therefore insisted that the determinative will 
of God does not “imply a necessity in all future things, but only a certainty in regard to 
the event” (italics mine). Freedom is to be found in acting according to desire. Ames 
illustrates this freedom in the Bible: “thus the event was certain that Christ’s bones 
should not be broken, because God willed that they should not be. But there was no 
necessity imposed upon the soldiers, their spears, and other secondary causes then 
present” (I.vii.49). Although it was a certainty that Christ’s bones would not be broken 
before he was taken off the cross, “secondary causes” such as the will of the soldiers 
assured that the freedom was preserved. Clearly, Ames takes a “compatibilist” approach 
here, saying that fi-eedom and divine determinism cohere. Indeed, so far from
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determining all things with a “hard necessity,” the will of God is actually the “the prime 
root and efficient cause of all contingency and freedom in things, on the ground that it 
effectively foreordains certain effects to follow certain causes” (I.vii.50).
Creation
After having outlined in general terms the sufficiency and efficiency of God, 
which make God “the proper and adequate object of faith” (I.vii.54), and having already 
dichotomized the sufficiency of God into essence and subsistence, Ames then 
dichotomizes the efficiency of God into creation and providence (I.viii.l). Creation, 
encompassing, “whatever exists outside of God” (I.viii.5) is defined as “the efficiency of 
God whereby in the beginning out of nothing he made the world to be altogether good” 
(I.viii.2), emphasizing that this work of God was “out of nothing” (I.viii.9). Ames 
thought a subjectivity corresponded to the objectivity of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
“God created all things out of nothing. Therefore our faith rests in him in hope against 
hope, expecting things which are not as if they were...” (I.viii.26). If God could create 
the universe through an act of omnipotent will, Ames thought the Christian should 
therefore trust God with his life.
Just as the glory of God is the end of God’s decrees, so to the glory of God is the 
end of the creation. More specifically, “God wanted to show both his perfection in his 
not needing any creature or outward thing...and his freedom in producing all things 
without natural necessity...” The phrase, “Natural necessity,” one that Jonathan Edwards 
would employ, is used to contrast the situation in which God would have had to create in 
a certain way. God’s glory is further sustained by the fact that “ .. .no creature was or
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could have been a cause, instrumental or principal, in the act of creation” (I.viii.l 6), once 
again ruling out human arrogance.
The creation was “very good” and everything was made teleologically, “for the 
end which the maker has before him” (I.viii.l7). Indeed, Ames defines goodness in this 
teleological sense, “The goodness of a thing created is the perfection of its fitness for the 
use which it serves” (I.viii.l8). This usefulness can be either “particular,” i.e., having to 
do with the usefulness an object has “in its own nature” (I.viii.l9) or “universal,” having 
to do with how an object can be used alongside others “for the perfection of the universe” 
(I.viii.20). These created things in their goodness “naturally tend towards God from 
whom they came. For secondary being is from primary being and for primary being. 
Hence those phrases: From him, through him, and to him are all things, Rom 11:36” 
(I.viii.2I). These created things tend toward God in two ways, “first, in that they declare 
God’s glory.. .second, in that they give occasion for us both to know and seek God.. .and 
third, in that they sustain our life that we may live well to God...” (I.viii.22). Clearly, the 
telos of all things was in Ames’s view inextricably God-centered.
Beyond the scope of this dissertation is Ames’s discussion of the angels, which 
are defined as “spirits of primary perfection created to minister to God” (I.viii.36), but it 
should be noted in passing that in Ames’s comments upon the excellencies of the angels, 
he spoke of their freedom of will, defined in a compatibilist manner:
The angels so excel in clear-seeing reason that they are said to be, as it were, full 
of eyes discerning immediately what God would have them do and how it is to be 
done. They excel in freedom of will so that they perform their offices with
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diligence Ps. 103:20; in perfection of strength so that they are able to do deeds of 
surpassing power, 2 Peter 2:11; and also in the greatest agility... (I.viii.38).
Ames closes his discussion of creation with God’s last creative act, humanity. 
Human beings were the last of all creatures to be made because they are above the rest in 
the intention of God (I.viii.62). God’s high purposes in creating man are evidenced by 
the fact that he created them “in a different manner from other creatures...” Specifically, 
non-humans and the rest of creation “were brought forth by a word only. Let there be 
light. .., but man was brought forth, as it were, with greater counsel and deliberation. Let 
us make man, Gen. 1:26” (I.viii.63). The chief “excellency” of man is found in the fact 
that he uniquely “bore the image of God” (I.viii.65). In the “inferior creatures,” there is 
“only a shadow and vestige” of the image of God, and therefore it is correct to say that 
the image of God “is not properly to be found” in them. Nevertheless, God denied 
humanity the status of being a perfect image bearer, reserving this status for the “son of 
God, Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3” (I.viii.68).
The topic of will arises once again in the context of man’s creation as the imago 
dei, particularly as Ames discusses the “inward” manifestations of the image in humanity. 
The inward image of God “is the perfection of body and soul” (I.viii.71). Ames extols 
the body’s “usefulness” ( I.viii.73), but spends more time describing the “perfection of 
the soul” which “consisted in its immortal nature, seen not only in the faculties whereby 
it has freedom in its actions in the understanding and the will— b^ut also in its endowment 
with gifts whereby man is rendered able and fit to live well, that is, in wisdom, holiness, 
and righteousness, Eph. 4:234; Col. 3:10” (I.viii.73). That the imago dei would include
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understanding and will is clearly consistent with Ames’s discussion of the sufficiency and 
efficiency of God.
Ames briefly comments upon the relation between the sexes:
The creation of man was male and female, both of them out of nothing as far as 
the soul is concerned. The body of the male was made out of the earth mixed 
with other elements and that of the woman out of the man and for the man so that 
nothing would be missing for his well-being, 1 Cor. 11:8,9. (I.viii.79)
Although female is portrayed as being “for the man,” two things are particularly notable 
in this passage. First is the fact that Ames spend very little time on the topic, and second, 
Ames equates men and women in terms of their souls, which clearly is the more 
important consideration in Ames’s thought. Both male and female were given the 
aforementioned “perfection of the soul,” replete with “freedom in its actions— in the 
understanding and the will” ( I.viii.73).
The Cosmos as Will: The Providence of God
In his discussion of the providence of God, which is “that efficiency whereby he 
provides for existing creatures in all things in accordance with the counsel of his will” 
(I.ix.I), Ames outlines a theology of universal, divine determinism, an all-encompassing 
understanding of the universe that relegates all events and all existence to the will of God. 
This expression of God’s working power “extends to all things not only general but 
particular, Ps. 145:15; Prov. 16:9, 33; Exod 21:13.” Since God is absolutely free, 
providence is not determined by any cause, but determines all causes...’’ Providence is 
“the universal and the particular cause of all things" (I.ix.2, emphasis mine), including 
human volition. To support the idea that God determines all events, he quotes, among
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other biblical passages, Proverbs 16:33 and Proverbs 16:9. Proverbs 16:33 seems to 
address the determination of seemingly chance events, “The lot is cast into the lap; but 
the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD,” where Proverbs 16:9 addresses human 
activity (including volition): “A man’s heart deviseth his way: but the LORD directeth 
his steps.”
It is not as if  human activity is akin to a marionette, guided skillfully by the hands 
of a puppeteer. Nor is the will to he understood as a beast of burden ridden by God or 
Satan (cf. Fiering, 1981). Rather, the providenee of God may he either “direct, whereby 
God, by himself, is “the sole cause” of things or events, or “indirect” whereby he 
provides through the use of means” (Fix.3). These “means,” also known as “secondary 
causes,” actually “prevail” in “eertain aspects of creation” (I.ix.5). The determination of 
human volition may be imderstood as one sphere in which “secondary causes prevail,” 
being “indirectly” determined through the means of human motivation, upbringing, and 
social context for example.
Ames argued that God’s use of secondary causes was an expression of the 
“abundance of his goodness” in that “he communicates a certain dignity o f efficiency to 
his creatures...” (I.ix.6). Understood as a gift of God, efficiency (including volition) is 
derivative, not, as the language of the 18* century would have it, “inalienable.” The 
implieation of this is that just as God may freely give efficiency to his creatures, he is 
also free to take it away.
Another reason God communicates his efficiency to the creature is in order to 
make “...his own efficiency more perceptible” (I.ix.6). Ames quotes 1 Sam. 14:6, in 
which Saul the friend of King David decides to raid a garrison of gentile soldiers with the
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help of his armor bearer only. In the face of overwhelming odds, Jonathan said to his 
armor bearer, "It is not impediment to the Lord whether he saves by many or by few," 
meaning that God’s working power is greater than the efficiency of any garrison of 
soldiers, and that God could, if willing, provide the victory. Jonathan is, of course, 
rewarded for his faith. Ames is arguing that in this and many analogous examples from 
the Bible, God had determined to glorify himself through the expression of his own 
efficiency. Similarly, “...God often uses unlikely means to produce the most worthy 
effects, 1 Cor. 1:27, 28; Amos 9:5; 2 Chron. 24:24; and he often makes the most suitable 
means ineffectual, Ps. 33:16 and 127:1, 2; Hos. 4:10” (I.ix.6).
This discussion of human vs. divine efficiency provides a useful backdrop to the 
views of human volition that would emerge in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
America from Enlightenment sources. It is widely recognized that the Enlightenment 
was (generally- see May, 1976) an “optimistic” movement that stressed human abilities 
while minimizing or ignoring theological considerations. Enlightenment discussion of 
human volition tended to characterize human efficiency as something possessed rather 
than received. To put the issue in Amesean language, the Enlightenment magnified the 
efficiency of man without recognizing the Communicator of all efficiency. And, rather 
than glorifying Efficiency, the Enlightenment extolled its own efficiency. If William 
Ames were alive today and given a chance to explain the loss of will in American 
psychology, one wonders if he might not have argued that Providence had, in response to 
Enlightenment hubris and ingratitude, ceased to “communicate...the dignity of 
efficiency” to his hmnan subjects.
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Thus, Puritan science had plenty of room for secondary causes... and so could find 
room for experiments concerning the properties of air in Robert Boyle, for example. 
Further, the ambiguity of scientific laws is also apparent in this context. Were Newton’s 
laws secondary causes, such as the properties of air on water levels, or were these “laws” 
simply expressions of God’s direct hand of providence, ordering things in an orderly 
way. Nevertheless, Ames was not averse to speaking of laws of nature. Making a 
distinction that further helps to elucidate and clarify Ames’s understanding of providenee, 
Ames argued that “the providence of God is either ordinary and usual, or extraordinary 
and unusual” (I.ix.8). Ordinary providence, has to do with the “order in natural things” 
which is “the law of nature.” This providence “...arises from the force and efficacy of the 
never revoked word of God given in the beginning. Let it be made, Let it be, Be it so . . .By 
its force it affects all matters which are normally the result of natural things” (I.ix.lO).
By contrast, “Extraordinary providence” has to do with “God’s provision for things 
beyond the usual and appointed order.” In these cases, “whatever is effected is...called a 
miracle” (I.ix.ll).
Finally, Ames dichotomized providence into conservational or governmental 
(Fix. 14). “Conservation is God’s making all things, universal and particular, to persist 
and continue in essence and existence as well as in their powers, Ps. 104:19, 20; Acts 
17:28; Heb. 1:3.” This is suitably called by the Schoolmen, “God’s holding in his hand,” 
because by this power God sustains all things as if with his hand” (Fix. 15). If God failed 
to conserve the creation, “every creature would return to that state of nothing whence it 
came...the cessation of divine conservation would, without any other operation, 
immediately reduce every creature to nothing” (Fix. 17). The creature depends upon God
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“in everyway,” even for it’s “being, existence, eontinuanee, and operation” (I.ix.l7). 
Given the fact that all existence is sustained by the efficiency of God’s providence just as 
all existence came into being through this same effieieney, Ames says that “conservation 
is nothing else than a continued creation. Neh 9:6, Thou has made...and thoupreservest 
all things” (I.ix.18).
In this discussion, Ames’s theology touches upon fundamental assumptions about 
the nature of the cosmos- assumptions that were being hotly contested during the 
seventeenth century with the advent of the “Scientific Revolution” and the ascendancy of 
corpuscularian/atomistie and mechanistic views of the universe. In light of the doctrine 
of the conservation of creation by Providence, the radicalism of the new mechanistic 
view of the universe can be seen more clearly. The seemingly innocuous assertions of 
pious scientists such as Robert Boyle of the Royal Society that the universe was like a 
grand, finely tuned machine made by a wise Machine-Maker, portrayed the universe as 
having independent existence (see Shapin, 1996). Boyle’s clockmaker could very well 
have made the clock and stepped away from his creation. Indeed, many scientists took 
that viewpoint. In Ames’s scheme, however, even the continued existence of the clock 
would have to be considered radically dependent upon God’s effieieney. The new 
viewpoint tended to take the existence of the clock for granted.
Although certainly not the intention of many participants in the Scientific 
Revolution, the mechanistic thinking was therefore an intellectual demotion of God vis-a- 
vis the creation. This shift in thinking certainly had many implications. One implication 
(relevant to the history of volition in American psychology) is that the meaning of a 
deterministic universe changed. In the Puritan viewpoint, all things were determined by
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an efficient but wise and loving God. In the modem viewpoint, all things were 
determined by a cold and impersonal machine, although perhaps a divinely designed 
machine. The implications of this difference are evident when we move from Ames to 
James. In view of the determination of all events by Providence, Ames found faith: 
“because the exercise of strength in creatures depends upon the will of God, it can be said 
that we tmst in God alone and not in those creatures through which we derive the bounty 
of God” (I.ix.26). James, on the other hand, found the prospect of a deterministic, 
monistic universe horrifying. For this reason, we will find Ames and the Puritans arguing 
fo r  a determined will, and James and other New Psychologists trying to find some free 
space in which the will may loose itself from the horrifying drone of the impersonal 
machine.
This conservation of all things provides the necessary backdrop for Ames’s 
discussion of “governmental” providence, “which is the power whereby God directs and 
leads all his creatures to their proper end” (I.ix.l9). The need for conservation is clear 
enough; things need to be “continued and maintained” in order to be govemed (I.ix.16). 
Given the continuous creation of God, Ames’s assertion that “the government of things is 
rightly God’s” seems improblematic. Yet, Ames, who did not have to grapple with the 
power of mechanistic views of the cosmos (which would come into prominence after he 
wrote the Marrow), argued that “...things could never attain the ends for which they were 
created unless govemed by the same power which created them. It is a failure in the 
worker to leave work that he has done to be directed by another” (I.ix.l9).
If the doctrine of the conservation of all things by Providence contradicted the 
emergent mechanistic views of the universe, the doctrine of the government of all things
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by Providence sounds in some ways very similar to these emergent views. In his 
discussion of “common government,” Ames takes up the topic of the orderliness of the 
creation. “Common government is God’s direction of all things in a similar manner.” 
This direction takes four forms. First is “the law of nature common to all things which is 
a participation of the divine law and will in all things from the very beginning. Job 
38:12.... Second a natural inclination or principle of working according to that law. Job 
5:7.. .Third, a natural instinct or peculiar stirring up of living creatures to higher activities 
with a certain show or suggestion of reason. Prov. 6:6.. .and 30:24-28... Jer 8:7.. .Fourth, 
a certain power to obey whereby all creatures tend to obey the command of God. Ps. 
103:21 and 148:8...” (I.ix.23). The scriptures he quotes all have to do with the 
orderliness and predicableness of the creation, according to God’s will.
The common government of God “shines forth in the operation of all things” 
(I.ix.24), particularly as individuals and societies seek their proper end and perfection. 
“Everything naturally looks toward an end; it is thus necessary that things be directed and 
govemed by an intelligence which is everywhere present and omnipotent, i.e., by God 
himself....” And, “...alongside of the ordaining power whereby everything seeks its own 
perfection, all things cultivate a common society, as it were, and desire the preservation 
of the whole more than themselves (as seen in heavy things carried upward to fill a 
vacuum)” (I.ix.24). Ames seems to be using Aristotelian language here, invoking ideas 
similar to entelecy, or that everything has a purpose in itself. More relevant here is the 
assumption that purpose requires the government of God. This assumption would 
continue throughout the nineteenth century until it met the naturalistic challenge of 
evolutionary thinking: that design can exist without a designer.
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
All creation, including humans, is subject to the “common government” of God. 
But there is another kind of government “added to” (I.ix.3) common government of God 
that is instituted with the special needs and obligations of humans in mind. This is the 
speeial government of God. This special government “...is God’s government of rational 
creatures in a moral way” (I.x.l). Because human beings are uniquely created in the 
image of God, they, like God, are “in some way immortal, and decide their actions in 
accord with their own counsel,” and, unlike God, “...are to be directed towards an eternal 
state of happiness or unhappiness in aecordance with their own freedom and counsel” 
(I.X.2). Human beings are not driven by instinct. Rather as possessors of the image of 
God, are to freely choose that likeness.
This special, moral government “eonsists of teaching and in carrying out what it 
has previously taught. Mic. 6:8, He has shown you, O man, what is good; Duet. 30:15, 
Life and good, death and evil.’'’ This teaching is found in “the revealed will of God, 
which is the rule for the moral life” (I.x.4). More specifically, God governs by teaching 
in two ways, making and establishing laws (I.x.5). Laws are made “...by commanding 
and forbidding” (I.x.6), while laws are established “...by promising or threatening” 
(I.X.7). The government of God consists in carrying out what he has taught (I.x.8).
In this context, the crucial Puritan concept of covenant is introduced: “From this 
special way of governing rational creatures there arises a covenant between God and 
them.” This covenant is “a kind of transaction of God with the creature whereby God 
commands, promises, threatens, fulfills; and the creature binds itself in obedience to God 
so demanding...” (I.x.9). Clearly, given all that Ames has said about God prior to this 
point, this is not a covenant “between those who are equal...” but is rather a covenant
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“between lord and servant” (I.x.lO). The covenant’s promises and threatenings are 
happiness as the reward of obedience, and unhappiness the punishment for disobedience. 
Yet, preserving the utter autonomy of God, Ames quickly stipulates that only the 
punishment can be “deserved” by the creature (I.x.l 1). The dependency of humans in 
this covenant is manifest, for the expected happiness that flows from this covenant is 
“from someone else” not from the self (I.x.12). The covenant also gives rise to “...the 
force and reason of conscience which is an intelligent creature’s self-judgment in his 
subjection to God’s judgment” (I.x.13). I would briefly add that the covenant also made 
the concept of will intelligible, as I will argue below.
Ames argued that the special government applies to men and angels because both 
are “rational creatures” (I.x.14), but for the sake of brevity I will focus on the special 
government of humans. Ames argued that two things are particularly crucial in the 
special government of men, “...the prescribing of a law and the ordering of the event to 
follow” (I.X.25). The essence of this prescribed law is “summed up in the Decalogue” 
and it is “written in the heart” in “the form of disposition [habitus] . . .” (I.x.26). Unlike 
the angels, who stood or fell independently of one another, the covenant was made with 
Adam, who was “...the first of mankind, from whom all men come...” Therefore, “...a 
law was given to him not only as a private person, as among angels, but as a public 
person or the head of the family of man. His posterity were to derive all good and evil 
from him. Acts 17:26; Rom. 5:18, 19; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22” (I.x.30). If Adam obeyed this 
covenant, life would have been his reward. If he disobeyed, the consequence would be 
death. Ames summarized this arrangement thus, “...the law of God or his covenant with 
man in the creation was. Do this and you will live', i f  you do it not you shall die. In these
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words there is, first, a command and then a promise—you do it and you shall live—and 
last a threat—if you do it not, you shall die” (I.x.32).
Adam failed to keep this covenant with God. In discussing this “fall,” Ames 
moves his discussion of the prescription of the law to a consideration of the “ordering of 
events.” “For man there are two things to be considered in the ordering of events.. .his 
fall and his restoration, Rom. 5:19, 1 Cor. 15:21” (I.xi.l). Because Adam was the 
covenant representative of humanity, “all mankind perished” in his fall (I.xi.3). This 
“fall” was "Yrom the obedience owed to God” (I.xi.4, italics mine) through the covenant 
of works. Adam transgressed the “...law ordained by God” (I.xi.4), specifically by 
eating the forbidden fruit, but “the first motion” of this sin “...came before the act of 
eating, so that it may truly be said that man was a sinner before he did the eating” (I.xi.6). 
This “first motion” was “the disordered desire for some superiority due to pride of mind.” 
Following the suggestion of the serpent. Eve ate the fruit to gain superiority (I.xi.7), and 
thereby manifested “contempt for the whole covenant” (I.xi.8).
Explaining how God’s greatest creation, i.e., humanity, could act in an evil way 
has always been one of the most difficult problems of Christian theology. How could 
Adam and Eve, created, as the Westminster Shorter Catechism would have it, “in 
knowledge, righteousness and holiness” act in such ignorance, unrighteousness, and 
unholiness? Arendt (1978) argued that Augustine “discovered” the faculty of the will, 
and it was precisely in his struggle over the issue of the origin of evil that he made this 
discovery. Ames, following this tradition, argued that the “principal cause” of the fall 
“was man himself in his abuse of free will, Eccles. 7:29.” Adam had “...received 
righteousness and grace by which he might have remained obedient, if  he had so chosen.”
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To defend God from the charge of unrighteously causing the fall, Ames insists that this 
righteousness and grace were “...not taken from him before he sinned...” qualifying that 
the “...strengthening and confirming grace hy which the act of sinning might have been 
hindered and the act of obedience effected was not given him—and that by the eertain, 
wise, and just counsel of God.” The charge of “...lay[ing] upon man the necessity of 
sinning” was also out of hounds because “man of his own accord freely fell from God” 
(I.xi.l 1). Implied in this statement is a compatibilist understanding of freedom, i.e., that 
freedom sufficient for responsibility is found in liberty from constraint. Arminianism and 
other challenges to Calvinism would sharply challenges these contentions. Edwards 
would defend the rationality of these formulations in his Freedom of the Will.
The Loss of Will as a Consequence of Adam’s Sin
Ames argued that there are two consequences of this sin of Adam, first, “guilt and 
the sense of wiekedness,” and second, “punishment” (I.xii.l). “Guilt is the obligation of 
the sinner to undergo just punishment for his fault...” (I.xii.2), and is accompanied by a 
“gnawing conseience...accusing and justly condemning. And then eomes a horror and a 
fleeing from the presenee of God...” (I.xii.6). The sense of wickedness “...is that 
spiritual pollution whereby a sinner is made destitute of all dignity and honor and 
becomes vile...” (I.xii.7), and “remains in the sinner after the aet” (I.xii.8), and is,
“ .. .often called the spot of sin, corruption, defilement...” (I.xii.8). Because of this sense 
of wickedness, sinners turn away from God and experienee shame (I.xii.9). In several 
ways, then, the fall affected the prevailing inclinations of the human will.
Pimishment, which “...is an evil inflicted on the sinner for his sin” (I.xii.IO), is 
“...called an evil heeause it is a deprivation...of the good of happiness...” (I.xii.l 1). The
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curses of the covenant of works come into view in the eonsideration of punishment, 
which is inflicted “...because it had been prohibited...” (I.xii.13). Interestingly, Ames 
found in the punishment of sin an assertion of the dignity of human beings: 
“...punishment, properly speaking, has no place but in intelligent creatures in whom there 
is also sin” (I.xii.l4).
Consistent with God’s desire to manifest his glory, the “ordaining of punishment” 
allows “...many attributes of God shine forth, especially holiness, righteousness, and 
mercy” (I.xii.l 7); Ames therefore earefully explicates the perfections of God manifest in 
the punishment of sinners.
After having discussed these general charaeteristics of punishment, Ames 
examines the speeifieities of the punishment inflicted on mankind for Adam’s sin.
Simply put, “the punishment inflicted on man for sin is death...” (I.xii.28), and death, in 
turn, is generally defined as “...a miserable deprivation of life” (I.xii.29). Ames thought 
of life as not only the union of body and soul, but also “...all the perfection which 
belonged to man in that [original] state, whether actually communicated or to be 
eommunieated upon a eondition...” (I.xii.30). Deprived of this perfection through death, 
sinners experience God’s “vengeance on sin” (I.xii.31), and “...subjeetion to misery” 
(I.xii.32).
The story then becomes a bit more complex. First, there are “two degrees” of 
death: “the beginning,” which has to do with death as experienced in this life, and “the 
consummation,” which has to do with the end of the world. Likewise, there are “two 
parts” of death, first, “the punishment which is loss [damnum\" which has to do with 
“deprivation,” and, second, “...the punishment whieh is a matter of eonsciousness
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[sensusY which can be considered the “positive” aspect of death. Finally, death has both 
“spiritual and bodily” manifestations (I.xii.34). Ames then sets out to explore each of the 
permutations that these divisions suggest.
The actual loss (as opposed to the consciousness) associated with the beginning 
(as opposed to the consummation) of spiritual (as opposed to bodily) death “...is the 
defacement of the image of God, i.e., the letting go of grace and original justice. Rom 
3:23...Eph. 4:18...” (I.xii.35), which in turn robs humanity of “all saving gifts,” and 
weakens, wounds and puts human nature “out of order” (I.xii.36). In terms of conscious 
realization, the begirming of spiritual death takes the form of “spiritual bondage” 
(I.xii.37), defined as “a subjection to the power of darkness or of spiritually deadly 
enemies...” (I.xii.38). More specifically, “this bondage is of the devil” (I.xii.39; which 
consists of “subjection” to the devil’s power, I.xii.40), and of those who serve him 
(I.xii.39), which is “bondage to the world and to sin” (I.xii.41). This bondage to the 
world “...is subjection to the evil incitements found in the world...” (I.xii.42), and the 
bondage to sin “...consists in man’s being so captivated by sin that he has no power to 
rise out of it, Rom. 6:16, 17, 19, 20” (I.xii.43). In sum, “spiritual death” is nothing less 
than the bondage of the human will to evil. The human will, so “captivated” by sin, is 
deprived of even the inclination to escape from its fallen misery.
Ames’s discussion of this bondage of the will to sin further reveals his 
understanding of freedom. “Although the freedom of the will essential to man’s nature 
remains, this bondage destroys the freedom which belongs to the perfection of human 
nature and includes the power to perform acts spiritually good and acceptable—or a least 
the bondage leaves that freedom remote and dead” (I.xii.44). Implied in this statement is
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that there are two kinds of freedom relevant to the question of human liberty. There is a 
freedom which is “essential to man’s nature,” whieh has to do with freedom from 
constraint. This freedom was not lost during the fall. There is also a freedom that 
“belongs to the perfection of human nature,” which has to do with possessing “power” to 
obey God’s commands. Adam’s fall into the “bondage of sin” therefore included the loss 
of freedom of will in this second sense. It was, in essence, a loss of the will to do good. 
Nevertheless, Adam retained the freedom to act as he would, although these acts were 
necessarily conditioned by his captivity to sin, resulting in “a multiplication of sin in this 
present life” (I.xii.45), which was actually a part of Adam’s punishment (I.xii.46).
Ames, expanding upon this “multiplication of sin,” makes a further distinction 
between “original” and “actual” sin (I.xiii.l). “Original sin,” Ames defined as “...a 
habitual deviation of the whole nature of man, or a turning aside from the law of God” 
(I.xiii.2). This “corruption” is in scripture:
“...attributed not only to the whole man in general but to each one of his parts. It 
is attributed to the intellect, as found in Gen. 6:5, The imagination and thoughts 
only evil; Rom. 8:5-7, They savor the things o f the flesh. To the conscience in 
Titus 1:15, The mind and conscience is defiled. To the will in Gen. 8:21, The 
imagination o f the heart o f man is evil from his childhood. To affections of every 
kind in Rom. 1:24, To uncleanness in the lusts o f their hearts. Last, to the body 
and all its members as in Rom. 6:19, Your members yielded to uncleanness and 
iniquity do commit iniquity.” (I.xiii.4)
The “perversion” of original sin, which includes a “habitual lack of obedience,” (I.xiii.5), 
has two parts, formal and material. “The formal part is an aversion to good...” (I.xiii.8),
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while “the material part is a turning and inclining towards evil.. (I.xiii.9). Ames here 
makes explicit what was before implicit: because of the “corruption” of original sin, 
man’s will “is captive and servile in its way of performing [its actions]. The will is 
deprived of the power of willing well and takes the form of willing amiss even when the 
object of the willing is good, Rom. 3:12, 7:14; 2 Cor. 3:5; John 8:34” (I.xiii.lO). 
Nevertheless, the will is still “free in the actions it performs.”
Moving from original to actual sin, Ames defines actual sin as “a deviation of 
human action or turning aside form the law of God, 1 John 3:4” (I.xiv.l). It follows from 
original sin as an act follows a habit, or as a person’s misdeed flows from a fault of his 
nature. In this respect original sin is rightly called the tinder for sin” (I.xiv.2). Although 
actual sins may be opposed to one another and have different objects, they “are tied and 
knit together at the point of their beginning or foundation...” (I.xiv.3). Ames dissects,sin, 
arguing that individual sins differ “in the matter of degree,” (I.xiv.4), but, since the 
“differences in actual sins are relative...” (I.xiv.6), sins should be divided according to 
the commandments they violate (I.xiv.7). He divides actual sin into “sins of omission 
and those of commission” (I.xiv.8). Sins may also be divided according to their object, 
be it God or man (I.xiv.l4), and according to their effect (I.xiv.l5). More to the point of 
this dissertation, however, is the division of sin “...according to its subject into sin of the 
heart, sin of the mouth, and sin of work. Thus it may be a word, a deed, or a thought 
directed against the law...” (I.xiv.l3). The notion of “sin of the heart” pervades Puritan 
thought, and undergirds the primacy of the interior life.
As sin multiplies, there is an “...increase in spiritual death both in the form of loss 
and in the form of conscious realization” (I.xiv.l 6). Regarding loss, “...there is a secure
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feeling and a stupidity, i.e., a lack of the sense of sin and misery” (I.xiv.l 7), and 
regarding conscious realization, there is a sense of terror” (I.xiv.l 9), which comes from 
both guilt and impending punishment (I.xiv.20). Yet, in the beginning of this spiritual 
death, “...God imparts a certain moderation, which is either internal or external” 
(I.xiv.21). Internally, there remain “vestiges of God’s image, Jas. 3:9,” which “...appear 
both in the imderstanding and the will” (I.xiv.22). The understanding retains “...the 
principles of truth which direct both the theoretical and the practical judgment” (I.xiv.23). 
The “theoretical principles” have to do with judgments of tmth or falsity, “...which all 
men who have any use of reason have some knowledge...” (I.xiv.24), and the “practical 
principles” have more to do with moral judgments, i.e., distinguishing “...between honest 
and dishonest, just and unjust—that God is to be worshipped, or that something is not to 
be done to another which one would not have done to oneself’ (I.xiv.25). These vestiges 
of God’s image give rise to “...a certain force of natural conscience, Rom. 2:15, Their 
consciences together bearing witness and their thoughts accusing one another or 
excusing. But this conscience, was well as the principles, is corrupt and even dead. Titus 
1:15, Their mind and conscience is defiled” (l.xiv.27).
The vestiges of the image of God in humanity also influence the will. Human 
beings still possess “...a certain inclination to dimly known good.” This inclination is 
“vanishing and dead,” but all humans possess it “to some degree.” The scripture 
therefore sometimes asserts that there are “shadows of virtue” which “...are approved and 
cultivated by all. 2 Tim. 3:5, Having a show o f godliness” (l.xiv.28). Further, this 
“restraining power” of God unleashed on the will and understanding also helps to curb 
excessive sin, “...so that even sinners abhor the committing of many grosser sins. 1 Cor.
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5:1, Such fornication is not found among the Gentiles’’ (I.xiv.29). God restrains sins 
through “...external means, both social and domestic, through which the course of sin and 
misery can be partly arrested” (I.xiv.30).
So much for spiritual death. Adam’s fall also brought about “bodily death,” 
which results initially in both inward and outward loss. Inwardly, this loss is of “...the 
internal good things of the body, that is, heath and vigor...” (I.xv.2), while outwardly the 
beginning of bodily death consists in “...the passing of the outward good things whereby 
life is either enhanced or sustained” (I.xv.5), which would include “poverty.. .loss 
of.. .food, raiment, and possessions...” (I.xv.7). In terms of conscious realization, the 
beginning of bodily death consists in inward manifestations, such as “weariness.. .pain, 
and disease...” (I.xv.9), and outward manifestation, “all those calamities to which the 
outer life of man is subject...” (I.xv.lO). Yet, just as spiritual death was moderated by 
God, so too God moderates the inward death of the body by giving a “due measure o f life 
granted.. .by the goodness of God...” inwardly (I.xv. 12), and, outwardly, “vestiges of the 
old dominion over the creatures.. Because of Adam’s sin, man lost “...all prior rights 
of using the creatures to his benefit,” yet God in “divine indulgence” allows humans to 
continue in their use of the creation. Therefore, humanity does not sin in using the 
creation, “although he may sin in the manner of use” (I.xv. 13).
This bleak picture grows bleaker as Ames finally discusses the “highest degree of 
punishment,” which is found in “the consummation of death,” which “...endures forever, 
and is thus said to be infinite in degree” (I.xvi.l). The consummation of death includes 
the “...losing of an infinite good.. (I.xvi.2), although there are “degrees” of this 
punishment and loss (I.xvi.3). The duration of this punishment is infinite (I.xvi.4), and
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can be considered from the point of view of loss and conscious awareness, as was the 
case when considering the “beginning” of death. In terms of loss, the consummation of 
spiritual death “...is total and final forsaking by which a man is separated completely 
from the face, presence, and favor of God...” (I.xvi.7), and in terms of conscious 
awareness, the consummation is found in “...a full sense of bondage to the power of the 
devil, to which a man is totally delivered. Matt. 25:41” (I.xvi.9). Included in this 
bondage to the devil is the impossibility of repentance: “ .. .the lost sin and will sin 
forever...” (I.xvi.lO), and, since all sinners in this life experience the restraint of God, 
Ames can say that “ .. .the sins of the lost have in them more of punishment than the sins 
of the living” (I.xvi.l I). All of this implicates the will. Since the lost are forever given 
to bondage to the devil, their wills are forever enslaved. Never again will God mercifully 
moderate evil inclination. The lost will forever hate God in hell. This hatred will be 
without constraint, and so free in one sense, but, lacking power to repent, the damned 
lack freedom in another sense. Clearly, the drama of hell undergirded the crucial status 
of volition in Puritan psychology.
Ames closed his sobering discussion of human sin with a consideration of sin’s 
“propagation,” or the “...participation in the condition of Adam by all human posterity 
descended from him in a natural manner. Job 14:5; Ps. 51:7; Rom. 5:14; Eph. 2:3.” The 
thought that all humanity is guilty in Adam’s sin was and would be a source of great 
controversy, and Ames immediately attempts to demonstrate the “justice of it.” The 
justice of the propagation is found in three factors:
First, in natural law by which inbred qualities are passed on from parents to 
children; second, in hereditary law by which the burdens of parents are transferred
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to children; third, in the law of like-for-like by which the rejection of good and the 
enduring of evil are balanced. (I.xvii.l)
The main source for this difficult doctrine was the Scripture itself. Ames quoted, among 
other things, Romans 5:14, which teaches that “...death reigned from Adam to Moses, 
even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression, who is 
the figure of him that was to come.” Given that the Puritans have been cited as a main 
source of Ameriean individualism (Berkovitch), this teaching concerning the propagation 
of sin is an interesting eounter-example. If this doctrine teaches anjdhing, it is that 
humanity shares a common tragic past, and must deal with this shared heritage.
Outlining concepts that are foundational for the “application of Christ” discussed 
in the next section of the Marrow. Ames argued that “the propagation of sin has two 
parts, imputation and real communication” (I.xvii.2). “Imputation means that the 
individual act of disobedience which was Adam’s becomes ours also” (I.xvii.3), while 
“real eommunication means that the individual sin, although not ours, is like ours in 
meaning and nature” (I.xvii.4). Reiterating much of what he said in the context of 
original sin, Ames argued that the deprivation of original righteousness that followed 
Adam’s first sin (i.e., original sin), has had grave consequences on, among other things, 
the will. The deprivation of original righteousness leads to a grave “defect” in the 
faculties of the soul, such that “any moral situation” is accompanied by “morally evil” 
inclination (I.xvii.8). “Out of this condition [of depravity of original righteousness] 
arises eaeh actual sin, for the mind blinded by the deprivation of light easily admits 
errors. And the will being now turned from God and without God bums with love of
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itself and evil desire” (I.xvii.9). From this propagation of sin, the aforementioned bodily 
and spiritual death in all its manifestations arises (I.xvii.lO).
Using this stark picture of human sinfulness and divine wrath as background, 
Ames prepares his readers for the all-important transition to the topic of salvation. Now, 
because of sin, humans must trust in God not only for life but also salvation. Turning to 
the book of Ephesians, Ames summarized the human condition: “dead in sins, Eph. 2:1.” 
Hinting at the secret of deliverance from this dead condition, Ames concluded this part of 
the Marrow calling attention to the “...one difference between the question of the rich 
young man. Matt. 19:16, What good shall I  do that I  may have eternal life? and that of 
the jailer. Acts 16:30, What must I  do to be saved?” (I.xvii.l 1). Implied in this hint is 
that the jailer recognized that he was a “man dead in sins,” but the rich young man 
thought that he could do some good. For Ames, the jailer was closer to redemption.
Summarv and Conclusion 
Ames taught that the “first and proper subject of theology is the will” (I.i.9). The 
“objectivities” of the Puritan story conceming God, sin and salvation called for a 
particular subjectivity. This subjectivity was the will, and the Puritan was always 
concerned that the sirmer’s will be properly conformed to the will of God. Therefore, the 
objectivities of the Puritan story were not meant to remain purely theoretical, but, instead, 
were meant to be life-transforming. For the Puritan, it was worse to know the truth and 
fail to respond, than to simply not know the truth at all.
The most basic proper response one can offer toward God is faith. Yet even this 
faith is a gift. Continually throughout the Marrow we are reminded that God is the 
source of all good, even the good that is found in human beings. The faith that God
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requires is at its most essential level an act of will, as opposed to a merely intellectual 
endeavor.
Ames goes to great length to define the “ohject” of faith, God. The clear and 
intricate description of the Divine Ohject stands in stark contrast to the increasingly 
diffusive object of will that would be articulated in the nineteenth century. The Puritan 
God is the fountain and source of life itself. Humanity is therefore absolutely dependent 
upon God for this life. Ames’s explication of the attributes of God similarly reveal the 
comparatively humble position of humanity, yet also show the glory of God (which is the 
purpose of the Universe). As we shall see, the weakness and contingency of human 
nature became less evident to Protestant mental philosophers strongly influenced by the 
Enlightenment (such as Upham), but, became increasingly clear to members of the New 
Psychology at the close of the nineteenth century. Ironically, then, we sometimes find 
that the Puritan psychology actually had more in common with the emergent “secular” 
New Psychology than it did with the un-Puritan hut Protestant antebellum mental 
philosophy.
Human will finds its ontological basis in God, who possess faculties of intellect 
and will. The will of God is most vividly portrayed in Ames’s portrayal of the 
“efficiency” or “working power” of God, which is “...that by which he works all things in 
all things” (I.vi.l). God’s will is dependent upon nothing, his purposes are never 
thwarted. Once again, the chasm between God and humanity is accentuated.
God’s will is the first cause of all events, including human volitions. Still, Ames 
insisted that this does not imply “necessity” because the sinful or virtuous humans of 
humanity are always done freely, without compulsion.
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God freely created the world, and so the world has purpose. The “excellency” of 
humanity is that they are made in God’s image. We leam that God’s providence, which 
is “that efficiency whereby he provides for existing creatures in all things in accordance 
with the counsel of his will” (I.ix.l), provides a foundation for the orderliness of the 
created order. He determines some things through secondary causes, as opposed to 
making all activities the result of his direct intervention. He warms the earth through the 
sun, for example. And human actions are determined through motives, inclinations, etc. 
Secondary causes, including the will, flow from the “abundance of his goodness” in that 
“he communicates a certain dignity of efficiency to his creatures...” (I.ix.6). This 
communication not only blesses the creature but also makes “...his own efficiency more 
perceptible” (I.ix.6). Herein lies perhaps the crucial difference between Puritan and 
Arminian/Enlightenment psychologies. Only the former unambiguously affirmed that 
human efficiency is derived. Arminianism was only interested in an efficiency that 
would submit to the ultimacy of the human will. The Enlightenment was not interested in 
communicated efficiency at all. Yet, the Puritan psychologist would say, the alternative 
to communicated efficiency is no efficiency at all.
Ames closes this section of the Marrow with a consideration of the fall of Adam, 
and the consequences of that fall. God had made a covenant Adam, promising blessings 
for obedience, curse for disobedience. The covenant was made “not only for himself’ but 
for all his posterity, i.e., for all of humanity. Adam fell by abusing the freedom that was 
given to him by God. Ames delves deeply into the dire consequences of Adams fall. 
Among these consequences is what we might call a loss of will, the loss of the original 
tendency of human beings to love, trust, and obey God. Still, since human beings are not
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forced to do evil, they remain culpable. In this life, God exercises restraining power 
keeping humanity from becoming as bad as it possibly can. At the end of time, however, 
the wicked will be judged and forever damned, the possibility of loving God forever lost 
to their wills. Yet the Puritan remained hopeful, for God bad elected some to everlasting 
life. Ames therefore turned next to “open” the drama of redemption to bis bearers.
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CHAPTER II
THE RESTORATION OF EFFICIENCY
“After the fall of man, we next consider his restoration” (I.xviii). Thus Ames 
begins the eighteenth chapter of The Marrow of Theology on a simple note. Likewise, 
the second chapter of this dissertation is a commentary on the remaining two-thirds of 
Book One in Ames’s The Marrow of Theology, in which Ames describes how Efficiency 
restores the efficiency lost to God’s elect. Consistent with Puritan impulses, the plan of 
salvation described herein was thought to glorify God. The center of this plan was Jesus 
Christ, the Son of God, who took flesh to redeem God’s elect. Ames describes in detail 
the purposes of Christ’s earthly ministry, the benefits Christ’s work brought to the elect, 
and how these benefits were actually applied to the elect. The story is detailed and 
thoroughly “sectarian,” even down to the details regarding how the story was to be 
administered in day-to-day churchly life.
The Restoration of Humanity 
With the fall of man in place, Ames turned to expound the restoration of man.
This restoration, which is “...the lifting from a state of sin and death to a state of grace 
and life,” (I.xviii. 1) finds its origin in the merciful purposes and effectual will of God, 
“Eph. 1:9, 10, He had made known to us...the mystery o f his will, according to his free 
good will which he had foreordained in himself that in the fu ll dispensation o f  those times 
before ordained, he might summarily gather together all things in Christ ” (I.xviii.4). By 
contrast, given the seriousness of sin and misery, the human will is impotent to construct
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a way of recovery: “there was nothing in man which could provide any power to effect 
this restoration.” Given the bondage of the will to wickedness, just the opposite is true: 
“there was rather much that made to the contrary...” (I.xviii.2).
The restoration of sinners to God has two grand parts, “redemption” and “its 
application.” Roughly speaking, redemption takes place outside of the believer, and 
application takes place within the believer. In order to fully explain the internal 
transformation of the believer (which has to do with the application of redemption), it is 
necessary first to consider redemption itself. Frufher, since one way to define will is as 
the subjectivity that corresponds to the objectivities of the gospel, it is arguably important 
to consider these objectivities. Yet, as I stated in the introduction, one of the goals of this 
detailed explication is simply to show the richness of the Puritan story.
Just as God is understood as sufficiency and efficiency, so too the parts of 
redemption correspond to these attributes (I.xviii.3). And, just as the sufficiency and 
efficiency of God are inseparable, so too are the parts of salvation “of one and the same 
compass. For the end of redemption is its application...” (I.xvii.4). Because the 
redemption accomplishes all that it is designed to accomplish, the salvation of the elect is 
sure, “According to Christ’s word in John 6:37, Whatever the father gives me shall come 
to me'' (I.xviii.5).
The Foundation of Restoration: The Mediator 
Just as the most crushing effect of the fall was on man’s will, so too redemption is 
designed with the restoration of the human will in mind: “redemption is establishing man 
in freedom from the bondage of sin and the devil by the payment of a just price...” 
(I.xviii.6). This price “could not be paid by man” and “required the work of a mediator to
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intercede between God and man making a perfect reconciliation between them..
(I.xviii.8). And, just as the one Adam who lived in only one age but whose life 
influenced many, the mediator, who is “...Jesus Christ alone. Acts 4:12” (I.xviii.10), was 
“given only for one age...” only (I.xviii.9), but his life influences people in all ages.
At this point, Ames entered into a detailed description of the mediator. Although 
some of the things to follow do not bear directly upon the topic of the will, Ames thought 
that the “person”, “offices”, “satisfaction”, “humiliation”, and “exaltation” of Christ were 
all prerequisite to the transformation of the Adamic will. I will therefore briefly 
summarize these teachings here.
The Person of Christ
Ames first detailed Christ’s “fitness” to perform the work of a mediator, which 
consists of “his person and the office imposed upon his person” (I.xviii. 12). Here Ames 
rehearses the orthodox view of the hypostatic union of the distinct divine and human 
natures in Christ:
The distinct natures [of Christ] are the divine nature.. .and the human, which is 
similar to ours in all ways (except sin and the mode of subsistence).. .The 
distinction between the two natures holds because they remain absolutely the 
same in essence and essential properties as they were before they were joined. 
Therefore the deity in Christ is neither changed, mixed, or in any way confused 
with the humanity nor the humanity with the deity. (I.xviii. 14)
Although this union adds nothing to the divine nature, yet, “ .. .in the human nature it 
effects a change whereby that nature is elevated to highest perfection...” (I.xviii. 17). The 
perfection of the human nature includes human mind. But this psychology is, to say the
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least, unique. Using biblical fenceposts as a guide, Ames described the mysterious 
psychology of the savior:
There were in Christ two kinds of understanding: a divine understanding whereby 
he knew all things, John 21:17, and a human, whereby he did not yet know some 
things, Mark 13:32. So there were two wills, one divine, Luke 5:13, and the other 
human, with a natural appetite, Matt. 26:39. So Christ has a double presence, but 
the human presence [retaining the true nature of humanity] cannot be everywhere 
or in many places at once. (I.xviii.27)
Though the Adamic will and understanding are now depraved, humanity now has hope 
for restoration because the will and understanding of Christ represent the “highest 
perfection” possible in a human. This perfection of Christ means nothing less than the 
possibility of the restoration of life to the spiritually dead. Ames, always eager to draw 
the practical subjective application says, “because God-in-Christ...has restored life to us, 
our faith is carried towards Christ” (I.xviii.28).
The Offices of Christ
In order to secure the salvation of the elect, Christ, from all eternity, entered into a 
“special covenant” (I.xix.4) with God to take three “offices” which were “...that of 
prophet, priest, and king” (I.xix.lO). These three offices, which portray Christ as the 
fulfillment of the three main Old Testament figures, pertain to specific deficiencies in 
humanity which resulted from the fall. The office of prophet deals with “ignorance,” the 
office of priest deals with “alienation from God,” and the office of king deals with 
“powerlessness to return to him” (I.xix.ll). Since the third office has most to do with 
volition, I will quickly dispense with the offices of prophet and priest, although these are
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crucial in the Puritan mind. As a prophet, Christ brings “...revelation of the whole will of 
God, which brings salvation...” (I.xix.l4). As a priest, Christ dies on the cross, 
“...expiating...the sins of men by sacrifice, and obtaining God’s favor for them. Col. 1:20, 
22; 2 Cor. 5:15; Rom. 5:10” (I.xix.17).
It is the kingship of Christ that deals most closely with the will. The kingship of 
Christ, which is “...his power to dispense and administer all things pertaining to the 
salvation of man with force and authority, Ps. 2:6; Dan. 2:44; Luke 4:36” (I.xix.21),
“ .. .holds sway in the very souls and consciences of men, Rom. 14:17” (I.xix.23). The 
kingship of Christ deals with “...the government of the souls and consciences of men...” 
which is clearly “...not possible for a mere man” (I.xix.30). The government of the 
human soul, as noted above, is primarily through the human will.
Although this kingship pertains most closely with the regeneration of the human 
will, the first two offices are prerequisite to this regeneration because “...the order in 
which salvation is brought...” corresponds to the order of the offices. The gospel “...must 
first be preached, then obtained, and afterward applied. The first is the role of the 
prophet, the second of the priest, and the third of the king” (I.xix.l2). Although Ames is 
certainly a voluntarist in his understanding of volitional processes, here again we find the 
idea that the understanding is always involved in volition.
Christ’s Humiliation
The redemption effected by Christ has “two parts...the humiliation of Christ as 
our mediator, and his exaltation” (I.xx.l). Both of these “estates” of Christ were 
prerequisite to rescuing poor sinners unable to obey God, and were carried out primarily 
to satisfy and demonstrate the justice of God. In essence, Christ was humiliated in the
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place o f  the elect—^who deserved the humiliation. Yet no human being could be 
humiliated like Christ, because only Christ is God. Given Christ’s divine nature, his 
humiliation consisted in “...his subjection to the justice of God in order to perform those 
things necessary for the redemption of man...” (I.xx.2), the first of which was taking the 
form of “...a servant which accompanied the taking of human nature,” existing “...in a 
form which was void of all glory and divine majesty.” The divine majesty was 
suppressed and hidden during the time of humiliation. By undergoing the further 
humiliation of the cross, Christ achieved “satisfaction” appeasing “...the honor of God as 
a kind of recompense for the injury done to him by our sins.. .Satisfaction takes away 
condemnation, Rom. 8:34, and finally brings with it reconciliation to salvation, Rom. 
5:10” ( I .X X .6 ) .  Because of his crucifixion, Jesus is called “an Offering and sacrifice fo r  
our sins. Eph. 5:2” (I.xx.lO). The humiliation of Christ also included an “achievement of 
merit” for the elect. He “procured righteousness for us by obedience. Rom. 5:19, Many 
are made righteous (according to the favor o f God)...'" (I.xx.12). In sum, “the whole 
mystery depends on this: Christ is such a mediator as to become also our surety, Heb. 
7:22.” Just as Adam is “the common beginning” for all who are “created and lost,”
Christ is “...the common beginning for those who are to be redeemed...Rom. 5:16-18; 1 
Cor. 15:22” (I.xx.l 1). Christ’s sacrifice perfectly satisfied “...all standards of justice,” 
and this work is graciously “...accepted in our name and for our good” (I.xx.l6). 
Therefore, “ .. .the greatest justice and the greatest grace are manifested together and 
together work in man’s redemption...” (I.xx.17).
The humiliation of Christ is also found in his life and his death (I.xxi.l). In his 
conception, the efficacy and initiative of God’s will is once again contrasted with
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humanity’s weakness and passivity: “In his conception two principles worked together, 
one active and the other passive” (I.xxi.3). The passive principle “...was the blessed 
virgin Mary...”, not because Mary “did nothing in the process of bringing forth Christ,” 
but rather “...because she did nothing of herself—except to provide the material out of 
which the body of Christ was formed...” (l.xxi.4). “The active principle of the 
conception,” on the other hand, was of God, specifically the Holy Spirit (l.xxi.5). Ames 
recounts the “private and public” life of Christ (I.xxi.l 2), specifically how “Christ.. .[both 
privately and publicly] subjected himself not only to the eternal and moral law, but also 
to the ceremonial and other laws of God.” (I.xxi.l 6). Christ’s obedience to the law 
“...was part of the humiliation, satisfaction, and achievement of merit which God 
demanded and received from him for us” (l.xxi.24). It was specifically his public life that 
was an “...open manifestation of himself to be the messiah” (l.xxi.30), and it was 
specifically the conclusion of this public life that was most crucial to the regeneration of 
the will of human beings.
Christ’s death was his “...last act of his humiliation...” and involved “...extreme, 
horrible, and most acute pain for the sins o f men” (l.xxii.l). Although Christ appeared 
very weak during his execution, Christ was active: “it was an act of Christ, and not a 
mere matter of enduring...” Christ’s will was also fully involved: “...it was also voluntary 
and not compelled.” Given that Christ willingly suffered “out of obedience to his father 
and love for us,” Ames concludes that “the act arose out of power and not merely out of 
weakness...” (l.xxii.2). The power of Christ in the event is also manifest in that his 
suffering “...contained the greatest punishment because it equaled all the misery which 
the sins of men deserved” (l.xxii.3).
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Ames closes his discussion of the humiliation of Christ with his death, which 
“...was the consummation of all humiliation. It was by far the greatest part of that 
humiliation” (I.xxii.5). Just as humanity through Adam underwent spiritual and bodily 
death in terms of “loss” and “conscious realization,” so too did Christ, both at the 
“beginning” (during his suffering on the cross) and the “consummation” (the point he 
actually died) of the process. With his typical methodical thoroughness, Ames recounts 
each permutation (e.g., the beginning of spiritual death by way of loss, the consummation 
of bodily death by way of conscious realization, etc.).
Christ’s Exaltation
After completing the first part of redemption, humiliation, Ames then moves to 
the second part, exaltation (see I.xx.l). “The exaltation of Christ is his glorious triumph 
over his and over our enemies” (I.xxiii.I). Although dead for three days, Christ 
“...overcame death...” and the devil, by “taking the prey out of his hands” (I.xxiii.2). 
Christ’s exaltation is the “crown and manifestation of this victory” over death and Satan 
(I.xxiii.3). In this exaltation, Christ was changed “...from the humble form of a servant 
and the attendant abject condition into a state of blessedness altogether heavenly...” 
(I.xxiii.5). Since the divine nature of Christ could not he improved upon, his human 
nature was subject to the most dramatic changes, receiving “...all the perfections possible 
for created nature.” Christ’s soul was filled with “complete fullness of wisdom and 
grace,” and “his body also was beautified...” (I.xxiii.7), yet he remained fully human; 
“...the exalted soul of Christ retained the nature of a soul, [and] the glorified body did not 
relinquish the essence and essential properties of a body” (I.xxiii.8). Just as there were 
three degrees of Christ’s extreme humiliation, there also were three degrees of exaltation:
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his resurrection, ascension, and his sitting at the right hand of God (I.xxiii.9). Most 
relevant to the topic of will is Christ’s resurrection:
Christ’s resurrection pertained to his whole human nature which had fallen by 
death. For the soul it was a resurrection from hell or from the state and dominion 
of death to which the soul, so far as it was a part of the human nature, was subject. 
For the body it was a resurrection from the dead and from the grave. (Lxxiii.lO) 
Although “the soul cannot be said to have risen again... this can be said of the body and 
human nature.” Through this resurrection, “The body and the man actually recovered 
their perfection, but the soul recovered the ability to act and move perfectly in the body” 
(I.xxiii.ll). This new ability relates to one of the purposes of the resurrection, which was 
“ .. .that he might be the substance, example, and begirming of our spiritual and bodily 
resurrection. 1 Cor. 15:20, 21, 23, F/e is made the first fruits o f  them that slept...in Christ 
shall all be made alive” (I.xxiii.I6). So, in some way, Christ’s resurrected soul and body 
become the believer’s resurrected soul and body. “For Christ as God is absolutely and in 
principle the cause of our resurrection. As he made satisfaction by his humiliation and 
death, he is the meritorious cause, but as he rose from the dead he is the exemplary cause 
and also a demonstration and a beginning for us” (I.xxiii.I7). He expounds on this theme 
when dealing with the “application” of Christ to the believer.
The second degree of exaltation is: “The ascending of Christ into heaven.. .by 
which he leaves the earth and ascends to the highest heaven as to a throne of glory. Aets 
1:11...Eph. 4:10...” (I.xxiii.I 8). This, too, applies to the renewal of human nature. “The 
ascension most properly applies to the human nature because it involved a change from a 
lower place to higher” (I.xxiii.I 9). The ascension of Christ is also particularly relevant to
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human volition because, in the ascended state, Christ is endowed with kingly glory: “The 
highest glory with which Christ is endowed in this state is properly and formally a kingly 
glory. Acts 2:36, Let therefore all he house o f Israel know for certain that God has made 
this man Lord. ” (I.xxiii.28). Just as the kingship of Christ deals with “...the government 
of the souls and consciences of men...” (I.xix.30), so this exalted kingly glory of Christ 
“...is the fullness of power and majesty whereby he governs all things for the good of his 
own...” (I.xxiii 29). This government, as we shall see, includes the wills of “his own.” 
Restoration Effected: The Application of Christ 
The benefits of Christ’s humiliation and exaltation become real to the believer 
through the “application of Christ,” which is “...the making effectual, in certain men, of 
all those things which Christ has done and does as mediator” (I.xxiv.l). Like all things in 
human history, God’s will and decree is the determining factor in the application of 
Christ (I.xxiv.2). God gave the elect to Christ and Christ to the elect before creation. 
(I.xxiv.3; I.xxiv.8), and it is through Christ that all saving benefits accrue to the believer: 
“All saving things are said to be communicated to us In Christ, as in the head. Because o f  
Christ, as obtained by his merit, and Through Christ, as the one through whom they are 
effectually applied...” (I.xxiv.6). The certainty of the application of Christ to the elect is 
solidified as Ames considers the unthinkable alternative: “If the redemption of Christ 
were of uncertain outcome, the Father would have appointed the Son to death and the Son 
would have undergone it without any eertainty whether any would be saved by it or not, 
and all the fruit of this mystery would depend upon the free will of men” (I.xxiv.7).
Above all things, Ames is concerned with the glory of God’s efficiency, and any notion
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of volition that grants to humans agency apart from God’s initiative would undermine 
this efficiency.
Although Christ died only for the elect (I.xxiv.8), and only the elect will be saved 
(I.xxiv.9), Ames argues that Christ’s saerifiee was infinite in terms of its “sufficiency,” 
and so Christ may be thought of having “...made satisfaction for each and all.” Given the 
hiddenness of God’s counsels, Ames argues that it therefore “...is the part of charity to 
judge well of every one...” (I.xxiv.9).
In the context of Ames’s account of the creation of humanity, he recounted the 
eovenant made with Adam, which required perfect obedience for the promise of eternal 
life. The purposes of God in making that kind of covenant with Adam become clearer as 
Ames diseusses the “New covenant.” Ames’s diseussion of the differences between the 
old and new covenants is revealing and relevant to the topic of human volition. One of 
the differences between eovenants was that “...the old was founded on the ability of man 
himself, but the new on Christ Jesus” (I.xxiv.l 7). The fall of Adam, like all events in the 
universe, was meant to magnify the effieiency and grace of God. In the old covenant 
God promised “only life,” and Adam was found wanting. But in the New covenant, God 
provides not only the promise of life, but “...all the means of life” (italics mine,
I.xxiv. 18). Said a slightly different way, the old covenant “required perfect obedience of 
works to be performed by man o f  his own strength prior to the carrying out of the 
promise, which would then be in the form of a reward.” Again, the moral strength and 
will of autonomous man was foiled in the old covenant, creating an opportunity for the 
demonstration of God’s righteousness in the new.
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Predestination
Early in his diseussion of predestination, Ames, as a true Puritan, keeps the glory 
of God at eenter stage: “Predestination is a decree of God concerning the eternal 
condition of men which shows his special glory, Rom. 9:22, 23, Willing to show his 
wrath and make his power known, he suffered with much patience the vessels o f  wrath 
prepared to destruction, in order to make known the riches o f his glory fo r  the vessels o f  
his mercy, which he has prepared for glory., d' (I.xxv.3) As the term “destination” 
suggests, predestination receives its names because “there is a sure determination of the 
order of means for the end...” (I.xxv.4).
Ames had defined God’s decree as the “firm decision by which he performs all 
things through his almighty power according to his counsel” (I.vii.2). Consistent with 
this definition, Ames argues that predestination is called a decree “...because it contains a 
definite sentence to be executed under firm counsel” (I.xxv.5). Since counsel is decree, 
“...his deliberation over the best manner of accomplishing anything already approved by 
the understanding and the will [of God]” (I.vii.9), Ames concludes, “predestination is 
accompanied with the greatest wisdom, freedom, firmness, and immutability. These are 
found in all the decrees of God” (I.xxv.6). “ .. .The number of the predestined.. .is certain 
with God not only in the certainty of his foreknowledge but in the certainty of the means 
he has ordered...” (I.xxv.7).
Recalling the efficiency or “working power” of God, Ames asserts that 
predestination causes its end to exist... it doesn’t presuppose that this end already exists 
(I .X X V .8 ) , but “...it depends upon no cause, reason, or outward condition, but proceeds 
purely from the will of him who predestines. Matt. 11:26, Even so. Father, because it
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pleases thee, Rom. 9:16, 18, It is not o f him that wills or o f him that runs but o f God who 
shows mercy ...He has mercy on whom he will and chooses those whom he will harden” 
(I.XXV.9).
The glory of God is further enhanced by the fact that God is not constrained by 
human merit. Since all humanity as a result of original sin is worthy of damnation, all 
humans are “equal among themselves.” “Hence it is not necessary, nor does it agree with 
the Scriptures, to appoint any previous quality in man which might be considered the 
formal object of predestination.” This does not mean that there is no difference between 
people, only that “the differences foimd in men are the result of the decree” (I.xxv.lO).
Ames, with his eyes fastened upon the scriptures, ever careful to guard against the 
idea that God reacts, tums to the topic of foreknowledge, a favorite topic of Arminian 
theologians who found in the biblical idea of foreknowledge hope for a more libertarian 
idea of human freedom. The decree, Ames insists, is not based upon foreknowledge of 
future events, but “proceeds purely from the will of him who predestines. Eph. 1:5, 9, He 
has predestined us... according to the good pleasure o f his own will... according to his 
free will which he had purposed in himself' (I.xxv.l 1). Indeed, foreknowledge itself is 
an act of God’s will, and is used by scripture synonymously with predestination, although 
this signification is “less accurate. Rom. 11:2, He has not cast away his people whom he 
foreknew” (I.xxv.13). Properly speaking, predestination is “...an act of the divine will 
towards a certain object which it determines to bring to a certain end by certain means. 
Eph. 1:11, We were chosen when we were predestined aeeording to the purpose o f him 
who works all things through the pleasure o f  his own will' (I.xxv.l2). Recalling his 
discussion of the efficiency of God, Ames reiterates, “there is properly only one act of
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will in God because in him all things are simultaneous and there is nothing before or 
after. So there is only one decree about the end and means, but for our manner of 
understanding we say that, so far as intention is concemed, God wills the end before the 
means...” (I.xxv.l4).
Finally, the predestination of God extends not only to the salvation of the elect, 
but also to the damnation of the reprobate: “There are two kinds of predestination, 
election and rejection or reprobation...” (I.xxv.17). “Election is the predestination of 
certain men so that the glorious grace of God may be shown in them. Eph. 1:4-6, He has 
chosen us...he has predestined us...to the praise o f his glorious grace” (I.xxv.l 8). 
Reprobation, on the other hand, “is the predestination of certain men so that the glory of 
God’s justice maybe shown in them, Rom. 9:22; 2 Thess. 2:12; Jude 4” (I.xxv.30). 
Calling
“Predestination has existed from eternity.. .but there is no inward difference in the 
predestined until the actual application of it. Eph. 2:3, And we were by nature the 
children o f wrath as well as others.. (I.xxv.2). So, Ames indicates, predestination 
brings about an inward difference. The explanation of how this predestined “inward 
difference” comes about recalls the former discussion of the person and work of Christ, 
e.g., his “offices” his humiliation and exaltation, etc. In the section on “calling,” we learn 
of God’s initial transformation of the inner life of the believer. Ames begins with a 
dichotomy: “The parts of application are two, union with Christ and partaking of the 
benefits that flow from this union. Phil. 3:9; That I  may be found in him...having the 
righteousness that is by the faith o f  Christ” (I.xxvi.l).
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Union with Christ is “...the spiritual relation of men to Christ by which they 
obtain the right to all the blessings provided by him. 1 John 5\\2 ,H e that has the Son has 
life; and 3:24, He dwells in him, and he in him ” (I.xxvi.2). (Ames discusses the 
“partaking” of the benefits in the next section, on justification). Since all humans are at 
first separated from God through sin, the union must be effected in time. “This union is 
accomplished by calling” (I.xxvi.3). Simply stated, “calling is the gathering of men 
together in Christ so that they may be united with him ...” (I.xxvi.4). Calling, like 
predestination, is based upon the will of God only, and “...does not depend on the dignity, 
honesty, industry, or any endeavor of the ones called...” (I.xxvi.6).
Predictably, Ames finds two parts to the calling, “...the offer of Christ and the 
receiving of him ...” (I.xxvi.7). In order for people to put trust in Christ, salvation must 
first be offered: “the offer is an objective presentation of Christ as the sufficient and 
necessary means to salvation. 1 Cor. 1:23, 24, We preach Christ...''' (I.xxvi.8). This offer 
itself is dichotomized into the “outward” and “inward” offer (I.xxvi.lO). The outward 
offer is simply “...the preaching of the gospel” (I.xxvi.l 1) to all who will hear. To make 
this preaching effective, the terrors of God’s law are used to “prepare” the hearer for the 
good news of grace (I.xxvi.l2). This preaching is in one sense a most democratic affair, 
since “...the promises concerning the outward promulgation are given to all alike with 
one command to believe.” Nevertheless, since “...the peculiarity of the things 
promised...depend upon the intention of the promiser, the promises belong only to the 
elect who are called the Sons and heirs o f the promise, Rom. 9:8” (I.xxvi.l 3). This 
recalls Ames’s comments that Christ’s death was only for the elect, yet in terms of its 
“sufficiency,” the death was infinite. In this light, Ames argued, the crucifixion may be
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thought of having provided satisfaction for all, and that it therefore “...is the part of 
charity to judge well of every one...” (I.xxiv.9). Although Puritan theology did make 
strong distinctions between elect and reprobate, it also encouraged the faithful to hold 
these doctrines with humility.
It is the inward offer of Christ that always occasions the change of will, i.e., that 
makes the sinner able to respond to the offer of Christ. “The inward offer is a kind of 
spiritual enlightenment, whereby the promises are presented to the hearts of men, as it 
were, by an inner word. John 6:45, Whoever has heard o f the Father and has 
learned...comes to m e.. .” (I.xxvi.l4). Yet, this illumination, although necessary, is not 
sufficient to produce faith, for “this is sometimes and in a certain way granted to those 
who are not elected...” (I.xxvi.l5). In order for one to actually receive Christ, it is 
necessary that “...Christ...is joined to man and man to Christ. John 6:56, He...abides in 
me, and I  in him” (I.xxvi.l 7). Christ, the source of human efficiency communicates that 
to the elect. Ames argues that this receiving is first “passive,” and then “active,” 
revealing that the renewal of the human will, like all things, is dependent ultimately upon 
the effectual will of God (I.xxvi.20).
If “receiving” is the joining of Christ to man and the joining of man to Christ 
(I.xxvi.l 7), the passive reception of Christ is related to the first, i.e., the joining of Christ 
to man. The passive reception of Christ includes the “generation” of “a spiritual principle 
of grace...in the will of man. Eph. 2:5, He has quickened” (I.xxvi.2I), and is “...the very 
beginning of a new life, a new creation, a new creature...” Ames indicates that the Bible 
sometimes calls this event, among other things, “regeneration.” So, in this sense, Ames 
implies that the believer, by passively receiving Christ, is passively united to Christ
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before actively receiving him. That is, a change is wrought in the will of the regenerated, 
but this change is distinct from and prior to any godly activity on the believer’s part. 
Regeneration is the cause of godly activity. Ames quotes Ephesians 2:5 to illustrate the 
passive reception of Christ, which, when fully quoted, helps to illustrate that passive 
reception is a kind of passive union with Christ, “Even when we were dead in sins, [God] 
hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved).” That is, this 
“quickening,” or regeneration, or the beginning of new spiritual life, is accomplished 
"'together with Christ” i.e., the passive reception of Christ can be understood as an aspect 
of union with Christ.
But the imion remains, at this point, completely passive. Ames then argues that 
“this grace [of regeneration] is the basis of that relation [there is that word] in which a 
man is [actively] united with Christ” (I.xxvi.22). Going back to Ames’s assertion that 
receiving Christ is the joining of Christ to man and man to Christ (I.xxvi.l 7), the active 
reception of Christ has to do with the believer imiting himself to Christ by virtue of an act 
of his changed will. That is, passive union with Christ is the basis of active union. Ames 
quotes Philippians 3:12 to illustrate the difference between passive and active reception 
of Christ, “...receiving is either passive or active. Phil. 3:12,1 apprehend, because I  have 
been apprehended.” Being passively apprehended by Christ results in a will to 
apprehend Christ.
In the section on original sin, Ames argued that sin influenced the whole person 
and each of its “parts,” including intellect, conscience, will, and body. This might 
suggest that the renewal provided by Christ would apply to each of these “parts” equally. 
Not so. Not only is the will “the proper and prime subject of this grace [of
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regeneration]...” but, more radically, “...the conversion of the will is the effectual 
principle in the conversion of the whole man. Phil. It is God that works in you both 
to will and to do o f his own good pleasure” (I.xxvi.23). Making a strong “voluntarist” 
argument, Ames insists, “the enlightening of the mind is not sufficient...” to convert the 
whole man “...because it does not take away the corruption of the will. Nor does it 
communicate any new supematural principle by which it may convert itself’ (I.xxvi.24). 
Ames made a similar argument when discussing God’s decrees; it is God’s will that 
makes the crucial difference between the “knowledge of simple understanding” (I.vii.25) 
which refers to possibilities and the “knowledge of vision” (I.vii.26), which has to do 
with things that will certainly come to pass. God knows all possibilities, but only when 
his will is added does possibility become reality. Likewise, the human will is the 
decisive difference between merely speculative intellectual activity and the intellectual 
activity that results in action. Yet, the analogy between God and humanity inevitably 
breaks down. Despite this “dignity of efficiency” possessed by the regenerated will, it is 
still unequivocally a derived, communicated efficiency (see I.ix.6). In the act of 
reception, the human will is at first completely passive, and “...plays the role neither of a 
fi^ ee agent nor a natural bearer, but only of an obedient subject. 2 Cor. 4:6; For it is the 
God who has said that light should shine out o f darkness who has shined in our hearts” 
(I.xxvi.25).
This passive reception of grace, which includes the renewal of the will through a 
principle of grace (see above) inevitably results in human activity, particularly active 
reception of Christ and his benefits. “Active receiving is an elicited act of faith in which 
he who is called now holy leans upon Christ as his savior and through Christ upon God.
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John 3:15, 16, Whoever believes in him', 1 Peter 1:21, Through him believing in God" 
(I.xxvi.26). This act of faith, as Ames explained earlier, is itself distinguished from mere 
intellectual assent through the participation of will. Yet the participation of the renewed 
human will through faith is paradoxical. It cannot be understood to be the possession of 
the human, because this would grant an autonomy of the human which does not comport 
with God’s efficiency. Yet, it cannot simply be God’s will expressed in humans, for this 
would deny humanity the dignity of efficiency that God communicates to the creature. 
Ames quickly resolves the tension thus, “this act of faith depends partly upon an inborn 
principle or attitude toward grace [which makes faith the believer’s] and partly upon the 
action of God moving before and stirring up [which makes faith the gift of God]. John 
6:44, None can come to me, unless the Father ...draws him” (I.xxvi.27). Human freedom 
is secured in this paradox. Faith is “...indeed called forth and exercised by man freely but 
also surely, unavoidably, and unchangeably” (italics added). Ames clarifies by quoting 
John 6:37, “Whomever my Father gives me will come to me” (I.xxvi.28). Although the 
initiative is found in the Father, who gives the elect to the Son, the elect “will come” of 
their own accord. Although Arminians would challenge the justice of this doctrine, and 
would insist on exercising an efficiency that is ultimately not derivative, Ames was 
comforted by the certainty of God’s salvation, and was content with a merely derived 
efficiency of action.
The renewed will not only embraces Christ and all his benefits, but also, from 
union with Christ, begins to reject evil. In other words, repentance is an inevitable 
outcome of union with Christ: “with this faith in which the will is turned to possessing 
the true good, there is always joined repentance, in which the same will is turned to doing
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the true good and comes to turn away from and hate the contrary evil or sin. Acts 19:4; 
Mark 1:15, Repent, and believe in the gospeF (I.xxvi.29). Repentance, like faith, is the 
free gift of God, “Eph. 2:8; Faith is the gift o f God', 2 Tim. 2:25, Whether God may at 
some time give them repentance,''’ and, also like faith, has “the same subject,” i.e., they 
“...both have their seat in the heart or will of man. Rom. 10:9; 1 Kings 8:48, With the 
heart man believes. They shall eome back with all their heart." Although faith and 
repentance are “begotten at the same time,” they do have different objects, “...for faith is 
properly directed to Christ and through Christ to God, but repentance is directed to God 
himself who has been offended by the sin...” and different ends, “...for faith properly 
seeks reconciliation with God but repentance [seeks] compliance with the will of God...” 
(I.xxvi.30). Further, this repentance is thoroughgoing: “repentance is not true and sound 
when it does not turn a man from all known sin to all known good, or when it does not 
continue in strength and actually renew itself continually form the time of conversion to 
the end of life” (I.xxvi.33). Evidently, Puritan confidence in the regenerating work of 
God was so strong that despite their ever-present awareness of sin, they also believed that 
holiness was a possibility in this life.
Justification. As Ames continues with the ordo salutis, the unresolved tensions 
regarding union with Christ become manifest, and make the discussion fairly 
complicated. Since these aspects of salvation are related to human volition, it is 
necessary to wade through, however. After calling, the next “step” in the order of 
salvation is “justification,” or the declaration by God of the believer to be righteous in 
God’s sight on the basis of Christ’s merits alone.
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Ames argues that there are “blessings” associated with union with Christ, and that 
believers “participate” in these blessings (I.xxvii.l). Using language that seems to 
hearken hack to the issue of calling and regeneration, Ames says that participation in the 
benefits of union “...brings a change and alteration in the condition of believers from the 
state of sin and death to the state of righteousness and eternal life. 1 John 3:14, we know 
that we are translated from death to life” (I.xxvii.2). This statement, arguing that the 
“change and alteration” from the state of sin to the state of righteousness begins after 
calling, is a counter-intuitive, sinee ealling (it may be recalled) includes the “generation” 
of “a spiritual principle of grace...in the will of man. Eph. 2:5, He has quickened’ 
(I.xxvi.21). In other words, Ames seems to be saying that the “change and alteration in 
the condition of believers from the state of sin and death to the state of righteousness...” 
only happens after the very significant change and alteration of calling and regeneration. 
The key to resolving this apparent contradiction is found in Ames’s assertion (quoted 
above) that believers “participate” in the blessings in Christ (I.xxvii.l). The idea here is 
that believers must be active in appropriating these blessings before they can be 
considered righteous. During the passive reception of Christ, there is indeed a true but 
incomplete “change and alteration,” but it cannot be said that this change is from “sin to 
the state of righteousness” until the believer actively receives Christ. Further, though the 
believer has passively received Christ, sin continues to remain in the person, further 
negating the idea that the Christian can be called “righteous” before faith.
Ames desired to make a clear distinction between two different ehanges that 
follow union (meaning active union) with Christ, “...relative and absolute (or real)” 
(I.xxvii.3). The relative change has to do with “...God’s reckoning” or declaration, rather
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than an actual change in the life or heart of the believer. Ames qutoes Romans 4:5 to 
illustrate the idea that the believer is graciously “declared” or “counted” righteous while 
remaining sinful: “Rom. 4:5, And to him who does not work, but believes in him who 
justifies the ungodly, his faith is imputed [or reckoned] as righteousness. . .” (I.xxvii.4). 
This justification of the ungodly, in which faith is imputed as righteousness “...is the 
gracious judgment of God by which he absolves the believer from sin and death, and 
reckons him righteous and worthy of life for the sake of Christ apprehended in faith. 
Rom. 3:22, 24, The righteousness o f God by faith in Jesus Christ in all and upon all that 
believe... they are freely justified by his grace... through the redemption made by Jesus 
Christ” (I.xxvii.6). That is, by virtue of union with Christ, the believer is accepted as 
righteous in Christ, although the believer remains sinful. Justification also “...has not 
degrees and is completed at one moment and in only one act” (I.xxvii.5). Because 
justification is simply the “...pronouncing of a sentence...” there is not “...physical or real 
change” involved in justification, only “...a judicial or moral change” (I.xxvii.7). Ames 
clearly has the refutation of Catholic orthodoxy in mind at this point, saying that Thomas 
Aquinas was wrong to argue that justification includes a real change (I.xxvii.8).
Catholic orthodoxy held that people are justified (declared to be righteous in 
God’s sight) on the basis of the real changes wrought in them through Christ. That is, in 
the Catholic view, a person is declared righteous because they are righteous, even though 
this righteousness is ultimately derived from Christ. The problem with this view, the 
Puritans (and the Reformers in general) seemed to think, was that it made the 
continuation of justification dependent upon the believer’s appropriation of Christ’s 
righteousness, and, more to the point, made it possible for justification to be lost, which
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they contended was clearly not taught in the scriptures. So, the Puritans needed to argue 
that justification is a once-for-all declaration that depends upon God’s declaration, not the 
believer’s meritorious appropriation of Christ. The problem that Ames seems to 
encounter here is that while arguing that no “physical or real change” is involved in 
justification, he previously seemed to argue that a real change took place during calling.
Justification, in which “...the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers...” 
(I.xxvii.l2), “...comes about because of Christ, but not in the absolute sense of Christ’s 
being the cause of vocation.” That is, the believer is not declared righteous in God’s 
sight by virtue of responding to the gospel, or by receiving new life through regeneration 
(i.e., the passive reception of Christ). That would, in the former case, make justification 
to be based upon the good works of the believer, and, in the latter case, make justification 
to be based upon a gr acious but incomplete change of heart and will wrought by God. 
Instead of being based upon some goodness in the believer, justification is “a gracious 
judgment” of God (I.xxvii.lO). Instead of the believer’s obedience, justification is based 
upon “the obedience of Christ” (I.xxvii.ll). A believer is justified rather “...because 
Christ is apprehend by faith, which follows calling as an effect.” This faith lays hold of 
“...the righteousness of Christ...” (I.xxvii.l4), rather than leaning upon its own inherent 
righteousness.
Although justification itself is not based upon a change of will, it still involves the 
will because it involves faith. As is the case with faith in general, justifying faith is 
inextricably linked to the will. Consistent with his general discussion of faith which 
carefully distinguishes faith from simple intellectual assent (I.iii), this justifying faith 
“...is not the general faith of the understanding by which we give assent to the truth
130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
revealed in the Holy Scriptures, for that belongs not only to those who are justified, nor 
of its nature has it any force to justify, nor produce the effects which are everywhere in 
Scripture given to justifying faith” (I.xxvii.l5). Truth faith, by implication, produces 
effects. That is, it involves the will. Instead of merely affirming certain facts about the 
gospel, true faith actual relies “...upon Christ for the remission of sins and for salvation,” 
seeing Christ as “...a sufficient object for justifying faith.” As testimony to the believer’s 
trust in Christ’s sufficiency, faith leans upon “...Christ alone...” for salvation (I.xxvii.17).
Again, justification does not entail a real change in the believer, “justification 
does not free from sin and death directly by taking away the blame or stain or all the 
effects of sin,” rather, justification is a legal declaration, removing “...the guilty 
obligation to undergo eternal death. Rom. 8:1, 33, 34, There is no condemnation... Who 
shall lay anything to their charge?...who shall condemn? ” (I.xxvii.20). Although a deep 
change is wrought in the believer during her passive reception of Christ, the justification 
of the sinner is based not upon these changes, but upon reliance on Christ’s merit alone. 
Still, the knowledge that one is accepted by God was thought to have had a positive 
influence on the will.
Adoption. Another great benefit of union with Christ that entails a “relative” but 
not a “real” change in the believer is “adoption,” which is “... the gracious judgment of 
God wherein he gives the faithful the dignity of sonship because of Christ...” (I.xxviii.l). 
Believers in Christ are given the grace and right to refer to God as “father.” The two 
preceding works in the ordo salutis, i.e., calling and justification, form the “foundation” 
for adoption (I.xxviii.5). For example, “the reconciliation found in justification,” i.e., the 
belief that the break in relationship with God due to sin is resolved, is understood as a
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presupposition for the believer to believe that God is a loving father (I.xxviii.6). The 
“sublime dignity” of adoption therefore does not make the believer just (I.xxviii.4), but is 
given to those declared just in Christ. Although adoption, like justification, reflects only 
a “relative” change in the status of the believer and does not include explicit changes in 
the will, the will is involved in two ways. First, adoption, like justification, is 
appropriated by faith, which by definition includes the will. Second, and relatedly, the 
reassuring knowledge that God is father, Ames argues, does influence the will of the 
believer.
Sanctification. Having discussed justification and adoption, which are “relative” 
changes of state for believers, Ames then discusses the “real” changes that accompany 
faith in Christ. These real changes of state include an “...alteration of qualities in man 
himself. 2 Cor. 5:17, Old things have passed away; all things are new” (I.xxix.l).
The real changes (i.e., the “alteration of qualities”) that take place in believers are 
dichotomized into “sanetifieation” and “glorification,” the former having to do with the 
gradual and imperfect changes wrought in the believer before death and the second 
coming of Christ, the latter having to do with the sudden and perfect changes wrought 
after death and/or the second coming (I.xxix.3). Sanctification is defined as “... the real 
change in man from the sordidness of sin to the purity of God’s image. Eph. 4:22-24...” 
(I.xxix.4). Ames contrasts justification and sanctification. Justification frees the believer 
from “the guilt of sin” while sanctification frees the believer from “the sordidness and 
stain of sin...” This freedom is nothing less than a restoration of “...the purity of God’s 
image...” (I.xxix.5).
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Ames distinguished sanctification Ixom the faith and repentance that are brought 
about in calling. In calling, “...faith is not properly considered a quality but a relationship 
with Christ, nor is repentance considered a change of disposition (for then it would be the 
same as sanctification), but a change of the mind’s purpose and intent.” By contrast, 
“sanctification involves a real change of qualities and disposition” (I.xxix.8). This seems 
a bit inconsistent. Previously, Ames argues that there is “a spiritual principle of grace 
[wrought]... in the will of man. Eph. 2:5, He has quickened" (I.xxvi.21).” Similarly, 
Ames argued that “this act of faith depends partly upon an inborn principle or attitude 
toward grace...” (I.xxvi.27). It is strange that Ames would argue that a “spiritual 
principle of grace” implanted in the will, or “an inborn principle or attitude toward grace” 
which precede faith and repentance do not qualify as a change in disposition. Perhaps it 
would have made more sense for Ames to have said that regeneration is the first step in 
sanctification. But Ames’s desire to maintain the idea that justification precedes 
sanctification in order to avoid the idea that justification is based upon the good works of 
the regenerated believer may have led to a certain inconsistency.
Just as original sin influences the entire person, sanctification “...pertains to the 
whole man and not to any one part. 1 Thess. 5:23, Now may the god o f  peace himself 
sanctify you wholly...” Yet, sanctification takes time; the “whole man” “...is not 
immediately changed” (I.xxix.lO).
The priority of the will in Ames’s thought is further affirmed in the process of 
sanctification. Recall that in “calling” the will was “the proper and prime subject of this 
grace [of regeneration]...” which brought about “...the conversion of the whole man” 
(I.xxvi.23). Similarly, the grace of sanctification “...is found first and most appropriately
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in the will whence it passes to other faculties according to the order of nature..
(I.xx ix .ll).
Sanctification involves the movement from “...the filthiness, corruption, or stain 
of sin. 2 Cor. 7:1...” (I.xxix.13) to “...the purity of God’s image” (I.xxix.l4), producing 
“...a new and divine creature...” (I.xxix.l5). The crucial temporal dimension of 
sanctification is expressed by the “two degrees of sanctification,” one degree occurring 
“in this life” and the other degree occurring “in the life to come...” This second degree of 
sanctification entails the cessation of “...the movement and progress of sanctification...” 
resulting in “...rest and perfection...” Therefore, “...in this life we are more properly said 
to enjoy sanctification than sanctity, and in the life to come only sanctity and not 
sanctification” (I.xxix.l6).
The fact that sanctification is not completed until “the life to come,” means that 
sanctification is “...imperfect while we live here as children,” and, “...all believers have, 
as it were, a double form— t^hat of sin and that of grace...” Ames jealously guards against 
any intimation that perfection can be found in the present life, which is a belief found 
only “...in the dreams of some fanatics. I John 1:8, I f  we say we have no sin, we deceive 
ourselves, and there is no truth in us.” Nevertheless, “...all that are truly sanctified tend 
to perfection. Matt. 5:48; 1 Cor. 13:11; 2 Peter 3:18” (l.xxix.29). The remaining sin 
found in believers is called “...in the Scriptures [among other things] the Old man...” The 
sanctified or “...renewed part is called the New man...the mind, and the like” (l.xxix.30). 
The will of the regenerate is therefore involved in “...a spiritual war [that] is continually 
waged between these parts. Gal. 5:17...” Further, given that the believer’s victory in this 
battle is incomplete in this life, “...there is [also] a daily renewal of repentance”
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(I.xxix.31). Recognizing a similar internal battle in unbelievers, Ames argues that this 
struggle “...is not the striving of the spirit against the flesh but that of flesh fearing against 
flesh inordinately desiring” (I.xxix.37). Ames is ever careful to maintain a strict 
distinction between the psychology of believer and unbeliever.
Maintaining the assertion that sin affects the “whole man,” Ames argued that the 
sin that remains in the believer “...is not only in the ineiting and sensory appetite [i.e., in 
the body], but in the will and reason itself [i.e., in the soul], 1 Thess. 5:23” (I.xxix.32). 
Although Ames’s theology pits “flesh” against “spirit,” which recapitulates the classical 
Greek antimony, we also see that Ames’s psychology does not argue that one part of the 
human mind is better than another (as did Plato, for example; see Cooper). Sin 
influences the “whole man,” body and mind.
Finally, although “...the best works of the saints are so corrupted by this flesh that 
some remission is needed” (l.xxix.34), “...the good works of the regenerate are not to be 
called sin; rather they are said to be defiled with sin” (l.xxix.35). Because the believer 
trusts in the righteousness of Christ (and not her own), that is, “Because of justification, 
the defilement of good works does not prevent their being accepted and rewarded by 
God” (l.xxix.36).
Glorification: Heaven on Earth. Given the imperfections of sanctification for 
believers, Ames calls this process of sanetifieation “a just and honorable good” (p. 171). 
Believers are capable, however, of experiencing the perfections of heaven, even in the 
present life. This experience of “perfect and exalted good” is called “glorification,” 
which is “... the real change in man from misery, or the punishment of sin, to eternal 
happiness. Rom. 8:30, Those whom he justified he also glorified’ (l.xxx.l). “Since the
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starting point is misery or the punishment of sin, [glorification] is called [in the 
Scriptures] redemption, 1 Cor. 1:30...” (I.xxx.3), and “redemption is a real deliverance 
from the evils of punishment, which is actually nothing but the carrying out of the 
sentence of justification.” While justification involves being “...pronounced just and 
awarded the judgment of life,” glorification is the “actual possession” of what is awarded 
and pronounced in justification (I.xxx.4).
Ames argues that glorification has several steps, the first of which is “...the 
apprehension and sense of the love of God...” (I.xxx.8). The second stage of glorification 
is the “...undoubting hope and expectation of the enjoyment of all those good things 
which God has prepared for his own. Rom 5:2, We rejoice under the hope o f the glory o f  
God” (I.xxx.lO). In this section, Ames unpacks a Puritan doctrine of assurance of 
salvation. While all believers have objective certainty of salvation, only some attain to 
subjective certainty. This certainty has certain fruits, e.g., “...consolation, peace, and 
unspeakable joy...” which Ames details. The third stage of glorification “...is the 
possession of spiritual gifts of grace in overflowing abundance...” (I.xxx.27), which 
would undoubtedly include the gift of fi^eedom of will to the good, although Ames does 
not mention it explicitly. The fourth stage of glorification “...is the experience of God’s 
benevolenee or good will...” (I.xxx.29), which includes “...God’s fatherly providence 
whereby he watches ever over the faithful for good...” (I.xxx.30), and the sense that 
“...all things work together for the good of God’s children, Romans 8:28” (I.xxx.31).
The final stage is “perfect glorification,” which involves “...the taking away of 
every imperfeetion from soul and body and the bestowal of total perfection” (I.xxx.33). 
Perfect glorification “...is granted to the soul immediately after the separation from the
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body, 2 Cor. 5 : 2 . . .It is not ordinarily granted to the soul and body together until that last 
day when all the faithful shall in one moment he perfected in Christ, Eph. 4:13; Phil.
3 :2 0 , 2 1 ” (I.XXX.34). Included in this perfection would he the perfection of will, in which 
the Christian, forever freed from sin, continually wills the good.
The Community, and Communities, of the Willing 
Although the application of Christ through calling, adoption, justification, 
sanctification and glorification is granted to individuals, the Puritans did not believe that 
Christ could he appropriated individualistically. This community orientation of Puritan 
theology served to sustain the particularity of Puritan belief, and, by implication, the 
faculty psychology of will. As was the case with the person and work of Christ, some of 
the details to follow do not deal with the will per se. Yet all of these things are relevant 
to the way in which Puritans thought about moral community. The Puritan story included 
details about how the story should he preserved. And, as I argued in the Introduction, 
moral community or culture, by preserving and reinforcing particular standards, are a 
necessity in the successful implementation of any moral endeavor. Surely the Puritan 
moral culture was one of the factors which historically had sustained the topic of the will 
in America, at least for a time. We will notice, however, a conspicuous absence of such 
communal and cultural considerations in the texts of Edwards, Upham, and James.
The subject of the application of Christ, Ames argued, is the church (rather than 
the individual believer), although this church is admittedly composed of “individual men” 
(I.xxxi.l). The church is, however, more than the subject of redemption. It is also the 
effect of redemption. The church does not somehow precede calling, which results in 
“...union and communion with Christ;” rather, “it is the church of Christ because it is
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united to Christ” (I.xxxi.2, italics mine). Indeed, since the New Testament word 
“church” is etymologically related to the word “calling,” the church is “...constituted by 
calling, whence both its name and definition” (I.xxxi.6, italics mine). Since union with 
Christ characterizes the church as well as the individual believer, the one and the many 
are reconciled: “ .. .believing men, on the one hand, are individuals called by God; on the 
other, they are collectively the company which is the church of God” (I.xxxi.l4). As the 
church is defined by the redemption (calling, adoption, etc.) described above, it is 
therefore impossible to “...understand the nature of the church unless we first perceive 
and explain the things which have to do with the application of Christ” (I.xxxi.3).
The church is a community which receives its identity by virtue o f its common 
relation to Christ. “Because the end of calling is faith and the work of faith is grafting 
into Christ, and this union brings with it communion with Christ, the church can be 
defined “as a company of believers, a company of those who are in Christ, and a 
company of those who have communion with him” (I.xxxi.7). Similarly, the church is 
defined by the object of its attention and affection. “Faith looks to Christ and through 
Christ to God; likewise the church which exists by faith looks to Christ as its head and 
though Christ to God...” (I.xxxi.8, see I.xxxi.ll). The relation of Christ and church is 
“so intimate,” that Christ must not only be considered as being in the church, and the 
church in Christ, but the church is even “...mystically called Christ, 1 Cor. 12:12, and the 
Fullness o f Christ, Eph. 1:23” (I.xxxi.l 5). Christ is the source of the church’s virtue and 
growth, and “...is the beginning honor, life, power, perfection in the church” (I.xxxi.17).
The doctrine of the church contained components that may have conduced to both 
Enlightenment and democratic belief. For one, the church “...embraces believers of all
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nations, of all places, and of all times” and is therefore called catholic (I.xxxi.l9).
Despite the sharp differentiation between saint and sinner, Puritan ecclesiology did also 
contain the belief that there indeed was a universal, international community of like- 
minded believers, and that, in the end, this community would be perfected and victorious. 
It is a small but significant change to argue that the community of like-minded believers 
might be perfected and victorious in this life.
Although the universalistic seeds for Enlightenment may have been found in 
Puritan thinking, these seeds could not grow in the soil of Puritan community and 
theology. The victory of the church is constrained by the will of God and by sin. Before 
Christ’s return, the chmch is “militant,” and “...knows only of a communion begun and 
so still struggles with enemies in the battlefield of this world...” (I.xxxi.22). Only after 
Christ’s return is the church “triumphant” and “perfected” (I.xxxi.23). Further, 
grandiosity was held in check by the distinction between the “invisible and visible” 
militant church (I.xxxi.24). Invisibility applies to the “essential and internal form” while 
visibility has to do with “its accidental and external form” (I.xxxi.25). The essential form 
is “a relation which cannot be perceived by the senses” (I.xxxi.26), while the accidental 
form is “easily perceived by sense,” and is defined by the “outward profession of faith...” 
(I.xxxi.27). Distinguishing between God-ordained institutional activity, i.e., the “outward 
profession of faith” in individual communities, and the true relation which these 
institutions were meant to embody left the Puritans with a sense that their own 
communities could be forgeries. In other words, it was possible that the community 
could profess faith, but lack the inward and invisible relation to Christ that the 
community claimed to possess. Nevertheless, it was possible to discern true and healthy
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churches from false churches, hased upon “the profession” of individual churches. This 
is illustrated by the distinction between the “manifest” and the “hidden” visible church 
(I.xxxi.32). The visible church is manifest when “...a greater number of saints exist and 
profession is freer and more public” (I.xxxi.33), and the church is hidden when “the 
number is fewer and profession less open. This is likely to occur in time of heresies, 
persecutions, or godless morality” (I.xxxi.34). Consistent with Ames’s dichotomization 
of theology into faith and observance, profession cannot he reduced to affirming correct 
doctrine. “Profession depends not only upon confession and the preaching of the word, 
but also upon the receiving of it and devout obedience to it” (I.xxxi.36). So, while the 
possibility that the community of the willing be fraudulent, lacking the inner reality of 
vital union with Christ, the Puritans also had a strong sense of what was needed to sustain 
this community. Doctrine and observance would need to he strictly maintained. The 
Puritans also took comfort in the belief that while the church is “subject to changes” it 
will never fail (I.xxxi.37), “for Christ must always have his kingdom in the midst of his 
enemies until he makes his enemies his footstool” (I.xxxi.38).
Finally, the theology of the church, or the community of believers, also contained 
moral prescriptions. The church was to engage in acts of communion with Christ, which 
had to do with presenting themselves to God and seeking his glory (I.xxxi.29), and also 
acts of communion with fellow believers, having to do with striving “...to do good to 
each other” (I.xxxi.30). Further, since God had not revealed precisely who were the 
elect, the kindness of the faith community was to be extended to all people. “Many acts 
of this kind are to be performed towards those who are not yet members of the church, for 
they ought to be judged as belonging to it potentially” (I.xxxi.31).
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Thus far, Ames’s doctrine of the church is very abstract. In his discussion 
concerning the “institution” of the church, he lays out the theology undergirding the 
establishment of particular expressions of the broader, universal church. Though the 
church is “catholic,” and includes all believers everywhere, the church is “visible” at the 
local level, “...both individually in its single members and collectively in its companies or 
congregations” (I.xxxii.l). Each individual, “particular” congregation is properly called a 
“church” (I.xxxii.3), and is “...a species of the church as a genus...” (I.xxxii.5).
Intentional community was a must. “Believers do not make a particular 
church.. .unless they are joined together by a special bond among themselves”
(I.xxxii.l4). “This bond is a covenant, expressed or implicit, by which believers bind 
themselves individually to perform all those duties toward God and toward one another 
which relate to the purpose.. .of the church and its edification” (I.xxxii.l5). “Therefore, 
no one is rightly admitted to the church except on confession of faith and promise of 
obedience” (I.xxxii.l7).
The covenant to join a church is strictly distinguished from the “covenant to make 
a city or some civil society...” A passage that would evidently be taken seriously in New 
England, Ames argues that “the same men may make a city or political society and not a 
church; or a church and not a city; or both a church and a city” (I.xxxii.l9). In any 
permutation, the distinction is clearly important.
Although the “secondary causes” of human effort and activity is required in 
establishing a particular church, the church is still “...instituted by God and by Christ 
alone” for the express reason that “...men have no power in themselves to institute or 
frame a church for Christ...” (I.xxxii.23). While human covenant is necessary in this
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institution, the church, Ames argues, “always depends upon him [Christ] as the head.. 
(I.xxxii.25), and follows Christ’s “ordinances” carefully (I.xxxii.26).
When a particular church faithfully relies upon and oheys Christ, the church can 
always expect God’s blessing to follow. Ames takes this reassuring belief to a strongly 
anti-individualistic conclusion. Since “ .. .the ordinances of Christ always have God’s 
blessing with them...” it follows that “...an ampler and surer blessing of God may be 
expected in the instituted church of God than is found in any solitary life” (I.xxxii.27). 
“Therefore, those who have opportunity to join the church and neglect it .. .can scarcely 
be counted believers truly seeking the kingdom of God” (I.xxxii.28). Community was 
not an optional requirement for the Puritan.
The Earthlv Means of Restoration 
The discussion of the institution of the church completes Ames’s discussion of the 
application of redemption. Turning then to the “way of application” (I.xxxiii. 1), Ames 
elaborates upon “...those means whereby the Spirit bestows Christ and all his benefits on 
us for our salvation” (I.xxxiii.2). These means are well-suited to the sustenance of moral 
community, as well as the continued sanctification of the will of the godly. The means 
Ames discusses depend upon the Holy Spirit, rather than having inherent power to 
“communicate grace.” “Therefore, although external means naturally concur and operate 
in the preparation of man to receive grace, yet in themselves they do not properly confer 
grace. It is the Spirit that works together with them, I Cor. 3:7, Neither is he that plants 
anything nor he that waters, but god who gives power to increase" (I.xxxiii.3). Even the 
means of grace serve as a reminder of human weakness and need of God’s grace. Ames 
dichotomizes the means of grace into “the ministry” and “the holy signs.” Somewhat
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awkwardly he notes that “ecclesiastical discipline” must also he “added” to the means of 
grace (I.xxxiii.4).
The ministry, Ames descrihes as “...an ecclesiastical function in which a man, 
being singled out, is responsible by special right for holy things...” (I.xxxiii.5). These 
men do not single themselves out nor do they have the power to appoint by themselves 
other ministers. Instead, the power given to ministers “...is a power of acting only by 
command of Christ and out of obedience to him alone, 1 Cor. 4:1,2” (I.xxxiii.6). 
Ministers do not possess “the spiritual or regal power of self-rule whereby one works in 
freedom and by his own choice...” which belongs to “...Christ alone” (I.xxxiii.7). The 
will of the minister is rather to be submitted to the will of God. Ministerial power, 
furthermore, is “relative” (I.xxxiii. 10), and “...depends upon calling, Heb. 5:4, No one 
takes this honor to himself except he that is called o f god as was Aaron’’ (I.xxxiii.14). 
Calling in turn depends upon “fitness for the ministry” (I.xxxiii. 15), which “...arises from 
a fit measure of gifts and a ready will to imdertake and execute the office” (xxxiii.17). 
The end of the ministry is the holy activity (i.e., holy volition) of the church, and 
endeavors to make the church “fit to do all the works which pertain to the good of the 
whole” (I.xxxiii. 18). This Puritan understanding of ministerial power can he understood 
as a stepping stone between monarchy and democracy, being “...altogether monarchical 
in respect to Christ as the king and the head. But in respect to the visible system of 
administration, it is of a mixed nature; partly aristocratic, so to speak, and partly 
democratic” (I.xxxiii.20) Ames’s congregational polity becomes manifest here, “There is 
no place for hierarchy, only “hieroduly or sacred service” (I.xxxiii.21). Further, each 
minister “depends directly upon Christ” that is, is not “subject to the power of another”
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(I.xxxiii.22), thereby ruling out presbyteries or synods as authoritative ruling bodies. 
Clearly, although American Puritanism did sustain moral communities, the training of the 
Puritan will did not require vast institutional infrastructure.
Ames makes a crucial distinction between “extraordinary” and “ordinary” 
(I.xxxiii.23), which served to explain the authority of the Puritan minister, and to connect 
this authority to the history of the Christian church. The extraordinary ministry were the 
apostles, prophets, and evangelists of the New Testament era (I.xxxiii.37), who served to 
place the church on firm foundations. Ames describes this ministry as “...one which has 
a certain higher and more perfect direction than can be attained through the ordinary 
means” (I.xxxiii.24). Extraordinary ministers serve “without error” (I.xxxiii.25), are 
called by God alone (I.xxxiii.26), and that calling is “direct” rather than mediated through 
people (I.xxxiii.27). The necessity for the extraordinary ministry is found in human 
weakness and need, “...because that will of God to which living well to God is directed 
could not be discovered by human industry or any ordinary means used in other arts and 
sciences. But it required men who were stirred up and sent by God...” (I.xxxiii.29).
From the point of view of the Puritan, the role of the extraordinary ministers was 
to leave the Holy Scriptures: “extraordinary ministers were raised up by God to instruct 
the churches not only orally, but also by divine writings...” These writings would allow 
the church to continue to benefit from their ministry “...even when such ministers no 
longer remained” (I.xxxiv.l). Due to the directing hand of God, the apostolic writings 
were “free from all error,” (I.xxxiv.2) and therefore completely reliable. Ames argues 
that the Holy Spirit inspired the writings in such a way that “what the authors have 
committed to writing, in terms of its substance and chief end is nothing else than the
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revealed word of God, which is the rule of faith and morals” (I.xxxiv.lO). Both the 
subject and object of the Holy Scripture is God’s will: “It is called Holy Scripture.. .partly 
because of its subject and its object, which is the true and saving will of God...”
(I.xxxiv.l 3).
Ames, like all Puritans, affirmed that the Scriptures, like their Author, are 
absolutely sufficient, “all things necessary to salvation are contained in the Scriptures and 
also those things necessary for the instruction and edification of the church...”
(I.xxxiv.l 5). “Therefore, Scripture is not a partial but a perfect rule of faith and 
morals...” (I.xxxiv.16). Part of the perfection of scripture is the way its style “...best fits 
the common usage of all sorts of men...” by using “...stories, examples, precepts, 
exhortations, admonitions, and promises,” rather than, “universal and scientific rules.” 
And, perhaps the greatest praise that Ames could offer the scriptures is that the style of 
the scripture “...greatly affects the will by stirring up pious motives, which is the chief 
end of theology” (I.xxxiv.l 9).
Since the scriptures were sufficient to inflame men’s wills, the minister needed to 
adequately convey this power and to guard against hiding this power from his flock. 
Ames’s discussion of the “ordinary ministry” is therefore tied tightly to the ministry of 
preaching. Ames defines the ordinary ministry as that “...which receives all of its 
direction from the will o f God revealed in the Scriptures and from those means which 
God has appointed in the church for its continual edification” (I.xxxv.l). The purpose of 
this ministry is to “ .. .preserve, propagate, and renew the church through regular means” 
(I.XXXV.9). Since ministers depend upon the scriptures, they depend upon the 
extraordinary ministers (I.xxxv.4). Further, unlike the extraordinary ministers, the calling
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of the ordinary ministry is indirect (I.xxxv.5), through the means of the church, which 
chooses men who, appearing as suitable (I.xxxv.7), are given a “lawful examination” in 
order to test the authenticity of their calling (I.xxxv.8).
More directly related to the topic of volition, ordinary ministers are given to move 
the wills of the members of the church through preaching. Preaching the biblical 
message “...is of utmost importance...” which is evidenced by the fact of its “...continuous 
use in the church” (I.xxxv.l 1). The preacher is called “to set forth the will of God out of 
the word for the edification of the hearers” (I.xxxv.l 2).
In order to assure that his readers (many of which at Harvard and Yale would 
become preachers) would become effective preachers of the word, Ames lays down 
several principles geared toward the inflaming of the believer’s will. It is imperative, 
Ames argued, that the preacher earnestly desire the edification of the church (I.xxxv.l 3). 
Further, he needs to keep “each individual” in his congregation in mind, not just the 
group (I.XXXV.14). Turning aside to “trivial points” that hinder edification is to be 
avoided (I.xxxv.l 5). The minister himself should strive to be saturated in the Bible, or, 
as Apollos was declared to be in the book of Acts, “mighty in the Scriptures” (I.xxxv.l 6) 
To “set forth” God’s will in a winsome manner, Ames instructs the aspiring 
minister that “...two things are necessary: First, the things contained in the [biblical] text 
[to be preached] must be stated; second, they must be applied to the consciences of the 
hearers as their condition seems to require. 1 Tim. 6:17...” (I.xxxv.l7). More 
specifically, “In setting forth the truth in the text the minister should first explain it and 
then indicate the good which follows from it. The first part is concemed with doctrines 
and proofs; the latter with application...” (I.xxxv.l9). Ames warns his students that the
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hearer may not be edified if  this pattern is not followed (I.xxxv.20). In a manner that 
recalls the Puritan distrust o f  merely speculative knowledge, Ames insists that “each 
doctrine when sufficiently explained should immediately be applied to its u se .. 
(I.XXXV.29). A minister sins when he limits his discussion to “...the naked finding and 
explanation o f  the truth...” To limit the sermon to mere doctrine is to neglect “...the use 
and practice in which religion and blessedness consist. Such preachers edify the 
conscience little or not at all” (I.xxxv.30). Further, the minister is not to elucidate 
esoteric doctrines from a given passage, but only those which seem “most necessary” are 
to be preached ( I.xxxv.31). The minister should use logical order to assist the memory 
(I.XXXV.33).
Application, which should follow doctrine (I.xxxv.44), aims “...to sharpen and 
make specially relevant some general truth with such effect that it may pierce the minds 
of those present with the stirring up of godly affections” (I.xxxv.45). Ames elaborates 
thus:
Men are to be pricked to the quick so that they feel individually what the Apostle 
said, namely, that the word of the Lord is a two-edged sword, piercing to the 
inward thought and affections and through to the joining of bones and marrow. 
Preaching, therefore, out not to be dead, but alive and effective.. . ( I.xxxv.46) 
Anything that might prevent the hearer from being “pricked to the quick” are to be 
avoided. “Stories known only to the learned ought [not].. .be mixed in .. .Much less 
should words or sentences in Latin, Greek, or Hebrew be used which the people do not 
understand” (I.xxxv.55). Likewise, a “show of learning” is to be avoided in preaching 
(I.XXXV.57). Effective preaching requires total commitment and consecration to the task:
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Speech and action should be completely spiritual, flowing from the very heart. 
They should show a man well versed in the Scriptures and in pious exercises, who 
has first persuaded himself and thoroughly settled in his own conscience those 
things to which he would persuade others, and in whom, finally, there is zeal, 
charity, mildness, freedom, and humility mixed with solemn authority.
(I.XXXV.60)
Further, “pronunciation must be natural, familiar, clear, and distinct so that it can be 
easily understood. It should fit the matter in such a way that the affections are moved...” 
(I.XXXV.61). The affections are hindered by two “offensive” styles, i.e., speaking too fast 
(I.XXXV.63) or too slow (I .x x x v .6 2 ) , both of which are to be avoided. “The sum of the 
matter...” Ames argued, “...is that nothing is to be allowed which dos not contribute to the 
spiritual edification of the people, and nothing omitted by which we may surely reach 
that end” (I .x x x v .6 7 ) .
The second means whereby the Spirit of God applies Christ and his benefits “...is 
found in the signs, or symbols” (I.xxxvi.l). Ames defines “sign” as “...something 
perceptible to the senses which, beyond the appearance of the thing it brings directly to 
the senses, at the same time makes something else come to mind” (I.xxxvi.2). The aspect 
of this discussion most relevant to volition has to do with “sealing” signs. Ames 
distinguishes “sealing” signs from “informing” and “reminding” signs:
In reference to end and use, [a sign] either serves the understanding and is called an 
informing sign; or it serves the memory and is called a reminding sign; or it serves faith 
and is called a sealing sign; or lately it may serve all of these together (I.xxxvi.7). Given 
that “the understanding” is usually contrasted with “the will,” one might have expected
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Ames to have said that sealing signs serve the will. Yet, since Ames argues that the will 
is the sine qua non of faith, he did not need to explicitly name the faculty. Sealing signs, 
by serving faith, arouse the will to cling to and lean upon the “thing” signified.
This definitional work finally takes the reader to the topic of the sacraments.
Signs that seal “the covenant of God” are called sacraments (I.xxxvi.lO). In the new 
covenant, the “thing” signified is “...is the new covenant itself, or Christ himself with all 
the blessings which are prepared in him for the faithful” (I.xxxvi.23). Although “ .. .some 
sacraments more expressly represent some dimension or aspect of this covenant than 
others...” (I.xxxvi.24), all the sacraments “...have this in common.. .they seal the whole 
covenant of grace to believers” (I.xxxvi.25). Further, “taking the sacraments symbolizes 
the union we have with God in Christ and the communion we hold with all those who are 
partakers of the same union, especially with those who are members of the same church” 
(I.xxxvi.34). Taking the sacraments, and being reminded of the blessings of imion with 
Christ, the will of the believing community is renewed in “...thankfulness and 
obedience...” (I.xxxvi.31). Ames later explains that the covenant of grace was sealed 
through sacraments in the Old and New Testaments. In the New Testament, the 
sacraments are “baptism and the Lord’s Supper” (I.xl.3).
Previously, Ames had dichotomized the means of grace into “the ministry” and 
“the holy signs.” He then tacked on “ecclesiastical discipline” (I.xxxiii.4). Ames’s 
discussion of discipline reveals that he considered discipline a crucial aspect of churchly 
life [“Therefore, discipline is usually associated by the best theologians with the word 
and sacraments in the marks of the church” (I.xxxvii.3)], and, parenthetically, that Ramist 
dichotomization did not always serve Ames well. Discipline, like preaching and the
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sacraments, had to do with conforming the will of God’s people to the will of God.
“Holy discipline is an application of the will of God to persons through censure to guard 
against offenses or remove them from the church of God” (I.xxxvii.l). While preaching 
sets forth the will of God “...to beget and increase faith and obedience” and while the 
sacraments apply the will of God to “...confirm faith and obedience,” discipline applies 
the will of God to “...remove the vices contrary to true faith and obedience” (I.xxxvii.2). 
Each of these means of grace, by begetting, increasing, confirming and purifying faith, 
have, by Ames’s definition of faith, the human will in view.
Discipline was yet another acknowledgment and provision for manifold Christian 
weaknesses, “discipline.. .is a wholesome remedy for the wounds and diseases to which 
the sheep of Christ are subject, 1 Cor. 5:5” (I.xxxvii.8). Contrasted to human weakness, 
Christ’s kingship (I.xxxvii.lO) which “represses sin” (I.xxxvii.l3) is involved in 
discipline, although Ames sadly reported that many churches “refuse to receive the whole 
kingship of Christ...” (I.xxxvii.l 1). Finally, discipline, aiming at the renewal and 
purification of the believer’s faith and will, finds its primary expression in “Christian 
correction,” although excommxmication is an option. “Discipline eonsists not only or 
even chiefly in the thunderbolt of excommunication and anathema, but primarily in 
Christian correction” (I.xxxvii.l5).
Recall from chapter I that the “old eovenant” was made with Adam, and 
promised life for obedience and death for disobedience. The “new covenant,” discussed 
earlier in this chapter, provided not only a promise of life, but also provided “...all the 
means of life” (italics mine, I.xxiv. 18). Since the human will had lost all ability to do 
good due to Adam’s sin, the old covenant was no longer a viable way of salvation. The
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new covenant, or “covenant of grace” was the means by which impotent sinners could be 
saved by God’s initiative through the application of Christ. Believing the Bible to have 
one message, Ames argues that the covenant of grace existed before the coming of Christ, 
and is therefore to be found in the Old Testament, as well as the new. Despite this 
continuity, “...the manner of the application of Christ or the administration of the new 
covenant has not always been so. It has varied...” (I.xxxviii.l, italics mine). Through 
time, the covenant of grace was declared with more clarity, “ .. .there has always been a 
progression from the imperfect to the more perfect” (I.xxxviii.2). Initially, “...the 
mystery of the gospel was manifested in a general and obscure way and later more 
specifically and clearly (I.xxxviii.3). The manner of the application of Christ is 
“twofold.” In one dispensation, the administration of the covenant “...points to the Christ 
who will appear...” while the other administration points “...to the Christ who has 
appeared” (I.xxxviii.4). “The Old and New Testaments are reducible to these two 
primary heads. The Old promises Christ to come and the New testifies that he has come” 
(I.xxxviii.5). Ames then attempts to show that the application of Christ can be found 
throughout the Old Testament. Admittedly, administration of the covenant of grace was 
“rude and loose” before Moses (I.xxxviii.l2), but “from Adam to Abraham” the gospel of 
Christ was nevertheless proclaimed through the promise that the seed of the woman 
would crush the head of Satan in Gen. 3 (I.xxxviii.l4). During this time, the benefits of 
the application of Christ, i.e., calling, justification, adoption, sanctification and 
glorification were all proclaimed (I.xxxviii.l 4-18). “From the time of Abraham...” 
(I.xxxviii.20), the “benefits of the new covenant were all more clearly and distinctly 
witnessed to than before” (I.xxxviii.21). Again, election, redemption, calling,
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justification, adoption, sanctification and glorification were all present (I.xxxviii.22-28). 
Similarly, from the time of Moses to Christ, redemption, justification, adoption, 
sanctification and glorification were all “set forth” (I.xxxviii.29-35).
After the appearance of Christ, the covenant of grace is administered in two 
dispensations, “...the one lasting until the end of the world and the other at the end itself.” 
(I.xxxix.l). The term “New Testament” has to do with the new administration of the 
covenant (I.xxxix.2), and so the New Testament is not new in essence, but only in form 
(I.xxxix.4), and has greater “clarity and freedom” than the Old (I.xxxix.6). The present 
administration of the covenant of grace includes freedom from the Old Testament 
ceremonial law which “forbade the use of some things in their nature indifferent.. .and 
[thereby] veiled the truth...” (I.xxxix.9). Further, “the application of the Spirit is more 
effectual and the gifts of the Spirit more perfect than they were ordinarily in the Old 
Testament” (I.xxxix.l2). The present administration is also no longer confined to “any 
one people” (I.xxxix.13). Given the perfection of this administration, “...it follows that 
the communion of saints in the church instituted according to the New Testament should 
be most perfect” (I.xxxix.l4).
The administration of the covenant of grace is, of course, through the church, and 
“ .. .a particular church should not consist of more members than may meet together in 
one place to hear the world of God, celebrate the sacraments, offer prayers, exercise 
discipline, and perform other duties of divine polity as one body” (I.xxxix.l 8). Given 
this primacy of the covenant community, Ames found the practice ““in some larger 
cities” of housing too many believers in one church abhorrent. In these cases, “...there
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are more believers than can hold communion together. It is a gross error leading to all 
sorts of confusion not to distribute them into several churches...” (I.xxxix.l 9).
In defense of a congregational polity, Ames challenges not only the Roman 
church (I.xxxix.20), but any “...national, provincial, or diocesan” form of government. 
“These forms were introduced by man from the pattern of civil government, especially 
Roman.” The biblical pattern is “...a parochial church or a church of one congregation; 
the members are united with each other and ordinarily meet in one place for the public 
exercise of religion” (I.xxxix.22). It is this local, contained unit that “...is properly 
signified by the word.. .church.” The New Testament does not give the word “a broader 
meaning...when it refers to a visible designated company” (I.xxxix.23). Therefore, 
“established congregations in the same country and province are [in the New Testament] 
...always called churches in the plural, never one church... (I.xxxix.24). And, although in 
the New Testament particular churches came together (I.xxxix.25), “nothing is read in all 
the New Testament about the establishment of any larger church upon which lesser 
congregations depend...” (I.xxxix.26). Ames thereby discards Presbyterianism. 
Nevertheless, “...particular churches.. .may and often should enter into covenant 
relationship and mutual association in classes and synods in order to enjoy common 
agreement and mutual help.. .but this combination does not constitute a new form of 
church...” (I.xxxix.27).
Given the equality and autonomy of individual churches, ordinary ministers are 
“elders of one congregation” not bishops of churches (I.xxxix.28), and are all equal 
(I.xxxix.29). The right of calling a minister is on the congregational level (I.xxxix.30),
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and “Episcopal ordination of a minister.. .without a church to which and in which he may 
be ordained is as ridiculous as trjdng to imagine a husband without a wife” (I.xxxix.35).
God’s provision for the whole church and all of human nature is manifested in the 
government of the local congregation. “Ordinary ministers are either pastors and 
teachers or ruling elders with whom are associated those who take care of the poor, 
namely deacons, deaconesses, or widows” (I.xxxix.37). The structuring of these offices 
is as if God had designed at least one office for each faculty of the soul:
By these offices Christ has sufficiently provided for all the necessities of the 
members of the church, so that they may be instructed in the knowledge of the 
truth especially by the teachers, stirred up to the practice of piety chiefly by the 
pastors, preserved in the course of life and called back to repentance for sins by 
them and the ruling elders, and helped in their poverty by the deacons” 
(I.xxxix.38).
Given that the pastors were charged with inflaming the will through preaching, and that 
the will is the principle subject of theology, the pastor occupied the highest position in the 
church.
The End of the World and the Perfection of the Will 
Ames closes the first part of the Marrow appropriately enough, by discussing “the 
end of the world.” The perfection of the administration of the covenant of grace, 
“...requires the coming and personal presence of Christ himself...” (I.xli.9). Ames here 
outlines better-known aspects of Christian theology. The second coming of Christ, which 
will be “ .. .attended with the greatest glory and power...” (I.xli.lO), will be followed by 
the separation of the godly and the ungodly (I.xli.ll), and body and soul will be
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resurrected (I.xli.l2). A “...sentence of life for the elect will be given according to their 
works, not as meritorious causes but as effects testifying to the true causes” (I.xli.26), and 
a “... sentence of death for reprobates will be given according to their works as true 
causes” (I.xli.27). “After the day of judgment Christ will remain king and mediator 
forever” (I.xli.34).
Ames also outlines lesser-known but more relevant aspects of Christian theology 
having to do with the end of the world. At the end of the world, the benefits of the 
application of Christ will reach their end. “...The end of calling will be reached by all 
who are called, for we are called to the eternal glory of god, 1 Peter 5:10” (I.xli.2). The 
justification of the elect will be completed in that “the sins of the faithful will not come 
into judgment. In this life they are covered and taken away by the sentence of 
justification.. .It would not be right that they should again be brought to light” (I.xli.22). 
Adoption will be manifested as the elect take “...possession of their inheritance...” 
(I.xli.4). Concerning sanctification, “...the image of God will be perfected in all the 
sanctified...” (I.xli.5). At creation, God denied this perfection to human beings, 
reserving it for the son of God only (I.viii.68). At the end of the world, however, Ames 
seems to argue that the elect, united to the perfect Son of God, attain to a perfection 
denied them even at creation. And, since the image of God has to do with possessing 
“...the faculties whereby [the soul] has freedom in its actions in the understanding and the 
will...” and also possessing “...gifts whereby man is rendered able and fit to live well...” 
This renewal is not for the soul only. At the end of the world, glorification will “...shine 
forth in all fullness, not only in the soul but also in the very body...” (I.xli.6). The end of 
the world marks a new and glorious beginning for the Christian pilgrim. Finally, the
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Christian is able to freely and perfectly walk in “wisdom, holiness, and righteousness” 
(I.viii.73).
Summary and Conclusion
Ames believed that the fall of Adam put human beings into a state of moral 
helplessness. Created to love and serve God, the human race now lacks the moral ability 
to do these very things. This sorry state was no surprise to God, who had from eternity 
past planned to redeem some of these sinners from their bondage. A crucial part of that 
redemption was to release the human will from its captivity to sin. Since redemption 
could not be accomplished by morally impotent sinners, a savior was needed, Jesus 
Christ.
Prior to the appearance of Jesus Christ, the Son of God existed as a member of the 
etemal Godhead, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This Son of God took flesh in the form of 
Jesus Christ, was perfect in intellect and will, and therefore held the promise of 
restoration of the human will. Christ came to fulfill the roles of a prophet, a priest and a 
king. One of the aspects of his kingly “office” was to rescue the elect from its 
powerlessness and bondage to sin.
There were certain other prerequisites for Christ to effect the moral 
transformation of the elect. Christ, the Son of God, was humiliated for the sake of the 
elect, undergoing the miseries of this life in their place. In addition to assuming human 
form, he satisfied divine justice by dying the cursed death of the cross. But Christ was 
also exalted, being raised from the dead, and ascending into heaven. All of these things 
he did for the glory of God and the salvation of the elect. Because Christ was punished.
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the elect will not be punished. Because Christ was raised from the dead, the elect will be 
raised from the dead, etc.
Yet, none of these things that Christ did for the elect actually help to transform the 
elect (including their wills) until Christ is “applied” to them. This application does not 
depend upon men’s free wills (for there is no such thing), but is initiated by God. Unlike 
Adam, who had to rely on his own strength to maintain favor with God, the elect rely on 
Christ’s strength and the certainty of his everlasting acceptance with God. Here again the 
glory of God is brought to the fore, and the weakness of humanity is highlighted.
The God of the Puritan Bible was a God of predestination, choosing from eternity 
past those to whom he would apply Christ. The predestination of God reveals the 
initiative and superiority of God. Since no sinner deserves this grace, the choice is 
entirely up to God. Still, predestination does not change the will of the elect. The actual 
change in the will and understanding of the elect begins with “calling,” or when the 
gospel of Christ is preached and the sinner is by grace given a new will to respond to that 
preached message. What happens in the call is that the helpless sinner is united to the 
exalted and perfected Christ. The union is first passive, so that the Godward inclination 
of Christ is given to the sinner’s will. Passively united to Christ, the sinner actively 
embraces this Christ for the first time. Thus possessed of a new will, the believer turns 
away from sin in repentance. Further, once united to Christ, a series of blessings accrue 
to the believer. First, the believer is accepted and pardoned by God, i.e., justified, not 
because of any change wrought in them, but because of Christ’s merit only. Second, 
since united to the Son of God, the believer is “adopted” as a child of God as well. Third, 
union with Christ leads to a progressive “sanctification” and renewal, which includes an
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imperfect but increasing holiness in the “heart” and will. Fourth, those united to Christ 
will to some extent in this life, and perfectly in the next, taste of the perfection that Christ 
purchased for them. A large part of that perfection is the perfection of their now sinful 
wills.
Ames moved on to a consideration of the church, or the community of the faith. 
Divinely ordained means of preserving the Puritan story through community are detailed 
here. Directions for beginning individual churches are given. The job description of the 
minister is elaborated, and Ames places great stress on the duty of the minister to move 
the hearts and wills of his congregation through preaching. Preaching tips designed to 
achieve that end are disclosed. The sacraments are described as “sealing signs” which 
are designed to increase the faith (and therefore wills) of the elect. The different offices 
of the church are described, and we leam that the office of pastor is especially designed 
with the wills of the membership in mind.
Finally, Ames closed the first Book of the Marrow with a consideration of the end 
of the world in which the souls of the elect, intellect and will, are perfected for all time.
Ames, having disclosed the manner in which God restores the dignity of 
efficiently to his creature, closes Book One of the Marrow of Theologv on a positive 
note. Still, Ames did not believe that the restoration of the saints’ efficiency was an end 
in itself. God united his people to his Son so that they may observe his commandments. 
So, in the next chapter we consider Book Two of the Marrow, in which Ames describes 
the basic principles of “observance,” or the duties which God requires of humanity, 
particularly redeemed humanity. In so doing we gain insight into Ames’s understanding 
of how a godly mind, particularly a godly will, worked.
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CHAPTER III
THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SAINTS
At the beginning of the Marrow, Ames claimed that theology is “the doctrine or 
teaching of living to God” (l.i.l), and, since living involves human action, “the first and 
proper subject of theology is the will” (l.i.9). The entire first Book of the Marrow 
(chapters one and two) bears out these assertions. Beginning with the primacy and 
efficiency of God’s will and the defacing of the human will through Adam’s sin (chapter 
1), Ames then discussed the way God renews the Ijuman will through the application of 
Christ in redemption. Yet something is still incomplete. In Book One, Ames discusses 
the prolegomena, the necessary requirements, of “living to God,” but he does not specify 
what living to God looks like. That is the purpose of the second book of the Marrow, to 
discuss the duties that God calls the redeemed to perform. Not surprisingly, Ames has 
much more to say about the will in this context as well.
Observance and Will 
Having discussed “faith in God” in Book One, Ames moves to discuss “the 
remaining part,” which is observance (ll.i.l). Just as the will of God initiated and 
designed the redemption of the elect, the will of God once again takes center stage. 
Observance “...holds the will of God as a pattern and rule...” (ll.i.2). Given all that 
Ames had said about the sovereignty of God, he makes an important qualification. The 
will of God in view here is not God’s “...secret, effectual, ordaining...” will, because 
“...all creatures.. .do the will of God [in that sense].” Rather, the will of God Ames is
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concemed with here is God’s moral will, or “...the will of God which prescribes our 
duty...” (II.i.3).
The human will, once again, moves to center stage. First, the posture of the 
human will is involved in observance. Enlisting the human will to serve (II.i.6) the 
divine will necessarily “...means our will is Submissive... ” to God. The demarcation 
between obedience and disobedience is also found in the posture of the will. An action 
can be called obedient when the will “...is made ready to bring the command of God, 
which has been heard or in some way perceived, into execution” (II.i.5). An obedient 
will is also eager and cheerful to do God’s will (II.i.36), and is zealous for God (II.i.37). 
Secondly, the goal of the human will is involved: “Observance applies our will to 
accomplish the will of God...” (II.i.4). Finally, observance affirms the primacy (in terms 
of importance) of the human will: “The principal subject of observance is the will, as it is 
in living faith. Phil. 2:13, It is God that works in you, both to will and to do ” (II.i.35).
Obedience brings about the highest form of human existence, for “from this 
submission to the will of God comes a necessary conformity of the will of God and ours. 
Rev. 2:6...” To will what God wills is to be an “image of divine perfection...” (II.i.8), and 
to partake of'''holiness because it takes the pure form and shape of God’s will” (II.i.9). 
Observance also restores the original telos of life, looking always “...to the glory of 
God....” (Il.i.lO), leaning always “toward God” as its end (II.i.l2).
This source of this obedience is paradoxical. Clearly, for Ames the Adamic will 
cannot obey God. Obedience issues from the redeemed will only, yet this will is 
continually assisted by divine grace. “The principle efficient cause of observance as an 
inner, abiding principle is indirectly faith and directly sanctifying grace” (II.i.l3). In
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Ames’s thinking both faith and sanctifying grace arc found in the redeemed soul, 
particularly the redeemed will.
Faith itself is an act of the will. It may be recalled from chapter 1, faith always 
includes the understanding, yet it is not a “mere act of the intellect.” Rather, the thing 
differentiating an act of mere “assent to evidence” and true faith is the will (I.iii.2). Since 
it is the will of the believer, faith must be considered the believer’s action. Ames makes 
a similar point when contrasting faith and observance early in Marrow. Faith and 
observance are “...distinguished in the order of nature, so that faith holds the first place 
and spiritual observance the second, for no vital actions or life are forthcoming except 
where there is an inborn principle of life” (I.ii.5). In other words, faith originates in the 
believer, through an “inborn principle of life.” This inborn principle refers to the passive 
reception of Christ, discussed in chapter two, wherein “a spiritual principle of grace is 
generated in the will of man” (II.xxvi.21). This “inborn principle of life” is roughly 
equivalent to the “sanctifying grace” mentioned above, which “...is the very power by 
which we are lifted up to accommodate our will to the will of God.” The fact that this 
grace is a property of the renewed soul is evidenced by Ames’s reference to “the new 
man and the new creature, Eph. 4:24; Gal. 6:15” (II.i.I6), which have to do with the 
regenerated soul, or “the restoration of the image or life of God in man” (I.xxix.24).
On the other hand, obedience flows directly from God. In Book One, Ames 
argued that “...the final dependence of faith, as it designates the act of believing, is on the 
operation and inner persuasion of the Holy Spirit. I Cor. 12:3, No one can say Jesus is 
Lord except by the Holy Spirit" (I.iii.l2). Similarly, Ames argues that faith results in 
obedience by drawing upon a power outside of itself:
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Faith brings forth obedience in three ways. First it apprehends Christ who is the 
fountain of li fe and the spring of all power to do well; second, it receives and 
acquiesces in the arguments which God has set forth in Scripture to induce 
obedience, namely, promises and threatenings; third, it has power to obtain all 
grace, especially that grace which occasions obedience. (II.i.15)
So obedience flows from within the believer, yet in three ways obedience is said 
to flow from a source outside the believer. First, Christ is the “fountain” and “spring” of 
this obedience, second, Scripture is required to move the will, and third, the will through 
faith must look outside of itself to “induce obedience.” Ames pulls together the two 
poles of this paradox (i.e., that the will is the source of obedience, and God is the source 
of obedience) in one statement: “For since sin came, man cannot of himself do anything 
acceptable to God.. .except it be done in Christ through faith and sanctifying grace. John 
15:4, 5, Without me you can do nothing^’ (II.i.l7). Faith and sanctifying grace, as shown 
above, belong somehow to the believer’s soul, yet the exercise these abilities is 
considered evidence, as Christ said, that apart from him the believer has no spiritual 
ability whatsoever.
The point is not trivial. The Puritans were concerned with avoiding two spiritual 
dangers, and used this paradox in an attempt to avoid these dangers. The first danger was 
perceived autonomy. The Puritans insisted that God was the source of all good. If they 
held only to the idea that believers possess an autonomous “spiritual principle of grace” 
(even if granted that this principle is given by God) this could lead to the dangerous 
assumption that dependence upon God’s help was no longer necessary in obedience.
This assumption would lead to human arrogance and undermine God’s glory. The
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second danger was passivity. The importance of obedient observance of God’s will is 
central to Ames’s theology. If the Puritans simply stressed dependence upon God’s 
intervention, they may simply have been tempted to “wait around” until God zapped 
them into action. The paradox'* is succinctly summarized in St. Paul’s assertion “I 
worked...yet not I” (1 Cor. 10:15).
Obedience requires more than a renewed will sustained by divine assistance, 
however. In order for the human will to conform itself to the divine will, it also needs to 
know what this will is, “Knowledge of this will is necessary for true obedience...” 
(II.i.25). This will is simply summarized in the ten commandments, or “....the 
decalogue” (II.i.20). Before turning to the explication of this will of God, be reminds bis 
readers, once again, of the paradox of observance, albeit from a slightly different angle: 
Our obedience is not the chief or meritorious cause of eternal life. For by grace 
we receive both the right to this life and also the life itself as a gift of God through 
Christ apprehended by faith.. .Yet our obedience is in a certain way the 
ministering, helping, or furthering cause of possessing this life (the right to which 
we have already been given), and in this sense it is called the way by which we 
walk to heaven...” (II.i.30)
In other words, the Christian does not obey God fo r  salvation, but rather obeys from  
salvation. And yet obeying/rom salvation also serves to further salvation. And, Ames 
adds, although this obedience is flawed by the sin remaining in the believer, it is still
'*! think Pahl (1992) is right to highlight the importance o f Paradox in debate over the will, yet I think he 
may actually misrepresent the true nature o f  this paradox. Determinism and indeterminism were not the 
poles o f the paradox. Rather, divine and human determinism were the poles.
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graciously accepted by God because of the believer’s union and identification with 
Christ, the only fully obedient buman (II.i.32).
“There are two elements in observance: virtue and virtuous action.. (Il.ii.l). 
“Virtue is a condition or habit [habitus'] by which the will is inclined to do well” (II.ii.4). 
This is “...distinguished from a vicious habit which inclines men towards evil, Rom. 7:17, 
20, 23” (II.ii.8). Virtuous habits do not render the “constitution of mind” perfect in any 
way, but rather signify “a general state of mind” or “disposition.” People differ in terms 
of the relative “perfection” of their habits (II.ii.5). A habit “...makes the subject behave in 
a certain manner, i.e., it moves the faculty, which otherwise would not be so moved, 
toward good” (II.ii.6).
Ames is very concerned with demonstrating that virtue is found in the will, giving 
eight reasons why this is so. First, since theology is the doctrine of living to God, and the 
will is “...the true beginning of life and of spiritual action,” it follows that “...the will is 
the true subject of theology...” Since virtue is an inclination to moral action and therefore 
an important part of “living to God,” it follows that virtue is located in the will (II.ii.7).
Second, since “...the will is that faculty which is truly carried toward a worthy 
good, Rom. 7:19, 21,” and virtue is an inclination toward good, it follows that virtue has 
to do most especially with the will. Third, virtue is “ .. .an elective habit, whose direct 
function is voluntary choice.” Fourth, since “...the will commends [sic] the other 
faculties...” virtue must belong to the will in order to influence these other faculties.
Fifth, the will does not in itself incline to the good’ ,^ nor does reason assure that it will
19 This reminds me o f Edwards’ assertion that there is no self-determining will. Implied is the idea that the 
will is still the will even when it is govemed by habit. WJ would say that it isn’t volitional any longer.
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move toward the good. Therefore, the will “...needs its own internal disposition to work 
correctly.” Sixth, the other faculties, being “...subject to outside compulsion...” could 
lose the virtue within them apart from the action of the will. The implication of the idea 
that virtue could be lost apart from the choice of the agent is that moral responsibility 
would he overtmned. Seventh, praise for moral behavior is ascribed to both the will and 
to virtue, and so they must be related to each other. Finally, the intellect “...cannot be the 
subject of virtue because intellectual habits, though most perfect, do not make a man 
good.” Similarly, the “sensory appetite” cannot “...be the subject [of virtue] because true 
virtue is found in the angels whose souls are separated from bodies, thus being void of 
appetite.” Yet, since the sensory appetite “...often possess some dispositions which make 
it possible for the will commanding rightly to be more easily obeyed...these dispositions 
partly resemble virtue” (II.ii.7).
The person possessing “...true and solid virtues...” is indeed a good person. Yet, 
given the redemption outlined in chapter 2, “...the very dispositions within us...” are not 
what renders the believer “...acceptable to God...” (II.ii.9). Rather, the status of goodness 
is given by grace through union with Christ in the declaration of justification. Still, the 
justified siiuier also has virtue through this union with Christ. Against an intellectualistic 
notion of virtue, Ames argued that Biblical virtue is opposed to “ .. .those virtues often 
called intellectual...” (Il.ii.l I). “Virtue... is also distinguished from the [intellectual] 
perfections of the mind which surely bring light whereby the will may direct itself toward 
well doing, but which do not incline it to do right” (II.ii.8). Although the intellect may
Ames is a bit inconsistent on this point. “Virtue... is also distinguished from the perfections o f  the mind 
which surely bring light whereby the will may direct itself toward welldoing, but which do not incline it to 
do right." (II.ii.8)
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rightly apprehend the right course of action, only a virtuous inclination will actually 
produce the right action.
Ames takes aim at “pagan” moral philosophy. The Bible alone is to direct the 
Christian life: “ .. .the sole rule in all matters which have to do with the direction of life is 
the revealed will of God” (Il.ii.l 3). Aristotle’s argument that “...the judgment of prudent 
men is the rule for virtue,” is a fallible standard, for there are no people “under whose 
judgment we might always stand...” (II.ii.l4). “Right reason” is also to be found in the 
Scriptures alone since the autonomous human mind produces only “imperfect notions” of 
virtue (Il.ii.l5). Ames’s conclusion is consistent and bold: “Therefore, there can be no 
other teaching of the virtues than theology which brings the whole revealed will of God 
to the directing of our reason, will, and life” (Il.ii.l 6). Since the Bible alone is the 
infallible guide for right living, Ames also challenges the arguments for a separation of 
ethics and theology (Il.ii.l7). Theology is an all-pervasive system, and does not need 
augmentation from “pagan” sources. The following oft-quoted passage in praise of Peter 
Ramus, nicely summarizes the perceived risks associated with using Aristotle as a 
philosophy text (as was the practice at Harvard and its British counterparts; see Fiering, 
I98I):
The judgment and desire of that great master of the arts, Peter Ramus, was no less 
pious than prudent: “If I could wish for what I wanted, I had rather that 
philosophy were taught to children out of the gospel by a learned theologian of 
proved character than out of Aristotle by a philosopher. A child will leam many 
impieties from Aristotle which, it is to be feared, he will unlearn too late. He will 
leam, for example, that the beginning of blessedness arises out of man; that the
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end of blessedness lies in man; that all virtues are within man’s power and 
obtainable by man’s nature, art, and industry; that God is never present in such 
works; either as helper or author, however great and divine they are; that divine 
providence is removed from the theater of human life; that not a word can be 
spoken about divine justice; that man’s blessedness is based on this frail life” 
(Il.ii.l8, italics mine).
Nothing could have been more contrary to the Puritan notion of virtue than the allegedly 
Aristotelian affirmation “that all virtues are within man’s power and obtainable by man’s 
nature, art, and industry.” Ames was jealous to affirm the idea that all power is God’s.
As we shall see, however, post-Puritan American mental philosophy and psychology 
would move tend to move in this “Aristotelian” direction, affirming that human beings do 
posses an inherent power to do the right thing. Yet, as we shall also see, this affirmation 
became increasingly strained in the late nineteenth century, when the study of physiology 
once again affirmed the limitations of human fi-eedom and ability.
Ames similarly engages in a somewhat extended refutation of the Aristotelian 
idea that virtue is “ .. .the mean between two extremes,” arguing that such a notion is 
indefensible (II.ii.35). He also includes a simple scriptural refutation: “It is obvious that 
the mean has no place in some virtues. The love o f God is to be praised not when it is not 
too much, but when it is most ardent” (II.ii.38).
The paradox of Christian obedience is reiterated in terms of virtue. “The same 
habit which is called virtue in that it inclines towards God in this way is also called a gift, 
for it is given by God and inspired by the Holy Spirit. And it is called grace because it is 
freely bestowed on us by the special favor of God” (Il.ii.l9). Virtue is a human
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possession, located in a human will and therefore located in some sense in the human 
heart. Yet, since this habit is itself “given by God and inspired by the Holy Spirit,” God 
must also be considered the origin of human goodness. Relatedly, Ames addresses the 
issue of habit formation through “daily use and exercise.” Here too the paradox of 
simultaneous human and divine activity arises;
It is often said that virtues are increased by daily use and exercise. This applies to 
true virtues which proceed from sanctifying grace; daily use can be called their 
disposing cause and, because of the promise of God, in a way their procuring 
cause. But use does not in principle or properly produce an increase of virtue. 
(II.ii.42)
Although “sanctifying grace” is given by the initiative of God only (I.xxvi.21), human 
activity is involved in “procuring” this grace. Yet the procured grace is still gift, and 
therefore human activity cannot be understood to “produce” the grace of virtue. These 
affirmations also stand in contrast to the psychologies of Upham and James. In these 
psychologies, which argued (to differing extents) for autonomous human activity, 
repetition and “daily use” were seen as fool-proof techniques to bring about the desired 
moral results. Mention of human dependency on God dissipated.
The Psvchologv of Good Works 
Ames’s discussion of “good works” is intensely psychological, and may rightly 
deserve the title “moral psychology,” since he specifies the psychological characteristics 
of moral action. Acts of virtue, which are acts that flow “from the disposition of virtue. 
Matt. 12:35, A good man out o f the good treasure o f his heart brings forth good things^’ 
(Il.iii.l), are equated with acts that are called “...good, right, laudable, and pleasing to
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God” (II.iii.2). These good actions have several requirements, all of which are crucial for 
understanding Ames’s moral psychology. First, virtuous action requires “...a good 
efficient cause or heginning, i.e., a well-disposed will working from true virtue. For good 
fruit does not grow except on a good tree. Matt. 12:33.” Given that Ames defines virtue 
as “...a condition or habit [habitus] by which the will is inclined to do well” (II.ii.4), it is 
not surprising that he finds volition to be central to moral action. His definition also 
parallels Edwards’ assertion that indifference is incompatible with moral activity (as we 
will se in chapter 4). The second crucial characteristic of Ames’s moral psychology is 
“...a good matter or object, namely, something commanded by God. Matt. 15:9, In vain 
they worship me, teaching doctrines which are the commandments o f men." The primacy 
of the object is once again affirmed by Ames.
These first two requirements of moral activity bring subject and object together,
A moral act is one that has normative requirements for both subject and object, i.e., the 
will (the subject) needs to be “good” as does the object. This subjective and objective 
normativity would eventually be dismissed from psychological thinking during the 
advent of the New Psychology, and may be a major element of the loss of will in 
American psychology. Nevertheless, the importance of the subject/object distinction 
would continue to be a crucial one in psychological thought throughout the period studied 
in this dissertation, even in the New Psychology of William James.
The third characteristic o f a good action shares similar continuities and 
discontinuities with the psychological thought that would develop in American textbooks. 
This characteristic of good action is “...a good end—or the glory of God and whatever 
redounds to his glory. 1 Cor. 10:31, all to the glory o f God’’ (II.iii.3). By way of
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continuity, teleological considerations in human activity would continue to remain central 
considerations. William James would ironically speak of “the gradually growing 
conviction that mental life is primarily teleological” (James, 1892, p. 4) in his 
Psvchologv: Briefer Course. By way of discontinuity, the notion that there is a normative 
telos to mental life would become increasingly problematic.
Ames brings these three elements of his moral psychology (i.e., will, object and 
telos) together in asserting that “...the end and the object in both good and evil acts often 
coincide, especially in the intention and choice of the will where the end is itself the 
proper object.” Acts such as these either have the end “as matter or object” or these acts 
are directed to things related to the end. In the former case, when the end is the object, 
acts are occasioned by “...desiring, willing, wishing, loving, and enjoying.” Whether the 
end is the object, or the object is “related” to the end, teleology is always involved in 
virtuous action. “To be truly good an action must be referred to God as the chief end, at 
least in effect” (II.iii.6).
A fourth requirement of virtuous action is “...a pattern or good standard...” 
Actions that accord with “...the revealed will of God” (II.iii.7) are therefore virtuous. 
Conscience, the intellectual faculty that apprehends the will of God may be considered 
“...a secondary standard for moral actions.” Good actions comport with “...a right 
conscience”, while “...an erring or doubtful conscience...” can be violated only after 
serious consideration (Il.iii.S). Nevertheless, since a good conscience is necessarily 
shaped by the word of God, it is implied that conscience alone is not a sufficient guide for 
moral activity (see Cases of Conscience; Ames, 1643, III. 17.20).
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The goodness or badness of an action also depends upon “circumstances.” “An 
individual action is always surrounded by circumstances upon which the goodness or evil 
of it greatly depends” (II.iii.9). Ames seems to use the term circumstances in the way we 
might use it today, to denote the specificities or peculiarities of a given situation or 
person, rather than universal characteristics of situations or persons. The circumstances 
related to voluntary action “...take on the nature of the object.” Ames elaborates: “For 
when the will takes some action, it wills all that is involved in the action and thus 
includes all known circumstances, expressly or implicitly. And when a known 
circumstance is changed, the act of the will is often changed” (Il.iii.lO). A possible 
example of this that Ames does not give might be a Puritan man who chooses to go to 
church knowing that a potential business contact will be at the church. This is an 
important circumstance (i.e., an idiosyncratic, non-universal situation) that becomes part 
of the object chosen. In choosing to go to church, the person is choosing also to meet a 
business contact. By implication, the object itself and its moral status has somehow 
changed in the process of changing circumstances. This is not the case concerning other 
faculties of the soul. Circumstances take the nature of an object with regard to the will, 
but they remain “only adjuncts” for the other faculties (Il.iii.l 1).
Since the object of the will is “all that is involved in the action and thus...all 
known circumstances...”, the “end” or final purpose of an action may be included in the 
object of the will. So, incorporating the frequently used example of “the drunkard,” 
Ames might say that the object of the drunkard’s will is more than merely drinking, but 
also includes “the end” of this drinking, which may be the removal of unpleasant psychic 
states. The inclusion of the end in the object differentiates the will from the other
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faculties of the soul. The end of an action is included in the object of the will, but is not 
included in the object of other faculties. This means that the final purpose or end of an 
act remains merely circumstantial to these other faculties, that is, the circumstances are 
“only adjuncts” (Il.iii. 11). Removing unpleasantness may be the object of the will, but it 
is not the object of the understanding, which simply specifies^^ the bottle or glass to be 
grasped. “So the end itself is correctly considered a circumstance so far as the other 
faculties and their acts are concerned, though this is not true for the will” (Il.iii. 12). For 
the will, “the end itself’ takes the nature of an object.
Ames classifies actions as good (that is, directly prescribed by the word of God, 
or deduced from the command of God), evil (i.e., prohibited by the word of God), and 
indifferent (i.e., actions neither commanded nor prohibited). An indifferent act occurs 
“...when its object includes nothing which involves the commanding or forbidding will of 
God” (Il.iii. 14). For example, loving neighbor is good, stealing is bad, but walking 
down the road is indifferent. Yet, even though “...many acts are indifferent, in their own 
nature, or in general, the circumstances make each individual, moral, and deliberate act 
either good or evil” (Il.iii. 13). Even indifferent acts “...are either directed to the proper 
end of conformity to the will of God, and thus are good; or they are not rightly directed, 
differ fi-om the will of God, and are thus evil” (Il.iii. 14). The fact that actions have an 
ultimate purpose is a characteristic of “truly human” actions which are “. . .done in 
deliberate reason” (Il.iii. 14). Further, Ames insists that the end of our activities must 
ultimately be conformity to God’s will. Again, the teleological nature of human activity
^°The understanding’s role in volition is limited to specification. See Cases o f Conscience (Ames, 1643).
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would be preserved in the New Psychology, while the normativity of Ames psychology 
would be made more difficult in the nonsectarian secular context.
Ames’s comments on acts that “have an evil sound” helps to further clarify his 
meaning of the distinction between circumstances and object. Besides actions which are 
good, evil, and indifferent, some distinguish acts which are said to “have an evil sound.” 
Considered by themselves they have in them a certain lawlessness, hut under certain 
circumstances they appear to be good, e.g., the killing of a man and the like. But such 
acts ought to he classified as indifferent, for they only seem to contain evil. To free a 
man from danger of death, for instance, seems to be good in itself, but many who are not 
evil are herein deceived, for the true goodness or wickedness of it in such action depends 
upon the circumstances [e.g., innocent or guilty] and the object [killing, i.e. good, evil or 
indifferent]. To slay the innocent or set at liberty the guilty is evil, but to slay the guilty 
justly or to deliver the innocent upon just reason is good (Il.iii. 15). So “circumstances” 
include the characteristics that make one person different from another, or one situation 
different from another.
The works of the regenerate are never “absolutely good,” because “all 
[the]...causes and conditions [i.e., the object, the end, the circumstances] must together be 
good to make an act absolutely good. A defect in any of them makes the act evil to that 
extent” (Il.iii. 16). Ames clearly advocates the possihility and even the inevitability of 
mixed motives in human volition in this passage. This has bearing upon the discussion of 
Jonathan Edwards, for he has been accused of leaving no room for mixed motives in his 
psychology. If this contention is true, he would represent a significant departure from 
Ames on this point.
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Given the present imperfect dispensation of redemption, “our good works while 
we live here are, therefore, imperfect and impure in themselves” (Il.iii. 17). Given these 
imperfections, these works are acceptable to God only “in Christ” (Il.iii. 18), and do not 
merit reward “...on the basis of justice” (Il.iii.19). Nevertheless, reward is given, by 
grace (II.iii.20).
Ames distinguishes outward vs. inward acts of virtue (II.iii.21). While “the 
inward act belongs to the will itself’ (II.iii.22), “the outward act belongs to a faculty 
other than the will, whether it is the understanding or the sensory appetite (commonly 
called internal), or the performing power (usually called external)” (II.iii.23). This 
“performing power” would be roughly equivalent to “motor activity.”
Goodness and badness inhere in acts of will, which are by definition internal:
“The internal action of the will has a goodness or evil so intrinsic that an act cannot 
maintain its nature without maintaining its manners.” Ames clarifies what he means by 
“manners” while describing the difference from outward acts: “An outward act, however, 
may remain one thing in nature and yet change in manner, evil becoming good or good 
becoming evil, as if one should begin to walk for an honest purpose but persist in his 
journey to an evil end” (II.iii.24). So “manners” have to do with goodness and badness. 
Acts of will are therefore intrinsically good or bad, while acts of other faculties are not. 
The same act of will cannot be good in one circumstance and bad in another. A good will 
is a good will a bad will is a bad will. Outward acts are not intrinsically good or bad. 
“Walking” may be good or evil, depending upon the underlying will. “The outward act 
without the inward is properly neither good nor evil. But the inward can be good or evil 
without the external, because the goodness of the act depends first and chiefly upon the
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will, and this is often acceptable to God, although the outward deed is lacking, 2 Cor. 
8:12, I f  there is first a ready mind, one is accepted according to what he has” (Il.iii.26). 
In addition to affirming the primacy of the interior, these passages also confirm that the 
will was considered a moral faculty of the soul.
Despite Ames’s division of acts into internal and external, he still maintained the 
organic unity of human activity. The (good or evil) internal act sets the external act in 
motion, but these two acts are nevertheless a unity: “It is one act in manner. For to will 
to worship God and to worship God because of that will are not two acts of obedience, 
but two phases of one and the same act; the goodness of the one continues in the other. 2 
Cor. 8:10, \ \, Do that very thing...that your readiness to will may be matched by 
performance” (II.iii.25). Despite the unity of the inward and outward act, Ames 
maintains the interiority of the will, and, by implication, the interiority of behavioral 
causation. Although it is possible that the internal act may exist without the external 
(II.iii.26), internal acts “...tend toward the external” (II.iii.27). The primacy of the will in 
the determination of the ethical quality of action is further affirmed by Ames’s assertion 
that the outward manifestation of the inner will completes the will’s activity, but it does 
not make the activity more moral: “Still the extemal act joined with the intemal does not 
properly and by itself increase its good or evil, so far as intention is concemed, but it 
serves as an accident [per accidens], continuing or increasing the act of the will itself’ 
(II.iii.28). The will therefore acts even before the outward “behavior” is manifested, and 
the goodness or badness of the act precedes the outward manifestation, and does not even 
require an outward expression.
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Ames made a distinction between acts which “depend upon the object” and those 
acts which depend “upon the end.” The issue here appears to be motives. Is the object 
(and the corresponding circumstances) itself the driving motive in a given activity, or is 
the goal of the actor primary? The reason for this distinction is that the location of the 
morality of the action depends upon the type of motive. In the following quote, Ames 
argues that the morality of actions motivated primarily by the object (and its 
circumstances) depends upon the nature of the object. Still, the execution of the act 
depends upon the will:
The good or evil of any act which depends upon the object [prohibited, 
commanded or indifferent] and the [good or bad] circumstances of the act is by its 
nature in the extemal [i.e., in the object and circumstances, which are outside of 
the will] before it is in the intemal, although in order of existence it is first in the 
intemal. To will to give everyone his own is thus good because giving [i.e., an 
extemal act, first by nature] itself is good, but the goodness exists in the act of 
willing [intemally] before the act of giving [extemally]. It is evil to will 
[intemally] to steal [an extemal act] because stealing is [objectively] evil. In 
intention the exterior act is the cause of the inward, but in execution the inward 
act is the cause of the outward. (II.iii.29)
Contrasted to this are actions motivated by the end or goal of the actor. In these cases the 
morality of the act depends upon the intemal purpose of the actor:
The good or evil which depends upon the end [e.g., the glory of God, or self- 
aggrandizement] is first in the inward act and then in the outward [i.e., the glory 
of God is not an object to be willed]. The very intention to reach the end is the
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inward act of the will. Thus to forsake the world for righteousness’ sake is good 
because it is good to will righteousness, and to give alms for vainglory is evil 
because it is evil to will vainglory. (Il.iii.30)
Just as the inward act of the will may exist without an outward manifestation, 
“...inward observance...” may exist “...without the outward...” and is nevertheless “...true 
observance, although incomplete.” Ames outlines two ways an inward act may occur 
without the outward. First, the person possessing the “effectual will” may lack 
opportunity of executing the intemal will. Second, the person may lack ability of 
executing (perhaps, to put the issue in Edwardsean language, through constraint or some 
other “natural inability”). In either case, the inward observance “...is not less acceptable 
to God than if it were joined by an extemal act, 2 Cor. 8:12” (Il.iii.32). But, if occasion 
and ability do exist, “...inward obedience is not sufficient by itself because the whole man 
ought to subject himself to God.” There is no “...inward obedience when there is no 
inclination to the extemal” (Il.iii.34). An act lacking “inclination to the extemal” is 
therefore not an act of will. Conversely, extemal action is not a sufficient condition for 
virtue: “observance which appears in outward actions without the inward is hypocrisy 
and is not observance in actual deed but a shadow of it” (II.iii.31).
As one might expect, Ames draws a moral conclusion to this line of 
psychologizing: “...we must not judge actions to be good or evil by the event.” Given 
human limitation, it is tme that a “...judge of offenses among men [should] be inclined 
favorably if  the event itself is favorable.. .Yet before the tribunal of God the inward sin is 
as great, other things being equal, when neither event nor outward act follow, as when 
both follow. Matt. 5:28, Whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her has already
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committed adultery with her in his heart” (Il.iii.33). Interiority is primary not only in the 
causation of human behavior, hut also in the moral quality of human action.
The Institutional Formdations of Will: Religion 
Ames divided “observance” into “...religion or justice” (Il.iv.I), arguing that “this 
division is made by God in substance in the parts of the decalogue, as explained by 
Christ, Matt. 2:37” (II.iv.2). The Christian virtues of “holiness” and “righteousness” 
correspond to these two aspects of observance, as does “...the division between love for 
God and love for neighbor” (II.iv.3). Ames focuses on the former duty, because “ .. .the 
duties of religion are primary and the most important...” (II.iv.9). Given the gravity of 
religious duties, they “...are to be cared for above all others. Matt. 10:37, He that loves 
father or mother above me is not worthy o f m e” (II.iv.l2) and should be “...performed 
with more intensity and dedication than the duties of justice...” (Il.iv.I 3). By way of 
illustration, Ames argues that it is possible to “strain too much” in the love of neighbor, 
but one cannot love God with too much intensity (II.iv.I4). Consistent with his 
distinction between inward and outward obedience, and the primacy of the interiority of 
moral action, Ames believes that “God is better worshipped with inward affection than 
outward deed,” although “...men need the outward deed more” (II.iv.l7). Ames, 
reiterating the primacy of the object, again asserts that “the immediate object of religion 
towards which it is directed is God...” (Il.iv.I9). More specifically, “religion is related to 
God through that divine excellency which shines forth in his sufficiency and efficiency” 
(II.iv.20). This sufficiency and efficiency of God inspire faith, which is the foundation of 
religion: “Religion comes directly from the faith by which we believe in God as the 
sufficient and efficient cause of life” (II.iv.21). And, as stated previously, since volition
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is the sine qua non of faith, it is the will that apprehends the sufficient and efficient God 
of the Bible. It is also interesting to note that notions concerning the “efficient cause of 
life” shifted during the time period studied in this dissertation. As American psychology 
became increasingly “Arminian,” a concern with the autonomous efficiency of humanity 
became paramount. Ames, given his definition of religion, may have thought that such a 
quest was inherently a religious quest, albeit one based on false premises: the worship of 
the human will as opposed to the One who graciously imparts a measure of his own 
efficiency to his human subjects.
The “proper act of religion,” therefore, is worship— the honoring, worshiping and 
adoring God. Ames was quick to add that no good could be added to God, but that the 
honor of worship “...is an outward good—a testimony to the virtue of another which adds 
to his glory or esteem. This is all a creature can do for God” (II.iv.23). This “true and 
worthy esteem of God,” which is the “first matter of religion” (II.iv.24) involves 
volitional activity as well: “The proper way of honor or religious worship is to subject to 
another the soul itself, and the inward affections and acts of the will” (II.iv.25). The 
worship of God requires nothing else than the submission of the will to God.
Natural vs. Instituted Worship
If the proper act of religion is worship, Ames dichotomizes worship or religion 
into two parts: “The parts of religion are two: natural worship and voluntary or instituted 
worship” (II.v.l). The topic of natural worship, which has to do with the acts of devotion 
springing from a knowledge of God’s nature, has a great deal to do with the topic of 
volition. The topic of “instituted worship” hearkens back to issues discussed in chapter 2. 
“Instituted worship is the means ordained by the will of God to exercise and increase
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natural worship” (Il.xiii.l). These means, such as preaching, baptism, and the Lord’s 
supper, (Il.xiii.l7), which also have to do with volition (chapter 2), are not disclosed 
through a simple understanding of God’s nature or of creation (II.xiii.3). Further, as 
indicated in the definition above, instituted worship serves the natural worship of God, 
“...otherwise it would not be worship, for one cannot give the honor due to God in any 
way other than by faith, hope, and love...” (II.xiii.5). Instituted worship serves as “...a 
means and instrument by which faith, hope, and love function...” (II.xiii.6) and flows 
from the natural worship of God (ll.xiii.8). Since “...no one besides God can know what 
will be acceptable to him...no thing can honor God unless it comes from him as the 
author” (ll.xiii.l3). By submitting to God’s institutions of worship, “...we make God 
ours and given him due honor in religious worship. We subject ourselves to his authority 
and ordinances” (ll.xiii.l4). Listening to God exclusively for direction in worship 
constrains the worshipper and prohibits religious or ceremonial novelty: “God must be 
worshiped by us with his own worship, wholly and solely-nothing must be added, taken 
away, or changed, Deut. 1:32” (Il.xiii.l9). Worship which is “devised by men” is strictly 
prohibited. Interestingly, Ames calls such religious creativity “will-worship” (ll.xiii.23), 
or lifting one’s own religious impressions or desires above the requirements laid down by 
God. This will-worship leads to the sin of superstition (ll.xiii.24), which is simply the 
improper worship of God (ll.xiii.25). “In superstition God is always the object and in 
some way the end, but the worship itself is unlawful” (ll.xiii.26).
“Natural worship,” which has to do with God’s nature, also applies to the topic of 
volition. Excepting the specific institutes of the worship of God, “...all those things 
which pertain to our duty...” can be understood when the nature of God is, by the grace of
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God, correctly perceived and known (II.v.3). This knowledge of God’s nature reveals 
that faith, hope, love, and the hearing of God’s word are appropriate and required acts of 
worship: “Everyone who understands the nature of God rightly knows that God is to be 
believed and hoped in, that he is to be loved and called upon, and to be heard in all 
things.” (II.V.4). This kind of worship “...is absolutely basic to salvation” in Christ, not 
as a cause of salvation but as salvation’s result (II.v.5). Natural worship engages the will 
in a particular way, directing the worshipper “...towards God, either as our good or as 
good in himself’ (II.v.9) in faith (when regarding him “...as he is ours at present”) or 
hope (when regarding him “as he is to be ours...”; II.v.lO). Natural worship, like all acts 
of observance, “...is both intemal and extemal” (II.v.7).
Ames’s explication of faith, hope, love and the hearing of God’s word all touch 
upon the topic of volition. “Faith is the virtue by which, clinging to the faithfulness of 
God, we lean upon him, so that we may obtain what he gives to us. John 3:33, He who 
receives his testimony has sealed that God is true...." (II.v.ll). Ames outlines five 
things that “belong together in divine faith,” and then explains how each is related to 
either the will, the understanding, or both:
These five things belong together in divine faith: 1) a knowledge of what God 
testifies to; 2) a pious affection toward God which gives his testimony greatest 
force with us; 3) an assent given to the tmth testified to, because of this affection 
toward God who is the witness of it; 4) a resting upon God for the receiving of 
what is given; and 5) the choosing or apprehension of what is made available to 
us in the testimony. (II.v.l2)
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The first element of faith, “...a knowledge of what God testifies to...” is understandably 
“...in the understanding.” Yet, since it is possible that “...unbelievers, heretics, apostates, 
and the devils themselves” may also have faith, it is clear that knowledge alone is not a 
sufficient condition for faith (II.v.l3). On the other hand, “the second, fourth, and fifth 
are in the will and produce faith as the force within and act of religion” (II.v.l 4). The 
will, understood as a motive “force,” is therefore manifested in “pious affection toward 
God” which is a “great force” within. The will is also the principle faculty involved in 
“resting upon God,” which Ames had previously described as the “life” that differentiates 
faith from “general assent” (I.iii.I6). Finally, the actual “choosing” of the thing promised 
(for faith cleaves to God’s promises, II.v.l 9) in the testimony of God is ascribed to the 
will as well. The third “thing” listed above, “an assent to the truth testified to, because 
of...affection toward God...” is located “...in the understanding but only as it is moved by 
the will. It does not have the virtue of faith, but is rather an effect of it” (II. v. 15). The 
fifth element of faith is related to Ames’s teaching concerning the link between interiority 
and exteriority of moral action. Just as the intemal act of observance tends toward and 
completes the extemal act (II.iii.26-28), he argues that the “...perfection of faith lies only 
in the choosing or apprehension, and so must be defined by it” (II.v.l6).
Ames furthers his voluntarist presentation of faith by suggesting that 
intellectualists actually hold to the most cmcial aspect of voluntarist doctrine: the 
insufficiency of the intellect to produce action. “Those who place faith in the 
understanding confess that there must be some action of the will to secure the assent, just 
as in human faith it is said to be a voluntary matter to give credit to someone. So if  faith 
depends upon the will, it must be that the first beginning of faith lies in the will” (II.v.20,
182
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
italics mine). So, just as Ames previously insisted that the understanding must be 
involved in the specification of the object (see Ames, 1643; Fiering, 1981), scoring an 
apparent point for the intellectualists, he turns the tables to argue that the crucial issue is 
not whether the intellect is involved in volition, but whether the intellect is sufficient to 
move the human being to action. Since, Ames argues, even the intellectualists grant that 
it is not, the voluntarist case is strengthened.
Ames attempts to further strengthen the case for a voluntarist conception of faith 
with a consideration of how infidelity, doubt, error, heresy and apostasy (II.v.42-47) tend 
to diminish or eradicate faith. The necessity of both will and understanding in faith are 
again affirmed: “These things are opposed to faith not only because they cut off the 
understanding’s assent, which is necessary to faith, but also because they take away the 
choice and apprehension of faith which is in the will” (II.v.48).
The primacy of the object is also further affirmed in Ames’s summary statement 
on the nature of faith: “The nature of faith is excellently set forth in the Scriptures when 
the faithful are said To cleave to God, Josh. 23:6; Acts 11:23; 1 Cor. 6:17. To choose the 
way o f truth and to cleave to the testimony o f God. Ps. 119:30, 31” (II.v. 17). This object 
primacy is evidenced by Ames’s nuanced discussion of the object of faith. On the most 
simple level, “God himself is.. .the first object of faith” (II.v.18), and God’s promises are 
also trustworthy but derivative objects of faith (II.v. 19). The “material object” of faith, or 
that thing out o f which faith arises, “...is whatever is revealed and set forth by God to be 
believed, whether by spirit or word, publicly or privately...” (II.v.21). Contrary to 
Roman Catholic teaching, “ .. .the church is not absolutely necessary as an object of 
faith....” (II.V.22), but is rather a “ ... direct axiom or judgment of truth... ” (II.v.23).
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Despite his anti-Catholic rhetoric, Ames also is willing, once again, to utilize the 
“schoolmen” when they agree with orthodoxy. Although the material object is an axiom, 
it is still true that “...the act of the believer is not directed to an axiom but to the thing, as 
the most renowned schoolmen say” (II.v.24).
The “formal object” of faith is God’s “truthfulness or faithfulness.” God’s 
truthfulness therefore differentiates biblical faith from opinion, and provides a sure 
foundation for the certainty of faith.
The formal object of faith is the truthfulness or faithfulness of God.. .It is a 
commonplace that faith depends on the authority of the one who gives the 
testimony. Faith is thus distinguished from opinion, knowledge, experience, 
sight, or sense. The authority of God plainly lies in his truthfulness or faithfulness. 
Titus 1:2, God who cannot lie, has promised. Hence the proposition is most true 
that whatever we are bound to believe through divine faith is true. Nothing ought 
so to be believed unless God himself witnesses the truth of it; God testifies as one 
who is truthful, and the truth in a witness who knows all things cannot be 
separated fi-orn the truth of his testimony. Therefore, it follows that all that we are 
bound to believe through divine faith is true. The whole matter is clearly 
confirmed and used by the apostle Paul in 1 Cor. 15:14, 15, I f  Christ be not raised 
our preaching is vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be false 
witnesses o f God, because we have testified o f God that he raised up Christ. If the 
testimony is not true, the witness is false. Unless it is admitted that whatever God 
witnesses is true, the surest consequence—namely, that God witness this or that 
and therefore it is true—would avail noting. Thus divine faith cannot be a
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principle or cause of giving assent to what is false or of making a false assent 
either directly or indirectly, either by itself or by accident.” (II.v.25)
Although faith is not by sight (and is therefore not “knowledge”), the faithfulness of God 
therefore assures “...the certainty of faith about the object.... It is true that our faith 
sometimes wavers, but this comes not from the nature of faith but from our imperfection” 
(II.v. 26). This certainty of faith is assured by the “...sufficient and sure presentation of 
the objects of faith...” which is found “...in the Scriptures...” (II.v.27). Although the 
Scriptures present the objects of faith surely, they cannot be mastered by calculation or 
human effort. An ethical and supernatural adjustment needs to first take place in the 
subject, “the light and witness of the Holy Spirit stirring up faith in us is necessary in the 
subject, or our hearts” (II.v.28).
Although the focus on objects has clear continuity with the New Psychology, 
there are two elements of this doctrine of objects that radically depart from the approach 
that would develop. First is the primacy of a particular object. Second is the 
undemocratic nature of this discourse. The object is accessible only to those to whom 
God makes it accessible. And the source of knowledge cannot be mastered by 
calculation or rationation. God controls understanding. God does the enlightening. The 
objects of the psychology of the new republic would need to be accessible to all, and the 
duty of enlightening would need to be given to the intellectual elite of the new country.
The ironies here, of course, are multiplied by the disjuncture between this doctrine 
of illumination, and the other aspects of Puritan theology and society, which maintained 
that a normative teaching office was also prescribed by the Bible, and that the Holy Spirit 
would work illumination only through the church and its officers. This is another species
185
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the paradox of Puritan belief, the dual sources of human activity. Just as faith is the 
believer’s and is Gods, so to illumination is God’s, but is also mediated through the 
church.
Since faith belongs to the believer, and yet is a gift of God, the paradox is 
maintained, “Faith is our life as it joins us to God. But it is also an act of life because it is 
a virtue and our duty towards God” (II.v.19, underline mine).
Hope, which is “...a virtue which leads us to expect things which God has 
promised us, Rom. 8:25” (Il.vi.l), is the foundation for charity, which is “...the virtue 
whereby we love God as the Chief good...” (Il.viii.l). Both hope and love find their 
foundation in faith: “Charity or love follows faith and hope in natural order as effect 
follows cause. We love God in charity because by faith and hope we taste in some 
measure how good he is ...” (II.vii.2). With faith as the foimdation, both hope and love 
have their roots in the will. “Therefore, not love but faith is the first foundation of the 
spiritual building of man. .. .it sustains and holds together all the parts of the building” 
(II.vii.3). Without divinely given faith, human beings are equipped with only “an imclear 
and remote inclination toward God...” which “...precedes faith...” It is not until the 
human being is given faith that this “ineffectual ‘woulding’” can be transformed into an 
effectual will, which issues in true love to God (II.vii.4). Once the will is enlivened in 
divine faith, the human being begins to possess a “love of union,” which is “ .. .that 
affection by which we will to be joined with God” (II.vii.7).
The Will to Commune
“From faith, hope, and love, the virtues of religion referring to God, there arises a 
double act which bears on the spiritual communion exercised between God and us; the
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hearing of the word and prayer” (Il.viii.l). Both of these spiritual exercises deal with the 
will. Just as observance in general is a conformity of the human will to the will of God, 
the hearing of God’s word, which is, “...the devout receiving of the will of God” 
(ll.viii.4), is a necessary preparation for observance. The hearing is not “the outward 
sense of hearing,” but is rather “...any perceiving of the will of God, and especially 
inward receiving and submission” (ll.viii.6). The will is involved in the “receiving” of 
the word of God. “The receiving of the word consists of two parts: attention of mind and 
intention of will” (ll.viii.7). “Attention is applying the understanding to perceive the 
revealed will of God.. .often called in the Scripture.. .seeking of the will of God or a 
seeking of God himself...” (ll.viii.8), and “intention is the application of our will to the 
devout observance of the will of God now known. Ps. 119:106...” (ll.viii.lQ). The 
opposite of this devout attention and intention is pride, which, at root, is the condition of 
a disordered will:
Most definitely opposed to hearing is, first, the pride by which one dwells on his 
own excellence. Such a person does not wish to submit to the will of God. Pride 
is always contrary to the humility of religion and to religious observance or 
obedience in general but it seems most surely opposed to them in this act of 
religion. A proud man is so far from subjecting himself to the will of another as 
to a law that he wants to have his own will in place of the law...” (ll.viii.22) 
Prayer, too, intimately involves the human will: “Prayer is a devout presentation 
of our will before God so that he may, as it were, be affected by it (ll.ix.l). The crucial 
difference between hearing the word of God and prayer is therefore found in the will. 
“Prayer differs from the hearing of the word in that hearing is oriented to the will of God
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but prayer to our will. In hearing the word we accept God’s will but in prayer we offer 
our will to God to be accepted by him” (II.ix.9). Prayer involves not “simple willing or 
desire,” but is “...a matter of the whole will, i.e., the will itself exhibited and presented to 
God.” Prayer is not simple desire or wishing, “...for then profane men would pray most 
since they desire most.” Instead, true prayer requires “...the desire to obtain something 
from God, the will to seek it from him, and finally the presenting or placing of the desire 
before God' (Il.ix.lO, italics mine). Just as faith’s primary object is God, prayer is 
differentiated from simple wishing by its expectant engagement with a particular object, 
God. And, just as faith involved the “whole man,” intellect and will, but is most centrally 
an act of will, so too prayer involves both, but prioritizes will: “Prayer is, therefore, 
formally an act of the will with an antecedent act of the mind by which we understand 
what, of whom, for what, and how we must pray; and a consequent act by which we 
conceive and express in what maybe called a mental word the prayer itself’ (II.ix.I5). 
Prayer, which aims “...to affect or move God...” (II.ix.I8), may be understood as a 
central way that God communicates the dignity of efficiency to human beings (I.ix.6);
“.. .God is pleased to commend the force and efficacy ofprayer to us by declaring himself 
to be affected and, as it were, moved by it. Our prayer is the means by which, and not 
otherwise, God is willing to communicate many things to us” (ll.ix.l9, italics mine). 
Finally, even mental prayer, involves the will; “Mental prayer is that which takes place in 
the will, mind, and affection without any outside sign purposely used, Neh. 2:4; 1 Sam. 
l:13” (II.ix.36).
Ames’s discussion of “the circumstances of worship” is also relevant to volition. 
“The circumstances of worship to be especially observed are the maimer [modus] which
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is described in the third commandment and the time which is commanded in the fourth” 
(Il.xiv.l). Concerning the time of worship, Ames insists that “The most solemn time for 
worship is now the first day of each week, called the Lord’s Day, Rev. 1:10; 1 Cor. 16:2” 
(II.xv.l). Ames’s longest chapter deals with the Lord’s Day, but this is not related to the 
topic of volition except in terms of the religious doctrines taught and obligations that 
were to be fulfilled on that day, which are inextricably linked to the will.
The manner of worship has much to do with the will. Just as a lack of respect for 
God’s institutions of worship involves a worship of the will, submission to these 
institutions involves the will as well. Although embedded in the institutes of Christian 
worship, the “suitable manner” of worship is still most closely related to “...the nature of 
religious things...” “That suitable manner is found when the circumstances are 
established which the nature of religious things requires” (II.xiv.7). The circumstances 
are dichotomized into “inward or outward” (II.xiv.9), and the inward circumstances are 
further divided into “...antecedent, concomitant, or consequent” (Il.xiv.lO). Volition 
touches upon the first two, which are discussed here. “The antecedent circumstances are 
a desire and stirring up of the mind or preparation in appropriate meditation on the things 
which pertain to the holy matter to be handled” (Il.xiv. 11). Ames explains in more detail: 
.. .before the public and solemn hearing of the word and prayer, private prayer is 
required, and before private prayer, if  it be solemn, there is required some meditation on 
those things with which our prayers have to do, whether about God to whom we pray or 
about ourselves who are about to pray or about the things which are to be prayed for 
(II.xiv.l3).
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Since God is supremely interested in his people conforming their will to his will, 
he expects his people to endeavor to prepare their wills for his worship. The concomitant 
circumstances, also a dichotomy, are “...reverence and devotion” (Il.xiv. 14). Devotion 
includes “...a certain special readiness to perform those things which belong to the 
worship of God... [and] a proper delight in performing them...” (Il.xiv. 17).
The Will to Do Your Neighbor Good: Justice 
After treating “religion,” which focuses on the worship of God (II.v.l), Ames 
moves to a discussion of “justice,” which is concerned with obligations toward humans.
It is significant that he treats justice last in the Marrow. Although justice is required in 
the Puritan understanding (“The truth of religion cannot stand with the neglect of justice 
and love toward our neighbor...” Il.xvi.lO), it is treated last in the Marrow not so much 
to emphasize its importance as to put it in proper perspective. Puritan theology, stressing 
the primacy of the divine Object, argues that the importance of humanity, and the moral 
obligations of love which flow from that importance are derived. “This bond of justice 
and affection of love ought to flow and derive from our religion toward God...”
(n.xvi.8). For Ames, to abstract humanity from its relation to divinity is to lose the 
grounds for the dignity of what is human.
As Ames moves from the “first table” (the first four of the ten commandments 
having to do with God) to the “second table” (the last six of the ten commandments 
having to do with humanity), there is a slight, but perceptible decrease of discourse 
related to the will. Nevertheless, the will is involved in this section of the Marrow as 
well. Surely, since justice is a virtue, and virtue involves the will (II.ii.4), the activity of 
the will is presupposed throughout Ames’s treatment of justice. But, as I will attempt to
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show, the ‘second table,’ being more concerned with outward action, is by definition less 
concerned with the will.
Whatever movement away from will-centeredness exists in Ames’s discussion of 
justice, he still defined the virtue of justice in volitional terms. “Justice,” Ames declared, 
“...is the virtue by which we are inclined to perform our duty to our neighbor” (Il.xvi. 1). 
Ames conceded that this definition is limited, because “general justice...” is “...virtue in 
general...” and therefore includes religious observance. Justice is also not to be 
understood as a form of human rights (i.e., a “...thing deserved or received...”). Rather 
justice “...sets forth the mutual duty between those who are bound by the same law; in 
this sense it contains all the force of the second table” (II.xvi.2). The object of justice is 
“...our neighbor” (Il.xvi.3), and therefore “...everyone is included...” (Il.xvi.5) as a 
potential object of justice. Since justice seeks the good of the neighbor, “ .. .this virtue is 
called love toward our neighbor...” (Il.xvi.6). As a virtue, love involves the will, since 
virtue is by definition “...a condition or habit by which the will is inclined to do well” 
(II.ii.4). It also relates to the will in that the iimer affections and desires of the individual 
are involved: “In this love there is always a desire for union, satisfaction, and good will, 
just as in love toward God, and there is often added mercy when we consider the misery 
of our neighbor, though this has no place in love toward God” (Il.xvi.7). The derivative 
nature of this volitional activity is stressed: “This bond of justice and affection of love 
ought to flow and derive from our religion toward God...” (Il.xvi.8). God is always the 
source of all good. Similarly, Ames argues that there is an “order of love:”
God is first and chiefly to be loved.. .After God, we are bound to love ourselves 
with the love of true blessedness, for loving God with love of union, we love
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ourselves directly with that greatest love which looks toward our spiritual 
blessedness. Secondarily, as it were, we ought to love others whom we would 
have to be partakers of the same good with us. For others may be deprived of 
blessedness without our fault, but we cannot be. Thus we are more bound to 
desire and seek it for ourselves than for others. (Il.xvi. 13)
Human happiness (“blessedness”) is therefore inextricably linked to the human duty to 
love God. First, by experiencing the blessedness of union with God, and then sharing that 
love with neighbor. “Hence it is that the love of ourselves has the force of a rule or 
measure for the love of others. You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Il.xvi. 14). 
Further evidence of the importance of the will to this discussion is that Ames defined the 
opposite of the love of neighbor as “an evil will” (Il.xvi.79).
Ames’s discussion of “the honor of our neighbor” (based on the fifth 
commandment) moves the primary concem away from the basic volitional impulses 
involved in love, toward the more outward activities that constitute justice toward 
neighbor. Justice affects neighbor either directly or indirectly (Il.xvii.l). Ames focused 
first on the justice that affects neighbor directly, which has to do with “...his status per se 
or to the degree of his status” (II.xvii.2). Honor, required in the fifth commandment, is 
justice related to the degree of status (II.xvii.3). In this command, “...human society is 
presupposed and sanctified—^private and domestic as well as public and political. Within 
this society men are to serve each other in the mutual duties of justice and love so that 
they may exercise and show forth the religion which they profess in the worship of God” 
(II.xvii.4). “Solitary life,” by way of contrast, is “wholly contrary to the law and will of 
God” (II.xvii.5).
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Honor, which “...is an acknowledgement of the dignity or excellence of another 
with proper testimony to it” (II.xvii.9), does involve the will, being as it is “...affected 
with reverence...” when “...excellence and dignity...” is apprehended (Il.xvii.ll). This 
reverence is not to be directed to the rich or powerful, but to excellence, and this may be 
found in individuals of lower status (II.xvii.l2). This virtue is also related to God, since 
it is the duty closest to the “ .. .nature of religion and piety through which we worship God 
himself...” (Il.xvii.l 3). Just as love is to be given to all, “the duty of honor we owe to all 
is to preserve their state of dignity unhurt” (Il.xvii.l 6). Ames outlines other virtues 
which likewise involve volition. Gratitude, for example, is “...a desire to compensate for 
the benefits received (II.xvii.59), and includes “...a kind of benevolent affection...” Just 
as inward action tends toward outward action, the affection of gratitude “...should not be 
exhausted in the emotion itself, but should be manifested in fitting endeavor.” Ames also 
mentions friendship (II.xvii.65), humility (II.xvii.67), and pride (II.xvii.68).
“Justice directed toward our neighbor’s situation concerns either his person or his 
outward possessions” (Il.xviii.l). In the former category includes Humanity, which is 
understood as “...the virtue by which we are inclined to preserve the life of our neighbor 
and his tranquility through lawful means” (II.xviii.5). Chastity, another virtue directed 
“toward our neighbor’s situation,” is “justice which relates to the purity of our 
neighbor...” (Il.xix.l), and is “...the virtue of preserving a person’s purity in the things of 
procreation...” (II.xix.2). The latter category includes Commutative justice, which is 
concerned with “...the outward benefit of our neighbor...” and has to do with 
“...commutations or exchanges of goods” (II.xx.l). This justice concerns itself with 
seeing that “...every man is given his own in external benefits” (II.xx.2). “His own” is
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defined as “...that over whieh he has lawful possession” (II.xx.3). Although justice is 
required in both “acquisition and use” (II.xx.7), Ames’s understanding of just acquisition 
has by virtue of hindsight a certain ominous tone; “Just occupation is a lawful taking of 
things which have belonged (i.e., “owned or possessed, II.xx.l2) to no one but may 
become someone’s” (II.xx.l 1). Ames’s sense of biblical history is that God ordained a 
first-come, first-served approach:
All things are said to have been common at the beginning of the world and also 
after the flood, in the sense that no man owed or possessed them in a particular 
way. They were available in common for anyone who would first take or occupy 
them. This explains the blessing of God upon mankind: Gen. 1:28... (II.xx. 13) 
Although this way of thinking had obvious application to the New World, Ames left 
nothing to the imagination, declaring, “the islands of the sea and the parts of the continent 
which have never been inhabited are in the same situation” (II.xx. 14). Since “ownership, 
and difference in the amount of possessions, are ordinances of God and approved by him, 
Prov. 22:2; 2 Thess. 3:12” (II.xx.I5), the Puritan could feel justified in settling New 
England, and claiming ownership to territories that had not yet been “owned or 
possessed” in a way that the Puritans could understand.
More relevant to the purposes of this dissertation, however, is the fact that issues 
of ownership and possession occupy a relatively small place in the Marrow. Although 
the seeds of injustice are undoubtedly sown in this particular chapter, it seems fair to 
weigh this chapter against the entire work. It is meaningful, I think, that discussion of 
ownership and possession follow  the worship of God and the love of neighbor in the 
Marrow. This appears to have been the case in Puritan society as well, which seemed
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more concerned with the hope that native Americans might be “...partakers of the same 
good with us...” (Il.xvi. 13) through evangelism, than in acquiring massive amounts of 
personal property (see Bremer). It appears that concem for personal property and 
ownership began to usurp concem for worship of God in mental and moral philosophy 
textbooks in the eighteenth century.
Whereas the former types of justice affect neighbor directly, Ames further 
outlines two types of justice that affect neighbor indirectly; “...tmth telling and 
contentment. The former affects our neighbor through his belief; the latter through some 
work or action of ours ordered by one of the previous commandments” (Il.xxi. 1). “Tmth 
telling is the virtue of heeding the tmth in giving testimony...” (Il.xxi.2). Ames 
interestingly notes that “an intention to hurt certainly increases the mischief of a lie but it 
does not constitute the nature of it...” (Il.xxi.22), further supporting the argument that as 
the focus changes from the first table to the second table, the will becomes less relevant.
Ames closes his discussion of justice with the virtue of contentment, which is 
“...the acquiescence of the mind in the lot God has given...” (Il.xxii. 1). This virtue, 
commanded in the tenth commandment (II.xxii.2), is preeminent:
Of all the virtues contained in the second table, however, none is more internal or 
intimate to vital righteousness than contentment. By it we are, as it were, led by 
the hand to contemplate and seek righteousness. And so righteousness in its 
purity is fitly handed here.” (II.xxii.3)
Contentment, which rejoices in the prosperity of neighbor (II.xxii.4), is “...the height and 
perfection of all love towards our neighbor. Hence contentment is in a way the perfection 
of godliness of a godly man... ” (Il.xxii. 5). Ames therefore concluded that the tenth
195
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
commandment . .stands at the end of an order which proceeds from the less to the more 
perfect and from the better known to the less known [by nature]” (Il.xxii.6). Part of this 
perfection is that contentment serves as a “foundation” for all the other duties we owe 
toward our fellow man (Il.xxii.8). The opposite of contentment is covetousness 
(Il.xxii.9), which deals with volitional processes such as the “ .. .desire which first 
instigates and excites the mind to yearn for the good things of our neighbors...”
(Il.xxii. 10). Positively, the commandment requires that we feel joy at our neighbor’s 
success (II.xxii.4). The tenth commandment is therefore highly interior, and extremely 
exacting. A mere desire for our neighbor’s goods is a sin.
It is fitting that Ames ended his explication of human moral duty by 
acknowledging human failure, even the failures of the elect. Although God is pleased to 
communicate the dignity of his efficiency to those who are united to Christ, Ames also 
believed that the Christian’s enjoyment of that efficiency is tempered by remaining sin. 
Because of the sin that still remains in the Christian, “ .. .we cannot precisely observe a 
law.. .We carry about us flesh that lusts against the Spirit, Gal. 5:17, and we cannot obey 
without covetousness, inclining and drawing us another way. Finally we are not perfect, 
Phil. 3:12, and we cannot render perfect obedience. We always need to have that petition 
in our heart and on our lips. Forgive us our debts” (II.xxii.2I). Still, always eager to 
affirm the Puritan paradox that the Christian is imable in himself, but able in Christ,
Ames affirmed, “Yet it is rightly and truly said that the Yoke o f  Christ is easy, his burden 
light. Matt. 11:30, and His commandments not grievous, I John 5:3.” This “ease and 
lightness of the law of God is not in proportion to our strength: It comes from the grace of
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our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God, with the gift of the Holy Spirit which is with 
all those who love the law of God. Amen” (Il.xxii.22)
Summary and Conclusion 
The second “Book” of the Marrow, the subject of this chapter, deals with 
“observance,” or conforming the human will to the will of God. This observance is only 
possible for those united to Christ. An observant will is submissive to God. Observance 
includes the restoration of the image of God in humanity.
Obedience to God is paradoxical. Through the application of Christ, the believer 
is given an “inborn principle of life,” which serves as the source of renewed observance. 
Yet, the believer also recognizes that God is the source of that moral strength: that the 
efficiency of the Christian life is like all efficiency: derived from Efficiency itself. As 
Ames summarized: “For since sin came, man cannot of himself do anything acceptable to 
God...except it be done in Christ through faith and sanctifying grace. John 15:4, 5, 
Without me you can do nothing" (II.i.17). This formulation allowed the Puritan to avoid 
the dual pitfalls of human pride and human passivity in observance.
Observance flows from virtue, which, far from being a moral indifference is “ .. .a 
condition or habit [habitus] by which the will is inclined to do well” (II.ii.4). Goodness 
flows from a bent toward the good. This bent is found primarily in the will.
Ames offers a prolonged discussion of “good works,” which, describing the 
psychology of moral behavior, may be called “moral psychology.” Good works flow 
from good wills, have good objects, are performed with good intentions, and respect good 
standards. As is the case in Book One, Ames continues to affirm the primacy of the 
object in the psychology of will: that the goodness or badness of the acts of will is often
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determined by the nature of the ohject. Further, even saints in this world are incapable of 
moral perfection. Acts of virtue have inward and outward components. Most essentially, 
these acts are inward, having to do with volition. Still, the inward acts of virtue have a 
tendency toward outward expression, and will certainly have that effect if possible. This 
is a premise that would he supported by all the authors considered in this dissertation.
Observance is expressed through religion or justice. Ames justified this 
distinction by the structure of the ten commandments; the first four commands having to 
do with one’s love to God, and the second six commandments having to do with one’s 
love to neighbor. Not surprisingly, Ames considered duties to God “primary.” For 
example, it is possible to love human beings excessively, but it is impossible to love God 
too much. The will has a crucial place in religious observance, since this observance is 
most essentially interior. Still, the outward expressions of religion are necessary.
The sufficiency and efficiency of God are center stage in true religion. “Religion 
comes directly from the faith by which we believe in God as the sufficient and efficient 
cause of life” (II.iv.21). Just as God’s character may be summarized by the dual 
characteristics of sufficiency and efficiency, religion strives to live in the comfort of this 
reality. By implication, true religion resists all attempts to exalt any efficiency or power 
over the efficiency of God.
Ames made a distinction between natural and instituted worship. Natural worship 
flows from a knowledge of God’s nature, and may be reduced to faith, hope, love, and the 
hearing of God’s word. Consistent with his statements in Book One, faith has a great 
deal to do with the will. So too do hope, love and the hearing of God’s will involve the 
will. Ames further affirms his voluntarist position on the will.
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Ames closes the book with a consideration of justice, or the duty of humans to 
one another. Love to God is the foundation of these acts of observance. Ames discusses 
here the human-centered part of the ten commandments, closing the book with the tenth 
commandment against covetousness. Ames presses upon the reader the importance of 
obeying this command, and yet how difficult it is to obey. The command, after all, 
prohibits envying and the desire to possess some good in a neighbor’s possession. He 
therefore closes the book as you expect he might: with an affirmation of God’s power and 
efficiency, and the dependence of the creature upon the creator.
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PART II: DOCTRINE 
JONATHAN EDWARDS’ FREEDOM OF THE WILL
‘“Tis manifest, that Arminian notions of moral agency, and the being of a faculty of will, 
cannot consist together.”
Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom o f  the Will, (III.7.14)
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II
Allen Guelzo (1989) opens his book Edwards on the Will by noting that Edwards’ 
father, Timothy Edwards, had for his 1694 Harvard M.A. defended a thesis explicitly 
related to the will: "‘An Indifferentia sit de Essentia liberi Arbitrii? ‘Whether or not 
indifference is of the essence of free will?”’ (Guelzo, 1989, p. 17). By answering in the 
negative, Timothy Edwards placed himself well within the prevailing orthodox 
Calvinistic camp in New England. Somewhat more surprisingly, Timothy Edwards’ 
thesis also addressed a question that his son Jonathan would address 60 years later in a 
substantial book called The Freedom of the Will. Jonathan too would answer in the 
negative.
The negative answer to this question could have been predicted from the theology 
textbook that both Edwardses may have used as undergraduates, William Ames’s 
Marrow of Theologv. Ames had argued that free, virtuous action flowed from a habit or 
inclination toward goodness—certainly not from any “indifference” in the will. But 
while an answer similar to Ames’s may have been sufficient for Timothy’s M.A., 
Jonathan would have to construct an answer for a broader and more “enlightened” 
audience. The times had changed.
The way Jonathan saw it, one of the most significant differences between the days 
o f  h is  fath er’s you th  and the eon tem p orary  situ ation  con cern ed  th e  rea lity  o f  the  
Arminian threat. In the 1690s, Arminianism had made significant inroads in England, but 
New England remained largely unaffected. In the 1720s, however, the Yale College 
community was shocked when its rector Timothy Cutler converted to Anglican
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Arminianism. Tutor Samuel Johnson soon followed. Since Jonathan Edwards was a part 
of that Yale community, he learned early on that New England could no longer relax on 
the Arminian question (see Guelzo, 1989; Marsden, 2003).
The Yale incident was the tip of the iceherg. Throughout the 1730s certain 
ministers or candidates for the ministry with Arminian leanings would occasionally arise 
in New England. Yet, “The sheer inertia of tradition.. .would preserve New 
England.. .Calvinism largely intact until the Great Awakening of the 1740s” (Guelzo, 
1989, p. 26). The excesses of the Great Awakening ironically may have served to 
weaken an already vulnerable New England Calvinism. Edwards emerged as one of the 
great defenders of the old way. Guelzo (1989) says it well: hy the time of the Great 
Awakening, Edwards was in no danger of abandoning Calvinism because his “Calvinism 
was now hound too tightly to him hy the cords of philosophy, theology, and, above all, 
his experience of divine grace.” These experiences firmly convinced him of the Amesean 
principle that all efficiency is of God. “It followed, then, that those who relieved God of 
His sovereignty for the sake of making room for mere human goodness were no better 
than thieves of the divine glory, and of Edwards’ delight” (p. 26). As Edwards said: 
“Some of the ill consequences of the Arminian doctrines are that it robs God of the 
greater part of the glory of his grace, and takes away a principle motive to love and praise 
him” (p. 26-27).
The Enlightened wondered if “Calvinistic determinism really differed from the 
ethical horrors of Hobbsean determinism....” (Guelzo, 1989, p. 23). As people like Yale 
rector Timothy Culler and tutor Samuel Johnson abandoned Calvinism they did so often 
on the pretext that Calvinism could not offer a satisfactory alternative to Hobbes. “In
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embracing ‘Arminianism,’ Cutler and Johnson appropriated, not the tenets of the Dutch 
heresiarch [Arminius], but rather the antimaterialist free-willism of Samuel Clarke. But 
this distinction did nothing to assuage the rage of Cormecticut at the apostates, and the 
catchword of ‘Arminianism’ stuck to anyone in New England who forsook Calvinism for 
indeterminism as a better protection against the storm of Hobbsian atheistic determinism” 
(p. 23-24).
Guelzo also notes that Edwards took a nontraditional approach to the problem of 
free will in Freedom of the Will. He versed himself in some of the philosophy of the day, 
particularly Locke in college, and read the leading ‘‘Arminian” authors. Edwards was 
careful to stipulate, however, “I would not be understood, that every divine or author 
whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an 
Arminian” (Edwards, 1754/1986, p. 132). Indeed, one of his targeted authors (Isaac 
Watts) was an otherwise well-respected Calvinist. Another of his authors (Thomas 
Chubb) espoused deism (God as a clockmaker who never intervenes in the creation), a 
doctrine Calvinists eonsidered much worse than Arminianism. Yet Edwards was 
eoncemed that the ‘‘Arminian” position on the will would eventually and inevitably lead 
to heresies such as deism (Ramsey, 1986). Guelzo (1989) therefore summarizes, “ .. .little 
of Freedom of the Will is devoted to historical or even theological Arminianism, but is 
instead construeted as a secular argument based on demonstrably psychological 
premises,” (p. 39-40) but noting that “...the ‘secularism’ of Edward’s argument is really 
only a means of justifying the theological a priori of Calvinism...” This will become 
apparent particularly in chapter 6 of this dissertation. Further, to reiterate a point made 
several times before, there is an irony to Edwards’ contribution to the debate. In some
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ways he played the role of prophet, demonstrating why an Arminian notion of will was 
unsustainable. Yet, by presenting his arguments in nonsectarian garb, Edwards’ attempt 
to save the will from the errors of Arminianism may have unwittingly contributed to its 
loss.
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CHAPTER IV
“TERMS AND THINGS” AND THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE OTHER
This chapter is a commentary on the first two parts of Freedom of the Will. In the 
first part of the work Edwards defined crucial terms such as motive, necessity, inability, 
liberty, moral agency, and, of course, “the will.” In Part II, Edwards, building upon his 
definitional work in Part I, confronted several irrational contentions that “Arminians” had 
made concerning the will. His goal in these pages was to show on purely rational 
grounds that the Arminian notion of will was an incoherent fiction. In so doing, he 
scored many points and was, I think, prophetic regarding the loss of will in American 
psychology. Still, he also contributed to the loss of will in American psychology by 
playing the Enlightenment game so well. A sectarian dressed in nonsectarian cloths, 
Edwards obscured the theological substructure that undergirded his notion of the will, 
setting a precedent for future discussion and debate in American psychology.
A Sectarian’s Nonsectarian Definitions
Edwards began by defining will. On a basic level his definition of will was 
simple. “The will.. .is plainly, that by which the mind chooses anything” (1.1.2). By 
speaking of “that” Edwards could have been interpreted as portraying the will as a kind 
of thing or entity, a position that he would seek to set aside. “ .. .an act of the will is the 
same as an act of choosing” (p. 137). Although some theoreticians such as Locke 
wanted to define will as that which either chooses or refuses, Edward thought that when
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we refuse we are choosing the absence of the thing refused- so to say the will is that by 
which the mind chooses is satisfactory.
Contrary to the “Arminian” psychology that was gaining steam during the 
eighteenth century, Edwards, consistent with his inherited tradition of scholastic 
psychology, used the term “will” very broadly. All of the following terms Edwards 
thought were synonymous with will and can be “reduced “ to the notion of choice: 
“choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, 
determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, being pleased 
or displeased with” (1.1.3). Terms such as “liking” and “inclining” show that Edwards, 
like Ames, thought that acts of will were internal.
The unity of the soul is evidenced in that when we prefer, we act. Although 
Arminian psychologies would typically attempt to break volitional activity into stages 
(e.g., intellect, then desire, then conscious choice), Edwards’ unitary mind acted as a 
whole. Once desire became strong enough, choice was made. There was no need for a 
separate act of a separate entity called “will” to either approve or reject the mind’s own 
preferences. Referring to his own subjective experience, Edwards claimed that “There is 
nothing else in the actings of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my 
preferring or choosing.. .that there should be such alterations of my external sensations 
and motions; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having 
ever found by experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and 
motions do actually instantaneously, and constantly arise” (1.1.4). By stressing the 
parsimony of mental processes, Edwards was loading the deck in favor of Calvinism.
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Although Edwards utilized Locke’s Essay as inspiration for his theorizing, he 
certainly did not agree with him on every point. For example, it is telling that Edwards 
took Locke to task early on in Freedom of the Will, for claiming that will and preference 
may move in opposite directions. This contention contradicted the unitary mental 
process that Edwards advocated. Locke’s example here is that a person might “prefer” to 
fly, but could never actually choose to fly. The problem with this example, Edwards 
claimed, is that the “immediate object of the will” is not noticed. The desire to fly is a 
“remote” object of preference, but, when we will to walk, that is, when we analyze the 
actual volition to walk, there is no preference to fly, but only to move limbs, etc. (1.1.4). 
Locke’s analysis at this point confused issues considerably. The object of the “remote” 
desire to fly is different from the object of the desire to walk. Since the proper level of 
psychological analysis is a specific act of will (and therefore the “proper object” related 
to that specific act), the philosopher must focus his attention upon the motives leading to 
that act (and therefore that object). The question at hand is: What determined the 
walking? Certainly not the desire to fly: the object of this desire is different than the 
object of walking. Further, since the person never actually flies, there is no act of will to 
analyze, just a “remote preference” or an ineffectual “woulding.” Since a would is not a 
will, this desire to fly simply does not relate to the psychology of volition.
Time and time again, the Arminian objection is that we are often aware of 
contrary preferences in any given act of the will. Yet, Edwards always brought the 
psychologist back to a consideration of the “proper object of the will.” Edwards 
dissected another Lockean example: the case in which a person utters persuasive words 
yet desires that they are not actually effective. The Arminian would claim that this is a
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clear case that the will can run counter to preference. Still, Edwards claimed, will and 
desire do not contradict in this example if we take the proper level of analysis. The 
person wills to utter persuasive words, and the person also desires to utter persuasive 
words. The person desires that the words spoken not persuade. This too is his volition. 
“In order to prove that the will and desire may run counter, it should he shown that they 
may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with respect to the very same 
object of will or desire: but here the objects are two...” (pp. 140-141). So, one act of will 
may disagree or he in tension with another act of will, and the desires associated with 
these acts of will may also be in tension with each other. But in any given act of will, 
desire will be consistent with the will (I.l .5).
Edwards concluded this section arguing that although the terms desire and 
volition may not be synonymous everyone can agree that “ .. .in every act of the will there 
is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination 
of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with 
respect to the direct object of the volition.” In an act of will, “there is some 
preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way rather than another....” (1.1.6). Two 
things are worthy of comment here. First, notice that Edwards conceived of will as a 
kind of connection between a subject and object. As we shall see, Edwards will speak of 
neeessity in grammatical terms, as a connection between a subject and predicate of a 
proposition. In anticipation of that section, it might be appropriate at this time to put 
Edwards definitions here into that context. Remember that a predicate is the part of the 
sentence or clause that expresses what the subject is or does. The direct object is part of 
the predicate and is the locus of the action of the verb. So, will can be considered a kind
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of connection between a subject (the person willing) and a predicate which includes an 
object (the thing willed), and a verb. One might even say that the verb is the will. That 
is, the alcoholic drank the drink. The very “drank” is the will. Similarly, when there is 
no verb, there is no volition: “ .. .where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a 
perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition” (1.1.5).
The second thing to notice here is that Edwards equates will with the inclination 
of the soul. This means that an act of will requires that “the soul, at that instant, is out of 
a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition.” This 
statement was a direct challenge to Arminian psychology which argued that freedom 
required that choiees be made when the mind was free from such a prevailing inclination. 
Edwards again defined volition in a way to preclude the possibility of Arminian 
psychology being true.
The Determination of the Will
In the second section of Part 1, Edwards turned to the issue of the “determination 
of the will.” Just as he accused Arminian psychologists of getting off track regarding the 
object of will, so too he confronted them for forgetting that the determination of the will 
is the question with which the psychologist of will is concemed. In this context, Edwards 
laid the groundwork for his challenge to another main tenet of Arminian psychology: that 
a free will is a self-determined will.
To determine the will, “if the phrase be used with any meaning...,” means to 
cause the will or choice to be one way rather than another. Will is determined when it is 
directed to “a particular object.” In other words, the question of the determination of the 
will must ultimately be able to explain particular volitions. Positing a general power of
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will (such as spontaneity) as the Arminian psychologists were wont to do does not 
explain why the will would ever move in one direction as opposed to another. So,
. .when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the 
body to be such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another” (1.2.1). At this point 
Edwards mentions an argument that is prominent throughout Freedom of the Will. To 
speak of the determination of the will is to presuppose that a will has a cause. Even the 
Arminians who speak of the self-determination of the will must mean this since they do, 
after all use the word “determined.” In brief, the problem with the self-determined will is 
that “the will is both determiner and determined; it is a cause that aets and produces 
effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action” (1.2.2).
So, what determines the will, then? It would be tedious, Edwards understandably 
thought, to enumerate all of the possibilities. On a general level, “ .. .it is that motive, 
which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will” 
(1.2.3). A “motive” is “ .. .the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to 
volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.” The motive may 
consist of “many particular things,” or only one thing. When many things combine to 
determine the will, the motive is “complex” (1.2.4). Edwards was a bit tautological 
here. What determines the will? The strongest motive. What is the strongest motive? 
That which determines the will. Although Edwards did try to clarify this initial tautology 
by cautiously specifying the nature of motives, he did open himself up to criticism on this 
point.
Concerning the intellectualist/voluntarist question, Edwards, like Ames, claimed 
that the understanding is always involved in volition: “Whatever is a motive, in this
210
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, 
or perceiving faculty.” Things that are “perfectly out of the mind’s view” can’t affect the 
mind (1.2.5).
Edwards argued that the things called motives or excitements or inducements 
have “some sort and degree of tendency, or advantage to move or excite the will previous 
to the effect...” Concerning the idea that it is the “strongest” motive which determines 
the will, Edwards defined strength as the “previous tendency” of the motive to move the 
will. Some motives have less of a tendency to move the will and are called “weaker 
motive[s]” some motives have much tendency to move the will, and are “stronger 
motive[s].” “And in this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest 
motive” (1.2.6).
At this point Edwards attempted to be a little more specific about the nature of 
motives. In brief, the strength of a motive depends upon “.. .the nature and circumstances 
of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree 
and manner of its view...” At this point, Edwards makes the understatement that it 
“would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration o f ’ the things that determine 
motive strength (1.2.7). But, he says, one thing is certain, and that is that “whatever is 
perceived.. .which has the nature.. .of a motive.. .is considered or viewed as good. ..” To 
say otherwise is to say that the appearance of objects that inclines the will to choice is 
something other than an appearance of eligibility, which is contradiction: “For to say 
otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance 
they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appearing 
eligible to it...” (1.2.7).
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Two things must be “well and distinctly observed” in this matter, though (1.2.7). 
First, the word “good” applies to a thing which appear as “agreeable” or “pleasing” or 
that which ‘^ suits the mind” (1.2.8). A pleasing object “..must have the greatest tendency 
to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind’s view, suits it best, and pleases it 
most; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good...” To say otherwise is a 
contradiction. The “good” includes the removal of that which is “disagreeable and 
uneasy” (1.2.9).
By way of clarification, Edwards noted that volition always has for its object the 
thing that appears most pleasant. Yet, as he mentioned above, the object is the “direct 
and immediate object of the act of volition.” An act of volition may be remotely related 
to other objects, but the direct object is “the thing most immediately willed and chosen”
(1.2.10). In the case of the “drunkard,” the object is the act to drink or refrain from 
drinking. That is, “the proper and immediate object” of the will “are his own acts”
(1.2.10). If the “drunkard” drinks it is because drinking was what was most pleasing at 
that time (1.2.10). “Remote” objects would include the pleasure or pain that will follow 
the drink, or a consideration of moral judgment. These remote objects are not the proper 
objects of will, though. The object of volition here is drink or no and when a person 
drinks that object appeared more pleasing than unpleasing (1.2.11). Notice that Edwards 
did not say that pleasure is always the object willed (which is the way William James 
characterized the idea that pleasure and pain determine volition). Even something that 
brings pain (like exercise, for example) may be deemed pleasing by the mind. Edwards 
was not saying that such an act causes the person to say that the unpleasant feelings are 
pleasant. It was not the feelings that were selected, but the action.
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Edwards attempts to uphold the unity of the mind in his formulations. He used 
the phrase “the will always is as the greatest apparent good” rather than that the will is 
determined by the greatest apparent good, “because an appearing most agreeable or 
pleasing to the mind, and the mind’s preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly 
and perfectly distinct.” It may be more properly said that action is determined by “that 
which appears most agreeable” rather than by preference or choice. An act of volition is 
“determined by that in or about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to appear 
most agreeable.” The factors which determine the mind’s view of an object are 
numerous and complex. “Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind’s 
view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the 
mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself...” 
He gives a few comments to this effect, trying to explain what might cause the mind’s 
view (1.2.12), such as “the apparent nature and circumstances of the object” or the thing 
viewed, the degree of “pleasure or trouble” in the consequences or circumstances of the 
object, or the clarity of the idea of the object. It is not important here to specify the 
things which Edwards thought might determine the view of the object, but rather to note 
that Edwards was thinking of human behavior as determined, and that determinants can 
be specified (much as contemporary psychology does).
Therefore, the choice of will never departs from that which appears most 
agreeable and pleasing: “If the immediate objects of the will are a man’s own actions, 
then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills.” Further, “there is 
scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, 
than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits
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them best, or what is most agreeable to them.” By definition, all else is contradiction. To 
say a person wills what is unpleasing is to say they are pleased with what is unpleasing 
(1.2 .22).
Concerning the intellectualist question, the will can be considered to follow the 
last dictate of the understanding only if understanding is taken in “a large sense” 
including the perception and apprehension, not merely reason or judgment. The dictates 
of reason are, along with all other determining factors, “put into the scales” to determine 
what is most agreeable. Edwards therefore had room in his psychology for motivational 
ambivalence. In such cases, we might find that both sides of the scale are heavy with 
incentive, and the choice is made only by the slightest preponderation of incentive 
(1.2.23).
Necessitv
In Section three, Edwards turned to “the meaning of the terms necessity, 
impossibility, inability.. .and.. .contingence.” Because these terms are used “abundantly” 
in the free will controversy, clarity was important (1.3.1). Yet definitions were also 
important because they would determine the course of the subsequent argumentation. 
Here we find Edwards defining necessity in such a way as to uphold the paradoxical 
Puritan doctrines of original sin and human responsibility.
To say that a thing is necessary “when it must be, and caimot be otherwise,” is not 
a good definition, because it leaves the words “must” and “cannot” unexplained (1.3.2).
In “common speech” necessity is a relative term- relating to “some supposed opposition” 
The same with the words “impossible”, “irresistible”, and “unable”. All these terms are 
relative, implying frustrated desire (1.3.3). To clarify the point, Edwards made a
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distinction between “general” necessity and things that are necessary “to us.'” The first 
has to do with things that must be “notwithstanding” any opposition at all, “from any 
quarter;” the latter type of necessity has to do with things that must be, “notwithstanding” 
whatever opposition we may put forth (1.3.5). It is this latter type of necessity that is 
most relevant to the free will controversy (1.3.6). This idea of personal necessity (which 
is, again, the “common” notion) supposes that there is some insuffieient opposition of our 
wills: “though we desire or endeavor [i.e., will] to the contrary,” the necessary thing 
occurs (1.3.7). As we shall see, Edwards was trying to rule out this idea of necessity, for 
the necessity he had in mind did not include the idea of opposition. In sum, the idea of 
necessity he was trying to oppose is that we are ‘unable’ to do something when all of our 
desires are insuffieient to overcome opposition (1.3.8).
Edwards was concerned that this “common” way of thinking about necessity was 
a “fixed and settled” cognitive “habit” that would not be easy to overcome. Instead, he 
desired to use the term as a “terms of art” and so admonished his readers to be careful 
(“exceeding circumspect and wary”) that they don’t “insensibly slide into the vulgar 
use...” of the term (1.3.9). So, when these words (such as “necessity,” “impossible,” 
“irresistible,” “unable”) are used in a manner that implies no opposition, they are used “in 
some new sense,” in a manner “quite beside their use in common speech” (1.3.10). It is 
precisely in this “new” way that many “.. .metaphysicians and philosophers...” use these 
terms in a way that implies no opposition (1.3.11). Defmitionally, then, “metaphysical or 
philosophical necessity is nothing different from certainty.” This certainty is the 
“certainty that is in things themselves.” This certainty in the things themselves is the 
foundation of our sure knowledge of them (1.3.12).
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Edwards thought it hest to adhere to the philosophical view of necessity because 
of certain problems associated with the typical definition of necessity: The typical 
definition of philosophical necessity is “that by which a thing cannot but be.” Still, 
Edwards though two things wrong with it. First, terms like necessity, can, cannot, 
unable, are in this case left undefined and, second, the terms cannot and unable seem to 
improperly imply opposition (1.3.13). Edwards therefore expanded his initial definition 
of necessity: “Philosophical necessity is nothing else than the full and fixed connection 
between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms 
something to be true.” When such a full and fixed connection exists, we can then say that 
“the thing affirmed in the proposition” is philosophically necessary. No opposition is 
implied in this definition. Edwards therefore concluded, “ .. .in this sense I use the word 
“necessity,” in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not 
inconsistent with liberty” (1.3.14).
The cormection between the subject and predicate of a proposition that “affirms 
the existence of something,” may be “full and fixed” in several ways. The connection 
between the subject and the predicate of the proposition may be “in and o f themselves." 
This is the case in “many things” which are “necessary in their own nature,” such as the 
“external existence of being generally considered,” and “God’s infinity” and the fact that 
two plus two equals four. In sum, “innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths 
are necessary in themselves” therefore, the subject and predicate which affirms them are 
perfectly connected. (1.3.16). Another way that the connection between subject and 
predicate of a proposition “which affirms the existence of something” may be necessary 
is because the thing affirmed has already come to pass. The existence of whatever has
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come to pass is now necessary (1.3.18). For example, the statement ‘Jonathan Edwards 
was bom in 1703’ is necessary in this sense. Finally, the existence of the thing affirmed 
may be necessary “consequentially.” This necessity of consequence applies to 
propositions that are perfectly connected with propositions that are necessary in one of 
the two ways mentioned above (in and of themselves, or by having already come to pass; 
1.3.18). So, all necessary things that are future (which are not necessary in themselves 
and are not necessary by having already taken place) must be necessary by a necessity of 
consequence. They obviously can’t be necessary in themselves or they would already 
exist, and they can’t be necessary by already coming to pass, because this contradicts the 
supposition. So anything that has a beginning, including things past, must come into 
being this way. Therefore, because volitions all come into existence (are not necessary in 
themselves) they arise by a necessity of consequence (1.3.19).
Edwards also noted that things may be necessary generally or particularly.
General necessity is when a certain relationship between subject and predicate is certain 
“in the most general and universal view of things” (1.3.20), and a particular necessity has 
to do with “a particular person, thing or tim e...” Many things that a particular person has 
no hand in, i.e., that their will did not create, are necessary in this way. This contention, 
as we shall see, has an important use in Edwards’ system (1.3.21), and is related to the 
Calvinistic doctrines of original sin and the sanctification of the believer.
Edwards closed his discussion of necessity with an application of his definitions 
to other terms such as “impossible.” The term impossible in this light is simply “negative 
necessity” or a “necessity that a thing should not be.” This too is a “term of art” different 
from the vulgar usage (1.3.23). “Unable” and “inability” have similar meaning. Contrary
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to the vulgar use, philosophers and divines use these terms in a way that does not imply 
insufficient will or endeavor, but rather deny that there is any such will at all (1.3.24). 
Edwards also highlighted the difference in the way the word “contingent” was defined in 
its vulgar use and its use by metaphysicians. In vulgar use, something is “contingent” 
when we can’t discern its cause. It isn’t to say that there is no cause, but just that the 
cause is not known (1.3.25). In the polemical writers, however, something is 
“contingent” when it comes to pass with no cause at all, i.e., it has “absolutely no 
previous ground or reason” (1.3.26). Edwards would challenge the idea that anything 
could possibly come to pass for no reason whatsoever.
Moral and Natural Necessitv
In Section 4, Edwards expanded upon his definitional work on the topic of 
necessity by developing the crucial distinction between two types of necessity, natural 
and moral, a distinction that would help to explain the Calvinistic paradox that humanity 
is in bondage to sin, and yet still accountable to God. Although Edwards appeared to be 
open to the possibility that the distinction between moral and natural necessity was not 
“ .. .a proper and perfect distinction...” (1.4.2), he believed that the distinction had “very 
important” theological consequences (1.4.7), and therefore utilized the distinction heavily 
throughout the Freedom of the Will. Although he adapted the terms to his use, he also 
indicated that he did not make them up. Instead he justified his use from the fact that 
these terms were the ones “usually” used (1.4.7).
After giving a varieties of uses of the phrase “moral necessity” he says that moral 
necessity is the “necessity and connection and consequence which arises from such moral 
causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in
218
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions.” Moral inability would 
therefore consist in a want of inclination or desire to do a particular thing (1.4.3). By 
implication, the human race, which lacks the inclination to obey God through the fall of 
Adam, has a moral inability to obey God. Further, we see that Edwards defines will as a 
moral entity. Although Upham and James would reject Edwards’ application of the 
moral/natural distinction, they would continue to affirm that the will is a moral faculty.
Natural necessity, on the other hand, is a necessity arising from natural causes. A 
will is by definition not a natural cause. We are said to be naturally unable when we 
can’t do a particular thing even if  we will because nature won’t allow it (1.4.4). In this 
sense, natural inability is most similar to the vulgar use of the term necessity as described 
above. The theological use of this term will become clear as we investigate the nature of 
these natural causes.
Although the types of motive differ in these two types of necessity, the nature of 
necessity is the same in both. For one, “moral necessity may be as absolute as natural 
necessity” (1.4.6). To make this point, Edwards appealed to the experiences of his 
readers—“.. .1 suppose none will deny...” that there are occasions when motives are very 
strong and difficult to resist. Although people may have power “ .. .to surmount 
difficulties...” still, “ .. .that power is not infinite...” For example, a man may be able to 
resist “ten degrees of difficulty,” yet not be able to withstand “a thousand degrees”
(1.4.6).
To clarify the distinction between natural and moral necessity, Edwards affirmed 
that the distinction isn’t in the “nature of the connection” but rather “in the two terms 
connected” (1.4.7). Moral necessity deals with moral causes which are of a “moral
219
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nature” such as “habitual disposition” or “motive exhibited to the understanding,” and 
moral effects, such as those “ .. .consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul.”
Regarding natural necessity, Edwards noted that much of what we call nature we 
don’t control. Our wills have nothing to do with the way the “material world” operates. 
Men are accustomed to making a distinction between ““nature” and “choice”; as though 
they were completely and universally distinct.” Although none will deny that choice is 
often dependent upon nature, we also, Edwards was convinced, easily see the difference. 
The difference is what is “suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and 
research” (1.4.8). Here, and throughout Freedom of the Will, Edwards utilized an 
introspective and intuitionist epistemology very similar to the type that would come to 
dominate American mental philosophy in Thomas Upham and others.
As if to make himself perfectly clear, Edwards repeats the point made earlier; 
“necessity” in the phrase “moral necessity” does not imply insufficient voluntary 
opposition. To the contrary moral necessity is “ .. .a certainty of the inclination and will 
itself’ (1.4.9).
These considerations of natural and moral necessity help to clarify the crucial 
concepts of “ .. .natural and moral inability” (1.4.10).
What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain what is 
intended by natural and moral inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do 
a thing, when we can’t do it if  we will, because what is most commonly called 
nature don’t allow of it, or because of some impending defect or obstacle that is 
extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or 
external objects. Moral inability consists not in any of these things; but either in
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the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of 
sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength 
of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and 
it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want 
of inclination . (1.4.10)
The fact that Edwards included the faculty of understanding among natural causes says 
much about his voluntarism.
A morally unable person may still possess the natural capability to do a morally 
good thing: i.e., he has the hardware—he has the intellect to tell him right and wrong, and 
the muscles to carry out the kind act. Yet, natural ability, although a necessary condition 
of moral activity, is still insufficient to produce moral activity. If the person possessing 
the requisite natural equipment lacks the inclination or desire to carry it out, the deed will 
remain undone. So in the case of moral inability, “ .. .the thing wanting is not a being 
able [in a natural sense], but a being willing [in a moral sense]. There are faculties of 
mind, and capacity of nature, and everything else, sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is 
wanting but a will.” To illustrate the point, Edwards spoke of “a woman of great honor 
and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave.” Likewise, “A 
child of great love and duty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father.” 
Fiufher still, “a strong habit of virtue and great degree of holiness may cause a moral 
inability to love wickedness in general...” (1.4.11).
Edwards returned here to the “ .. .distinction of moral inability, viz. of that which 
is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional” (1.4.12). “General 
and habitual” moral inability is an “inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of
221
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that nature or kind [good or evil], through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual 
and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination.” For example, “a very ill- 
natured man” can’t be kind.” On the other hand, “particular and occasional” moral 
inability or the inability of will in a particular act, is “ .. .an inability of the will or heart to 
a particular act, through [1] the strength or defect of present motives, or of [2] 
inducements presented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion. If it be so, that 
the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an 
inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any 
case, that the will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things 
considered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and induce it.” Edwards 
therefore ruled out libertarian or indeterminist notions of mental action (such as those that 
would characterized Upham and James). “ .. .Will and endeavor against, or diverse from 
present acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or 
habitual; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, 
it is” (II.4.12). These distinctions also helped to clarify Calvinistic thought. All people 
in Adam possessed a general inability to do the good, possessed as they were of an 
inability to “all exercises” of obedience to God’s law. Yet, even those united to Christ 
were liable to individual acts of disobedience, and, although not possessed of the general 
inability characterizing those “in Adam,” are still to be considered morally unable in 
those particular sins through insufficient motives.
The word “inability” is therefore used by Edwards in a way divergent from its 
“original import” in the phrase “moral inability” (1.4.13). As noted above, when used in 
its “proper” and common sense “inability” signifies natural inability. That is, in the case
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where a person has a will/inclination, yet is still unable. It isn’t proper to say “it can’t be 
done” if a person could do it if he willed. A drunkard could (would be able to) keep the 
cup from his mouth if he were so inclined: “ .. .a man can’t be truly said to be unable to do 
a thing, when he can do it if  he will.” In other words, a person can’t be said to be without 
natural ability when he is only lacking in moral ability. He can but he can’t. If the will 
were there, he could engage in the activity. “There are faculties of mind, and capacity of 
nature, and everything else, sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.” 
Since natural ability is present, personal responsibility is held intact.
Libertv and Moral Agencv
The fifth and final section of the first part of Freedom of the Will deals with the 
issues of freedom and agency. Edwards, building upon his definitions in previous 
sections, argued that “the plain and obvious meaning of the words “freedom” and 
“liberty” in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that anyone has, to do 
as he pleases.” This definition includes freedom “ .. .from hindrance or impediment in ... 
doing.. .as he wills.” The opposite of this liberty is “ .. .being hindered or unable to 
conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise” (1.5.1). Freedom is therefore 
lost only in cases of natural inability.
Only those beings that have a “faculty, power or property” called “will” can have 
(or not have) liberty (1.5.2). Still, Edwards advised caution in this regard because of the 
classie error of the hypostatization or reification of faculties. Properly understood, a 
faculty is simply an ability belonging to someone or some thing. The error which 
Edwards (following Locke) challenged is turning the faculty into a being or a thing.
When this error is committed it is easy to treat the reified faculty as if it were an agent
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within the agent, possessed of faculties itself. But since freedom or liberty can only be 
predicated of agents, and the will is not an agent, it is improper to ascribe liberty to the 
will itself. Freedom of the will is in this sense a misnomer. The term freedom can only 
be meaningful when it signifies the freedom of the agent to do as he or she pleases (1.5.2).
Two things are contrary to liberty: “constraint” and “restraint” (1.5.3). Constraint 
is force or compulsion- being forced to do something contrary to his will. Restraint is not 
being able to do according to his will. Edwards explicitly endorses Locke’s treatment of 
this topic. As long as the will is free from constraint or restraint, the will is free. Liberty 
has nothing to do with how the will is caused: “let the person come by his volition or 
choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his 
pursuing and executing his will, the man if  fully and perfectly free, according to the 
primary and common notion of freedom” (1.5.4). According to this definition, even the 
actions of those in Adam, whose inclinations are necessarily against God, are free and 
therefore culpable.
Edwards then turned to the Arminian/Pelagian definition of freedom. He thought 
that there were three things which “belong to their notion of liberty.” First, it is said to 
consist “ .. .in a self-determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty that the will 
has over itself...” Second, a free will is indifferent, i.e., “.. ..the mind, previous to the act 
of volition, be, in equilibrio.” Finally, a free will is a contingent will, not in the 
previously defined vulgar sense of the term (i.e., not knowing the cause of an event), but 
in the manner in the philosophical sense, “ .. .as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and 
certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence” (1.5.5). In
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Section II, Edwards would attempt to dismantle all three of these ideas: self- 
determination, indifference, and contingency.
Finally, Edwards defined a moral agent as . .a being that is capable of those 
actions that have a moral quality, and which can be properly denominated good or evil in 
a moral sense...” Moral agency includes a “moral faculty” which is a “ .. .sense of moral 
good and evil,” and “ ... a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions 
by moral inducements or motives...” (1.5.6). The sun does excellent things but isn’t a 
moral agent. Fire does bad things, but isn’t a moral agent. “Brute creatures” likewise 
lack moral faculty, are not sensitive to moral inducements or motives, and lack the ability 
to reason. They too cannot be considered moral agents (1.5.7).
To further illustrate his meaning, Edwards described the difference between a 
human ruler and a subject. These folks have a “circumstantial” difference in that they 
differ in the moral inducements by which they are capable of being persuaded. Rulers 
can’t be persuaded by the sanctions and threats, rewards/punishments of moral law, but 
both can be influenced by “a knowledge of moral good and evil.” The “ .. .moral agency 
of the supreme Being,” however, differs from the moral agency of created moral beings 
in that God cannot be moved by threatenings, but is rather is moved by a pure and perfect 
vision of moral good. True to his Puritan heritage, Edwards sought to posit the 
supremaey of God in everything, seeing in God not only “the essential qualities of a 
moral agent” but also the very “ .. .source of all moral ability and agency.” Any moral 
ability or agency found in human beings must be credited to the Source. And, since 
humanity is made in God’s image, humanity shares in the moral agency of God (1.5.8). 
Here Edwards reiterates the crucial Amesian point that God is the only source of
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efficiency in the universe, and is therefore to be given credit for all goodness found in the 
world. As we proceed, it will become clearer that Edwards too was intensely interested 
in preserving God’s glory as the Source of all goodness, and in advocating for the 
creaturely humility that this glory implied.
Arminian Irrationalitv 
In the second part of Freedom of the Will, entitled “Wherein It Is Considered 
Whether There Is or Can Be Any Such Sort of Freedom of Will, as That Wherein 
Arminians Place the Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such 
Thing Ever Was or Can Be Conceived of,” Edwards applied his various “terms and 
things” to the Arminian psychology. As the title suggests, his goal was to show how 
Arminian psychology was based upon something inconceivable and irrational. Less 
obvious, Edwards was concerned with refuting several varieties of the Arminian error. 
This approach puts the subsequent developments in American psychology into an 
interesting light as American mental philosophy tended to recapitulate one variety of the 
Arminian position, while the New Psychology tended to favor another.
S elf-Determ i n ati on
In the first section, Edwards took aim at the first of the three components of 
Arminian notion of freedom of the will: the idea that the will must possess a “self­
determining power” in order to be free. Recalling his warning against the reification 
problem, or of ascribing agency to faculties, he assumes that the Arminians are aware of 
this problem and will not commit it (II. 1.2).
If the will is self-determined, then any given act of will must be caused by the will 
itself. But, “ .. .if the will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines all the free
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acts of the will in the exercise of a power of willing or choosing; or, which is the same 
thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts” 
(II. 1.4). If this is the case, every free act is determined by a preceding act of the will. By 
definition, if this preceding act of choice is free, it must also be determined by a 
preceding act of choice. Yet this line of reasoning makes it impossible for there to be a 
“first act” in the chain of causality. If a free act of will must be self-determined, it must 
be caused by a preceding act of will. Yet this presumes that the preceding act of will is 
also free, and therefore also preceded by an act of will. One can take the chain of cause 
an effect back as many steps as one may like. Eventually there must be a first free act of 
will. But, by the Arminian definition this free act will also be self-determined, i.e., 
caused by a preceding act of will. The Arminian is therefore left with the very awkward 
situation of a first free act of will preceded by another free act: a contradiction. The 
Arminian might at this point say that the first act of will is caused by something other 
than the will. But this too contradicts the Arminian definition of freedom: that a free act 
of will is a self-determined act of will. Given the Arminian definition, free will is shown 
to be a non-entity. “ .. .This Arminian notion of liberty of the will, consisting of the will’s 
self determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world” (II. 1.5). 
A will shut “wholly out of the world” is a non-entity, a myth. Arminian psychology, 
then, though attempting to extol the powers of the human will, ended up destroying the 
will instead.
Edwards then turned his attention to possible lines of defense that an Arminian 
might levy against this argument. For example, Edwards constructed a possible evasion 
that:
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When the Arminians speak of the will’s determining its own acts, they don’t mean 
that the will determines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of the will 
determines another; but only that the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the 
use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it without any act 
going before the act determined... (II.2.1)
This evasion is “full of the most gross absurdity.” If the power of the will 
determines an act of will, it must do so by a prior act of will. In what other way can the 
will affect anything but by choice? Edwards continues in this vein, refuting several such 
“objections,” which do not need to be included in this analysis. Time and again he shows 
that each possible Arminian objection ultimately ends up in the problem of infinite 
regress described above. Each objection, that is, except one. The exempt objection that 
an Arminian might posit is that an act of will simply “ .. .comes to pass o f itself, without 
any cause; and that there is absolutely no ground or reason of the soul’s being determined 
to exert such a volition...” (II.2.11). If this is what Arminians mean when they insist on 
the will’s self-determining power, they speak “words without meaning” and reduce the 
entire debate, which has to do with what determines the will, to meaninglessness and 
absurdity. Since Arminians also held to the idea of contingency as a requirement of 
liberty, Edwards was convinced that Arminian psychology actually committed this error. 
Although Arminians “ ... hold the free acts of the will to be contingent events...,”
(II.2.12) it must be maintained that things that are caused are not contingent. If 
something determines the will, it isn’t a contingent event. So, even the Arminian 
contention that free acts of will are self-determined contradicted the idea of contingency, 
which states that acts of will are not determined.
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Causality and Contingency
In light of the Arminian belief that free acts are contingent (i.e., uncaused) acts, 
Edwards thought it necessary to answer the question in the next section: “whether any 
eyent whatsoeyer, and yolition in particular, can come to pass without a cause...” 
Ironically, this yariety of “Arminianism” was arguably not preyalent in American 
psychology until the adyent of “scientific” psychology of William James. Still, giyen its 
late ascendancy, Edwards’ comments here are of interest.
Edwards began his section defending the principle of uniyersal causality with an 
attempt to define the issue. Typically the term “causality” refers to “positiye efficiency” 
to bring something to pass, i.e., “positiye productiye influence.” But the word cause can 
be used more broadly to apply to anything that seryes as a “ground or reason” for a 
particular existence. The sim is the efficient cause of the thawing of water, but is also a 
cause of their freezing, although not an efficient cause. The “withdrawmenf ’ of the sun 
is the ground and reason of freezing, it is connected to the freezing, i.e., the freezing 
depends upon the “withdrawment.” This is in Edwards mind as much of a cause as an 
efficient cause (II.3.1).
Repeating a point made aboye, causes may be moral as well as natural. Both 
types of cause are equally “real” (II.3.2). In arguing for the efficacy of moral causes, 
Edwards was insisting that motiyes and other psychological eyents had causal efficacy. 
James would make the same point throughout the Principles. His chapter on the 
automaton theory is particularly releyant here. Yet, as it became more difficult to 
articulate a coherent notion of moral agency, it became increasingly difficult to explain 
precisely how yolition was a moral phenomenon.
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Edwards defined cause as:
any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, 
either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the 
ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it 
is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a 
consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the 
proposition which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence 
[like the absence of the sun or of sound], or not. And in agreeableness to this, I 
sometimes use the word “effect” for the consequence of another thing, which is 
perhaps rather an occasion than a cause, most properly speaking.” (II.3.3) 
Although many of Edwards interpreters’ have made much of his “occasionalism,” which 
is the doctrine that the only efficient causality belongs to God, this particular use of the 
term occasion seems simply to refer back to the idea that something can be a “ground or 
reason” of an existence without being an efficient cause, such as his description of the 
sun’s “withdrawment.” Unlike these other commentators, I will not interpret Edwards’ 
Freedom of the Will in light of his “Miseellanies,” which makes it more difficult to 
interpret him as an occasionalist. I do not deny that this was his viewpoint, I simply 
desire to interpret Freedom of the Will the way his eighteenth and nineteenth century 
interpreters would have interpreted it. Why did Edwards take such definitional pains? 
Perhaps with tongue in cheek, Edwards explained that it was to remove an “occasion” to 
object to what he says later in the book. Even here, an “occasion” may be interpreted as a 
non-efficient cause, i.e., something having an influence through its absence (II.3.4).
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Edwards thought it common sense that nothing comes to pass without a cause, 
except that which is self-existent such as God. All things that “begin to be” (like 
volitions) must have a cause. This idea, that a new existence must have a cause “ .. .seems 
to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the 
minds of all mankind, and the main foundation for all our reasoning about the existence 
of things, past, present, or to come.” Edwards’ recourse to common sense is significant 
here, showing that he was indeed trying to utilize a nonsectarian and enlightened method 
to sectarian ends. His use of the pronoun “our” is significant in this regard. For Ames, 
“our” beliefs were most frequently the beliefs of the sectarian community. Edwards, 
utilizing the approach of enlightenment, desires to speak to a universal community of 
like-minded and reasonable individuals (II.3.5). Whenever we see a “new mode of 
existence “ .. .the mind of mankind necessarily supposes that there is some cause or 
reason...” for the change (II.3.6).
If the principle of cause and effect is taken away, “all knowledge of any 
existence” is eradicated, including the existence of God (II.3.7). Given the limitations of 
the human mind, we argue for the existence of God in a way that relies heavily upon 
notions of cause and effect: “we first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that 
there must be an eternal cause; and then secondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, 
that this being must be necessarily existent; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of 
his existence, we may descend, and prove many of his perfections a priori” (II.3.8). 
Edwards’ use of reason to prove God’s existence is surprising given his rather voluntarist 
approach to salvation. Edwards, like Ames, thought that the understanding could never 
fully embrace the truth of the gospel unless God changed the will. Yet here in Freedom
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of the Will Edwards adopts a different strategy: attempting to reason people into the truth 
using “universal” argumentations.
In a less theologieal strain, Edwards also thought that the rejection of the notion 
of cause and effect undermines our ability to know anything at all. If there is no cause 
and effect, we can know nothing “ .. .but our own immediately present ideas and 
consciousness.” Why is this? Typically, we infer that the sensations that are “excited in 
us” are caused by things outside of us (II.3.10). Without the notion of causality this 
inference is ungrounded. Further, without the notion of causality, the behavior of people 
is entirely inexplicable. So, if the will is not determined or caused, then “millions and 
millions” of volitions come about “without any cause or reason why they do so...”
(II.3.11). Yet, since contingence is blind, the fact that we see order and predictability in 
the world mitigates against the idea that there is no causality. Predictability and order 
can’t follow contingence: “ .. .something besides mere contingence has a hand in the 
matter” (II.3.12).
Closing this section, and pointing toward the next, Edwards gave a specifie 
example of how some Arminians attempted to argue for contingency in the acts of the 
will— b^y positing that the will operates from different principles than matter. Still, 
Edwards pointed out that even if  Arminians were to argue that acts of the will are not 
subject to cause and effect because they are “ .. .existences of an exceeding different 
nature from other things...” such an argument “ .. .would be an evidence of their strangely 
forgetting themselves...” They would be giving a reason (i.e. a cause) to explain why 
there is no cause of the will (II.3.I4). So it is “repugnant to reason” to argue that an act
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of the will may come to pass without a cause. All things that are not self-existent must 
have a cause (II.3.15).
The “Active” Nature of the Will
The next section of Freedom of the Will deals with this particular “error” 
exclusively, by focusing upon “THE AUTHOR of the Essay on the Freedom o f the Will 
in God and the CreaturesE Edwards had in mind here the Calvinist theologian, 
philosopher and hymn-writer Isaac Watts. Edwards had pointed out in his introduction 
that a person may be a Calvinist in nearly every respect, but still fall into the Arminian 
error concerning the will. Edwards thought Watts had so stumbled. Given the strong 
reputation of Watts it is perhaps not surprising that Edwards never actually explicitly 
named Watts (II.4.1).
Watts thought that the notion of self-determination was not applicable “in 
corporeal things,” yet did hold for spirits [like the soul] because spirits “ .. .are beings of 
an active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can determine 
themselves” (II.4.1). The problem with this solution, Edwards thought, is that by giving 
a reason that there is no reason for the will’s actions he contradicts himself. The active 
being is the cause, so cause and effect must apply even to spirits according to Watt’s own 
suppositions— i.e., the cause is found, according to Watts, in the nature of the spirit 
(II.4.2). A further problem is that active nature is a ‘‘general thing, it is an ability or 
tendency of nature to action...” Yet this ability in itself can’t explain why the person 
chooses one particular thing over another. Active nature is undifferentiated- the whole 
debate, Edwards reminded his Arminian opponents, is about elucidating that which 
causes the will to move in one direction or another, not just to elucidate why the will
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moves in general (II.4.3). The notion of active being is also liable to the infinite regress 
refutation of self-determination. Since active being can only bring about effects by 
acting, we are left with the difficulty of explaining the first act of active being. The 
Arminian is left with difficulties any way he turns: if  this first act is caused by a previous 
act of the active being, or if  this act is caused by something other than active being.
After expanding and refining these arguments, Edwards concluded, “therefore the 
activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties which the notion of 
a self-determining power in the will is attended with, nor will it help, in the least, its 
absurdities” (II.4.8). Given these contradictions, Edwards concluded that Arminian 
psychologists are forced into great inconsistency.
Indifference
In the next section, Edwards turned to the idea that the will needs to act fi-om a 
state of perfect indifference in order to be free. Tellingly, Edwards was perplexed with 
the way that Arminian psychologists reported a “universal” experience that was foreign 
to Edwards’ Calvinistic consciousness: “A GREAT ARGUMENT for self-determining 
power, is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to determine our 
wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented...” Edwards rejects the idea 
that this experience is universal. Still, Edwards’ Calvinistic subjectivity would become 
increasingly rare in the American context, and the Arminian argument would be used 
widely, with Upham and James as leading (modified) examples (II.6.1).
Edwards took Isaac Watts to task for this viewpoint. Watts asserted that there are 
“many instances” when the will isn’t determined by “ .. .present uneasiness, nor by the 
greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by anything else.”
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The will in this case “discovers its own perfect power of choice, rising from within itself, 
and free from all influence or restraint of any kind.” The will may in many cases move 
without motive or preference (II.6.2).
Instead of interpreting this Arminian subjectivity, Edwards challenged Watts on 
logical grounds. The idea that the will can move without motive is a contradiction. It is 
to say that the will chooses while remaining indifferent, that it is inclined while not 
inclined, has preference while having no preference, etc. Always concerned to focus his 
analysis on the moment of choice. Watts, Edwards thought, must want to say that the will 
is indifferent when it chooses. If he were simply saying that the will is indifferent until it 
has choice/preference, he would not have been saying anything controversial. The 
controversy and the illogic of the idea is that choice is made while will is indifferent. 
When different objects appear “equally fit,” Watts argues, the will by its own 
determination “creates its own pleasure,” so that the pleasure arises from its choice, 
which wasn’t based on antecedent pleasure. Edwards interpreted Watts to mean that the 
will is indifferent when it chooses, and preference follows the choice, which is made in 
indifference (II.6.3).
Edwards also criticized Watts’ notion that the pleasure follows the choice. For 
Edwards, by definition, the pleasure is the choice, not its consequence. A choice “in the 
same instance”, in the same occasion or case, can’t come before itself. Edwards 
frequently simply argues from the assumption that his definitions are true, and does not 
pause to consider whether his definitions may have shortcomings based upon the 
psychological experiences of Arminians: “The very act of choosing one thing rather than 
another, is preferring that thing.” Given Edwards’ definitions, it simply does not make
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sense to say that the will chooses without preference (II.6.4). Again, “to suppose the will 
to act at all in a state of perfect indifference.. .is to assert that the mind chooses without 
choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can 
follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow” (II.6.6).
To he fair to Edwards, he did offer an explanation for what the Arminian 
psychologists took to be an example of a choice made in indifference; to touch a square 
on a chessboard. Edwards postulated that three steps are involved in the purportedly 
“indifferent” action of the will, each of which show that the mind is always subject to 
inducements (II.6.8). First, a person has a “general determination that it will touch one of 
the squares,” perhaps for “making some experiment.” Second, since no one square 
actually appears better than any other, the agent makes “ .. .another general determination 
to give itself up to accident...” Finally, the person makes “a particular determination to 
touch a certain individual spot’ that the mind suggests through accident.” Yet throughout 
the process the mind is never actually indifferent to the act of will in question (II.6.8).
One of the reasons that Arminians get confused at this point is that they misunderstand 
the nature of the object. The object of volition in the chessboard example was not a place 
on the chessboard, but was rather the action of touching a place on the chessboard
(II.6.12). Yet, since the mind has no preference for any particular square on the 
chessboard, the Arminian mistakenly concludes that the person makes the choice 
indifferently.
The Problem with Indifference
In the next section Edwards challenged the idea that freedom of the will consists 
in indifference. Here Edwards reveals that his target was more than simply Arminians,
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since “Pelagians, semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others...’’held to this 
view (II.7.2). Although there were minor differences in approach, Edwards thought that 
all groups held that indifference “ .. .leaves the will not determined already; but.. .vacant 
of predetermination, so far, that there may be room for the exercise of the self- 
determining power of the will; and that the will’s freedom consists in, or depends upon 
this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the will itself to be the determiner of the act 
that is to be the free act” (II.7.4).
Edwards insisted that, for this scheme to work, the indifference must be '‘’perfect 
and absolute’, there must be perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation [sic] or 
inclination.” This is because an antecedent inclination removes perfect indifference from 
the self-determining power of the will; the soul is already inclined in one 
direction.. .when inclination is present, it “binds the will, so that it is utterly impossible 
that the will should act otherwise than agreeably to it” (II.7.5). Here again Edwards 
seems to fall back on his definitions. For while the “strength of the will” was something 
separate from “inclination” in Arminian minds, these two were inextricably linked in 
Edwards’ mind. So, given Edwards’ definitions, in order for the will to be “its own 
master” the indifference in the will needs to be perfect (II.7.10)
With these things in mind, Edwards then asked if  “ .. .this notion of the liberty of 
will consisting in indifference and equilibrium, and the will’s self-determination in such a 
state, be not absurd and inconsistent” (II.7.11). To this end, Edwards laid down “ .. .an 
axiom of undoubted truth; that every free act is done in a state of freedom, and not only 
after such a state.” If an act merely follows a state of freedom, that act isn’t free:
“ .. .liberty must yet continue, and coexist with the act; the soul remaining in possession of
237
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
liberty.” This is simply the Arminian’s assertion.. .actions are free when the soul is 
indifferent (II.7.12). So, Edwards asked, is this possible in the Arminian way of 
thinking? Gan a soul put forth a volition while remaining indifferent? “The very putting 
of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer.” This would 
amount to saying that (given Edwards definitions, of course) the soul has preference 
while it has no preference. “Choice and preference can no more be in a state of 
indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest...” The implication of this Arminian 
doctrine, therefore, is that volition and freedom are mutually exclusive concepts. Like 
darkness and light (II.7.13).
Some may object to this reasoning, saying that it misrepresents the Arminian 
position because all that the Arminian asserts is that will is free to determine its own 
volition (i.e., preferences), not that it is devoid of preferences. The free will is the cause 
of the transformation from indifference to inclination (II.7.14). To this Edwards 
wondered how a will in a perfect state of indifference might put itself out of this 
indifference. It must do it by will or choice. If it isn’t by choice, how else is the will 
going to determine it? If it isn’t the will, then the will isn’t self-determined and therefore 
not free. So, if  we grant that the indifferent soul puts itself out of indifference by choice, 
we have the same absurdity, an indifferent soul choosing, or a soul with no inclination 
inclining (II.7.15).
Another evasion is to say that liberty “consists in a power to suspend the act of the 
will,” this suspension allowing the mind to consider/deliberate both sides before willing 
(II.7.17). Edwards applied a familiar analysis to show that this notion also is absurd. For 
example, if liberty of will consists in suspending another act of will, the liberty of that
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suspending must consist in suspending that suspension. Not only is suspending a 
suspension an absurd idea, but one is also left with the problem of infinite regress, as is 
so often the case in Arminian psychology.
The Role of the Understanding
Edwards argued that “nothing is more evident” than that when men act voluntarily 
they do as they please. This in turn requires that the thing to be done “appears” 
agreeable, which means that an act of the understanding is involved in volition (II.9.1). 
Many Arminian writers conceded the fact that the acts of the will have a connection to 
the understanding. He lists Dr. Whitby, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Dr. Tmnbull as 
examples (II.9.2). Given this admission, Edwards sought to “impartially” consider if 
these Arminians were consistent with themselves (IL9.3). Dr. Whitby “plainly supposes” 
that will follows the understanding’s view of the greatest good, or, as Edwards quotes 
him in a long quote, "‘'what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be 
chosen” (II.9.4). Along these lines Whitby argued “that there is no need of any physical 
operation of the Spirit of God on the will, to change and determine that to a good choice, 
but that God’s operation and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the 
understanding...” The fact that Whitby posited an infallible connection between 
understanding and will was itself a kind of necessity, pointing outside of the will to 
explain the determination of the will’s actions (II.9.6). One way of avoiding this is to say 
that the contents of the understanding are determined by the will, through the will’s 
determination to attend to certain things and ignore others (II.9.7), but this is a “weak and 
inconsiderate” reply. What determines the preceding act of the will to attend to some 
things and not others? According to Whitby’s own assertions, the light in the
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understanding is that “which alone doth move the will.” So, even this preceding act of 
the will was determined by the understanding. Any act of will that precedes the 
preceding act of will must be similarly determined. And if every act of will is determined 
by the light of the understanding, none of them are free aceording to the Arminian belief 
that a free will is self-determined. So, with “one stroke” Whitby destroys his own 
argument (II.9.8).
Edwards also criticized Samuel Clarke’s variety of Arminianism. Clarke 
collapsed will and understanding into one faculty, but, Edwards argued, this maneuver 
doesn’t help, because “If the dictate of the understanding be the very same with the 
determination of the will or choice.. .then this determination is no fruit or ejfect of choice: 
and if so, no liberty of choice has any hand in it...” (II.9.9). If the determinations of the 
will and the dictates of the understanding are the same thing, then freedom is the freedom 
to choose whatsoever dictates of the understanding one wills. But this makes choice 
precede understanding, which is contrary to the supposition that understanding precedes 
choice (II.9.10). Furthermore, if  the last dictate of the understanding is the determination 
of the will itself, if  that last dictate is to be free in the Arminian sense, it must be self- 
determined, i.e., determined by choice, so the soul must freely choose what that dictate 
will be. So this is a choice preceding the last dictate of the understanding, a 
contradiction. If the will and understanding be the same, then this preceding choice is 
also a dictate of the understanding. Yet if this understanding be not necessary, it must be 
the product of the self-determining will, in infinitum (II.9.11). Edwards continued that if 
the will and the understanding are the same, we have confounded them. Supposing that 
Arminians believe this, then for the understanding to be free, it must be self-determined.
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and not rely on thing prior, etc. This is not a desirable kind of freedom. Do we really 
want to be free from the evidences that are presented to our understandings? Arminians 
argue that the use of reason is a main vehicle for moving men toward morality. Yet, if 
freedom consists in freedom from such causes, then freedom increases to the extent that 
reason’s ability to persuade is diminished (II.9.12).
Whether will and understanding are really one, the Arminian understanding of 
freedom from necessity requires that will not be connected with understanding, “and the 
further from such coimection, the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and 
complete, the determinations of the will have no connection at all with the dictates of the 
understanding.” This makes moral appeals vain because these appeals are to the 
understanding (II.9.13).
Motives
Edwards then turned his attention to the role of motives in the determination of 
will, a topic of particular importance in nineteenth-century American psychology. If the 
will is subject to cause, then it must be “excited by some motive.” To imagine that no 
motive is necessary is the same as to say that the will has no end, no teles, when it acts. 
This was contrary to Edwards’ definition; “ .. .for the mind to will something, and for it 
to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing”
(11.10.1). Motives are the cause of acts of will, i.e., they bring about the existence of 
these acts. “Motives do nothing as motives.. .but by their influence...” Acts of will are 
the effects of their cause, motives (II. 10.2). If volitions are the effects of motives, they 
are necessarily cormected to motive. If will is caused by motive, it isn’t caused by itself, 
i.e., it isn’t a self-determining power (II.10.3).
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After laying the definitional groundwork, Edwards took aim at the system of Mr. 
Chubb’s, whieh was, like all of the systems Edwards examined, “greatly divided against 
itself’ (II. 10.4). Chubb, like Edwards, was “abundant in asserting” that will is subject to 
motive, and that motive is the “previous ground and reason of all its acts.” Directly 
quoting Chubb, “Volition cannot take place without some previous reason or motive to 
induce it.” Chubb uses terms reason and motive interchangeably it seems: a motive is a 
reason that the will moves (II. 10.5).
So far so good. Yet, to Edwards’ great confusion, Chubb also asserted that 
motives are the consequence of free volitions, for before the mind is subject to any 
motive, it chooses to be so. In other words, the will chooses to comply with the motives 
presented to it. To be free, a soul must be able to act or refirain from acting from its 
motives. Will therefore acts as the final arbiter, choosing among motives regardless of 
their strength (II. 10.6).
Edwards thought that these things were manifestly inconsistent. “How can the 
mind first act, and by its act of volition and choice determine what motives shall be the 
ground and reason of its volition and choice? For this supposes the choice is already 
made, before the motive had an effect.” The absurdity of this is analogous to the idea of 
a son who is before the father yet who is begotten of the father (II. 10.7). If the preceding 
accusation is correct, that the choice is before and after the motive, how is it true that 
every act is preceded by a motive, as Chubb asserts? So the same motive is both before 
and after the act of the will, and thus is illogical (II.10.8).
Chubb called motives the “passive ground or reason” for action, a “remarkable 
phrase” in Edwards’ estimation (11.10.10). Ramsey argues that Chubb’s use of this
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phrase is not as ambiguous as Edwards’ claims. Edwards’ language is highly charged 
and a case can be made that he is too quick to show that Chubb is illogical before actually 
fairly representing his psychology. Ramsey argues that Chubb’s idea of passive ground 
is simply that motives stimulate the will to activity, and then become passive- the will 
then makes its choice. Ramsey thus argues that an essential difference between Edwards 
and Chubb is that Chubb argues for a sharp distinction between understanding and will.
Edwards was taken aback by the fact that Chubb asserted that volition requires 
motive, yet volition does not follow the strongest motive. With physical causes, the 
strongest prevails, but not with moral causes. The reason why this is the case, Chubb 
explained, is that motives are not strictly speaking real causes at all, but are “passive 
reasons” for action. Ramsey’s explanation helps here. Motives can only suggest.
Loudly or softly, they can only suggest. The ultimate choice is made by the autonomous 
will (11.10.12). There is a strong similarity between Chubb and Upham at this point. 
Upham, too, argued that the will acted as an arbiter among the various motives which are 
presented to it. He did this by arguing for a strong distinction between intellect, 
sensibility, and will. He further divided sensibility into two distinct types of motives 
which suggest to the will which way to go. The ultimate determination is up to the will.
Edwards did not take time to reflect upon the possibility that Chubb may have 
been operating upon the assumption that psychological faculties are like autonomous 
agents which have powers of action within themselves. If he had, he would have 
“anticipated” a very common tactic of nineteenth-century American faculty psychology. 
Instead, Edwards simply argued that “these things can’t stand together.” Since Chubb 
admitted that motives “invite,” this must mean that they are inviting in accordance with
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their strength (11.10.13). But if the will follows a motive that is not strongest, it is acting 
with no cause at all, with no motive at all, which contradicts, Edwards thought, Chubb’s 
assertion that will always follows motive. The idea that mind can prefer a weaker motive 
is, Edwards thought, absurd, and is inconsistent with Chubb’s assertion that there is 
something in the motive that moves the will. “Can there be previous ground in a thing 
for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event?” (11.10.14).
Although Edwards may not have been as careful as he might, he still does seem to 
have scored a point against Chubb’s approach, which seems to undermine the meaning of 
motive strength. Still Edwards proceeded throughout this section to argue simply along 
the lines of his own assumptions and definitions. If we assume that will is determined by 
strongest motive, Edwards continued, the idea that weaker motive might determine will is 
a contradiction. It is to say, “..the event follows an antecedent or a previous thing, as the 
ground of its existence, not only that has no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency.'" 
Edwards’ main criticism is that Chubb says that the motive is the ground and reason of 
the will, and then, by denying the importance of motive strength, in effect says that 
motive is not the ground and reason of the will (11.10.15,16). It is as if  God designed a 
scale so that the side with less weight would move down. This would prove that the 
weight isn’t the thing that moves the scale. And, given that strength of motive is 
irrelevant, the balance should be able to move with no weight at all (11.10.17). In other 
words, if motive strength is irrelevant, Edwards wondered what other way they could be 
relevant.
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Foreknowledge and Necessity
In a section that illustrates very well the fuzzy boundaries between enlightenment 
and sectarianism, Edwards argued that God’s foreknowledge of volitions proves that 
volition is not contingent, or without necessity (II. 11.1). Edwards focused on God’s 
foreknowledge because Arminian theology argued that God’s “choice” of those who will 
be saved is based not upon an eternal predestination, but rather upon a foreknowledge of 
faith. God “chooses” those whom he knows will of their own free wills believe in Christ. 
Edwards hoped to show that the foreknowledge of God was really no ally to the 
Arminian cause.
There were two parts to Edwards’ argument. First, to show that God has a certain 
foreknowledge of men’s volitions, and second, to demonstrate the consequences of this 
fact (II. 11.2). Edwards was amazed that he even needed to establish this first point, yet 
found that the doctrine was “denied by some that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be 
the Word of God.” Crucial to the thesis of this dissertation, Edwards did not assume that 
everyone would agree with the analysis that was to follow, but directed his argumentation 
to “ .. .such as own the truth of the Bible.” This phrase indicates that Edwards thought he 
was proceeding on purely rational grounds up to this point. Ele though he could assume 
all his readers would “own” reason, but not all Scripture (II. 11.4).
Edwards’ first argument was based upon the fact of God’s prediction of the 
choices of human beings in the Bible (II. 11.5). Edwards first laid down some rational 
principles which Edwards thought all could embrace (II. 11.9). First, if  God doesn’t know 
volitions in advance, he can’t foretell them (II. 11.6). Second, if  God doesn’t foreknow 
the volitions of men, neither can he foreknow the consequences of these volitions
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(II. 11.7). The consequences of men’s choices are enormous, “branch[ing] forth into an 
infinite number of series.” No matter how important and vast these consequences are, 
God, if he cannot know the volitions of human beings, does not know their consequences 
either (II. 11.8). This was a conclusion altogether unacceptable to a Puritan such as 
Edwards.
Edwards then turned to the Scripture to show that, first, Men’s moral volitions 
have been foretold by God. The moral (good or bad) conduct of Pharaoh, Josiah, 
Israelites, Ahab, Hazael, Cyrus, kings of Syria and Egypt, “Antiochus Epiphanes,” Peter, 
and Judas are all foretold in the Bible. Edwards gives Scripture references for most of 
these events (Peter doesn’t get one, for example, because Edwards assumed that his 
readers knew the reference; 11.11.10).
Secondly, events that depended upon the moral conduct of particular persons are 
also foretold by God in the Bible. For example, God’s promise to Abraham required that 
Joseph be sold into slavery and resist temptation (11.11.12). Third, God also foretold the 
moral conduct of entire nations and large masses of people: the Egyptians, Amorites, the 
destruction of Babylon, and the return from “Babylonish captivity” (11.11.12-19). Fourth, 
unless God foreknows, the promises concerning things future are unsound as well 
(11.11.20). The “great apostasy” predicted involved the moral actions of men and could 
not have been foretold if  God doesn’t foreknow volitions (II. 11.21). Fifth, without 
foreknowledge, the promises concerning the kingdom of Christ are also on very shaky 
grounds (11.11.22), as are the foundational promises made to the patriarchs.
Sixth, if God doesn’t have foreknowledge of men’s actions, prophecies in general 
are without substance because “almost all of them, if not universally without exception”
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have to do with the moral actions of moral agents, or with events dependent upon the 
actions of moral agents (II. 11.27). After listing other examples, Edwards concluded that 
God needs to foresee the actions of men’s wills, or all his predictions are “without 
knowledge” (II. 11.30). If God can’t foresee the actions of men’s wills, he could not 
foreknow anything related to the actions and works of mankind. All he could know was 
the workings of nature not dependent upon man, and those events “as he would bring to 
pass himself hy the extraordinary interposition of his immediate power” (II. 11.31). Yet, 
God couldn’t really foresee those events that he plans on bringing to pass by 
extraordinary interposition, because he would need to know “the state of the moral 
world” to interpose.. .which he isn’t allowed to know. He wouldn’t foreknow when the 
right time to judge the world would be, or anything else (II. 11.32). Further, God really 
couldn’t foresee what would come to pass in the natural world, because the moral world 
is the end of the natural world, and God’s plans concerning what de does in the natural 
world depend upon what he plans to do with the moral (II. 11.33). The consequences of 
all this were unfathomable to a Bible-believing person. For example, when Jesus said 
that heaven and earth will pass away, but his words would not pass away, he was engaged 
in conjecture (II. 11.36).
For a second argument, if  God doesn’t foreknow volitions, he didn’t foreknow the 
fall and couldn’t foreknow the things that are consequent to this event. He couldn’t 
foreknow Christ’s coming into the world, or the events leading up to this event. The 
Scripture couldn’t say that God chose Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph 
1:4), nor do all of the other references to this foreknowledge stand (II. 11.38).
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Third, if God doesn’t foreknow volitions, he can’t rightly be portrayed as the God 
who rules over all with tranquility and joy, nor can it rightly say that God doesn’t repent. 
The consequence is that we must interpret Gen 6:6 quite literally: God is subject to 
continual disappointments, and repents over his creation continually (II. 11.4).
Fourth, if God can’t foresee, and is subject to such disappointments, his 
management of the world must be under “great and miserable disadvantages.” God will 
continually have to shift his plans, “mend broken links as well as he can, and be 
rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case 
will allow.” He must be subject to confusion. Not able to forsee, he will regret the 
consequences of his choices, like humans (II. 11.41). This simply doesn’t accord with 
reason or Scripture. God is, according to Scripture, perfectly prescient, his plans stand, 
immutable (II. 11.42).
Fifth, the consequence of this scheme is that God, after he made the world, was 
frustrated in his plans, and when the world had turned toward sin in Noah’s days, we 
literally interpret scripture that God repented, because he had no idea things would turn 
out so bad. Further, God has no idea if such things will continue, as man is left to his 
own free will (II. 11.43). According to the scheme Edwards was trying to refute, the fall 
could not have been foreseen and must have greatly disappointed God. So the Messiah 
and everything else must be the fruits of the disappointment that his good world got 
messed up by the free will of angels and men. Further, even after the cross and 
resurrection, God remains uncertain if  these interventions will be effective. During the 
apostasy of Christendom (i.e., the middle ages), God couldn’t be sure the church would 
ever recover (II. 11.44). So, although Scripture clearly claims that God made the world
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for himself and foreordained that he would accomplish his purposes, this is impossible if 
one assumes that God does not have a foreknowledge of volitions (II. 11.45).
Having shown from Scripture that God has foreknowledge of volitions (a point 
that Arminians agreed with), Edwards then attempted to prove that this foreknowledge 
implies necessity (a point that Arminians strongly denied), by a necessity of consequence. 
Edwards’ first assertion used to prove that foreknowledge implies necessity was that an 
indissoluble connection with something already existing makes a thing necessary 
(II. 12.4). Edwards had in a previous section of Freedom of the Will argued that for 
things which are past, “their past existence is now necessary.” It is impossible now that 
these past things should be otherwise than certain (II. 12.5). Divine foreknowledge is 
necessary in this sense; it came into existence a long time ago (II. 12.6). Things 
connected with this necessary existence are also necessary by a necessity of consequence. 
Just as a proposition that is connected to a proposition that is necessarily true, is also 
necessarily true (II. 12.7). Similarly, if there is divine foreknowledge, then the events 
connected to this foreknowledge are also true. These volitions are necessary, i.e., they 
must come to pass (11.12.8).
Edwards’ second assertion was that no future event that is contingent (without 
necessity) can be certainly foreknown. To be certain of anything requires evidence, or 
something that makes the existence evident (II. 12.10). But if future events are 
contingent, the future existence of that event is without evidence.. .there is nothing that 
would make the existence evident. There are two kinds of evidence: self-evidence, or 
things necessary in themselves. Or, secondly, connection to something that is self- 
evident. Contingent future events have neither. Because there is no evidence for the
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existence of these contingent events, they can’t be known. Therefore, God can’t 
foreknow them (II. 12.11).
Third, if future volitions are not necessary, God can’t foreknow them. To say he 
could foreknow them would be inconsistent, i.e., to say that he certainly knows 
something that is uncertain. If God knows all things, he would know that such a thing is 
uncertain. To say that God would know an uncertain event with certainty would be to 
say that God is in error. To say that God may have ways of knowing contingent events is 
ridiculous, the same as saying that God may know contradictions to be true (11.12.13).
The corollary to these rationations was, not surprisingly, directly relevant to the 
theological differences between Calvinists and Arminians. Calvinists, likes Ames, had 
always argued that God had decreed every event that would come to pass, including the 
faith of the elect. Arminians thought that God knew of the faith through foreseeing the 
future. The Arminians gained nothing by making this distinction. The connection 
between the decree and its terminus is no more certain than the connection between 
God’s foreknowledge and its terminus. Adding a degree to foreknowledge doesn’t make 
it more certain (11.12.14). Things infallibly foreknown are as certain as any decree 
written down (11.12.15). Given the Arminian assumption that foreknowledge does not 
impede the liberty of the individual, since foreknowledge of volitions implies necessity, 
necessity can’t impede the liberty of the individual. It also follows that, if  the decrees (as 
opposed to the foreknowledge) of God are somehow contrary to liberty it can’t be in their 
necessity (11.12.16).
At this point Edwards took aim at the specific claims of certain Arminians, in the 
process highlighting the fact that foreknowledge may not cause the future event, but it
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certainly makes it necessary (11.12.18). The problem with Arminian reasoning is that it 
supposed that the only way a relation can be proven necessary is if it is causal. God’s 
foreknowledge makes the volitions necessary, even if  it doesn’t cause them (11.12.19).
Further, if one grants that God’s foreknowledge is the effect of future existences 
(a point that Edwards did not agree with), this doesn’t make the existence of the event 
any less certain/necessary. This is as if the event has already happened, and already had 
its influence, causing its effect, God’s foreknowledge. This makes the existence of the 
action absolutely certain. Because the effect (foreknowledge) exists, so too the cause (the 
existence) must be certain (11.12.23). No matter what tactic one takes, as long as the 
Arminian holds to the idea that God possesses a certain and perfect knowledge of the 
volitions of men, these volitions are necessary (11.12.27-28).
Edwards concluded this chain of reasoning asserting that “ .. .there is no 
geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration, 
than that God’s certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent 
with.. .contingence.” Therefore, the Arminian idea of liberty falls (11.12.32). Further, the 
Calvinist notion of decree “does not at all infer any more fatality in things” than the 
notion of foreknowledge, that Arminians embrace. So all the rhetoric about having the 
tendency of Hobbes or the Stoics applies as much to them as it does to the Calvinists 
(11.12.33). Likewise, Arminian objections to the Calvinist doctrines of total inability and 
efficacious grace (that they are incorrect because they imply necessity) fall on the same 
grounds (11.12.34).
Edwards concluded the second part of Freedom of the Will by arguing that even 
the Arminian notion of a self-determined will posits a kind of necessity. If all the firee
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acts of will are determined by antecedent acts of will, the acts are determined and 
therefore necessary. And the preceding acts, if they are to be free must also be 
determined by antecedent acts, and are also therefore necessary. So all free acts of the 
will are necessary and can’t be free  unless they are necessary. Yet, Arminians contend 
that necessity is inconsistent with liberty (II. 13.1).
If the Arminian counters by saying that the free acts of the will are not 
determined, i.e., have no cause, it doesn’t help. This is the same as saying that acts of 
will come about for no reason whatsoever. “But that which is without a cause, is 
dependent on no free act of the soul; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on 
nothing...” (II.13.2). The Arminian idea of liberty therefore both embraces and rejects 
contingency. Edwards certainly had no quibble with the Arminian when he inadvertently 
embraced necessity, even thought this was a contradiction with his own definition of 
freedom. But to embrace contingency would be to undermine the very dignity of the 
human that the Arminian purported to protect:
Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to, 
particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a full and 
perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, without the least 
connection with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of reason, or 
rmderstanding; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the 
will over its own determinations. The notion mankind has conceived of liberty, is 
some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or 
privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as this, to be 
perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreasonably, and as
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much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as 
destitute of perception as that smoke that is driven by the wind! (II. 13.4)
Summary and Conclusion 
Edwards began his Freedom of the Will defining the “various terms and things” 
that he would use to dismantle Arminianism. As Guelzo (1989) has noted, however, he 
defined terms in such a way as to automatically exclude Arminian psychology. So, while 
it would be difficult to attack Edwards’ abilities as a reasoner, it would be possible to 
attack him on definitional grounds. I called attention to this as a matter of further 
illustrating the problems associated with a “nonsectarian” approach to moral discourse. 
Since Edwards based his chief arguments on reason, he could simply play the Arminians 
as inconsistent and irrational. Yet, since he did not subject his definitions to scrutiny, 
these claims were suspect. As we shall see in Thomas Upham, he too tended to simply 
define his psychological system according to his theological predilections while 
simultaneously claiming the mantle of objectivity and science.
Edwards, like Ames, used the term “will” very broadly to include the whole 
gamut of psychological phenomena that have to do with the basic inclinations of the 
human soul. Contrary to Locke (and Arminians as well), Edwards argued that will and 
desire are inseparable phenomena: the tendency to separate them was based upon a 
confusion of objects. Although it is possible to have desires for contradictory objects, a 
given act of will concerns only one object. Therefore, the desires one might have toward 
another “remote” object are not relevant to a given act of will.
Similarly, Edwards argued, Arminians offered confused explanations of the 
determination of the will. The duty of the mental philosopher is to explain particular acts
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of will, i.e., why the will moves in one direction rather than another. By offering a 
general principle like “spontaneity” (as some Arminians had done), this question is not 
answered. A better answer, Edwards thought, is that particular acts of will are 
determined by the “strongest motive.” Objects which appear “in the mind’s view” most 
pleasing are the objects that are chosen. Motives did not “influence” the will like one 
billiard ball hitting another. Rather, will simply was what the mind does when possessed 
of inclination and the ability to carry out the inclination. The things which determine the 
“mind’s view” are multitudinous, and Edwards did not feel obligated to provide an 
exhaustive list. The fact that Edwards believed that the causes o f volition could be 
specified, however, indicates that he was entirely comfortable with a “scientific” 
approach to psychology, although this obviously was not his purpose. Still, this stands in 
contrast to the “Arminian impulse,” which made a scientific psychology of will difficult 
at first, and, in the end, impossible.
Edwards then dealt with the term “necessity.” Edwards was concerned that the 
popular notion of necessity stood in the way of a proper understanding of the freedom of 
the will. Popularly, an event is necessary when it takes place despite fierce opposition. 
We try and try, but the event takes place anyway. A proper understanding of the freedom 
of the will, however, would require a philosophical definition of necessity, i.e., certainty. 
Regarding acts of the will, all that necessity means, therefore, is that under certain 
conditions volitions will certainly occur. For example, when a person desires to engage 
in an activity and nothing stands in the way of such an engagement, the act will 
necessarily follow. No opposition to the will is involved. As we have seen, this
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definition helped Edwards to argue that the sins of those fallen “in Adam” could be 
necessary and still remain subject to judgment.
For Edwards, there were two types of necessity, natural and moral. Natural 
necessity was a certainty having to do with “natural causes.” For example, water will 
boil at a certain temperature. Natural causes include essentially everything outside of the 
will, including the acts of the understanding. Moral causes are those things pertaining to 
volition such as motives, affections, inclinations, etc. Moral necessity simply means that 
volition certainly takes place in view of the strongest motive. Moral inability, then, is a 
lack of inclination to perform a certain activity. Once again, Edwards’ nonsectarian 
reasoning supported his sectarian beliefs. This helped to support the Calvinist belief that 
apart from Christ, people are morally unable to trust God. Yet, since people possess the 
natural ability to do this, culpability remained intact.
Edwards also carefully defined “freedom.” Naturally necessary events are not 
free. For example, a person may desire to stand up but may be tied down and thus 
naturally unable to perform the task. Morally necessary events, on the other hand, are 
free. When a person acts according to desire, i.e., when they do what they want to do, 
they act as a free person. This definition also served Calvinistic theology. The sinful 
volitions of humanity are morally, but not naturally, necessary. Therefore, these actions 
are free and therefore culpable.
Finally, Edwards turned to the issue of moral agency. A moral agent is one who 
can engage in actions which are “properly denominated good or evil in a moral sense.” 
Further, moral agents possess a moral sense and are capable of understanding moral 
inducements. In this context Edwards affirmed Ames’s basic contention that God, not the
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human will, is the source of all moral good in the world. Edwards reveals himself 
therefore to be engaged in the same theological project as William Ames, the desire to 
uphold the glory of God in the salvation of sinners. Methodologically, his approach is, 
however, considerably different.
The Second part of Freedom of the Will applied this definitional groundwork to 
the varieties of Arminian psychology with the purpose of showing the irrationality of the 
same. The first Arminian postulate that Edwards challenged is that the freedom of the 
will consists in its self-determination. His basic refutation was simple, and was repeated 
in various forms throughout the book. A self-determined will is, by definition, a choice 
determined by the will. Since the only activity the will engages in is choice, it follows 
that the self-determined will must determine its own actions through a preceding act of 
choice. But that leaves the Arminian with a problem concerning this preceding choice: 
was this choice free (self-determined), or was it determined by something outside of the 
will? If the choice is determined by something outside of the will (i.e., if the choice is 
not free), then the Arminian cannot argue that the final choice (i.e., the choice depending 
upon the non-free choice) is free. If the preceding choice is to be free, it too needs (on 
Arminian premises) to be determined by another act of will, which leaves yet another 
choice to be examined. Is this choice free? If so, what about the choice preceding that 
choice? Etc. The regress continues until we reach the first act of the will. If this first act 
is determined by something outside of the will, then the whole chain is not free. If this 
first act is free, then it is by definition a self-determined act, i.e., preceded by another act 
of will, which is impossible (a first act cannot be preceded by another act). Self- 
determination therefore crumbles. The Arminian notion of the self-determined will.
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Edwards concluded, “is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world”
(II. 1.5). This conclusion is highly germane to the question being addressed in this 
dissertation: why did American psychology lose the topic of the will? If Edwards was 
right, the Arminian notion of free will was simply a myth, something that does not and 
cannot exist. If American psychology were to embrace the self-determined will (which it 
did in the psychology of Thomas Upham and others), therefore, Edwards’ argiunent 
implies that the will of American psychology existed in name only. That is, in some 
sense, American psychology lost its will well before the 1930s.
In view of the fact that some Arminians also contended that free acts of will are 
also contingent (i.e., uncaused) events, Edwards attempted to show the destructive 
implications of denying the universal existence of cause and effect. In addition to 
undermining common sense, the denial of universal causation undermines the 
foundations for knowledge of the outside world and of God himself. Edwards also took 
exception to the idea that the “active nature” of the will can explain particular choices. 
The notion of an active nature is a general cause that cannot explain particular events.
Some Arminians argued that choices can be made in a state of “indifference,” that 
is, without prevailing motives in one direction or the other. Although Edwards thought it 
possible for the will to be indifferent before a choice, he foimd the notion that a choice 
could be made in a state of indifference was a blatant contradiction (given Edwardsean 
definitions, of course). Edwards defined the will as the preponderating inclination: to say 
the will acts without inclination was to say that it inclines without inclination. Further, if 
one postulates that freedom consists in indifference (as some Arminians did), this 
indifference would need to be “perfect.” Any inclination would put the soul out of
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equilibrium and would therefore rob that act of freedom. The stronger the inclination, the 
less freedom. Given that acts of volition are by definition inclinations of the soul, there 
can be no such thing as a freedom of indifference in the acts of the will.
Edwards also took certain Arminian writers to task for their position on the 
relation between will and intellect. For example, some had argued in intellectualist 
terms, saying that the will can be determined through the persuasion of the intellect. Yet, 
Edwards pointed out, this was a deterministic postulate, and contradicted Arminian 
definitions of freedom. In another section, particularly relevant to nineteenth century 
American psychology, Edwards challenged the contentions of some Arminian 
psychologists concerning the role of motives. These psychologists thought that motives 
are necessary to move the will, but that the strength of motive was not the ultimate 
determinant of action. Edwards argued that this approach was also incoherent: if  motives 
do not determine volition by their strength, what other kind of influence can they have?
Arminians had taken refuge from the purportedly pernicious implications of 
Calvinism by arguing that God does not decree and predestine some to everlasting life, 
but rather foreknows who will come to faith of their own free will. Edwards spent 
considerable time showing, first, that the Bible does teach that God foreknows the 
volitions of people (as the Arminians insisted), and second (in a manner inconsistent with 
the Arminians), that this foreknowledge implies necessity just as much as the strongest 
Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. He closed the second section of Freedom of the 
Will arguing that even the Arminian’s beloved notion of self-determination implies a 
kind of necessity. Since the Arminian’s only option is to embrace the irrationality of
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contingence at this point, Edwards hoped to show that the Arminian really had no place 
to go. Except, of course, to Calvinism.
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CHAPTER V
“THAT HORRID BLASPHEMOUS CONSEQUENCE”
In Part I and Part II of Freedom of the Will (chapter 4 of this dissertation), 
Edwards attempted to show that the Arminian notion of will and moral agency was 
incoherent. In Part III, he tried to show that Arminianism was actually destructive, 
undermining even the very things that Arminians held most dear such as moral agency, 
the character of God, the usefulness of moral law, and common sense. Continuing to use 
his nonsectarian approach, Edwards further cornered his Arminian adversary by turning 
the tables on them. It is not, after all, Calvinism that undermines morality. It is, 
ironically, Arminianism that undermines.
Having dealt with the question: “whether any such thing [as the Arminian notion 
of freedom of the will] does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of,” Edwards 
turned to a different question: “whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral 
agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment” (III. 1.1). Given the 
fact that Upham and James both assumed that this type of liberty was essential to moral 
responsibility, this is a question relevant to the history of American psychology. Not 
only did Edwards think that the Arminian notion of liberty was illogical, but this section 
of Freedom indicates that Edwards would have thought that such a notion substantially 
undermined American psychology’s moral project
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The Demotion of God and Elevation of Humanity 
The Necessary Virtue of God
Edwards began the inquiry of Part III by examining “the virtue and agency of the 
supreme moral Agent, and fountain of all agency and virtue” (III. 1.2).
Edwards quoted Whitby to illustrate the Arminian belief that he desired to refute.
Whitby proclaimed, “if all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty 
names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can 
blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise 
only for what he could not avoid?” Whitby’s insistence that necessity and virtue are in 
conflict apparently did not apply to his notion of God, however. He plainly affirmed that 
God’s actions, which are necessarily good, do not possess this type of fi-eedom (III. 1.3).
Edwards thought this conflict highly significant. God, Arminians and Calvinists 
agreed, is necessarily good, the source of all good found in humans, and is therefore 
worthy of praise and approbation. Yet, given the Arminian belief that virtue and 
necessity are incompatible, “this being.. .has no virtue at all.” Although the Arminian 
may call God’s holy attributes good, they are good in the same way that the sun is good, 
or the rain. Yet, the Arminian would be inconsistent to call God morally good, for he 
lacks the requisite freedom from necessity (III. 1.4).
Yet here the Arminian is forced to contradict the very plain teaching of scripture, 
that God is necessarily virtuous in all he does. Edwards declined to offer proof texts to 
prove this point because such an exercise would be “altogether needless to such as have 
been brought up under the light of the gospel” (III. 1.5). This passage is helpful in that it 
grants a sense of Edwards’ perceived audience. Edwards took for granted that his
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audience would have been broadly Christian, and would have had a rudimentary 
knowledge of the Bible.
Given the Arminian belief that virtue requires freedom from necessity, one must 
come to an unthinkable conclusion. “Men are worthy of that esteem.. .which yet God is 
not worthy of.” Human beings possess a kind of moral excellency which does not and 
cannot have God as its fountain. Human beings therefore enjoy a status of moral “pre­
eminence” relative to God. The moral excellency of human beings outshines the moral 
excellency of God. The highest praise therefore ought to be reserved for humans 
(111.1.6). Edwards took it for granted that these theological consequences o f the 
Arminian notion of freedom would weigh heavily upon Arminian minds. What might 
have been the consequences of a moral culture that exalts human nature above the ideals 
it purportedly values most? In Ames, God was the supreme efficiency bestowing upon 
his creatures a measure of efficiency. The virtue of human beings was therefore 
derivative. In the Arminian scheme, human beings possess an efficiency that God can 
not impart.
What praise and respect should be given to humans for their pre-eminence? Since 
the scripture represents God as worthy of all glory and honor, Edwards wondered what 
special commendation can human beings receive over and above the praise due to God? 
(III.l .7). The puzzle is solved, of course, if one rejects the Arminian notion of liberty. 
Furthermore, if  it is true that the necessity of God’s moral goodness precludes him from 
receiving praise, there is no more reason to give God thanks for that goodness than there 
is reason to thank a person for a benefit which they were compelled to bestow (III.1.8).
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Yet all of this Edwards took to be so much nonsense. In Edwards mind, the God of the 
Bible was to be praised and thanked for his goodness (III. 1.9).
The Necessary Virtue of Christ
Just as Whitby argued that virtue requires freedom from necessity (a point 
Edwards attempted to refute in the previous section), Whitby also argued that this 
freedom from necessity is needed for one to be subject to moral law and therefore liable 
to praise or blame (III.2.1). With this in mind, Edwards moved to a consideration of the 
“moral conduct and practice of our Lord Jesus Christ” in his life on earth. Edwards 
sought to demonstrate two things about Christ. First, “that his holy behavior was 
necessary,” and second, that his holy behavior was indeed virtuous and worthy of praise 
and reward (111.2.2).
Edwards offered eleven points to prove that Christ’s holiness was necessary, i.e., 
that “it was impossible” that Christ’s holy acts could have been “otherwise than holy, and 
agreeable to God’s nature and will” (III.2.3). To prove the point Edwards again turned to 
biblical exegesis. Although he did not offer the stipulation that he did earlier that this 
analysis applied only to those who “own the truth of the bihle” (II. 11.4), he must have 
assumed it here. One example of this exegetical proof that Christ was necessarily holy is 
that God had prophetically promised to uphold the messiah “by his Spirit.. .that he should 
not fail...” (IIL2.4). Likewise the promises made by God to the messiah of a future 
kingdom of glory could not have been kept had Christ fallen into sin (in.2.7).
Further, “it was often promised to the church of God of old, for their comfort, that God 
would give them a righteous, sinless Savoir. Jer.23:5,6...” (III.2.8). The eleventh and 
final point was that Christ himself was “abundant in positively predicting his own future
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glory.. These predictions would have had no eredibility had Christ failed to remain 
spotless (III.2.16). Edwards concluded this relatively lengthy section thus “Thus it is 
evident, that it was impossible that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should 
be otherwise than holy, and conformed to the will of the Father...” (III.2.17).
Edwards explained his verbosity on this topic because “some of the greatest 
Arminians...” had denied the necessity of Christ’s holiness. Stunningly, Edwards 
confessed, “I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy 
between Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of will as 
is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, 
promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit”
(III.2.18). This quote is another and perhaps the most convincing illustrating the 
ambiguity of Edwards’ project. Was Edwards writing as a secular writer? As a Calvinist 
theologian or an enlightened philosopher? Writing to Calvinists, Arminians, or others? 
Most of Edwards prose had a “secular” flavor and could have invited readers of many 
persuasions. Still, Edwards was writing with a strong sectarian perspective, which only 
grows clearer as The Freedom of the Will progresses.
As promised, Edwards then turned to consider whether Christ’s necessarily holy 
actions could be considered virtuous (III.2.19). Although Whitby argued that commands 
and prohibitions require a freedom from necessity (or a “liberty ad utrumlibet” which is, 
according to Ramsey a “freedom to choose either of two things, or to act in either way or 
direction, whichever one pleases'"-, III.2.20), Christ was clearly subject to commands in 
the biblieal account.
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Whitby also argued that “promises offered as motives” for holy action undermine 
liberty ad utrumlibet. Edwards thought that Whitby’s contention was “demonstrably 
false, if the Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in Christianity, or the holy 
Scriptures,” it is that Christ’s will, though necessarily good, also “had promises of 
glorious rewards.” Further, Christ offered rewards to those who would follow him.
When the biblical account is analyzed on Arminian premises, one is left with the startling 
conclusion that Christ’s holy actions were not praiseworthy because “his will was not 
indifferent, and free either to these things, or the contrary; but under such a strong 
inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it impossible that he should 
choose the contrary.”
Edwards attempted to show on scriptural and theological grounds how shocking 
such a conclusion must be for the Christian. Not only does the Bible ascribe the highest 
praiseworthiness to Christ (III.2.23), but it also reveals that part o f Christ’s earthly 
mission was to be a “most fit and proper example” of praiseworthy virtue (III.2.24).
God the Father is frequently portrayed as pleased with Christ’s holiness (III.2.25), and so 
too are the angels in heaven reported as worshipping Christ for his holy actions on earth 
(III.2.26). Christ is also frequently portrayed as having received great reward for his 
virtuous earthly ministrations (III.2.27). Edwards thought it therefore safe to conclude 
that Christ was under a moral necessity to do good, yet was rightfully subject to the 
praise and approval of one obedient to the moral law, thereby undermining Arminian 
principles. Necessity and praiseworthy virtue are indeed consistent given the biblical 
data.
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The Undermining of Culpability, Moral Law, and Virtue 
Necessity, Blameworthiness and the Undermining of Culpability
Just as the case of Christ preyed that necessity can coexist with moral merit, 
Edwards then turned to proye that necessity can coexist with moral demerit. Contrary to 
this, Whitby thought that freedom from necessity was also prerequisite to sin. That is, it 
must be “in our power to perform or forbear” an eyil act in order for it to be considered a 
sin (III.3.1).
To refute this idea, Edwards turned to the biblical passages that indicate that God 
may at times “giye people oyer” to their sinful desires, i.e., allow a person’s eyil desires 
to haye full sway without restraining grace. Edwards reminded his readers that the Bible 
does teach that God giyes some people oyer to their sin, such as “Ps. 81:12, ‘So I gaye 
them up to their own hearts’ lust, and they walked in their own counsels’” (III.3.2). The 
consequence of the Arminian assumption that necessity and blameworthiness are 
incompatible, Edwards pointed out, was that when God “giyes up” people to their 
sinfulness, the actions which flow from the resultant inability to refrain from sirming are 
no longer culpably sinful (III.3.3). Judas was clearly destined to betray Christ: his sinful 
action was necessary. Yet according to the Arminian scheme, so too would Judas be 
excused for his sinful behayior (III.3.4).
Yet contrary to the scriptural eyidence, Whitby denied “that men, in this world, 
are eyer so giyen up by God to sin, that their wills should be necessarily determined to 
eyil.” [clearly reyealing that the issue here is biblical exegesis not pure reason]. 
Interestingly, Edwards’ description of Whitby fits Thomas Upham’s position yery well 
when he notes that “ .. .it may become ‘exceeding difficult’ for men to do good, haying a
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strong bent, and powerful inclination to what is evil.” Yet Whitby, like Upham, still 
believed that a total loss of ability was rare. Still, Edwards thought that this position did 
not help Whitby very much, for if the necessity of sirming “wholly” excused the sin, then 
“its being difficult to avoid it excuses him in part” (III.3.5). The consequence of this line 
of thinking is that the more strongly inclined a will is to unholiness, the less blamable that 
person becomes (IIL3.6).
Edwards also thought that Whitby and other Arminians were inconsistent as 
theologians. Like the Calvinists, Whitby affirmed “that fallen man is not able to perform 
perfect obedience,” and is not capable as Adam was to continue in a sinless estate. Yet, 
to concede that fallen humans are inclined to sin is to argue that the human will is out of 
the perfect indifference that is supposed to be so necessary for freedom. Edwards 
wondered, then, “why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding 
beyond what men have power to do?” (III.3.10). The Arminian’s own doctrine 
concerning the effects of the fall affirms this very thing. Not only Whitby, but 
“Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves in what they say of the 
inability of fallen man in this respect.” Here Edwards enters into the heart of a sectarian 
theological dispute. Arminians declared that humans are inclined by the fall to sin, and 
that Christ died so that these imperfections might be forgiven. Yet, to accommodate 
human weakness, God overruled the moral law that humans were originally under and 
accepts the sincere attempts to obey this mitigated law (113.3.11).
Edwards, perhaps getting a bit off target, here challenges the coherency of the 
Arminian position on the relation between law, Christ’s death, and moral agency. If God 
really did overrule the moral law, why did Christ have to die? This new law does not
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expect perfection, and so would not require a saerifiee to atone for the sin of 
imperfeetion. “What need of his suffering, to satisfy for that which is no fault...?” Why 
did Jesus need to die when God had already developed a way in which imperfect 
obedience could be accepted? Edwards’ explication is more detailed than this, but it is 
important to stress how easily Edwards slides into a critique of an entire theological 
system. Clearly, Edwards is concerned with Arminianism as a whole, and not just the 
Arminian position on the will, although he sees this position on the will as the root of a 
host of errors.
The Undermining of Moral Law
One variation of the Arminian insistence that virtue and necessity contradict was 
that God would never command something that an agent cannot do (III.4.1). In section 
four, Edwards hoped to demonstrate that moral commands and moral inability are indeed 
compatible concepts. To this end, Edwards made three major points.
The first point is related to the ambiguity inherent in the term ability. Recall that 
Edwards had previously laid out the distinction between natural and moral ability, a 
distinction based upon the difference between natural and moral causes. This distinction 
in the end amounts to non-voluntary and voluntary causes. Therefore, given Edwards’ 
definitions, the inability in question here in the Arminian dispute is moral.
Although God is concerned with the outward expressions of obedience, it is “the 
will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the will,” which are the 
“proper object” of the command. It is the soul itself which receives commands, bodily 
action is accountable to moral law only to the extent that the bodily action is under the 
control of the soul. And the only faculty of the soul which can obey or disobey
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commandment is the will. Here again Edwards’ discussion of the will shows how broad 
of a conception he had, compared to an Upham or James who tended to think of will in 
much more narrow terms. ‘“Tis by this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or 
refuse complianee; for the very notions o f ‘consenting,’ ‘yielding,’ ‘aceepting,’ 
‘complying,’ refusing,’ ‘rejecting,’ etc. are, according to the meaning of the terms, 
nothing but certain acts of the will.” Sounding much like Ames, Edwards defined 
obedience as “the submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another.” 
Disobedience is likewise the refusal of this submission. Therefore, when God commands 
obedience, he commands the will.
This passage also helps to highlight the cosmie significance of the concept of will 
in the Puritan universe. Human beings are defined by their obedienee or disobedience to 
the supreme Being. This disobedience or obedienee has “in the primary nature of it” 
(III.4.3) to do with the conformity of the human will to the divine will. In the Puritan 
world, the loss of the concept of will would be the loss of the way in which the relation 
between humanity and divinity was understood. Since volition and the divine-human 
relation were eorrelative ideas, it is perhaps not surprising that the loss of one of these 
ideas (the divine-human relationship) was quickly followed by the loss of the other idea 
(volition).
As a corollary to this, it follows that if  there are a series of acts of volition, the 
command is directed always to the “first and determining a c tf  i.e., the act that is at the 
root of all subsequent acts (III.4.4). A second corollary is that if there is “any sort of act” 
preceding the first volitional act, this act cannot be subject to command because it is by 
definition non-volitional (and command is directed only to the will; III.4.5). Edwards
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had in mind here his previous analysis in which he criticized the Arminian notion of self­
determining will for requiring either an act of will to proceed the first act of will (which 
is a contradiction) or something else to precede the first act of will (which also 
contradicts the tenets of self-determination). If the soul does determine every act of 
volition in this latter way, it cannot be subject to command since it is not a will. For this 
and other reasons, humanity cannot be the subject of command and there is “no room left 
for virtue or vice in the world” (III.4.6).
And so the tables are turned on the Arminians, who claimed that it was the 
Calvinist system that undermined morality. Indeed, there is no way “whatsoever” to 
make Arminian precepts consistent with the cherished notions of “moral government, and 
with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threatenings” (III.4.7). To add 
insult to injury Edwards also argues that the notion of indifference also undermines the 
very coherence of the notion of moral command.
The second point Edwards made to argue that inability is not inconsistent with 
command is that the present will is by nature always unable to do anything other than 
what it at present is actually doing (III.4.8).
Edwards here reviewed the distinction between natural and moral inability, 
reminding his readers that “a man may.. .be said to be morally unable to do a thing, when 
he is under the influence of prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of 
inclination, under such circumstances and views.” Further, the will is always determined 
by the strongest motive, and is therefore not able to resist this strongest motive (111.4.9). 
Edwards offered several clarifications of this point and answered several objections 
(III.4.10-I7).
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In this context, Edwards made a helpful point which clarified his position on 
habits. Although every act of disobedience evidences moral inability to obey in that 
moment, Edwards also conceded that in a certain way inability may be greater in certain 
acts than others. “A person whose strength is no more than sufficient to one hundred and 
one points, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter 
weight than the former” (III.4.307). Another way to express the same idea (borrowing 
from the Introduction), is that some may have a “general” or “habitual” inability to do a 
certain act, while others have a “occasional” or “particular” inability. Here it is helpful to 
see that Edwards did acknowledge that it is harder to change “habitual” volitions than 
“particular,” but that he considered both voluntary.
Pulling his first two points together, that commands are directed toward the will, 
and that an act of disobedience implies inability in that act, it appears to the case that 
commands are sometimes directed toward a will that is presently unable to obey.
Inability and commandment are therefore not inconsistent with one another (III.4.I8).
A commandment must be able to require a state of will that does not presently exist. If 
this were not the case, if commandments could only prescribe actions that are already 
underway, then the usefulness of the commandment would be undermined. Indeed, the 
commandment would be “perfectly vain and impertinent” (III.4.19). If not, there could 
be no such thing as disobedience, a point which no Arminian would consciously affirm. 
Further, if  inability excuses disobedience, and wickedness is the possession of wicked 
inclinations which render obedience impossible, it follows that “wickedness always 
carries that in it which excuses it.” Indeed, the more evilly inclined the sinner, the more 
excused the sinner becomes in this train of thinking. “His moral inability, consisting in
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the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness consists; and 
yet according to Arminian principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness; 
and by how much the more he has got it, by so much is he the further from wickedness” 
(III.4.20). It only makes sense, then, that moral inability does not excuse a person from 
commandment.
Edwards closed this section with comments that I will not develop here, except to 
say that he argues that natural inability (as opposed to moral inability) does indeed 
excuse. “If men are excused from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be 
commanded, it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the will itself, but 
extrinsic to it; either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances” 
(III.4.22). Helpful here is Edwards’ reiteration of the belief that the understanding was 
considered a natural rather than a moral cause of behavior.
In the next section, Edwards turned to an issue “insisted on by many” that people 
may be unable to obey the commands of God and yet be “sincere” in their desire to obey 
and therefore excused for their shortcomings. This controversy is perhaps impertinent to 
this dissertation as it deals with an issue that was not a major concern of Upham or 
James. Although Upham and James used the words related to “sincere,” the usages are 
fairly minimal. In his refutation of this idea, Edwards fell back on some of the basic 
principles o his psychological system, such as the idea that the strongest desire 
determines volition, and therefore a weak and an “insufficient and ineffectual” wish 
caimot be considered a “true desire” (111.5.1,5).
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Indifference and the Loss of Virtue
So too is the case with Section 6 of the Freedom of the Will, in which Edwards 
attempts to dismantle the idea that indifference is necessary for true liberty and true 
virtue. Upham and James tended to be Arminians of a different stripe, recognizing that 
the human mind is rarely (if ever) indifferent to moral objects of volition. They tended to 
lean in the direction of a Chubb who thought that the will could act as an arbiter among 
the various motives presented to the mind. Nevertheless, this section is still relevant in 
that it outlines Edwards understanding of how motives worked.
According to Arminians, indifference is requisite for the liberty of the will. In 
order for an action to be virtuous, it must be performed in liberty, and therefore “the heart 
must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent 
and cold the heart is with relation to the act which is performed, so much the better; 
because the act is performed with so much the greater liberty.” Edwards thought that this 
did not agree with the “light of nature” and the historic belief of “mankind” which tended 
to think that virtue required an inclination toward the good, and that “the stronger the 
inclination, and so the further from indifferenee, the more virtuous the heart, and so 
much the more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it” (III.6.2). At another point 
Edwards calls this the “common sense” viewpoint (III.6.3).
On Arminian principles, it is only an aet of will made in a state of indifference 
that can be virtuous. Once a motive or inclination is set before the mind, it is no longer in 
a state of indifference, and can therefore no longer be considered free and virtuous.
Some Arminians might counter and say that the act is free if the will can suspend acting 
for a time and take things into closer consideration. Yet, since only an action done with
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freedom can be virtuous, then only the act of suspending action can be virtuous in this 
scheme of things. Either way, the common sense notion that virtue consists in strong 
inclinations toward the good is overridden (III.6.3).
Added to this sad state of affairs is the Arminian notion that a free act must be 
self-determined, which, Edwards thought, contradicted the idea that a virtuous act must 
be indifferent. For any self-determined action must be determined by a preceding act of 
will, and this preceding act of will must put subsequent acts of will out of the state of 
indifference. “So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or 
vicious according to Arminian principles. If the action be determined by a preceding act 
of choice it can’t be virtuous; because the action is not done in a state of indifference.. .If 
the action be not determined by a preceding choice, then it can’t be virtuous; because 
then the will is not self-determined.” Virtue and vice therefore have no place in the 
Arminian “imiverse.” [What Edwards did not offer here, nor anywhere (I believe) in 
Freedom is evidence that any Arminian actually did simultaneously affirm these separate 
notions of freedom.]
Edwards offered other arguments against indifference as prerequisites to virtue. 
For one, he thought it also to be “common sense” that indifference to evil is evil (III.6.5). 
Further, positing indifference as essential to liberty “is utterly inconsistent with the being 
of any such things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If liberty of 
indifference be essential to moral agency, then there can be no virtue in any habitual 
inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to indifference, and imply in their nature the 
very destruction and exclusion of it” (III.6.7).
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Likewise, the notion of the self-determining will undermines the Arminian ability 
to make moral sense out of habits. In order for this (self-determining) approach to work, 
the “scales” of the will must not be put out of balance, but this lack of balance is 
precisely what a habit entails. Therefore, since the self-determining power of the will 
cannot be involved in such an act of will, such an act can be considered neither virtuous 
nor blameworthy (III.6.8). Or, as Upham and James would argue, such an act might not 
be an act of will at all.
Conversely, it follows that the most morally praiseworthy actions are those which 
are “performed without any inclination or habitual bias at all” because such actions are 
“performed with most liberty.” In other words, the Arminian scheme inverted the notion 
that character, or the habitual inclination to do good, was actually a virtuous thing 
(III.6.9). Likewise, a vicious habit and exceedingly strong inability to do good is excused 
because of a lack of Arminian liberty (III.6.10). Habits therefore cannot “have anything 
of the nature of either virtue or vice” (III.6. II). Even the objection that habits can be 
virtuous ?/they are formed through indifference and self-determination (III.6.I2) falls 
because the Arminian supposition is that virtue or vice only exist when “this liberty is 
[actually being] exercised” (III.6.I3).
Edwards concludes on a sobering note: “On the whole it appears, that if the 
notions of Arminians concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow that 
there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, 
gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ 
above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives; or in delight in holiness, 
hungering and thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence to
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mankind: and on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of dispraise, in 
the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, 
habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious 
and cruel towards men. For all these things are dispositions and inclinations of the heart. 
And in short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality o f mind.-, no such 
thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin: and the stronger those habits or 
dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from 
being so indeed; the more violent men’s lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, 
ingratitude and maliciousness, still the further they are from being blameworthy 
(III.6.14).
In short, the Arminian notion of freedom and liberty unraveled the entire fabric of 
Christian morality: “ .. .if we pursue these principles, we shall find that virtue and vice 
are wholly excluded out of the world...” (III.6.15).
Motives. Virtue, and the Nonexistence of the Arminian Will
Edwards concluded Part III of Freedom bv considering the inconsistency between 
Arminian freedom and the effects of motives. Motives are usually thought to influence 
the mind either internally (by a “preponderancy of the inclination”) or externally (by a 
“preponderancy of.. .circumstances”). Either effect necessarily puts the mind out of 
indifference, and, given the assumption that indifference is necessary for moral agency, 
motives therefore cannot contribute to either virtue or vice (III.7.2). If motives in any 
way incline the mind to move in a particular direction, liberty is destroyed and so too is 
the virtue or vice of an action influenced by that motive (111.7.3-8).
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Here again Edwards impugns the Arminian position on the grounds of common 
sense. Any choice made from a good motive, such as “prudence or wisdom” cannot be 
virtuous. Such a choice would have been made with a “good end” in mind, and so moved 
by this consideration would have lost its virtue in proportion to the strength of the 
inclination to the good end. A truly virtuous action from an Arminian viewpoint, i.e., one 
done in indifference, would need to be done for “no good end” at all, and without any 
“good intention.” Yet, according to our natural intuitions of morality, such an act would 
have “no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro by 
the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved.”
Edwards then turned the tables on the Arminians once again, using an argument 
that they were fond of levying against the Calvinists. If God has predestined some to be 
saved, the Arminian asked, what use is it to exhort, command, and encourage a person to 
repent? After all, whatever will be will be. Edwards thought his analysis proved that it 
was actually Arminian assumptions which led to “that horrid blasphemous consequence” 
that God’s exhortations are “insincere and fallacious,” for the effect of such exhortations 
is only to throw the will out of its equilibrium and thereby to deprive it of the opportunity 
to act virtuously (i.e., in indifference). Therefore, Edwards victoriously concluded,
“ .. .theirs is the doctrine which if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the 
most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy; and not the doctrine of the Calvinist” 
(III.7.12, italics mine). Given all of the above, the Arminian doctrine “shut[s] all virtue 
out of the world...” (III.7.13)
Most prophetically in view of the goals of this dissertation, Edwards concluded: 
‘Tis manifest, that Arminian notions of moral agency, and the being of a faculty
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of will, cannot consist together; and that if there be any such thing as, either a 
virtuous, or vicious act, it can’t be an act of will; no will can be at all concerned in 
it. For that act which is performed without inclination, without motive, without 
end, must be performed without any concern of the will. To suppose an act of the 
will without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or 
end; then in that act (as was observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, 
and chooses nothing; so that there is no act of choice in the case: and this is as 
much to say, there is no act of will in the case. Which very effectually shuts out 
all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe; inasmuch as, according to this, 
there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the will is concerned; and 
according to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the 
principles of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act 
wherein the will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room for any 
virtuous or vicious acts at all. (III.7.14)
By teaching that the will is always involved in virtuous action, and, by implication, that 
the will cannot be involved in virtuous action, Arminianism undermined not only 
morality, but the very existence of will itself. It would take nearly a century and a half 
for this to become manifest in American psychology.
Summarv and Conclusion 
Having disposed of the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will on rational 
grounds in Parts I and II of Freedom of the Will, Edwards turned to discuss the 
theological and moral consequences of the Arminian notion in Part III. Shockingly, 
Edwards argued, the Arminians had elevated the moral status of humanity above the
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moral status of God. Even the Arminians conceded that God’s activities were necessarily 
virtuous. By then arguing that necessity is incompatible with freedom, they were arguing 
that God is not free in his actions, and that human beings therefore possess a dignity that 
not even God himself possesses. Edwards applied the same line of argumentation to the 
life of Jesus Christ, arguing, first, that Christ’s “holy behavior was necessary” and, 
second, that his holy behavior was still worthy of praise and reward. The goal of this 
argument was to problematize the Arminian belief that necessity was incompatible with 
praise and blame.
Just as Christ’s actions were necessarily holy and yet infinitely praiseworthy, 
Edwards next attempted to demonstrate that necessarily evil actions must also be 
blameworthy given, for example, that the Bible explicitly teaches that some evil actions 
(like the betrayal of Christ by Judas) were predestined. If the Arminian notion that 
necessity is incompatible with responsibility is granted, then Judas could not be held 
responsible for his actions.
Contrary to Arminian teaching, Edwards also challenged the assumption that 
commands are incompatible with moral inability. As we saw in William Ames, 
Puritanism taught that the fall of Adam had rendered humanity unable to obey God’s 
commands, and yet human beings are still responsible for this disobedience. One line of 
argumentation Edwards employed here was that the very notion of command makes no 
sense in the Arminian scheme of things. Commands are addressed to the will, 
particularly the ‘'"first and determining act” of the will (III.4.4). Referring back to his 
refutation of self-determination in which he showed that a self-determining will can never 
actually have a first act, Edwards concluded that commands have no object in the
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Arminian universe and are therefore useless. Further, when a person engages in any act, 
that person is by definition unable to engage in another act. When a person disobeys a 
command, that person is at that moment unable to simultaneously obey the command. 
Therefore inability and command are compatible concepts.
Arminians also argued that indifference is a requirement for liberty and therefore 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Edwards thought that this conception clearly 
undermined the common sense view of the matter. Typically, people believe that being 
strongly inclined toward the good and strongly averse to evil are good things. The 
Arminian position is against this common sense intuition, arguing in effect that a cold 
heart is more virtuous than one with a strong bent toward the good. Further, Edwards 
added, the notions of indifference and self-determination are incompatible. For a will to 
determine itself is to incline itself in a particular direction. But as soon as the inclination 
takes place, the virtue of the act is removed if Arminian assumptions are granted.
Finally, if indifference is prerequisite to virtue, then all merit associated with holy habits 
and dispositions is lost. The tendency of Arminianism, therefore, is to altogether 
undermine and even reverse traditional notions of virtue and vice.
Edwards concluded his consideration of the “blasphemous consequence[s]” of 
Arminianism by, once again, turning the tables. Arminians were fond of saying that the 
predestinarian flavor of Calvinism tended to undermine morality and impugn God’s 
justice. Given the above considerations, however, it is the Arminian system that 
undermines morality and leads to the ultimate blasphemy: that God’s commands are 
actually given in insincerity. Since the commands of God throw the will out of
280
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
equilibrium, the liberty of indifferenee is lost. If Arminian premises are granted, God’s 
issue of commands actually undermines virtue.
Perhaps most prophetically, Edwards argued that “Arminian notions of moral 
agency” tended to undermine the very existence of the faculty of the will. If virtue must 
he performed without inclination or purpose, as Arminians suppose, then virtue must not 
he an act of will because acts of will are necessarily inclinational. Since Arminians insist 
that there can he no virtue without the will, Edwards argued that the will therefore 
appears to have every part, and no part, in Arminian virtue.
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CHAPTER VI
A CALVINIST’S LAST STAND
In Part IV and the Conclusion of Freedom of the Will, we find that Edwards’ 
main concerns were indeed theological concerns. Although the first sections of the 
treatise do have a “secular” flavor, Edwards ends the hook on a more pronounced 
sectarian note. Part IV of Freedom was entitled: “Wherein the Chief Grounds of the 
Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and Defense of the Forementioned Notions of 
Liherty, Moral Agency, etc. and Against the Opposite Doctrine, Are Considered.” Once 
again, Edwards’ strivings against Arminianism had a prophetic edge when considered as 
a part of the unfolding story of the will in American psychology. The “reasonings” that 
Edwards challenged in these pages, including those having to do with “common sense,” 
the notion of “fatality,” the disdain of “metaphysics,” and the trust of introspection, 
would continue to characterize American psychological thinking for a century and a half, 
seeping into the writings of Thomas Upham and William James.
Anticipating and Explaining the Assumptions of American Moral Psvchologv 
As Edwards attempted to confront the “reasonings” of Arminians, he enumerated 
a number of assumptions that would come to characterize American moral psychology 
for over a century.
The Essence of Virtue
Edwards took exception to the Arminian idea that “the virtuousness of the 
dispositions or acts of the will consists.. .in the origin or cause of them,” as opposed to
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consisting in their nature. Only when the will is the cause of an act, the Arminians 
contended, can the person be at fault, and only then can the act be blameworthy.
Edwards noted with a degree of disbelief that Arminians took this to be self-evident 
(IV. 1.1), a notion that Edwards regarded as “a gross absurdity” (IV. 1.2).
If the virtue or vice of an action does not lie in its nature, it does not and cannot 
exist at all. To prove this point, Edwards tried to show that here again the Arminian is 
forced down the path of infinite regress and absurdity. If a particular sinful action is 
sinful because of its cause, how does one determine whether that cause (which must be an 
action) is sinful? According to the rule that the sinfulness of an action lies in its cause, 
one must determine the sinfulness of that cause (which is an action) by its cause. And the 
sinfulness of that cause is likewise determined by the cause of that cause. In this scheme 
“we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower cause to a higher, in 
infinitum', and that is thoroughly to banish it from the world...” The only thing, then, that 
can actually be considered blameworthy is a cause that is only a cause. Yet this will not 
work because one must be able to the cause of an action in order to ascertain its goodness 
or badness. The only criterion that is left to make the moral judgment is the nature of the 
cause, the very criterion the Arminian attempts to deny (IV.1.3).
Edwards thought he had common sense and the “natural notions of mankind” on 
his side here. Evil “consists in a certain deformity in the nature of certain dispositions of 
the heart, and acts of the will; and not in the deformity of something else, diverse from 
the very thing itself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the cause of it. Which 
would be absurd, because that would be to suppose, a thing that is iimocent and not evil.
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is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil.” The Arminian position amounts to 
saying that “vice don’t consist in vice, hut in that which produces it” (IV. 1.5).
Edwards speculated as to why the Arminians arrived at the idea that the goodness 
or badness of a moral action is determined by its cause by drawing an analogy with a case 
when the cause of an action does indeed determine its goodness or badness. “ .. .It is 
indeed a very plain dictate of common sense” that the moral good or evil oi"'outward 
actions'" (or “sensible motions of the body”) depends not upon their nature, but upon the 
will that produces them. In other words, the goodness or badness of a particular bodily 
motion depends upon its cause. The confusion here may have resulted from the fact that, 
at some unspecified point, the terms signifying the internal reality of will (e.g., 
inclinations, volitions, etc.) began to be replaced with terms signifying outward behavior 
(e.g., actions). By failing to pay close attention to the difference between moral and 
natural phenomenon, the Arminians were led into this particular error. It is worth noting 
that we find in Upham and especially in James the same tendency to equate volitions with 
outward (or muscular) activity (IV. 1.10).
Action and Agencv
Edwards took exception to the Arminian’s ‘'''metaphysical notion o f agency and 
action." As he understood it, this notion was that:
.. .Unless the soul has a self-determining power, it has no power of ‘action’; if  its 
volitions be not caused by itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic 
cause, they can’t be the soul’s own ‘acts’; and that the soul can’t be ‘active,’ but 
must be wholly ‘passive,’ in those effects which it is the subject of necessarily, 
and not from its own free determination. (IV.2.1)
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Chubb’s own particular manifestation of this belief was the assertion that self- 
determination is the essence of action, and that “it is impossible for a man to act and be 
acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time; and that nothing that is an action, can be 
the effect of the action of another.. (IV.2.2).
Chubb’s notion of agency therefore stipulated that action can be “under the 
power, influence or action of no cause” whatsoever. Similarly, in an argument sounding 
much like William Ames’s description of God, human action is never an effect, “for to be 
an effect implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its cause.” 
Yet this is an inconsistent position because a self-determined action is an effect, an effect 
of a preceding choice of the will. The same problem inheres in the idea that free actions 
are contingent, i.e., having “no necessary dependence or coimection with anything 
foregoing.” Yet the idea of self-determination plainly posits that acts of will are 
necessarily connected with preceding acts of will. Likewise, Edwards reiterates 
previously mentioned inconsistencies with the idea of self-determination. He sums his 
criticism thus:
So that according to their notion of an act, considered with regard to its 
consequences, these following things are all essential to it; viz. that it should be 
necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it 
should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and design; 
that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on a 
previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately 
out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it 
should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is
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what the mind causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent, according 
to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, it 
precluding all previous choice in the affair. (IV.2.5)
Given this series of contradictions, and relevant to the “loss of will” this 
dissertation explores, Edwards thought that this notion of action “is an absolute 
nonentity.” By implication, then, the Arminian will was a nonentity. As we explore the 
psychology of Upham and James, one might be able to conclude that their notions of 
volition, predicated upon similar notions of self-determination, did posit a rather vacuous 
notion of will. Although it seems certain that “the will” of Edwards and the Puritans was 
lost to American psychology textbooks in the early nineteenth century, it may also be the 
case that, in the American context at least, to have lost that will was to lose the reality of 
will itself (IV.2.6).
Further, another part of the problem was that Arminian psychology had changed 
the original meaning of the term “action.” The common usage of the term action “seems 
to be some motion or exertion of power, that is voluntary, or that is the effect of the will; 
and is used in the same sense as “doing”: and most commonly ‘tis used to signify 
outward actions. So thinking is often distinguished from acting; and desiring and will, 
from doing” (IV.2.7). Other less common yet valid ways of using the term “action,” 
include describing the motions of corporeal things “especially when these motions seem 
to arise from some internal cause which is hidden', so that they have a greater 
resemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of internal volition, or 
invisible exertions of will.” Only very rarely does one find the term action applied the
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thoughts or volitions, unless one reads the “philosophers and metaphysicians” who co­
opted the term for their own (apparently Arminian) purposes.
The word action is “never used in vulgar speech” in the way that Arminian 
theologians use it as “an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary cormection 
with anything foregoing” (IV.2.9). Typically the term was applied to individuals who do 
things voluntarily, regardless of the cause of that action.
Edwards really did understand the self-determined will to be central to the 
Arminian theological and metaphysical substructure.
To answer the objection that Edwards’ psychology confounds passion and action, 
he clarified that these words signify opposite ‘'^relations'' not opposite “’existences." The 
terms are similar in this way to the terms cause and effect. And just as one event may be 
simultaneously an effect of one thing and a cause of another, so too a volition may 
simultaneously have a “passiveness” relative to some causal factor, and an “activeness” 
relative to something that it influences. “ .. .To suppose, that there are acts of the soul by 
which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet 
themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself is the object of 
something acting upon, and influencing that, don’t at all confound ‘action’ and 
‘passion.’” (IV.2.12). Action maybe, and indeed is, both a cause and effect.
Just as Edwards speculated as to why the Arminians arrived at the idea that the 
goodness or badness of a moral action is determined by a knowledge of its cause, so too 
Edwards speculated how this “inconsistent notion of action, when applied to volition” 
came to be. In order to properly describe a person’s movements as an action, it must be 
the result of that person’s voluntary determination. “Hence some metaphysicians have
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been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition 
itself, that that also must be determined by the will; which is to be determined by 
antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not considering the contradiction it 
implies” (IV.2.13). The other reason for the confusion had to do with the imprecision of 
the “metaphysical distinction” between action and passion. Just as these terms have been 
deemed to signify opposite existences, so too philosophers had believed that volitions had 
to be one or the other (IV.2.14-15). Yet, Edwards, attempting to give the Arminian 
mental philosophers the benefit of the doubt, argued that a little consideration would lead 
them to abandon the inconsistencies associated with the belief that actions cannot be 
necessity, given the necessity of God’s holy actions (IV.2.16).
Necessitv, Praise, and Blame in Ordinarv Usage
Continuing in this strain of explaining Arminian lapses in logic and common 
sense, Edwards addressed the strong Arminian belief that necessary actions cannot be 
morally good or evil. Arminians considered the belief in their incompatibility as 
“contrary to common sense.” Edwards was concerned that these arguments were not 
only making undue progress as they were being “greatly triumphed in” but that they were 
confusing some Calvinists who could not reconcile scriptural teaching with this 
purportedly universal dictate of common sense.
First, Edwards conceded that it is “indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, 
that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with praise or blame.” If men are forced to 
engage in particular actions against their wills, i.e., if they are forced or robbed of natural 
ability to do something, they cannot be deemed culpable for such an action. Another 
truth accessible to common sense is that one’s responsibility for doing things which are
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nearly impossible (i.e., nearly naturally impossible) is curtailed yet not eliminated by that 
natural difficulty. Conversely, any natural cause (i.e., a cause outside of the person’s 
inclinations) moving a person toward an action typically deemed praiseworthy diminishes 
the praiseworthiness of that action. In short, as natural causes replace moral causes, the 
virtue or blame of the action is diminished.
Secondly, people begin to use phrases such as “‘must,’ ‘can’t,’ ‘can’t help it,’ 
‘can’t avoid it,’ ‘necessary,’ ‘unable,’ ‘impossible,’ ‘unavoidable,’ ‘irresistible,’ etc.” to 
signify “constraint or restraint” which are both types of natural necessity. These words 
are therefore associated with the idea of “contrary will,” or the idea that necessity thwarts 
desire and inclination. We therefore have a “strong habit” of associating the idea of 
necessity with being “free.. .from all fault or blame” (IV.3.5). Third, it is not surprising, 
then, but actually very common to carry over the “ideas of innocency or blamelessness” 
that we leam to associate with idea of necessity into situations when there actually is no 
contrary will or endeavor (IV.3.5-8).
Edwards offered other reasons for why people are slow to correct this cognitive 
habit. For one, philosophers typically use terms necessity imprecisely, and are not in the 
habit o f clearly defining terms and making careful discriminations between common and 
philosophical use of terms (IV.3.9). Further, actual similarities between the terms lead to 
confusion (IV.3.I0).
Fourth, Edwards thought that people may “inwardly entertain” the idea that moral 
necessity actually does run against the will’s sincere desire. There are some “wicked 
men” who are deceived into thinking that “they wish that they were good, that they loved 
God and holiness; but yet don’t find that their wishes produce the effect.” Edwards here
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rehearses the difference between true willingness and “indirect willingness,” noting that it 
is impossible that a will be against itself and that an ineffectual desire is not truly a will. 
One of the reasons for this confusion is that “men through a prejudice in their own favor, 
are disposed to think well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account ‘cm good 
and virtuous, through their respect to virtue be only indirect and remote, and ‘tis nothing 
at all that is virtuous that truly excites or terminates their inclinations. Further, some of 
the terms used to describe moral necessity (e.g., “impossible,” “irresistible”) improperly 
imply resistance, which is, by definition, never the case in moral necessity.
Finally, people are strengthened in their tendency to think that necessity and 
blame are incompatible when the enormity of eternal punishment is brought to the fore. 
Arminians go about rhetorically “setting forth the greatness of the punishment in strong 
expressions; ‘That a man should be case into eternal burnings, that he should be made to 
fry in hell to all eternity, for those things which he had no power to avoid, and was under 
a fatal, unfrustrahle, invincible necessity of doing’” (IV.3.12).
True Common Sense
Although Edwards was not certain that his explanations for Arminian irrationality 
would be “thought satisfactory” by his readers, he felt more confident that he could 
demonstrate that moral necessity and culpability are “not at all inconsistent with the 
natural apprehensions of mankind...” The “common people,” i.e., those “who are 
furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphysical 
and philosophical subtleties” are also least likely to make the Arminian error (IV.4.1). 
Edwards first quickly and easily defined the “vulgar notion of blameworthiness:”
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.. .a person’s being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; contain[s] 
these two things: 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His 
pleasure’s being wrong. Or in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing 
their notion; a person’s having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. 
And this is the sum total of the matter (IV.4.2).
What sets the “common people” apart is that they do not “ascend up in their reflections 
and abstractions, to the metaphysical...” in order to ascertain the nature of 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. “If this were the case [i.e., if  people needed to he 
metaphysicians to ascertain the nature of moral praise or blame], there are multitudes, 
yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand 
would live and die without having any such notion...” To the contrary, human beings 
have at a very young age “a sense of desert,” which proceeds from ^'experience” and a 
"natural sensation” that some act was good or had (IV.4.3).
Common people believe that only a person’s “own acts” are morally culpable, and 
a person’s acts are simply those things done by choice, i.e., done according to the 
inclinations of the heart (IV.4.4). So too common people also believe that “faulty or 
praiseworthy deeds” are done with liberty, but by liberty they mean the freedom to do 
what they desire to do, free from restraint. The idea that a free act of will must proceed 
from a self-determined will never crosses their minds (IV.4.5). In short, the view of the 
common man is precisely the view of Edwards, just more simple.
Further, if  common people really thought that moral necessity and praise and 
blame were in opposition, then we might expect to find that praise and blame actually 
decrease as the strength of moral necessity increases (i.e., as inclinations toward the good
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or evil increase). This is, after all, as Edwards had previously shown, precisely the 
common way natural necessity and praise and blame are found to vary (IV.4.6).
It is easy to see, however, that “the reverse of these things is true.” Clearly, when people 
are strongly inclined to the good they are found to be more worthy of praise, and those 
strongly inclined to the bad are found to be more worthy of blame (IV.4.7).
It follows then, that the Arminian notion that culpable acts are those “which [are] 
not determined by an antecedent bias or motive...” is fallacious. Indeed, the very 
opposite is true. “Men don’t think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, for the agent’s 
being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive; but the more. And if 
good inclination or motive has but little influence in determining the agent, they don’t 
think his act so much the more virtuous, but the less” (IV.4.8).
Even when “good or evil dispositions” are thought to be “implanted in the hearts 
of men by nature itself,” such as an arrogant or haughty nature, people not only condemn 
the actions which flow from that disposition, but also mention that disposition when 
condemning the person. Yet, when a natural necessity, i.e., a force moving “against their 
inclinations” the person is held to be blameless. “Thus ‘tis very plain, that common sense 
makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity [i.e., natural and moral], as 
to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men’s 
actions” (IV.4.9). Edwards thought these intuitions were so well ingrained in human 
nature that he “very much doubted whether the Arminians themselves have ever got rid 
o f ‘em ...” (IV.4.10).
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Edwards then reinforced his points on the reality of the distinction between 
natural and moral necessity, and criticizes the way Arminians blur the distinction to their 
advantage. For example they will say:
‘That which is necessary (say they) is necessary; it is that which must be, and 
can’t be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and can’t be 
done: and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it.’ And such comparisons 
are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk who has lost his legs, and 
condemning and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man, 
who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, etc. (IV.4.11)
In other words, the Arminians would deny the importance of the distinction between 
natural and moral necessity but then only give examples of natural necessity to prove the 
point that culpability and moral necessity are opposed to each other (IV.4.11).
Given these realties, Edwards concluded that Arminians couldn’t claim that their 
doctrine is based on common sense, but must rely on “some philosophical and 
metaphysical arguments” (IY.4.12). The “pretended demonstration[s] of Arminians from 
common sense” are based upon “a grand illusion.” There is, as he argued before, a strong 
habit of associating blamelessness and necessity, built upon our early encounters with 
natural necessity. This association is unwittingly carried into the Arminian’s 
methaphysical use of the term, and actually is the “foundation” of their “arrogant” 
ruminations. In this context Edwards reveals that he found many Arminian discourses 
insulting and im-Christian (concerning the “un-Christian” nature of Arminian 
argumentation, note his use of the term neighbor):
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And this [the habit of associating necessity and blamelessness] is the main ground 
of all the right they have to treat their neighbors in so assuming a manner, and to 
insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as weak bigots, men that 
dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their 
eyes against the noonday light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first­
born of absurdities, etc. (IV.4.13)
Yet Edwards was convinced that his arguments had shown not only that the Calvinist 
position was none of these things, but that the status of the Arminian doctrine was in 
doubt: “But perhaps an impartial consideration of the things which have been observed in 
the preceding parts of this inquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose 
doctrine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with common 
sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind” 
(IV.4.13).
Means and Machines
Edwards then turned to discuss the Arminian objection that Calvinism turns 
human beings into “mere machines.” He described the objection thus:
.. .If it be so, that sin and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure 
connection of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be 
worth the while to use any means or endeavors to obtain the one, and avoid the 
other; seeing no endeavors can alter the futurity of the event, which is become 
necessary by a connection already established. (IV.5.1)
To answer this objection that endeavors and means are useless, Edwards first tried 
to explain what an unsuccessful use of endeavors is. He thought an endeavor could be
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unsuccessful in two ways. First, when the means do not lead to the desired ends.
Second, when the end comes ahout, hut not because of the means employed. Yet if there 
is a connection between means and the desired end, that use of means has been successful 
(IV.5.3). Put into these terms, the original question, which is that necessity undermines 
the use of means, is transformed into the question of “whether on the supposition of there 
being a real and true connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, there 
must he less of a connection between means and effect.” Edwards thought the posing of 
the question sufficient to answer the question. Indeed, necessity is prerequisite to the 
usefulness of means: “Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things: and if 
there were no connection between foregoing things, and following ones, there could he 
no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and 
fruitless.”
Even if  we imagine that there is a “succession or train of antecedents and 
consequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already 
sure and necessary...” this does not hinder the efficacy of means, since these means may 
simply “belong to the series” of sure and necessary events (IV.5.5).
As we have come to expect, Edwards turned the table on the Arminians at this 
point. Clearly, the efficacy of means is established in a scheme that allows for necessity. 
Given the previous reasoning, it is clear that the efficacy of means actually demands 
necessity. Therefore, the use of means and endeavors actually makes no sense given 
Arminian presuppositions. Since fi'ee acts are contingent and self-determined, which rule 
out connections between virtuous action and antecedents, all cormections between 
antecedent means and subsequent action must be excluded in the production of virtue.
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Arminians are therefore precluded from using any means to the production of virtue.
Such means could only serve to throw the will out of equilibrium and therefore 
undermine the virtue involved (IV.5.7-11).
Edwards then turned to confront the theological variety of the argument that 
necessity undermines duty. He offered an example of a form of this argument: “What 
future happiness or misery I shall have, is in effect determined by the necessary course 
and connection of things; therefore I will save myself the trouble of labor and diligence, 
which can’t add to my determined degree of happiness, or diminish my misery; but will 
take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence” (V.5.12). This 
Arminian argument, Edwards pointed out, is internally inconsistent. On the one hand it 
says that one cannot influence the outcome of one’s life through the use of proper means. 
On the other hand it does just the opposite: it posits that means (i.e., “sloth and 
negligence”) will influence future happiness (i.e., sloth will lead to “comfort”).
Finally, Edwards addressed the idea that necessity “makes men into mere 
machines.” To combat this conclusion, Edwards articulated his understanding of the way 
humans differ from machines:
“ .. .Man is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere machine, in 
that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of will, and so is capable 
of volition and choice; and in that, his will is guided by the dictates or views of 
his understanding; and in that his external actions and behavior, and in many 
respect also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his will; so 
that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases; and by 
means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations
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and actions as according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, 
esteem, love and reward; or on the contrary, of disesteem detestation, indignation 
and punishment” (IV.5.14).
Edwards thought that these characteristics are “all the difference that can be desired, and 
all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the Arminians 
themselves come to. . for the Arminians also posit the difference between man and 
machine in the fact that “man has a power of choosing” (IV.5.15). But if we push the 
issue, Edwards argued, we find that the Arminian scheme actually makes men worse than 
machines, for at least “machines are guided by an understanding cause.” The self- 
determined will, however, “is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind 
contingence” (IV.5.16).
Stoicism. Hobbes, and Calvinism
Edwards also addressed a favorite Arminian argument against Calvinism: that by 
insisting that “there are no acts of the will.. .but what are attended with some kind of 
necessity,” they posited doctrine that agreed with the Stoic “doctrine of fate” and 
Hobbes’ doctrine of “necessity” (IV.6.1). To this Edwards simply replied that, consistent 
with the Calvinist notion of common grace, “there were many important truths 
maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, and especially the Stoics, that 
are never the worse for being held by them.” Indeed, it was widely held by Christian 
divines that the Stoics had come the closest to gospel truth of any pagan sect.
Besides, Arminians had been inconsistent in their use of this rhetorical move. When 
Arminian theologians saw parallels between their teachings and the Stoics, they saw this 
as “a confirmation of their doctrine,” but when they saw a parallel between Calvinists and
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Stoic philosophy, they argued that that proves Calvinism to be “heathenish” (IV.6.4). 
Indeed, Edwards noted that the Arminian theology . .agrees in some respects with the 
opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers,” such as Epicurus, the “father of 
atheism and licentiousness” (IV.6.5).
Concerning the accusation of maintaining the same doctrine of necessity with 
Hobbes, Edwards claimed that he had never read Hobbes. If there is a similarity, that 
does not change the truth of the position “merely because it was once held by some bad 
man” (IV.6.7). He thought his opponents would agree that “‘tis common for the 
corruptions of the hearts of evil men, to abuse the best things to vile purposes.”
Further, Edwards noted in closing, the Arminians agreed with Hobbes “in many more 
things” than do the Calvinists (IY.6.8).
Necessitv and the Divine Will
Next Edwards turned to the objection against a deterministic view of the will that 
if it makes humans machines, it also makes God a machine. Edwards quoted Isaac Watts 
here, who claimed that necessity in God would “destroy the glory of his liberty of 
choice,” and “make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. 
Hobbes’s doctrine of fatality and necessity.” Guelzo (1989) noted that Watts (who was a 
Calvinist in other regards), moved in an “Arminian” direction concerning the will in 
order to move away from such Hobbsian fatalism. Edwards was attempting to call back 
such wishy-washy Calvinists back to a consistent Calvinism.
Edwards thought Watts’s claim that necessity in God’s volitions would make him 
a “minister of fate” played to people’s “imaginations and prejudices” and blurred the 
issues considerably. Edwards admitted that human understanding of the operations of
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God’s faculties and human faculties, indeed, fairly representing even human psychology 
is an exceedingly difficult task given the limitations of human language.
Seemingly contrary to Ames, Edwards thought that “some things in God” are 
“consequent and dependent upon others,” for example, God’s knowledge and holiness are 
prior “in the order of nature” to God’s happiness. Still, Edwards thought that the 
language of cause and effect was not precisely applied to the immutable God who is the 
cause of all things (IV.7.4). Still, Edwards had difficulty with Watts’s claim that 
necessity in God’s will was somehow demeaning to God.
Edwards thought it funny that Watts would consider it a disadvantage that God 
necessarily always chooses what is “wisest and best,” as if  this necessity were some sort 
of straight)acket impeding God’s freedom. To the contrary, God’s sovereignty by which 
he rightfully, independently, and wisely exercises absolute power to do whatever he 
pleases, is the height of perfection. ‘“Tis the glory and greatness of the divine 
sovereignty, that God’s will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient wisdom in 
everything; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no 
wisdom; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting 
without reason, design or end” (IV.7.6). If God’s will were not necessarily wise, it would 
be “subject to some degree of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable 
to evil.” The thought of God’s will being moved “hither and thither at random, by the 
uncertain wind of blind contingence,” was ghastly indeed (IV.7.7).
Consistent with Edwards’ rhetorical strategy, he caught Watts in an inconsistency 
here, for Watts also claimed, ‘“That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than 
according to this fitness and goodness in things’” (IV.7.11). If it does not diminish God’s
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nature to be necessarily determined by the “fitness and goodness in things,” Edwards 
insisted, than it is also no diminution “to be thus determined in all things (IV.7.14).
Since Watts admitted that God necessarily chooses the good when there is a 
“fitness and goodness in things” to be chosen, Edwards then extrapolated that if there is 
in every instance such a fitness or goodness, then all of God’s choices are likewise 
necessary. So in the next section of Freedom Edwards inquires if this is indeed the case, 
i.e., ''whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible things which are in God’s 
view, and maybe considered as capable objects of his choice, there is not evermore a 
preferahleness in one thing above another.” Watts had denied this, but Edwards 
attempted to prove that it was indeed the case (IV.8.1).
Edwards intended to challenge two arguments that were used to prove Watts’s 
point. The first point is that “in many instances” there are no differences between the 
possible objects of choice. The second point is that there is only a very small and 
therefore insignificant difference between these objects. Edwards went to lengths to 
show that these points still do not diminish the fact that God volitions are indeed morally 
necessary.
The Author of Sin
Edwards next tumed to perhaps the most popular of Arminian objections to the necessity 
of human volition: that the first cause of these volitions is “the author of sin,” and those 
so determined by this first cause are therefore absolved of their sinful actions. Edwards’ 
first reply to this objection is that it simply does not help the Arminian cause, even if it is 
true.
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Again, the Arminians were inconsistent in arguing this point. For one, Whitby had 
argued that if God withholds the assistance that a human being needs to avoid sin that 
makes God the author of sin just as much as if he were the efficient cause of it. Yet this 
assertion is inconsistent with another contention of Whitby’s, that God had withdrawn his 
restraining hand from “the devils and damned spirits” which had resulted in deepest 
wickedness. If God’s withholding grace from humans makes him the author of human 
sin, Edwards noted, his withholding of grace from devils makes him the author of that sin 
as well. “And doubtless the later is as odious an effect as the former” (IV.9.4).
Arminians, arguing that the necessary connection of cause and effect makes God 
the author of sin, were saying in effect: “ .. .that for God to be the author or orderer of 
those things which he knows beforehand, will infallibly be attended with such a 
consequence, is the same thing in effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence.” 
Again, the Arminians are not helped by this argument from knowledge of consequences. 
God’s foreknowledge, which most Arminians embraced, certainly implied knowledge of 
consequence, i.e., the knowledge that, given the way in which he made the world, certain 
sins will inevitably follow. For example, he knew beforehand that if he made a man 
named Judas during a certain time and at a certain place, that he would certainly sin by 
betraying Christ. Edwards did not deny that this is a theological difficulty, he just denied 
that it was one with which only Calvinists had to deal. Instead, it was “a difficulty 
wherein the Arminians share with us” (IV.9.6).
Since Arminians blamed Calvinists for making God the “author of sin” Edwards 
thought it important to define the phrase. He emphatically denied that he or any Calvinist 
held God to be the author of the sin if  that means the actual “doer” of sin, or “the sinner.”
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God cannot sin, but is instead perfectly holy in all he does. Yet, if “author of sin” means 
“the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and at the same time, a disposer of the state of 
events, in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if 
it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be 
all that is meant, by being the author of sin, I don’t deny that God is the author of sin...” 
Still, Edwards admitted to disliking the phrase because it usually carries the former 
meaning. But, in light of the acceptable definition, the Arminian too must agree that God 
is the author of sin in that sense (IV.9.8).
Edwards followed this contention with a long list of scriptural passages proving 
that God is the author of sin in the limited sense, beginning with the case of God 
hardening Pharaoh’s heart so that he would sin and not set the Israelites free from their 
slavery. He also mentioned the fact that Arminians must have agreed with: that the 
crucifixion of Christ was predestined by God, yet involved sinful actions on the part of 
many. Edwards concluded this section saying that “it is certain and demonstrable, from 
the holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that 
God permits sin; and at the same time, so orders things, in his providence, that it certainly 
and infallible will come to pass, in consequence of his permission” (IV.9.12).
Whitby’s argument notwithstanding, Edwards further insisted that “there is a 
great difference” between arguing that God is the fountain and efficient cause of sin on 
the one hand, or arguing that God is the permitter of sin on the other. Referring back to a 
previous example, the sun can be considered the fountain and efficient cause of heat and 
light, yet it cannot be thought of as the fountain and efficient cause of cold and darkness, 
although the withdrawal of the sun certainly leads to these effects. Like the withdrawal
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of the sun occasions cold and darkness, so too the withdrawal of God’s grace leads to or 
occasions sin. In no sense, however, can God be considered the actual fount or “author” 
of sin in the typical usage of the term (IV.9.14).
In an argument applying more to James then Upham, Edwards argued for the 
propriety of God’s sovereignty over all events in the moral world. The “supreme and 
absolute Governor of the universe” has the right and obligation to order “all important 
events” within the purview of his kingdom. Certainly “the moral actions of intelligent 
creatures” are included in this purview (IV.9.I5).
Further, Edwards argued, the events of the moral world will be ordered by 
something, either by design and wisdom or contingence and chance. Arguing on purely 
pragmatic grounds, Edwards asked, “is it not better, that the good and evil which happens 
in God’s world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded and determined by the good 
pleasure of an infinitely wise Being.. .then to leave these things to fall out by chance, and 
to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or aim?” Edwards 
thought that the answer to this question was “doubtless,” although James would have 
disagreed. For Edwards, an orderly universe was a comfort. For James, an orderly 
universe was a graceless universe (IV.9.16).
Still, Edwards thought that it far superior to leave the government of the universe 
to Wisdom, then to “blind and unmeaning causes.” This latter arrangement would fall far 
short of the “liberty” which the Arminian divines so earnestly sought. On the other hand, 
God’s government of the world leaves room for “real liberty,” i.e., the ability to do as one 
pleases, and in this sense liberty and necessity agree (IV.9.I7).
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Edwards reminded his Arminian readers that God may permit morally evil things 
to happen so that he may bring about good events. The selling of Joseph into slavery and 
the cmcifixion of Christ were two of his Scriptural examples on this point.
Arguing that “God ,may hate a thing as it is in itself’ and yet ordain that good 
may flow out of that thing, Edwards challenged his readers: “I believe, there is no person 
of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should 
be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the 
endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world”
(IV.9.20). If not, Edwards thought it entirely reasonable to suppose that the distinction 
between the “things which God thinks best should be, considering all circumstances and 
consequences,” and “those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his nature.” That 
is, that God can love holiness and hate sin, yet still permit sinful things to happen because 
the best possible results will follow that permission. Interestingly, here too, James 
thought otherwise, and felt himself competent to judge whether it was best for certain 
events to happen or not (in “Dilemma of Determinism;” IV.9.2I).
Sin’s First Entrance Into the World
These considerations were relevant to the perplexing question of “sin’s first 
entrance into the world.” If God had created Adam in knowledge, righteousness and 
holiness, how did Adam fall into sin? Arminians could argue that the Calvinist notion of 
necessity meant that God was the author of that first sin. Edwards reiterated his previous 
discussion regarding God’s “permitting” sin rather than causing it: God withheld his 
“divine influence” from Adam and he, in his creaturely imperfection, sinned.
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Yet, the Arminian might object, why should not have God gone all the way and 
simply made Adam sinful to begin with? To this Edwards replied, first, that it was fitting 
that sin should enter into the world through the “imperfection which properly belongs to 
the creature” in order to avoid the appearance that God was actually “the efficient or 
fountain” of that evil. As always, God’s glory is key. Second, as he was wont to do, 
Edwards argued again that Arminian principles do not solve the theological paradoxes of 
the Christian faith. The Arminian explanation for sin’s first entrance into the world, 
based upon self-determination and contingency is incoherent: self-determination would 
argue that Adam’s first sin was caused by a preceding act of sin. To say that the sinful 
volition of Adam came from nothing is not only incoherent, but also does not solve the 
culpability issue: how could God hold Adam accountable for a sin which he had nothing 
to do, a sin which arose from pure chance?
Calvinism and God’s Moral Character
At this stage in Freedom, Edwards summarized what he thought he had 
accomplished so far, with a particular focus on the question of God’s sincerity in issuing 
commands to his subjects:
The things which have been already observed, may be sufficient to answer most 
of the objections, and silence the great exclamations of Arminians against the 
Calvinists, from the supposed inconsistence of Calvinistic principles with the 
moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of mankind. The 
consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained, with the 
fitness and reasonableness of God’s commands, promises and threatenings, 
rewards and punishments, has been particularly considered: the cavils of our
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opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin, have 
been answered; and also their objection against these principles, as inconsistent 
with God’s sincerity, in his counsels, invitations and persuasions, has been 
already obviated, in what has been observed, respecting the consistence of what 
Calvinists suppose concerning the secret and revealed will of God: by that it 
appears, there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret will of God, that 
his ordination and permission of events should be such that it shall be a certain 
consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it is man’s duty to 
do, and so God’s perceptive will, that he should do... (IV. 11.1)
Arminians would accuse Calvinists of impugning God’s character by arguing that 
God’s decree (foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass) is inconsistent with his issuing 
commands: why would God tell a person not to steal if he knew that that person would 
steal regardless? The Arminian objection falls because Arminians believe in God’s 
foreknowledge of all events. By implication, Arminian theology also affirms that God 
knows beforehand that certain commands will be disobeyed and ignored, yet he continues 
to issue the command nonetheless.
Given the Arminian belief that moral agency requires a self-determined will free 
from all necessity, Edwards argued that it was actually the Arminians that impugned 
God’s character. If a moral act must be free from all necessity, then God’s actions must 
be free from all necessity. But this supposition undermines all attempts to rationally 
prove the “moral perfections of God.” If Arminian assumptions prevail it is impossible 
to prove “that God certainly will in any one instance do that which is just and holy”
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(IV. 11.3). Here Edwards appears to endorse a classic approach to apologetics, assuming 
that reason can be used to demonstrate certain religious truths.
Edwards also accused Arminians of simply begging the question in their 
argumentation. Arminians in their argumentation simply assume that their definition of 
freedom is valid and that people cannot be subject to command or persuasion. From this 
starting point, the Arminians then “heap up scriptures containing commands, counsels, 
calls, warnings...” etc., assuming that this proves the Calvinists are in error. Yet, “none 
denies, that there are commands...” in the Scripture. Therefore, it is the responsibility of 
Arminians to “first make manifest the things in question [i.e., the nature of true freedom, 
etc.], which they suppose and take for granted, and shew them to be consistent with 
themselves, and produce clear evidence of their truth...” (IV. 11.4). (As we will see in 
the case of Upham and James, there really is not much argumentation in support of the 
Arminian notions, jUvSt assertion.) Further, Edwards reiterated, it is the Arminian scheme 
that ultimately contradicts the use of commands, motives and persuasions (IV. 11.5).
The Tendency to Atheism and Licentiousness
The next objection against Calvinism that Edwards confronted was that 
Calvinistic necessity tended toward “atheism and licentiousness.” Typical of his style, 
Edwards again tumed the tables on the Arminians. For one, the philosophers which had 
been associated with Calvinism and Arminianism told a telling story. The Stoics, which 
were compared by Arminians to the Calvinists, were “the greatest theists,” while 
Epicums was both an atheist and “the greatest maintainer of contingence” (IV. 12.1).
It is only the doctrine of necessity that allows for a rational proof of God’s 
existence. The doctrine of contingency undermines this proof since it implies that things
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come to pass for no reason whatsoever. Edwards concluded that . .it is the doctrine of 
the Arminians, and not of the Calvinists, that is justly charged with a tendency to 
atheism; it heing built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of every demonstrative 
argument for the proof of the deity; as has been shewn...” (IV. 12.2).
And, despite the objection that Calvinism renders all “means and endeavors” vain, it is 
actually Arminianism that undermines these things because it denies the necessity which 
these things presuppose, overthrowing “all connection, in every degree, between 
endeavor and event, means and end” (IV. 12.3).
Further, Arminianism leads to licentiousness because it “excuses all evil 
inclinations, which men find to be natural; because in such inclinations they are not self- 
determined.” If the necessity of evil inclination excuses a moral agent, then even “the 
vilest acts and practices” will be justified. The stronger the evil inclination, the greater 
the necessity, the greater the excuse (IV. 12.4).
Edwards also thought that practically speaking, it was the Arminian doctrine that 
actually produced the worse results. Although some abused the Calvinist doctrine, it was 
Arminianism that produced “ .. .vice, profaneness, luxury and wickedness of all sorts, and 
a contempt of all religion, and of every kind of seriousness and strictness of 
conversation...” He thought that these effects could be seen in “our nation in particular.” 
Here Edwards seems to see an overlap with theological Arminianism and the “wisdom of 
this age,” which is consistent with the redundancy of the Enlightenment and Arminianism 
concerning the freedom of the will. In view of this perceived link between Arminianism 
and licentiousness, Edwards mocked what he saw as arrogant modem claims that 
Calvinism needed to be rejected in order to advance virtue (IV. 12.5).
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Metaphysics and Psychology
Edwards closed Part IV of Freedom of the Will considering the Arminian 
objection that defenders of Calyinism . .run into nice scholastic distinctions, and 
abstruse metaphysical subtleties” which are opposed to “common sense.” It is possible 
that some Arminians would leyy the same objection against Freedom of the Will, and 
Edwards wanted to proyide an intelligent defense against this claim.
One challenge to this accusation is its friyolity, i.e., taking exception to the 
Calyinist defense because of the science to which it is “properly reduced.” Such an 
objection is equiyalent to taking objection to an argument because of the language in 
which it is deliyered. “If the reasoning be good,” Edwards thought, it does not matter 
what science or what language it belongs to. Further, such an argument is inconsistent 
since the kind of argumentation employed in Freedom “is no more metaphysical, than 
those which we use against the Papists, to disproye their doctrine of 
transubstantiation...,” and is of the sort used to proye “that the rational soul is not 
corporeal,” and that God exists. In short, Protestant theology depended a great deal upon 
“metaphysical” reasoning, and Arminians should not take exception to its use when 
considering the question of the freedom of the will. Metaphysical reasoning also applied 
to the task of natural theology, and nearly eyerywhere else. There is “no strict 
demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can 
haye no proof, that is properly demonstratiye, of any one proposition, relating to the 
being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, 
the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of 
morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical” (IV. 13.2). Edwards therefore
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pleaded that his arguments be considered and not written off simply because they are 
deemed “metaphysical.”
Further, the arguments in Freedom were not abstruse or based upon strange 
distinctions. In a passage that serves as a nice summary of Edwards’ main points, he 
attempted to show that his basic arguments had really been quite simple:
There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation, in determining, 
that a thing is not before it is, and so can’t be the cause of itself; or that the first 
act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or 
direct it; or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind remains in a 
state of absolute indifference; that preference and equilibrium never coexist; and 
that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, consisting in indifference: 
and that so far as the will is determined by motives, exhibited and operating 
previous to the act of will, so far it is not determined by the act of the will itself; 
that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or some 
antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their 
causes, and are connected with them; that virtue is not the worse, nor sin the 
better, for the strength of inclination, with which it is practiced, and the difficulty 
which thence arises of doing otherwise; that when it is already infallibly known, 
that a thing will he, it is not a thing contingent whether it will ever be or no; or 
that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it 
either may be, or may not be. And the like might be observed of many other 
things which belong to the foregoing reasoning. (IV. 13.3)
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Crucially, it is also unhelpful to stubbornly reject the reasoning such as that found 
in Freedom of the Will because it contradicts some purportedly “natural sense of the 
mind.” People who argue like this simply refuse to engage argumentation because they 
believe they already know that Calvinistic necessity is simply not possible. In this case, 
the difficulty is “nothing but a mere prejudice.” Edwards challenged this type of person 
to confront his arguments rationally. In the footnote associated with this paragraph, 
Edwards took exception to the frequent use of the term “experience” to validate Arminian 
intuitions. This quote, relegated to a footnote, may well have been the core of a 
refutation of the American mental philosophy tradition:
A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may 
well suppose, that all men have the same human faculties; so a man may well 
argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that shew the nature of 
those faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good right 
to allege his experience, as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in 
innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many 
respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and 
that my will has some command of my thoughts; and that the acts of the will are 
my own, i.e., that they are acts of my will, the volitions of my own mind; or in 
other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others 
experience in this affair. But as to my finding by experience, that my will is 
originally determined by itself; or that my will first choosing what volition there 
shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of 
the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition arises in my mind
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contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature; 
and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any 
such thing.” (IV. 13.4, italics mine)
Edwards’ final paragraph in Part IV is a defense of the idea that the Arminian 
notion of moral agency is actually the position positing abstruse and unintelligible 
metaphysical notions which have no correspondence with common sense or reality. 
“Metaphysical” notions such as “self-determination” and “sovereignty of the will,” are 
incoherent, and the terms such as “necessary,’ ‘contingency,’ ‘action,’ ‘agency,’ etc.” are 
used in a way “quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech.” In so 
doing, Edwards argued that there is a “common” belief system that can be known, and 
that Arminians contradict that belief system (IV. 13.7).
A Sectarian Conclusion to a Nonsectarian Argument 
It is curious after such an earnest attempt to argue rationally with his opponents, 
that Edwards began the conclusion to Freedom of the will on a note of skepticism. He 
thought it “not unlikely” that those propagating “the modem fashionable divinity” would 
simply revitalize the old arguments against necessity, and ignore the substance of 
Edwards’ arguments. Prophetically, Edwards proclaimed that those reading his book; 
“may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, 
about the ‘fate’ of the heathen, ‘Hobbes’ necessity,’ and ‘making men mere machines’; 
accumulating the terrible epithets o f ‘fatal,’ ‘unfhistrable,’ ‘inevitable,’ ‘irresistible,’ etc. 
and it may be, with the addition of ‘horrid’ and ‘blasphemous’; and perhaps much skill 
may be used to set forth things which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking to 
the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those who have either too little capacity.
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or too much confidence of the opinions they have imhihed, and contempt of the contrary, 
to try the matter by any serious or circumspect examination.” Indeed, in the footnote to 
this paragraph, Edwards indicates that he thought that the tone of Arminian philosophers 
blurred the line “between argument and contempt.'" Clearly, Edwards was not convinced 
that Arminians would be willing to engage him on rational grounds (Conclusion.!).
The question of the freedom of the will was, in Edwards mind, the lynchpin upon 
which all disagreements between Calvinists and Arminians hung. Edwards optimistically 
believed that his arguments had not only refuted the Arminian notion of freedom, but that 
the “contrary doctrines” had been “demonstratively confirmed.” Therefore, “God’s 
moral govemment over mankind.. .is not inconsistent with a determining disposal of all 
events, of every kind, throughout the universe...” This ''universal, determining 
providence’'’ does not undermine moral agency because it regulates human volition 
through a moral rather than a natural necessity. Indeed, Edwards repeats his argument 
that moral agency and the use of commands only makes sense in such a divinely 
determined system. Here Edwards extends his arguments, attempting to demonstrate 
from reason God’s providential control of all things. For the sake of this dissertation, the 
most significant thing about this argument is that Edwards seemed to think it possible that 
a chief doctrine of Calvinism could be proved through a nonsectarian method, i.e., reason 
(Conclusion.2).
Edwards arguments supported the traditional “ .. .Calvinistic doctrine of the total 
depravity and corruption o f  man’s nature, whereby his heart is wholly under the power 
of sin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to 
love God, believe in Christ, or do anything that is truly good and acceptable in God’s
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sight.” The Arminians thought that such an inability robbed humans of the indifference 
and self-determination requisite to moral agency, and that God would be unjust in such a 
system to demand of sinners what they cannot do. Yet, Edwards reiterated the dual 
points that, first, the necessity that binds the sinner is a moral necessity, which is entirely 
consistent with culpability, and second, that indifference and self-determination are 
illogical concepts which can have no real existence. The Calvinistic doctrine therefore 
stands.
The Calvinist doctrine ‘‘’irresistible’'' and ‘‘efficacious grace f  i.e., the idea that 
Cod of his own initiative changes the sinner’s heart so that belief is possible, is also 
vindicated. The Arminians thought that this doctrine undermined morality because it 
posited a source of virtue outside of the self, i.e., “the good which is wrought, would not 
be our virtue, but rather God’s virtue...” Yet, given Edwards’ refutation of self- 
determination and his related support of the idea that virtue must have its source outside 
of the will itself, Edwards rejected these Arminian notions. Indeed, given his previous 
“proof’ of universal causality, and of Cod’s provident control over all events, it follows 
that the volitions of human beings must also fall under this control, either through Cod’s 
efficiency or his permission. Since all allow that “virtuous volitions” are attended by 
“some positive influence” from Cod, it follows “that Cod’s assistance or influence, must 
be determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event.” 
Whether Edwards is successful here in proving the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace 
is irrelevant. It is clear, however, that he thought doctrine to be of great importance, and, 
in seeming contradiction to his own aforementioned doctrine of total depravity (which 
held that people are unable to believe truth unless Cod changes their heart), Edwards
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argued as if he believed that rational argument could lead to belief (Conclusion.4). The 
importance here is that Edwards participated in the development of the nonsectarian 
moral culture in American colleges, by inviting debate on solely rational rather than 
creedal lines.
Edwards also thought his arguments served as a proof for both the decree of God, 
i.e., the idea that God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass, and for the doctrine of 
election, i.e., that God chooses from eternity past which people he will regenerate and 
save. The Arminian objection against these doctrines was that the necessity of election 
undermines moral agency, rewards and punishments, the use of commands and 
persuasions, etc. Assmning he had proved God’s providence, he extrapolated that God’s 
disposing of all events must be by design, which is the same as decree. Since this decree 
must be eternal, and, as previously proved, results in the regeneration of certain hearts, 
we can infer that God had from all eternity chosen beforehand whom he would regenerate 
(Conclusion.5).
The scope of the atoning sacrifice of Christ is likewise implicated in these things. 
For whom did Christ die? Given God’s election of certain saints to be saved, it follows 
that Christ’s death must have been to this end. That is, Christ’s death must have been 
consistent with God’s overall goals of redemption: to save the elect from sin. Therefore, 
Christ died for the elect only.
The doctrine of the necessary '^perseverance of saints,” i.e., that the elect will not 
only infallibly come to faith through efficacious grace, but will infallible remain in faith, 
is likewise proved. Arminians argued that a self-determined will must not only initiate 
the Christian life, but must also complete it. Therefore the idea that God would oversee
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the beginning and end was repugnant to Arminian theology. Yet, since Edwards had 
debunked the notion of self-determination, so too must the Arminian objection to 
perseverance be negated (Conclusion. 7).
Further, the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is consistent with the 
doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election. Efficacious grace does not depend 
upon the self-determined will of the sinner, but is given in time to all those whom God 
elected. Since people are elected to be saved from all eternity, it follows that those whom 
God regenerates, he will also sustain until the end (Conclusion. 8)
Edwards hoped to leave his proof of Calvinism in the hands of “fair and impartial 
reader[s],” another affirmation that seemed to be at tension with his own doctrine of total 
depravity. That is, if  human beings are in bondage to sin, will they really be “fair and 
impartial” when considering arguments that contradict that sin? Edwards proceeded as if 
he believed Enlightened discourse could achieve the purposes of God (Conclusion.9). He 
also thought that Arminian arguments had unfairly “injured” the reputations of “first 
Reformers.” Edwards’ disgust with the prejudices of Arminian rhetoric is clear at this 
point. The thought that men as capable and godly as the great Reformers would be cast 
as ignorant fools writing in a dark age was infuriating. Edwards thought the self­
portrayal of Arminians, as “gentlemen possessed of that noble and generous freedom of 
thought,” and of the contemporary milieu as an “age of light and inquiry,” were deeply 
misleading. He conceded that many of these people were indeed “men of great abilities” 
who had made contributions to philosophy and to the church. Still, given his refutation 
of Arminian errors, Edwards also thought that Arminian arrogance concerning human 
freedom was unfounded. Indeed, “ .. .their differing from their fathers with such
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magisterial assurance, in these points of divinity, must be owing to some other cause than 
superior wisdom” (Conclusion.9).
Edwards therefore also challenged his readers to consider whether the advance of 
Arminian opinion in Great Britain (“our nation”) and elsewhere was really the advance in 
understanding as it had often been portrayed, or if “it may be owing to some worse 
cause.” Given Edwards’ usage of terms such as “sovereign” to apply to the Arminian 
view of hvunan nature, perhaps Edwards thought that this “worse cause” may have been a 
hubristic elevation of human nature and a corresponding diminution in the status afforded 
to the true sovereign of the universe, God. (Conclusion. 10). Indeed, some Arminians 
held so tenaciously to their beliefs in self-determination and contingence, and their 
rejection of necessity, that they explicitly held this as an a priori assumption by which 
they interpreted the Scripture. Any place in Scripture apparently teaching Calvinist 
doctrines, they argued, must be interpreted counter to its obvious sense. Others, 
seemingly more humble, thought Calvinist doctrines endangered God’s reputation. Still, 
Edwards argued, it is best to allow God to teach us through the scripture, than to 
arrogantly assume that we know best before we even begin (Conclusion. 11).
Given his arguments against Arminian divinity, Edwards was glad that the 
Scriptures did not teach Arminianism because that would be most repugnant to reason. 
“Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach 
such doctrines, which in one age and another, through the blindness of men’s minds, and 
strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the 
wise and great men of the world; which yet, when they are most carefully and strictly 
examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural
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dictates of reason” (Conclusion. 12). Edwards ended Freedom of the Will with a quote 
from 1 Corinthians, reinforcing the main thrust of Puritan psychology: that, above all,
God is to be glorified, and humanity humbled:
‘But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise: and 
God hath chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are 
mighty: and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God 
chosen: yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; that no 
flesh should glory in his presence.’ Amen. (Conclusion. 12)
Summary and Conclusion 
Edwards began the last part of Freedom of the Will attempting to explain why the 
Arminians would be tempted to believe in their incoherent tenets. The first Arminian 
premise Edwards considered was that the virtue of acts of will depends upon the cause of 
these acts of will rather than the nature of these acts. For the Arminian, only a self- 
determined act was virtuous. As one might expect, Edwards used to infinite regress 
argument to show that this was an incoherent notion. If the virtue of an act is determined 
by a previous act of will, then we must determine the virtue of the act determining this 
preceding act, and so on. Virtue is therefore “banish[ed] from the world” in the Arminian 
universe (IV. 1.3). Edwards speculated that the Arminians may have arrived at this 
conclusion by confusing terms with a situation in which the virtue of an act is determined 
by its cause: in the determination of bodily movements.
Edwards also considered the Arminian’s “metaphysical notion of agency and 
action” ponderous, and offered an explanation for this belief. In essence, the Arminian 
notion of agency was that truly virtuous action must never be an effect; it must never be
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“passive” but must instead be “active.” Further, passivity and activity were considered 
by some Arminians to be contradictory terms. Edwards showed that this premise was 
false: it is possible for a volition to be an effect of one thing, and yet a cause of something 
else. Guessing what might have led the Arminians to such metaphysical notions,
Edwards once again turned to the confounding of inward and outward actions. Just as 
outward actions are determined by the will, so too, the Ajtminians may have erroneously 
concluded, must the actions of the will be determined by the will. It should be noted that 
this premise also seemed to characterize the thinking of Upham and James. That a truly 
virtuous action must be entirely “original” and “underived.”
The Arminian belief in the incompatibility of necessity and praise and blame was 
also in need of explanation. Edwards offered five reasons that Arminians fell into this 
error. One of these reasons is that Arminians may have learned to associate terms dealing 
with natural necessity with moral necessity. For example, a situation may be 
“unavoidable” in a natural sense even though there was a will to the contrary. When the 
term imavoidable is used to describe the will, the idea of contrary will is improperly 
carried over.
Arminians often accused the Calvinist position on necessity and morality to be 
contrary to common sense. In the next section of Freedom of the Will. Edwards 
dismantled this argument and showed that it actually was the Arminian notion of moral 
agency that contradicted common sense. In brief, “common” people believe that actions 
which flow from evil (or good) inclinations are evil (or good). Indeed, the stronger the 
evil inclination, the more evil the action. Since the Arminian notion of moral agency 
teaches that strong inclinations actually eradicate moral responsibility, it is clearly
319
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Arminianism that contradicts common sense, and Calvinism which has common sense on 
its side. Given the nineteenth-century rise of a common sense approach to mental 
philosophy in America, Edwards’ comments on this point are particularly relevant. To 
question the validity of claims to common sense would be to question the very 
foundations for the psychological systems of early nineteenth century American textbook 
writers like Thomas Upham.
The use of fatalistic argumentation also falls apart. Some Arminians would argue 
that if everything is predestined, and the outcome is already eertain, it makes no sense to 
use means in order to obtain moral ends. But, contrary to Arminian suppositions, it is 
only a system that allows for necessary connections between means and ends that 
actually supports the use of means. In the Arminian system, means can only serve to 
throw the will out of indifference or undermine the self-determination of the will. 
Likewise, Arminians are out of bounds by arguing that necessity makes people machines. 
The dignity of souls endowed with will and intellect far surpasses machines, Edwards 
countered. Yet the Arminian notion of moral agency makes humans worse then 
machines, which, unlike their contingent and self-determined counterparts, are guided by 
purpose and understanding.
The attempt to dismiss Calvinism by associating Calvin and Hobbes was also 
inconsistent and theologically uninformed. Edwards did not deny that both Calvinism 
and Hobbes embraced necessity. Yet, it was common practice in Edwards’ day to follow 
the doetrine of common grace, that truth could be known by Christian and non-Christian 
alike. The Arminians employed the principle, and saw pagan advocacy of their doctrines 
as confirmation of their doctrines. Why the similarity between Hobbes and Calvinism on
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the point of necessity was supposed to be damning Edwards did not know, particularly 
given the fact that the Arminians agreed with Hobbes on more points than did the 
Calvinists. Again, Edwards seemed to be accusing the Arminians of deception and a lack 
of genuineness in their argumentation.
Just as Arminians believed that necessity rendered human action machine-like, 
undermining the dignity and virtue of human actions, so too did some Arminians argue 
that God’s virtue and excellence would likewise be undermined if his actions were 
necessary. To this Edwards replied that it is certainly no disadvantage to God that his 
actions are always wise and virtuous, and that it would be greatly disadvantageous if his 
actions were somehow random. Further, Arminians themselves were often inconsistent 
in their argumentation here, often representing God as being necessarily virtuous.
The Arminian objection that Calvinism makes God the “author of sin” (and 
therefore absolves people of their sins) was also problematic on a number of grounds. 
Again Edwards called Arminian theologians to account for their inconsistencies, and 
once again challenged the usefulness of “foreknowledge” to avoid theological 
difficulties. Certainly a sure foreknowledge of future sins makes God just as “guilty” as 
the full decree that sinful things should occur. Still, Edwards rejected the idea that God is 
the author of sin if  that meant that God is the efficient cause of sin. But he fully 
embraced the idea that God had ordained certain sins to take place for good purposes, and 
that the withdrawal of God’s grace is the occasion but not the fountain of these sins. 
Edwards did not deny that these assertions were difficult, but also thought it far better 
that the evil in the world is under the control of a purposive and benevolent deity than be
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purposeless and wanton. Edwards also used these principles to explain “sin’s first 
entrance into the world.”
Contrary to Arminian accusations that Calvinism tends toward atheism and 
licentiousness, Edwards pulled the various strands of his argumentation to argue just the 
opposite: Arminianism undermines belief in God and reinforces human sinfulness. For 
example, contingence, which posits that things come about for no reason, undermines 
rational proofs for God’s existence. Arminianism also excuses evil inclinations because 
these rob the soul of the indifference requisite for moral agency. Finally, the Arminian 
argument was further challenged by the fact that England, which Edwards saw as having 
widely embraced Arminianism, had the grossest cases of licentiousness.
Edwards closed Part IV of Freedom of the Will challenging the Arminian 
contention that the Calvinist position on the will was “abstruce” and overly 
“metaphysical.” Besides the fact that metaphysical inquiry is entirely appropriate and 
unavoidable in theological inquiry, Edwards made the case that his arguments were 
actually quite simple—arguing, for example, that the contention that “the first act of free 
choice, has not another act of free choice going before that...” is not very complicated. 
Arminian notions of self-determination, necessity, contingency, etc., however, were 
actually quite convoluted. In this context Edwards also problematized the entire 
introspective method to arriving at purportedly “universal” psychological knowledge: 
Edwards denied ever having the experiences of contingency and self-determination which 
the Arminians claimed to be universal. The critique that Calvinism is “metaphysical” 
allowed Arminians to continue in their prejudice without actually considering arguments 
outside of their camp.
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Edwards began the extended Conclusion to Freedom of the Will continuing in his 
skepticism and ambivalence about his own project: he did not think that Arminians would 
actually carefully consider his arguments, but would rather recapitulate the old arguments 
with great stridency. Edwards’ ambivalence is a telling critique of the problems 
associated with the nonsectarian and “enlightened” approach to truth which denies the 
centrality of moral community, and propagates the mythology of the individual as an 
autonomous truth-seeker. His ambivalence is also an instance of the tensions between his 
own theology (which affirmed that only God can change the heart) and his leanings 
toward enlightenment. Edwards nevertheless thought that he had demonstrated the truth 
of Calvinism, and offered a point-by-point demonstration of the main tenets of Calvinism 
vis-a-vis Arminianism (i.e., the “five points of Calvinism”). Ending Freedom of the Will 
on a note similar to that of William Ames, Edwards rejoiced that God reveals his 
magnificent truth to the simple, and keeps it from the wise. Edwards thereby manifested 
his complex understanding of reason in the process of persuasion. Although he thought 
that truth could be demonstrated through reason he did not believe that truth so 
demonstrated could be embraced without God’s help. All efficiency to do good was, 
after all, God’s alone.
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PART III; APPLICATION
"So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their notion of liberty, consisting 
in the will's determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself."
Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom o f the Will, (II. 5.4)
328
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III
The Third Part of the Dissertation “Applieation” gets its name after the final part 
of the Puritan jeremiad in which the “doctrine” is fleshed out in the real world. Historical 
hindsight allows us to take “application” to another level since we are granted a 
knowledge of the development of American psychology that Edwards did not have.
There are two “uses” to Edwards’ doctrine. The first centers on Thomas Upham’s 
Mental Philosophv. which serves as a representation of the Americanization of 
Enlightenment mental philosophy. The second use focuses on William James’s 
Principles of Psvchology, the seminal work of the New Psychology.
329
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
USE I;
THOMAS C. UPHAM’S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY
. .[Man] possesses, as an attribute of his own nature, an amount of real efficiency suited 
to the limited, sphere which Providence has allotted him .. ..There is no accountable 
existence without power...”
Thomas C. Upham, Mental Philosophy, (1.274).
330
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
INTRODUCTION TO USE I
As noted above (see section on the selection of texts), Enlightenment thinking 
began to infiltrate American colleges during the eighteenth century, particularly the latter 
half of that century. Although educators made use of the original European texts, 
particularly of Reid and Stewart, it wasn’t until 1827 that an original American 
appropriation was published for use in colleges. The work was entitled Elements of 
Intellectual Philosophy, and the author was Thomas Cogswell Upham (Fuchs, 2000a; 
Fuchs, 2000b). As Fuchs has noted, this text set a precedent for the shape and flavor of 
the study of psychology in America that continues to the present day (e.g., in terms of its 
eclecticism, its being a summary and interpretation of a wide variety of sources, it 
evangelistic appeals in favor of the scientific method, etc.).
For the next 42 years, Upham would continue to write and revise his psychology. 
Five years after the publication of Elements, Upham published the third edition of his 
text, this time changing the title to Elements of Mental Philosophy. The title reflected the 
fact that Upham was now considering more than the intellect, incorporating sustained 
reflection on “the sensibilities.” Upham added the third “department” of the will in 1834, 
which served as the final part of a three-volume edition of his mental philosophy. These 
three departments of the mind were joined in a single volume in his 1861 abridged 
edition (Fuchs, 2000b, p. 5-7). This abridgement evidently was widely adopted, being 
reprinted [according to Worldcat] in 1863, 1867, 1868, 1871, 1873, 1875, 1876, 1879, 
1880, 1882, 1883, and 1889. Based upon statistics such as these both Fuchs (2000b) and 
Salter (1986) have argued that Upham’s prototypical psychology textbook was extremely
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successful. Salter (1986) estimated that “Upham’s Mental Philosophy went through an 
astounding fifty-seven editions (1826-1899),” and that he was “the prototype mental 
philosopher of the nineteenth century” (p. 12). Although it would be more appropriate to 
consider these “editions” as mostly reprints, this conclusion seems quite reasonable. 
Indeed, Salter may have underestimated\]Tphsim’s popularity, stating that “Mental 
Philosophv was possibly as popular as any [textbook] from 1830 to 1860” (p. 18). Given 
the popularity of his abridgement in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s, Upham’s popularity appears 
to have been sustained well into the postbellum years as well.
In terms of selecting a text for analysis, 1 have chosen what appears to be the very 
last revision of the entire full-length version of Mental Philosophv. Upham’s (1869) 
preface, written two and one-half years before his death (Preface dated September, 1869, 
Upham died April 2, 1972), stated, “...desirous of rendering [the book] as perfect as 
possible, 1 have recently subjected it to re-examination and revision, and accordingly it 
appears now in a somewhat new form, in some respects condensed and in others 
enlarged, and with the results of the author’s latest inquiries and emendations” (p. v). 
This full-length treatment also allows for a more extensive treatment of the topic of the 
will as compared to that given in the abridged version of 1861. Although Upham’s 
(1834) stand-alone book on the will would provide a more extensive foundation for 
Upham’s philosophical thinking of the will, 1 have chosen Mental Philosophv because a 
crucial part of my analysis is the relationship which the will was thought to have to the 
other “faculties” of the soul. Even the mere number of pages devoted to each topic is 
important in this regard.
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A brief note is in order concerning Upham’s religious orientation. As noted 
previously, Upham was trained at the Calvinist Andover Theological Seminary, 
graduating in 1821. He took the professorship of mental and moral philosophy at 
Bowdoin College in 1825, and remained in that job for his entire career. During his 
tenure at Bowdoin, Upham continued to evolve spiritually. Perhaps the most meaningful 
event in Upham’s spiritual life was his experience of “entire sanctification” under Phoebe 
Palmer, the leading exponent of a “new” and “updated” version of Methodist 
perfectionism for the early nineteenth century American scene (Noll, 2002). Bundy 
(1998) has noted that the spirituality that Upham learned from Palmer “had two distinct 
foci” (p. 29). The first of these was an emphasis on “personal holiness” and the second 
on “social holiness.” Both of these emphases are evident in Upham’s (1869) Mental 
Philosophv. Most important for our purposes is the emphasis on personal holiness. 
Although Upham was not a systematic theologian (Salter, 1986), and although his 
theological views are better expressed in other works (Bundy, 1998), it is also true that 
Upham does make fairly clear theological assertions in his Mental Philosophv. What 
becomes evident, even in Mental Philosophv, is that Upham’s theology is not the 
conservative Calvinism of Edwards and Ames. In other writings Upham argued for the 
perfectibility of the person through the freedom of the will (Bundy, 1998), reflecting 
Methodist (and Arminian) roots rather than old-style Calvinism, which steadfastly denied 
that perfectibility was possible in this life. This same emphasis on freedom of the will is 
evident in Mental Philosophv. Still, we find vestiges of Upham’s Calvinistic background 
in Mental Philosophv. The most obvious vestige is Upham’s insistence that the will is 
subject to law, a proposition he defends by quoting Edwards.^’ Upham’s theological
Vemon Howard (1964) portrays Upham therefore as a “half-way house” between the determinism o f
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ambiguity in Mental Philosophv may very well be an example of the nonsectarian 
impulse described above, while Upham’s lack of ambiguity concerning the autonomy of 
the will is, I think, a clear example of the “Arminian impulse” that characterized 
nineteenth-century American psychologists, including William James.
Edwards and the indetenninism o f James. Although Howard’s dissertation deserves more careful attention 
than I can give it here, I am not quite comfortable with this thesis because James, as I will argue below, 
arguably took determinism more seriously than Upham. Howard focuses his analysis o f James on his essay 
“the Dilemma o f Determinism,” and on James’ analysis o f effort in Principles o f  Psvchologv. Howard’s 
analysis o f these texts is accurate, I think, but it ignores other parts o f  James’s writings that stress the idea 
that the vast majority o f  our voluntary actions are subject to determinism.
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CHAPTER VII 
ARMINIAN INTUITIONS
This chapter is a commentary and analysis of the first volume of Upham’s (1869) 
Mental Philosophy. This volume dealt with “the faculty of the intelleet,” while the 
second volume dealt with the faculties of the sensibilities and the will. As one might 
expect, volume one had little to do explicitly with the topic of the will. Nevertheless, the 
volume is full of considerations relevant to the “Arminianization” and eventual loss of 
will in Ameriean psychology. In particular, deterministic processes are a eoneem to 
Upham. In a maimer that antieipates similar maneuvers by William James, Upham de­
claws these potentially threatening considerations, preserving room for Arminian 
freedom. For example, Upham shows a reticenee to embrace the newly emerging seience 
of physiology because of its mechanistic implications. The classification scheme that 
Upham offers (intellect, sensibilities, will) frees the will from the eneroaehment of the 
motive powers. Upham makes a strong distinction between will (which can be “free”) 
and habit (which is a product of deterministic processes), and sees the need to limit the 
sphere of habit in order to avoid wresting too much control from the will. The powers of 
association are also considered from an Arminian perspective. Finally, Upham’s 
nonsectarian intuitions reveal that human beings possess a degree of God-given “power” 
or “efficiency” which makes them responsible moral agents.
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Preliminaries
Upham’s preface places him squarely within the American psychological 
tradition. Claiming to have produced a “just and impartial account” of mental philosophy 
which utilizes the insights but depends upon none of the “various philosophical sects,” 
Upham reveals himself to be a participant in enlightenment and nonsectarian moral 
culture. Once characteristic of this nonsectarianism is the fact that his approach is 
“eclectic in its character.” Further, in a move that Edwards would have found 
problematic, Upham rejected the “bold conjecture” of deduction and reason in favor of 
“the subjective test of my own mental experience and operations.” Instead of serving any 
particular religious sect, Upham thought his work would be “accordant.. .with the 
principles and interests of correct morals and religion.” In this light, Upham added 
piously that he hoped that his endeavors had been blessed with God’s “assistance” (I.iv).
Upham further mentioned that his work proceeded “.. .upon the basis of a 
threefold division of the mind, viz., the INTELLECT, the SENSIBILITIES, and the 
WILL.” He admitted that this division had .. .not generally been made prominent in 
philosophical writers...” Yet the division was to Upham “.. .a fundamental one, without 
which there is no adequate foundation for morals, aesthetics, or religion.” Indeed, as we 
shall see, this division of the mental faculties was inspired directly by the Arminian 
impulse that Edwards had tried to refute.
Induction did not mean disorder. Far from it. Upham’s claim that “ .. .the reader 
will find the whole subject open[s] itself connectedly and symmetrically, and in such a 
manner as to present, in its completed outline, not merely a disjointed congeries of 
philosophical facts, but the regularity and beauty of a philosophical system” (I.iv-v) was
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right on the mark. The psychology of Upham is nothing if  not “symmetricar’ and 
orderly: a symmetry and order home perhaps more in the sensibilities of nineteenth 
century America than in any actual structure inherent to the human mind.
Upham thought he was making a unique contribution and not merely 
recapitulating other men’s arguments. Although he claimed no originality in “the general 
division of the Sensibilities is into the Natural or Pathematic and Moral,” he did indicate 
that his views on conscience were original and he hoped that “ .. .some of the difficulties 
which have hitherto attended it have been removed, and that the whole subject is placed, 
to some extent, in a consistent and satisfactory light” (I.v). In other areas as well, Upham 
thought he was advancing knowledge, . .particularly in the classification of the 
Emotions and the Desires, and their relation to each other, and in some of the doctrines 
contained in the portion on the W ill...” (I.v).
Upham wrote the preface to this edition of Mental Philosophv when he was 70 
years old. He had watched his book move “ .. .through successive editions,” and 
accurately portrayed the situation by declaring that the book had “ .. .been favourably 
received by the public; perhaps as much so as other philosophical works.” Yet, he notes 
that the 1869 edition had been subjected to . .re-examination and revision...” and 
reflected “ .. .the results of the author’s latest inquiries and emendations” (I.v).
Primary Truths
By way of preparation, Upham indicated that “it is often highly important, in the 
investigation of a department of science, to state, at the commencement of such 
investigation.. .what things are to be considered as preliminary and taken for granted, and 
what are not.” Doing so avoids “.. .useless disputes...” (1.17). Upham therefore
337
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
delineated “primary truths” which he considered foundational to the rest of the hook. 
Primary truths, Upham explained, referring to both Buffier and Stewart, . .are such, and 
such only, as can neither be proved nor refuted by other propositions of greater 
perspicuity” (1.18). Primary truths are “elementary,” i.e., cannot he broken down into 
smaller elements, and “ .. .illuminate the understanding by their own light, and not by a 
light let in from any other source.” They “.. .are forced upon us, as it were, by our very 
constitution” and “ .. .control the convictions of.. .all mankind.. Finally, primary truths 
are “ .. .the natural and necessary revelations and announcements of our mental nature”
(1.19) and “ .. .are the propositions into which all reasoning ultimately resolves itself...”
(1.20).
The first example of a primary truth is “personal existence.” “The proposition that 
we exist is a sort of corner-stone to everything else...” and is “ .. .a proposition antecedent 
to reasoning...” This “truth of nature” is undeniable, for even doubts about personal 
existence imply that “ .. .there is some one to doubt” (1.20). Without dogmatizing, Upham 
offered a theory to explain the development of the concept of personal existence (which 
had to do with inferring self-existence from changes in conscious states.) Showing that 
he had to deal with issues that Edwards did not, Upham included “personal identity” 
among the primary truths, which has to do with the continuity and sameness of the mental 
and bodily self. [In this context, Upham avoids the notion of reification of faculties, 
arguing that “The soul of man is truly a unit. It is not, like matter, separable into parts” 
(1.22)]. To illustrate personal identity, Upham discussed “the farmer.. .who.. .knows that 
he is the same person who, twenty years before, entered the forest with an axe on his 
shoulder, and felled the first tree.” Personal identity is something we simply do not
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doubt, and, typically, is something that we . .believe and know, not from the testimony 
of others or from reasoning, but from the interior and authoritative suggestion of their 
very nature...” (1.24).
Another primary truth is belief. “Nothing is better known than that there is a 
certain state of the mind which is expressed by the term BELIEF” (1.25). Like other 
primary truths, it is impossible to define or describe belief since it is an ultimate 
constituent of human nature. Although different theories may be offered regarding the 
nature of belief and i ts determinants, “the fact that belief arises” was for Upham an 
“ .. .ultimate.. .primary law” which “ .. .no more admits of explanation than does the mere 
feeling itself.”
Given some movements within philosophy, one of Upham’s main concerns was to 
buttress the “credibility” of the “intellectual powers.” When people challenge the 
intellectual powers they necessarily, as Stewart pointed out, argue in a circle. Quoting 
Sir James Mackintosh, “Universal skepticism involves a contradiction in terms. It is a 
belief that there can be no belief. It is an attempt of the mind to act without its structure, 
and by other laws than those to which its nature has subjected its operations” (1.26).
Regarding reasoning, Upham said that there were two “.. .ultimate truths which 
are at the foundation of all reasoning whatever.” First (and along with Edwards in a very 
Calvinistic vein) is the belief that there can be “no beginning or change of existence 
without a cause,” (1.27) which is a “universally admitted” (1.28) truth. Additionally, the 
fact of universal causation “ .. .is an exceedingly important one,” particularly since “it is 
susceptible.. .of a moral and religious application.” If we trace the chain of causal events 
backward, we must finally arrive at “ .. .one self-existent and unchangeable head and
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fountain of being.” The chain of causation stops with God . .since He differs from 
everything else which is the object of thought, in being an existence equally without 
change and without beginning” (1.29).
Upham also argued that both mind and matter have “.. .uniform and fixed laws.” 
By God’s design, human beings learn to believe in the “uniformity and permanency of 
the laws of nature” (1.29). Since God has designed human beings to develop “ .. .strong 
faith... in the continuance of the laws of creation...” (1.30), there is strong reason to 
suppose that these laws apply to both matter and mind. The belief that mind and matter 
are governed by law is “ .. .a vast foundation of knowledge...,” without which “ .. .the 
power of reasoning cannot deduce a single general inference...” (1.31). Upham here 
argues in a vein similar to Edwards, who insisted that universal causality was a 
foundation for the rational proof of God, and for morality itself. Interestingly, however, 
and indicative perhaps of the presumptions of enlightened discourse, Upham does not 
argue that God (or other truths of theology) is a “primary truth” that is assumed but not 
proved. It is evident in Mental Philosophv, however, that Upham does assume the 
existence of God throughout.
The Immaterialitv of the Mind
Upham addressed “ .. .the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul.” 
A topic which is “ .. .obviously too important to be altogether dispensed w ith...”
Defining terms, he noted that “the words MATERIAL and IMMATERIAL are relative, 
being founded on the observation of the presence or of the absence of certain qualities.” 
We apply the term “material” to objects such as wood and iron in which “ .. .certain 
qualities, such as extension, divisibility, impenetrability, and colour” inhere. Immaterial
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objects lack these qualities. (1.32). Given the importance of the topic, Upham was quite 
clear about his intentions: “ .. .we are to attempt to show that the soul is not matter, and 
that thought and feeling are not the result of material organization” (1.33). As we shall 
see below, Upham thought it necessary to demonstrate that mental processes are “not the 
result of material organization” because he harbored a most un-Calvinistic notion of 
“necessity”—the notion that Edwards had attempted to refute. So, while Upham 
manifested strong Calvinistic sensibilities, his Arminian sensibilities are also evident and 
even prevalent. One could argue that the entire structure of Upham’s psychology is 
based upon the assumptions that Edwards had tried to refute.
One of Upham’s favorite lines of evidence was human language. Language, 
Upham thought (following other “writings on the philosophy of the mind”) provides 
insight into the conscious experience of people. If a diversity of languages refer to the 
same conscious phenomenon, he argued, we have evidence that such a phenomenon has a 
real existence. Upham was “unable to harbour the supposition” that language might not 
refer to real existences, for that would mean that “ .. .men are deceived and led astray in 
this opinion” (1.33). Without getting specific, Upham assured his readers that other 
languages possessed terms correlative to the English terms mind and matter.
Anticipating James, Upham argued that the immateriality of mind was a crucial 
doctrine because its opposite, “the material doctrine,” had insufferable consequences.
The idea that “ .. .thought is the result of material organization, and that the soul is not 
distinct from the body...” was liable to “ .. .no small objection.. .that it makes the soul 
truly and literally a machine” (1.35-36). Still, this possibility does not haunt Upham to 
the extent that it did James, since he does not make continual recourse back to the issue
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as James seemed to. Clearly, this had been a concern in European thought since Hobbes, 
but it had not gained a significant hold in American thought at this point. Nevertheless, 
Upham perfectly articulates the concerns that would haunt William James.
Since matter “ .. .is known to be subject to a strict and inflexible direction, the 
origin of which direction is exterior to itself,” it follows that:
The material universe is truly an automaton, experiencing through all time the 
same series of motions, in obedience to some high and authoritative intelligence; 
and is so entirely subject to fixed laws, that we can express in mathematical 
formulas not only the state of large bodies, but of a drop of water or of a ray of 
light; estimating minutely extension and quantity, force, velocity, and resistance. 
Apparently making a distinction between being “entirely subject to fixed laws” and being 
merely subject to them, Upham argued that this entire subjection is not a characteristic of 
the mind. Although the mind has laws, it “ .. .knows what those laws are...” and is in this 
different from matter which does not know the laws to which it is subject.
More to the Edwardsean point, however, is that self-determination is itself a law 
of mind. “Matter yields a blind and unconscious obedience; but the mind is able to 
exercise a foresight; to place itself in new situations; to subject itself to new influences; to 
surround itself with new motives...” These special powers of mind are a ground of its 
freedom, allowing it to “ .. .thus control, in a measure, its own laws.” Unlike the mind, 
matter “ .. .may justly be characterized as a slave,” possessing “ .. .no self-determining and 
self-moving element...” As such, matter is subject to “ .. .an inflexible destiny” (1.36). 
Therefore, since the laws of mind did not imply a necessity (in the Arminian sense of the 
word), it was in Upham’s mind of utmost important to make a clear distinction between
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mind and matter. Although Upham claimed that this is a topic “auxiliary to the main 
suhject” (1.32), it is clear that the unique self-determining powers of the mind were of 
central importance to Upham, as we shall see helow.
To further these views, Upham contended that “ .. .there is an absence of that 
precise correspondence between the mental and bodily state which would evidently 
follow from the admission of materialism” (1.36). Upham, who apparently thought that a 
strict correspondence between mind and matter necessarily implied a godless 
materialism, granted that the mind is connected with the brain, but he argued that this 
connection was imperfect. If materialism is true, the destruction of the brain will 
necessarily be accompanied with the destruction of the soul. Yet, Upham thought 
(obviously contradicting contemporary psychology), the soul does not appear to be able 
to be thus destroyed Upham changes focus a bit during this section to make his point, 
arguing that since “the body” (as opposed to the brain) is frequently injured without 
damage to mind, materialism is challenged. Even injury to the brain does not accord with 
materialist doctrine, which holds tha t .. .the soul does not merely exist and act in 
connexion with the body, hut is identical with it” (1.38).
Referring to the controversy over the localization of function, Upham noted that 
the mind, if it is identical with brain, “ .. .must be diffused through the whole of that 
organ, or limited to some particular part.”
Upham, utilizing Ferriar as support, argued that since “ .. .an extensive collection 
of well-authenticated facts...” testify “ .. .that every part of the brain has been injured, and 
almost every part absolutely removed, but without permanently affecting the mental 
powers...” (1.38), the belief that there is a strict identity of mind and brain is challenged.
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Upham quoted Ferriar as saying that on the basis of the evidence, . .1 am disposed to 
conclude, that, as no part of the brain appears essentially necessary to the existence of the 
intellectual faculties... something more than the discernible organization must be 
requisite to produce the phenomena of thinking” (1.39). That “something more,” of 
course, had to be the immaterial soul.
In addition to this sparse physiological evidence, Upham also engaged in a kind of 
sentimental argumentation to support the immateriality of mind. The “kindred powers of 
memory and imagination,” for example, was able to transport Upham into “a far-distant 
place,” in which: “I see distinctly before me the trees which shaded me, and the hills 
where I wandered in my childhood. The same waters flow before me, the same bright sun 
shines in the heavens; I see around me a multitude of familiar faces, and embrace, with 
all the vividness of early affections, my old companions. In this excursion of the soul, 
how many recollections have been revived! How many feelings have been restored!” 
(1.40). Thus transported by such sublime imagery, Upham simply asked his readers if 
such a “wonderful power” could be made out of “ .. .a mere mass of matter? I think not.” 
Similarly, Upham thought that the greatest intellectual productions could not be ascribed 
to automata. He also argued that the materialist understanding of the soul was 
“inconsistent with future existence” (1.41).
Although “ .. .immortal existence of the soul does not follow with absolute 
certainty from the mere fact of its immateriality...” it is by that fact “ .. .rendered in some 
degree probable” (I.4I). The opposite doctrine implies the end of the existence of the 
soul at the death of the body. The moral consequences of this doctrine were therefore 
again to be rejected. Pulling on the evangelical heartstrings of his audience, he asked.
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“where, then, is that immortality, of whieh the light of nature as well as Revelation 
assures us?” The “materialist” answer that a new soul would be ereated was not 
satisfaetory, for that would be . .an origination rather than a continual existence.” The 
new soul would not be the soul of the person to whieh it belonged. Yet Upham thought 
his conclusion was “evident” and that “ .. .If the doctrine of immateriality falls, then that 
of immortality and of a future retribution falls with it” (1.43).
Laws of Belief
As we have seen in William Ames, and will se in the psychology of William 
James, the psychology of belief figured heavily in discussions of the will. Just as he had 
asserted in his discussion of primary truths “ .. .that there are in men certain original and 
authoritative grounds of belief ’ (1.44), Upham set out to enumerate further some of the 
controlling principles which guide belief. Suggestion, whieh provides consciousness with 
“.. .knowledge of certain elementary notions, such as the abstract conceptions of 
existence, mind, self-existenee or self, personal identity, succession, duration, space, 
unity, number, power, right, wrong, and some others” (1.44), consciousness, which 
provides “ .. .knowledge of our mental states...” (1.44), the senses, which provide 
knowledge of “ .. .of the external, material world...” (1.45), memory, and human 
testimony, all serve as “grounds” as belief. For example, we could not believe in the 
existence of material objects without the senses, or in the reality of our thoughts apart 
from consciousness. Upham’s defense of human testimony is revealing on a theological 
as well as psychological level. He thought that “men are naturally disposed to speak the 
truth,” and when they lie, they experience a violent “jarring” of “ .. .every honourable 
sentiment within us” (1.47). Clearly this view of human nature was quite positive.
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reflecting the contemporary movement away from the doctrine of original sin such as that 
maintained by Ames and Edwards. Further, this assertion, and the entire tone of 
Upham’s discussion of belief, tends to view human beings as rational problem solvers 
rather than driven in certain directions through passion. As such, Upham leaned in an 
intellectualist direction. To further illustrate this point, his comments on “reasoning” as a 
ground for belief, illustrate how far from a voluntarist position Upham was. “ .. .Is it,” 
Upham asked, “a fact, that Reasoning necessarily controls our convictions in any case?” 
Although voluntarists have typically answered this question negatively, Upham seemed 
to dismiss the question as preposterous: “If we can suppose such a question to be 
seriously put,” Upham argued, “no man has it in his power to refuse obedience to the 
decisions of reasoning” (1.50).
“Arminian” Classification 
Upham followed his intellectualist discussion of belief with a consideration of the 
“classification” of the mental faculties, another topic directly relevant to evolution of the 
psychology of will in America. James (and the New Psychology in general) would 
implicitly accuse the “old” indigenous mental philosophy tradition of committing dual 
fallacies in its construction of the human mind. The first error was reifying the faculties 
as independent existences or “things” and the second was explaining mental experience 
as self-determined activities of the reified faculties (Kosits, 2002c). Interestingly, Upham 
avoids the reification error by insisting that “it is undoubtedly true, that the human soul is 
to be regarded as constituting a nature which is one and indivisible...” and that dividing 
the mind into facilities did not constitute a process of hypostatization, but was simply a 
consideration of the mind from different “points of view.” Yet Upham, despite his
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assertions to the contrary, so emphasized the distinctions between faculties as to lean in 
the direction of the reification error. For example, immediately after stating that his 
classification was a contemplation of the mind from three different “point of view,” 
Upham stated that the intellect possess unique characteristics which . .shuts it out from 
the domain of the sensibilities...” (1.51, italics mine). And, as this commentary on 
Upham’s psychology continues, it will become evident that he was careful to consider 
each “faculty” largely in isolation from the others. As such, the system takes on a 
contrived, theoretical tone, in which the mind is portrayed as it might be expected to 
function in some ideal world rather than in the phenomenological messiness of reality.
Unlike the dichotomous faculty psychology (i.e., dividing the soul into intellect 
and will) which had prevailed for centuries in American colleges, Upham insisted that a 
trichotomous division of the mental faculties into intellect, sensibility and will, was 
essential to an accurate and morally acceptable mental philosophy. He thought there was 
“ .. .abundant illustration and proof’ of the trichotomous division, and while intentionally 
avoiding evidential overkill, spent several pages elucidating his reasons for the move to 
trichotomy.
As was his typical practice, Upham referred his readers to their own conscious 
experience, whieh he was confident his readers could consult and know with ease:
“mental philosophers assure us that we are enabled, by means of consciousness, to 
ascertain what thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish them from each 
other” (1.52). This quote is a perfect illustration of James Hoopes (1989) contention that 
a main characteristic of “the consciousness concept” of the Enlightenment was the lack of 
ambiguity in knowledge of our own internal states. By way of contrast, Hoopes argued
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that the previous faculty psychology employed by the Puritans and others, since it 
supposed that intellect and will could (and often would) oppose each other, made inner 
experience ambiguous and in need of interpretation. Mental states are unambiguous to 
Upham, and clearly reveal a trichotomous structure of the mind. In an increasingly 
nonsectarian and secular context in which the authority of ecclesiastic structures was 
being undermined, Upham and others found in consciousness a sure “authority” and 
“aid” (1.53), which was to be trusted in resolving a multitude of psychological and ethical 
issues.
Upham was reasonably confident to assert that there was a general agreement that 
“intellections” and “volitions” were separable phenomena. Yet, Upham noted, with both 
typical confidence that his internal experience accurately reflected universal experience, 
and with intellectualist sensibility, “ .. .our consciousness, if we will but attend to its 
intimations with proper care, will probably teach us, that the nature of a volition more 
nearly approaches that of a purely intellectual act than it does the distinctive nature of 
emotions and desires.” This provided a ground for making a separation of volition from 
the “sensibilities” (i.e., the emotions and desires).
Upham also thought that language provided “unbiased” support for his 
trichotomization of mind, quoting a variety of sources which made admittedly incidental 
references to three different types of conscious experience. For example, Upham referred 
to “the popular author of Literary Hours...” whose . .interesting biographical sketch of 
Sir Richard Steele” explained the subject’s “inconsistencies” and “feeble performances” 
as being due to “.. .the feebleness of the will.” Yet, in this explanation, Upham delighted 
to note that the author . .incidentally, but very clearly...” made the trichotomous
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distinction. Upham quoted this author thus: ‘“His misfortune, the cause of all his errors, 
was not to have clearly seen where his deficiencies lay; they were neither of the head nor 
of the heart, hut of the volition’” (1.55). Among his several examples (which included 
Locke and Hume), Upham even quoted “President Edwards,” who, “in his Diary of 
private and personal experiences, under date of Jan. 12th, 1723.. .in speaking of the 
consecration which he felt it his duty to make of himself to God, and of the self- 
renunciation consequent upon it, says: ‘I can challenge no right in this understanding, this 
will, these affections, which are in me.’” Upham thus proposed to expound a system of 
psychology which his Puritan forebears, including the great Edwards himself, had 
actually unknowingly espoused.
Whatever the validity of this connection to Edwards, Upham was connected in a 
more subtle way to the famed author of The Freedom of the Will. As Guelzo (1989) 
argued, Edwards followers (“the New Divinity”) were forced to clarify issues which 
Edwards had left unclear in his Treatise. One of these issues was the perplexing issue of 
spiritual substance, i.e., the nature of the thing which underlay the thoughts and feelings 
of the human mind. This was the occasion of an in-house debate between “exercisers” 
who denied the reality of spiritual substance and instead argued (in order to protect the 
justice of God) that the human soul consists simply in exercises which are ultimately 
determined by God, and the “tasters” who (also to protect the justice of God) argued that 
human beings were in possession of a distinct spiritual substance which gave rise 
volitions. Upham quotes at length the “king of the tasters,” the Reverend Asa Burton, to 
support his trichotomous cause:
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A writer of our own country, who has furnished some valuable contributions to a 
knowledge of our mental structure, expresses himself thus: ‘.. .when we attend to 
the affections and to volitions, it is evident there is a generic difference between 
them. It is evident that pain, pleasure, and desires are not volitions, and have no 
similarity to those voluntary exertions which produce.. .There is, therefore, no 
more propriety in classing the affections and volitions together, than in making 
but one class of the affections and perceptions. The affections and volitions so 
widely differ, that they naturally divide themselves into two distinct general 
classes.’ (1.58-59)
Ironically, although Burton utilized the trichotomous division to support traditional 
Calvinist doctrines such as original sin and regeneration, Upham would transform 
Burton’s trichotomous psychology into an Arminian mechanism for self-determination.
The Extemal Intellect and the Will
The Origin of Knowledge
Upham began his treatment of the intellect by coimecting knowledge of the 
material world with the design of God. We might say a theological functionalism 
characterizes the entire work. “Providence has obviously designed and established an 
intimate eonnexion between the soul and the material world.” Evidence of this fact is 
found “.. .in the mere fact of the existence of an extemal creation” (1.65). Certainly God 
did not create the world full of beautiful and interesting objects “for nothing,” but rather 
created minds to perceive and delight in their beauty. All of the sensory apparatus is 
given by God to put us in contact with the material world:
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The question, then, immediately recurs. What is the meaning of the expenditure of 
the Divine goodness in the formation of the eye, in the windings and ingenious 
construction of the ear, and in the diffusion of the sense of touch? We cannot 
give a satisfactory answer to this question, except on the ground that there is a 
designed and established connexion between the mind and the material world. 
(1.66)
Upham considers the origin of knowledge, arguing against a strong empiricist 
“tabula rasa” account, insisting that the mind “ .. .may be compared to a stringed 
instrument.” Although the instrument possesses the capacity to make music, it must 
come into contact with someone to play it in order to function. So too, the human mind 
comes to life as it encounters the outside world. “This living and curious instrument, 
which was before voiceless and silent, sends forth its sounds of harmony as soon as it is 
swept by outward influences” (1.67). Once the mind is “ .. .brought into action, .. .it finds 
new sources of thought and feeling in itself’ (1.68). Upham offered some thoughts on the 
development of the mind from infancy, and provided examples to illustrate the necessity 
of extemal stimulation for the proper development of the intellect. Since the mind is 
totally dependent upon contact with the outside world for knowledge, he also explicitly 
argued against innate knowledge.
Upham thought that his “ .. .doctrine of outward sources of knowledge,” was 
therefore a good balance between the two extremes of empiricism and nativism.
Although dependent upon the outside world for its proper development, the mind 
develops qualities and abilities that cannot be reduced to or explained by its experience.
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This theory . .combines Sensationalism and Intellectualism, the Sensuous and the 
Super-sensuous, in one conjoined and harmonious system” (1.82).
Extemal Intellect: Sensation
Upham began his discussion of the “extemal intellect” with two caveats. The first 
point, which is cmcial to understanding his psychological system, is that “ .. .each power, 
each susceptibility, has its appropriate place. And the examination of a power out of the 
right place causes much perplexit/’ (I. 83). In order to understand perception, for 
example, one must study perception. Memory must precede reasoning, etc. Upham 
wamed that “ .. .even a slight deviation from the tme order of arrangement.. .produces 
more or less of perplexity and confusion” (1.83). Upham’s psychological system is 
nothing if  not well-ordered, stressing the logical interconnections between the various 
powers of the mind. Utilizing this method, he constmcted a system of psychology that 
claimed to fairly represent God’s original design for the human mind—a considerable 
contrast to James Principles, which have been criticized by their lack of organization.
Upham first attempted to describe sensation as a mental state, and then the power 
of sensation. The state of mind called sensation is simple, and therefore “unsusceptible 
of definition.” Nevertheless, he could affirm that sensation immediately follows 
impressions on the sensory organs, yet takes place in the mind. Further, sensation as a 
mental phenomenon, although dependent upon the body is still inexplicable in physical 
terms. “We find ourselves unable to resolve and explain the connexion between mind 
and matter in this case, as we do in all others. All we know and all we can state with 
confidence is, that a mental affection is immediately subsequent to an affection or change 
which is physical” (1.89).
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Extemal Intellect: The Perceptive Power
After sensation Upham placed perception, which . .differs from sensation as a 
whole does from a part.” He defined perception as “ ... an affection or state of the mind 
which is immediately successive to certain affections o f the organ o f sense, and which is 
referred by us to something external as its cause’’' (1.89-90). Whereas sensation is “ .. .the 
[simple] state of the mind, without reference to anything extemal which might be the 
cause of it...” while perception is “ .. .is the name of a complex mental state, including not 
merely the intemal affection of the mind, but also a reference to the exterior cause.”
While sensation is entirely within, perception “.. .carries us, as it were, out of ourselves, 
and makes us acquainted with the world around us.” Perception therefore guards the 
mind against the error of solipsism; “Perception or perceptivity prevents the possibility of 
such a mistake.. .it undeceives and dissipates the flattering notion that all things are in the 
soul; it leads us to other existences, and, in particular, to the knowledge of the vast and 
complicated fabric of the material creation” (1.90). Upham closed his chapter with a 
discussion of the primary and secondary qualities of objects, which are not entirely 
relevant to the topic at hand.
Extemal Intellect: The Senses
Another topic which is not necessary to discuss in detail is Upham’s explication 
of the five senses. Although God has a perfect knowledge of all objects without use of 
physical organs, human beings are so designed that these organs are needed to gain this 
knowledge. Upham emphasizes the wisdom of “our Maker” throughout this section in 
the way in which the different senses tend to provide information which the other senses 
do not. Upham recognized the role of physiology, but did not emphasize it: “As a general
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statement, when the brain has been in any way injured, the inward- sensation, which 
would otherwise be distinct on the presentation of an extemal body, is imperfect” (1.95). 
As is typical of his approach, Upham had a clear rationale for the order of his discussion 
of the senses, beginning with the senses which would “ .. .cause us the least difficulty in 
the analysis of its results,” and proceeding “ .. .to others successively, as we find them 
increasing in importance.” Beginning with smell, Upham discussed taste, linking these 
two senses as particularly useful regarding food.
Throughout the discussion, Upham emphasizes the design and wisdom of the 
senses, describing how each organ is “precisely adapted” (1.100) for its appointed task. 
Simple survival is part of God’s plan. For example, taste and smell work together as part 
of the “ .. .benevolent provision for protecting men and the animal creation generally 
against the introduction of what would be noxious to them” (1.100). This is a form of 
“doxological science” (Bozeman, 1977). The best example of this is Upham’s 
description of the eye. According to the dictates of “ .. .benevolent Providence,”
On a slight examination, the eye is found to be a sort of telescope, having its 
distinct parts, and discovering throughout the most exquisite constmction. The 
medium on which this organ acts are rays of light, everywhere diffused, and 
always advancing, if  they meet with no opposition, in direct lines. The eye, like 
all the other senses, not only receives extemally the medium on which it acts, but 
carries the rays of light into itself; and, on principles purely scientific, refracts and 
combines them anew. It does not, however, fall within our plan to give a minute 
description of the eye, which belongs rather to the physiologist; but such a 
description, with the statement of the uses of the different parts of the organ, must
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be to a candid and reflecting mind a most powerful argument in proof of the 
existence and goodness of the Supreme Being. How wonderful, among other 
things, is the adaptation of the rays of light to the eye! If these rays were not of a 
texture extremely small, they would cause much pain to the organ of vision, into 
which they so rapidly pass. If they were not capable of exciting within us the 
sensations of colour, we should be deprived of much of that high satisfaction 
which we now take in beholding surrounding objects; showing forth, wherever 
they are to be found, the greatest variety and the utmost richness of tints. (I.117- 
118).
The comment, about the physiologist is similar to the kind that would be made by 
James, with the exception that the New Psychology would use physiology as a way of 
setting boundaries with the old psychology. Although Upham does quote scientific 
sources, the reports he cites are usually anecdotal rather than experimental (e.g., I.I24). 
He also discusses issues which are still discussed in the area of sensation and perception, 
such as the estimation of distances (1.126). Nevertheless, Upham’s psychology lacks the 
profound respect for physiology that characterized William James.
Extemal Intellect: The Evils of Idealism
Throughout his discussion to this point, Upham spoke as if  “material objects” had 
real existence. Yet, following his Scottish common sense forebears, the topic of idealism 
had to be mentioned and disposed of. So, before moving on to the next power of the 
intellect (i.e., the power of conception), Upham tumed his attention to the refutation of 
idealism.
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Upham began his defense of realism with the simple observation that . .all 
mankind.. .believe in outward objects...” (1.133). Yet, it had to be conceded that the 
senses can sometimes deceive. For example, “ ... a straight stick, thrust into the water, 
appears to us crooked...” (1.133). This is not evidence of fallacy, however, just 
imperfection and limitation. Given the limitations of the senses, we come to perceive 
them as fallacious only as a “.. .consequence of our expecting too much of them” (1.134). 
Given that the sense are designed by God, the seeker after truth can “.. .confidently 
expect to be led by them into the truth, so far as our Creator designed that it should be 
made known to us” (1.135). Upham quotes Reid at length to make that point that other 
cognitive errors are simple due to “want of care” in reasoning rather than faulty design of 
the senses. The piety of this line of reasoning is evident: Upham desired to avoid at all 
costs accusing the creator of wrongdoing or imperfection of design.
Given these and other defenses for the general reliability of the senses, Upham 
tumed his attention to the actual existence of the material world. Belief in the material 
world is human nature, and if  a person “.. .gives himself up to the instinctive tendencies 
of his nature,” he can not “ .. .doubt the reality of such an extemal, material creation.”
The idealist “objection” to this observation, Upham explained, was that the senses do not 
actually refer to an outward object as they seem. A person may be convinced that 
outward objects exist, but simply be deceived. This contention serves as “the basis of the 
doctrine known as IDEALISM.”
Without attempting to make idealism plausible (Edwards had, after all, embraced 
it), Upham unleashed his refutation. Given the primacy of consciousness in his system, 
he repeated the universal belief in the reality of outward objects. Upham was always
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impressed with universal beliefs, and thought that rejecting such a belief".. .ought not to 
be lightly asserted.” Indeed, following Stewart, he argued that the very character of God 
would be impugned if such beliefs were false;
But to create man so that he should be irresistibly led to believe in the existence of 
a material world when it did not exist, to create him with high capacities of 
thought, feeling, and action, and then to surround him with mere illusive and 
imaginary appearances, does not agree with that notion of God which we are wont 
to entertain. (1.144)
Upham’s primary concern, it seems, was to avoid “skepticism.” “ .. .If the senses 
are not a ground of belief and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited skepticism 
on all subjects” (I.I45, italics mine). Among these subjects is morality itself: “It will in 
this case be impossible to fix upon anything whatever which is to be received as 
evidence, and men must give up all knowledge of intellect as well as matter, and will be 
at once released from all moral obligation” (1.145). To the contrary, the senses provided 
“foundations” of knowledge, and, “ .. .effectually cause belief...” Guelzo (1989) noted 
that Edwards thought that this fear of skepticism had been misplaced, and that the real 
danger was that of materialism. Although Upham did discuss the evils of materialism, it 
is clear in this case, and throughout his entire book, that skepticism was a more pressing 
concern. If Edwards was right, however, that materialism was the issue, the mental 
philosophy of Thomas Upham and other nineteenth century American mental 
philosophers may have left the Protestant establishment unprepared for the challenges 
that lay ahead.
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Extemal Intellect: Habit
Upham tumed from his consideration of idealism to the topic of habit.
Previously, Upham had mentioned that habit . .indicates a law of the mind’s action; and 
back of that law, inasmuch as law is only the form or mode of activity, there is and must 
be a principle of power” (1.131). When considered as a power, habit carmot be 
considered a uniquely cognitive power. The “mighty influence” of habit “ .. .is felt in all 
the three leading Departments under which the mind is to be considered...” (1.131-132).
In due time, Upham promised to discuss the effects of habit upon each of these three 
“Departments.”
When considering the habits of sensation and perception, Upham made the more 
specific comment that habit cannot strictly speaking be considered a cognitive power 
since it does not actually increase knowledge. Nevertheless, habit can facilitate and 
improve the cognitive powers. Habit can therefore be considered an “auxiliary power.” 
Although it is difficult to define habit, Upham thought it easy to examine and describe the 
results of habit, which are ‘"That the [given] mental action acquires facility and strength 
from repetition or practice.” One striking characteristic of this definition and of 
Upham’s tone whenever he discusses habit, is its positiveness. Whereas William James 
would famously speak of habit in the Principles as if it were primarily a loss of freedom, 
Upham saw it as a great help in right thinking. Certainly James thought habit was a help, 
but his tone was quite foreboding. Upham is more upbeat. For example, Upham saw 
habit in “ .. .the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, [in] the rapidity of the 
accountant, [in] the coup d’ceil or eye-glance of the military engineer, [in] the tact and 
fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and in other like instances” (1.148).
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Habit conjoins bodily and mental effort, and may serve as a kind of replacement 
to will. If a particular muscular effort is continually linked with the volition, it may be 
. .rendered so prompt by habit, that we are unable distinctly to recollect any exercise of 
volition previous to the active or muscular exertion” (1.148). Although habit had 
previously implied automaticity and predictibleness of action, we see that a result of 
Upham’s libertarian definition of will included a strict demarcation of habit and will. 
Whereas the term will was previously used as a general non-specific term demarcating 
the moral side of human nature, Upham had narrowed the “office” of the will 
considerably. Given its limited jurisdiction, it could therefore be frequently overridden. 
Although Upham only had slight intimations of the results of this understanding, we find 
in James’s voluntary psychology that the jurisdiction of the will would only continue to 
decrease in size. To change metaphors, the homunculus would, throughout the 
nineteenth century, decrease in size until it became a non-entity. At the root of this 
shrinkage was the desire to find some aspect of human activity which is free from the 
powers of determination.
When applying the power of habit to the senses, the tone continues in a largely 
positive marmer. Habit, when applied to smell, facilitates the “discrimination of odours” 
(1.149). Similarly, habit improves the discriminating abilities of taste (1.150), and 
improves the musicians’ ear (1.152). Habits “ .. .imply increased quickness and power 
wherever they exist” (1.161). Habits also increase the skill required by particular 
“callings.” For example, the farmer may assess the quality of a piece of land with 
amazing facility and quickness (1.163). Indeed, Upham rhapsodizes about the abilities of 
habit and the wisdom of their Creator:
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[Habits].. .evince the striking powers of the human mind, its irrepressible 
energies, which no obstacles can bear down. They evince also the benevolence of 
our Creator, who opens in the hour of misery new sources of comfort, and 
compensates for what we have not by increasing the power and value of what we 
have (1.162).
Yet, always ready to draw a moral from a psychological principle, Upham sounded the 
notes of warning, noting that habit can also lead to the strengthening of impious desires. 
Drawing upon a favorite example of mental philosophers, Upham noted that although 
“the bibber of wine and the drinker of ardent spirits readily acknowledge[s], that the 
sensation was at first only moderately pleasing, and perhaps in the very slightest degree,” 
that his overindulgence in “ardent spirits” gradually creates “ .. .a prisoner, a captive, a 
deformed, altered, and degraded slave” (1.151). Each additional “indulgence” is an 
“addition of a new weight” which “ .. .lessen[s] the probability of escape” (1.151).
To add to the weight of this moral lesson, Upham quoted a pamphlet published in 
the London Quarterlv Review entitled “the Confessions of a Drunkard” (1.152), which 
describes the descent into such bondage. The excerpt includes a passage (apparently 
advocating the avoidance of alcohol altogether) that, like James’s admonition in his 
chapter on Habit, addresses the young: “Could the youth, to whom the flavour of his first 
wine is delicious as the opening scenes of life.. .be made to understand what a dreary 
thing it is when a man shall feel himself [to].. .have no power to stop.. .it were enough to 
make him sash the sparkling beverage to the earth in all the pride of its mantling 
temptation” (1.152).
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Yet, even in the face of the possibility of addiction, Upham maintained his 
optimism and faith in effort and willpower. Although his Calvinist forebears tended to 
see “slavery” to the more subtle sins as normal, Upham thought that slavery was rare, and 
believed, like a true “Pelagian,” that God had designed human nature with adequate 
power to set oneself free from impending bondage and that original sin did not 
significantly diminish this ability. Even in the ease of the “bibber” of wine: “we do not 
mean to say that he is the subject of an implacable destiny, and cannot help himself. But 
it would seem that he can help himself only in this way; by a prompt, absolute, and entire 
suspension of the practice in all its forms, which has led him into this extremity” (1.152). 
Nevertheless, Upham conceded that few winebibbers “ .. .have the resolution...” to 
exercise such willpower when the addiction becomes sufficiently intense. This move 
toward effort and willpower was an Arminian move, a strict narrowing of the domain of 
the will in order to preserve some territory over which the will might be sovereign.
The topic of “muscular habits” was also a concern to Upham. Upham noted that 
“some writers,” including Reid and Hartley, contended “ .. .that bodily or muscular habits 
operate in many cases without design and volition on the part of the person who has 
formed them; and that, as they are without any attendant thought, without any preceding 
mental operation, such bodily acts are to be considered as purely mechanical or 
automatic.” Given that Upham’s Arminian psychology is thoroughly concerned with the 
control of the agent over his actions, this issue was a great concern to Upham. One 
example of these thinkers was that of learning to play the harpsichord:
When a person first begins to learn, it is admitted by all that there is an express act 
of volition preceding every motion of the fingers. By degrees, the motions appear
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to cling to each other mechanically; we are no longer conscious of volitions 
preceding and governing them. In other words, there is nothing left but the 
motions; there is no act of the mind; the performance, admirable as it is, has the 
same character and the same merit with that of the action of a well-contrived 
machine. (1.169)
The similarity with James’s psychology of habit here is striking, and it is noteworthy that 
James shared a deep concern with the automaticity of behavior.
Although Upham readily granted that activities such as playing the harpsichord 
are often attended with “ .. .the appearance of being independent of the will,” Upham, in 
an attempt to argue that the domain of the will was not shrinking, assured his readers that 
this was indeed “were appearance” (italics mine), for four reasons. First, the law of habit 
applies to all faculties of the soul, and, in the case of volition, apparently automatic 
behavior is attended with “very rapid” volitions which are not attended carefully and 
therefore quickly forgotten. Second, talented players of musical instruments are able to 
change tempo voluntarily. When playing slowly, they can pay close attention to each 
movement and therefore be aware of the voluntary nature of their playing. But when 
playing quickly, they cannot attend carefully to the various movements, and therefore 
cannot remember the individual volitions. To deny this account, Upham thought, implied 
“ .. .an inexplicable jumble of voluntary and involuntary actions in the same performance” 
(1.170). Third, if one assumes that these muscular habits are automatic, then there is no 
middle road: “ .. .the action must be strictly and truly automatic; that is, it must, from the 
nature of the case, be the motion of a machine.” As a machine, the playing must be 
invariable and predictable [note that James thought of mechanism in the same way].
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Since the playing of musical instruments is far from predictable, they cannot be done 
without purpose or volition.
Finally, Upham prophesied regarding the effects of the mechanistic theory of 
muscular habit. If the theory is allowed in this domain, there is no reason why it could 
not be applied to activities other than muscular movements. If this is allowed, “it will be 
the result of this tendency to wrest all those powers which it [habit] reaches, whether 
bodily or mental, from the control of the will.” To put the issue a bit differently, “ .. .this 
principle [of muscular habits] will infallibly make men machines, mere automatons, 
before they have lived out half their days” (I.17I). In Upham’s mind, determinism was a 
threat to his self-determined Arminian will, and he felt that threat as a loss of sovereignty 
and power in the faculty.
Extemal Intellect: Conception
Upham moved next to “a third Cognitive power,” conception. Arguing always 
from a functional standpoint, Upham immediately discussed the necessity of this power. 
Sensation, the first power, does not provide knowledge of things outside of the self. 
Perception, the second power, limits knowledge to things immediately before the person. 
“A little reflection,” Upham therefore noted, “ .. .shows us that we need another power, 
which will enable us to keep our past knowledges [sic] in our possession, when the 
objects of knowledge have passed beyond the reach of our senses. This is the 
“conceptive power.” The conceptive power works when the objects of thought are not 
present, but differ from memory because “we take no account of.. .the particular time, 
when those objects which laid the foundation of them were present...” (1.173). His 
chapter on conception has little to do with volition, except for the fact that he looked at
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the relation between habit and coneeption, and also made a passing reference to how 
conceptions . .are sometimes attended with belief; when they are very lively, we are apt 
to ascribe to them a real outward existence, or believe in them.” Our proclivity to believe 
our ideas is a topic that James did address, particularly in terms of “reality.” Indeed, 
James’s chapter on the perception of reality contains his theory of belief, a theory very 
relevant to volition, as we shall see. Further, given the strong traditional link between the 
psychology of belief and the psychology of volition, these comments do not seem 
irrelevant.
Simple vs. Complex Thoughts
Before moving on to the next cognitive power (i.e., abstraction), Upham devoted 
a chapter explaining the difference between simple and complex thoughts. Again, this is 
not a topic that is particularly relevant to the topic of will, but Upham does repeatedly 
make reference to the simplicity of particular thoughts because he saw these thoughts as 
being accessible only through the powers of introspection. Further, since simple states of 
mind can be known through introspection, Upham saw these states as the very foundation 
of knowledge.
The division between simple and complex “mental affections” is given by nature. 
Simple “state[s] of mind” (1.184) are indivisible, i.e., they cannot be broken into parts. 
Whenever it is possible to “detect.. .more than one element...” simplicity is lost. Simple 
states of mind are also indefinable, because true definitions require that the thing being 
defined be broken down into elements. Finally, simple mental states are'necessarily 
linked to reality, while complex thoughts may often have no real thing “corresponding to 
them.” Therefore, simple ideas are of utmost epistemological usefulness. “Whenever, in
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our analysis of a subject, we arrive at truly simple ideas, we have firm footing; there is no 
mistake, no delusion.” Epistemological error occurs when human beings combine . .the 
elements which nature furnishes.. in a false way. Upham tended to think that simple 
mental shapes precede complex, and he challenged the idea “ .. .that some.. .of our 
complex notions are framed at once and immediately, whenever an occasion presents 
itself, and are not necessarily dependent on the prior existence of any other feelings.”
This would be James’s challenge to the associationists, who seemed to conceive of 
knowledge in much the same way as Upham. Yet, Upham argued, just as some 
“habitual” activities are volitional yet without awareness, the mind’s conceptions are 
formed so quickly that it is possible to fail to notice the simple constituent ideas involved 
in that cognition. Conversely, Upham also desired to avoid the idea that complex notions 
are “.. .literally made up of parts...” but . .have the relation to them which any material 
whole has to the elements composing it” (I. 190, italics mine).
Upham thought that only two of the three “Departments” of the mind are capable 
of having complex states of mind: the Intellect and the Sensibility. It is possible to have a 
“complex affection” just as it is possible to have a “complex perception.” But the “acts 
of the Will” are “always simple” (1.191). Such a formulation allowed Upham to feel 
quite confident in his assertions about the will. Given the Edwardsean critique that the 
very existence of the Arminian is in doubt, the fact that Upham would consider his 
conscious experience of will to be unproblematically reliable is indeed an ironic twist in 
the story.
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Excursus: The True Philosophical Method 
Upham completed his chapter on simplicity and complexness with what seems to 
be a tangent: a discussion of philosophical method. The links to simplicity and 
complexity are there, however. Upham tackled an objection to the idea that the mind first 
requires simple ideas before being able to have complex ones. These problem with this 
idea, it was contended, was that it “ .. .makes the whole visible creation a mere 
aggregate.. .of attributes, qualities, or properties.” A person holding this objection might 
say, “What we behold yonder...is mere greenness, resistance, hardness, form, &c., but 
nothing more; it is not a TREE. In the firmament there is brightness, and heat, and 
roundness, and uniformity of motion, but that is all; we mistake when we suppose there is 
a reality, an actual SUN” (1.193). Upham saw this way of thinking as a reiteration of 
thought of Pyrrho and of Idealism.
Sinee we commonly infer the reality of things or existences from their attributes 
or exercises, we may from our feelings and thoughts infer the existence of mind. From 
the “manifestations and attributes” of God we infer the existence of God, although we do 
not have a direct perception of him. From the “qualities and properties of bodies” we 
infer the existence of matter (1.194). The mind is designed to translate these “signs” of 
existence into the firm and certain belief that the “thing” in question really exists.
Although these ruminations may seem far removed from a consideration of the 
psychology of will, they are linked to the epistemological issue that was highly relevant 
to the way in which the will was approached. In the days in which The Marrow of 
Theologv was used as a textbook, knowledge was constructed within a particular moral 
community defined by particular theological beliefs. As I have frequently reiterated, a
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primary difference in approach was the desire of nineteenth-century mental philosophers 
to speak to all people. Since the interpretation of scripture has always been a contentious 
affair, the irenical methods of the Enlightenment seemed to offer a way to retain the 
benefits of sectarianism (e.g., a common worldview and moral code), while eschewing its 
exclusivity and its reliance on scripture.
For this reason, Upham’s comments on “the true philosophical method” (1.194) in 
mental philosophy seem particularly relevant to the topic of this dissertation. To review, 
Upham had just argued that the mind’s reliance upon simple ideas did not mean that the 
mind is limited to knowledge of simple ideas. The mind instead automatically perceives 
the objects to which the simple mental states refer. It was also true, however, that the 
mind was designed to be limited in its understanding of reality: it may truly know the 
existences to which its ideas point, but it cannot know all things.
This, I believe, is the lesson Upham drew from his analysis of the simple and 
complex mental states. After assuring his readers that their minds were designed to allow 
knowledge of existences, he thought that “ .. .at this point...” the reader was prepared to 
receive more information about the methods of mental philosophy. He had four points in 
mind. First, the “progress” of mental philosophy relies upon strictly maintaining “ .. .the 
distinction.. .between mental philosophy and Ontology.” Mental philosophy assumes that 
the mind exists and has certain powers and proceeds to observe and classify mental 
phenomena. Ontology, on the other hand, “ .. .desirous of knowing what it is which lies 
back of phenomena, advances with greater boldness but with less success, and announces 
itself as the science of existence.” Although we are “adapted” to have clear access to our 
mental states, we are no so well equipped to fathom “the problems of existence, which
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are hidden in the Infinite or Absolute of things.. Indeed, . .any thing short of 
omniscience” falters in understanding ontological questions.
Second, given the adaptations and limitations of mind, it followed that the best 
method for understanding the mind was “the Baconian,” which:
.. .commencing with the rejection of all prejudices, and having no interests but 
those of truth, proceeds with the careful observation and the equally careful 
classification of mental facts, as they are disclosed not only in the sphere of our 
own consciousness, but as they are revealed in the observation of the thoughts and 
feelings of others, and in the history of men in all ages. This method, in its 
application to the mind, includes all the facts and intimations, especially those 
relating to personality and the foundation of moral distinctions, which are 
suggested and affirmed by the Intuitional power, as well as the knowledge coming 
from other sources. (1.195)
The belief that mental philosophers were capable of rejecting “all prejudices” was 
perhaps the leading vulnerability of the American mental philosophy movement, as it was 
a chief weakness of the Enlightenment in general. In moving away from the traditionally 
community-embedded and sectarian roots of morality Upham and other American mental 
philosophers thought they could put morality on firm Baconian foundations. What they 
did not seem to realize was the extent to which they carried out their craft with strong 
inclinations toward a broadly evangelical and pietistic morality. As the population of 
mental philosophers and psychologists became less evangelical (although retaining the 
results-oriented pragmatism of pietism; Hart, 2002), and the clear dictates of
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introspection tended to contradict evangelical morality, the shaky foundations which 
Upham and other laid here would become quite clear.
Upham’s third point sounds like a page out of a New Psychology textbook. A 
consideration of physiology facilitates the mental philosophers “ .. .interpretation of 
mental action” (1.196). Up to this point, Upham had applied this principle in his 
discussion of the senses. Here Upham pinpointed the physiological fact that would 
strongly shape the introspections of William James: “the distinction first drawn and 
demonstrated by Sir Charles Bell between the nervous filaments connected with 
sensation and those connected with motion...” (1.196). While James filtered seemingly 
all of his introspections through this physiological insight, Upham did not integrate this 
fact into his psychology. This movement from recognition to integration may be seen as 
one of the true differences between the old and the “New” psychologies.
Upham concluded this section with the common but bold affirmation of the 
importance of mental philosophy. There are “ .. .many and important departments of 
science, which, in their principles, if  not in their applications, are based upon it, or are 
closely connected with it.” These would include “the principles of morals, the laws of 
evidence, the doctrine of aesthetics, logic, language, axiomatic truths, artistic taste, the 
philosophy of eloquence, the philosophic relation of the sciences to each other...” Even 
religion, which “ .. .coimects the soul with God” relies to some extent upon mental 
philosophy (1.196). Here again Upham subordinates the sectarian interpretation of 
scripture, which was traditionally the foundation of morality and religion at American 
colleges, to the nonseetarian and “unprejudiced” insights of mental philosophy. The 
criticism made above applies here as well.
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Extemal Intellect: The Abstractive Power
Following his discussion of simple and complex ideas, Upham described the 
power of abstraction. Fluman beings frequently desire to closely examine complex 
thoughts by breaking them into parts. The process of breaking complex thoughts into 
their elements is what Upham meant by Abstraction. Although this topic is not closely 
related to the will, Upham did comment on the role of the will in abstraction. In 
abstraction, the mind desires to focus upon particular components of a “complex notion.” 
The will, acting in conjunction with these desires, determines which parts will be 
considered, and, by implication, which will be ignored: “ .. .we may tmly and justly be 
said to have not only a desire, but a determination to consider or examine some part of 
the complex idea more particularly than the others” (1.199-200). He offered the 
following example:
If, for example, we have in mind the complex notion of any object, a house, tree, 
plant, flower, and the like, but have a desire and determination to make the colour, 
which forms a part of this complex notion, a particular subject of attention, the 
consequence is, that, while the quality of colour occupies our chief regard, the 
other qualities will disappear and no more be thought of. If we determine to 
examine the weight or extension of an object, the result will be the same; in other 
words, the extension, weight, colour, and whatever else may be discriminated in 
its attributes, will become distinct and exclusive objects of attention, and will thus 
be mentally abstracted. (1.201)
Upham’s careful distinction between desires and volitions in the above quotations is 
important, indicating the radieal distinction he made between desire and volition.
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Whereas Edwards and other deterministic Calvinistic psychologists of will saw will as 
the manifestation of the strongest desire, Upham’s “Arminian” psychology was careful to 
leave the final determination to embrace or reject the inclinations of desire up to the will. 
Extemal Intellect: Attention
Skipping Upham’s interesting but largely irrelevant treatment of “general abstract 
ideas,” we tum to his commentary on the power of attention. The previous quote 
illustrating Upham’s view on the role of will in abstraction provides a nice segue into his 
consideration of attention. In that quote, Upham argues that the end of the “desire and 
determination” is to make a particular object the “subject of attention” (1.201). As would 
be the case in William James, the will and attention are therefore closely cormected in 
Upham’s psychology.
Since attention does not actually increase knowledge, Upham considered attention 
as an auxiliary power of the mind rather than a cognitive faculty. When a mind is in a 
state of attention, “ .. .the mind is steadily directed, for a length of time, to some object of 
sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects” (1.217). Attention can exist in different 
degrees, and, as William James would also claim, is determined (i.e., “depend[s] upon”)
“.. .the strength and permanency of the attendant emotion of interest.” As he was wont to 
do, Upham noted that certain individuals in history were noted for the power of their 
attention, such as Julius Caesar. Another example, “the chess-player Philidor” provides 
another insight into the links between volition and interest, and the awkwardness of 
Upham’s multi-step view of human volition. Philidor:
.. .could direct three games of chess at the same time, of one of which only he 
required ocular inspection, the moves of the other two being announced to him by
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an assistant. The moves of the chessmen formed the subject about which his 
thoughts were employed; and such was the intensity of interest and such the 
power of the will, that the mind found no difficulty in dwelling upon it to the 
entire exclusion of other subjects, and for a considerable length of time. (1.218)
In this quote Upham not only made a strong link between attention, interest and will, but 
also reiterated the awkward distinction between motivation and volition. In this quote 
Upham almost seems to equate the “intensity of interest” and “the power of the will,” yet 
the demarcation between them was quite deliberate: actually equating the two would be, 
in Upham’s mind, reducing the human to a mere machine. The will needed to hover 
above the inclinations of interest and arbitrate in freedom.
The power of attention, Upham explained, always has an intellectual component: 
the object to be attended to first needs to be specified by the mind through perception. 
Yet, behind the perception of the object, Upham argued, is an act of will “ .. .directing, 
condensing, and confining the perception.” Behind the act of will is “ .. .a feeling of 
desire or interest, which is antecedent to the volitional act, and which brings the will into 
action” (1.219). Yet, as will become clear below, desire and interest cannot be 
understood as causing volition, but standing merely as the occasion upon which the will 
arbitrates. The role of the will, which is occasioned but not caused by motives, is to 
focus the mind on this right object. Although we will see James advocating much the 
same notion of attention and volition, it is also worthy noting that Upham here 
recapitulates the position of Chubb which Edwards criticized: that acts of will are only 
occasioned but not caused by the motives. Edwards wondered if  this undermined the 
coherence of the motive concept. This is a question which we will revisit as we progress.
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Upham closed his consideration of the power of attention with a moral 
admonition that reveals the nonsectarian nature his enterprise. Upham encouraged his 
students to utilize their powers of attention in such a way to maximize their knowledge.
In order to do this, he warned against “ .. .a hasty and careless reading of authors...” 
(1.222), which entailed wandering “ .. .from object to object...” (1.223). After this 
admonition, Upham addressed the “alleged inability to command the attention,” which 
some would use to excuse themselves from this intellectual duty. These objectors 
“ .. .find it difficult to retain the mind in one position...” (1.223). Upham noted that 
attention cannot be sustained without desire, and recommended one particular desire as 
uniquely conducive to sustaining intellectual efforts; “ .. .a love of the truth.” There is 
“ .. .no other effective remedy than the one just mentioned, A LOVE OF THE TRUTH, a 
desire to know the nature and relations of things merely for the sake of knowledge” 
(1.224). Even Christ advocated the preeminent love of the truth: ‘Christ says of himself, 
that ‘he came into the world to bear witness to the truth’” (1.224). While Upham’s more 
sectarian forebears would have interpreted Christ’s bearing witness to the truth as relating 
to the particular sectarian and churchly truths of the gospel, Upham applied it to the 
mission of the betterment of the world: “A desire to know the truth in morals, in religion, 
in science, in the arts, in government, and in all the various kinds and methods of thought 
and inquiry, furnishes the key to much that is great and ennobling in the history of the 
race.” Yet, as this pursuit of the truth has “foundations” which come from God, Upham 
could take for granted that these foundations would take care of themselves.
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Extemal Intellect: Dreaming and Somnambulism
Upham’s consideration of Dreaming and Somnambulism also touched upon the 
will. Dreams . .are our mental states and operations while we are asleep.” Upham was 
confident that his broad audience could relate to the fact of dreaming because “ .. .they are 
so prevalent; it being very difficult, if not impossible, to find a person who has not had 
more or less of this experience” (1.226). Upham explained the “ .. .wildness, 
inconsistency.. .contradiction...” and general “incoherency” of our dreams as being due, 
in part, to the fact that “ .. .when we are asleep, our associated trains of thought are no 
longer under the control of the WILL.” Although this did not mean that “ .. .the 
operations of the will are suspended...” during sleep, for we feel that we are actually 
determining the direction of our dreams. Nevertheless, the volitions which are enacted in 
dreams:
.. .have ceased to exercise their customary influence in respect to our mental 
operations. Ordinarily we are able, by means of an act of the will, to fix our 
attention upon some particular part of any general subject which has been 
suggested, or to transfer it to some other part of such subject, and thus to direct 
and to regulate the whole train of mental action. But, the moment we are soundly 
asleep, this influence ceases, and hence, in connexion with the other cause already 
mentioned, arise the wildness, incoherency, and contradictions which exist.
(1.230)
This passage reveals that Upham thought of the will as the glue which kept the mind in 
control of itself. Again, this conception of will is considerably narrower than the 
conception found in Ames and Edwards. Arminian psychology, concerned as it was with
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the human ability to exert its own power in the world, may also be understood as a 
psychology of self-control and self-assertion.
Upham also turned to the will to explain why dreams have the strong appearance 
of reality. “ .. .Dreaming conceptions have the appearance of reality [because].. .they are 
not susceptible of being controlled, either directly or indirectly, by mere volition.” 
Typically, perceptions of objects that always produce the same effects in us and do not 
depend upon the will are perceived as real. Since “essentially the same circumstances 
exist in dreaming” as in cases where we do not have control over our perceptions, we also 
experience our dreams as involuntary.
As one strongly interested in the power of the will, it is not surprising that Upham 
would find the topic of somnambulism to be an issue “ .. .of considerable interest and 
importance” (1.236). “Somnambulists,” Upham explained, “are persons who are capable 
of walking and of other voluntary actions while asleep” (1.236, italics mine). Among the 
interesting facts associated with this condition were that somnambulists often did not 
remember engaging in their nocturnal activities, until being shown evidence of these 
activities. Although Upham did not hesitate in calling these muscular movements as 
being due to “volitions” (1.237), he asked how the muscles could remain active while the 
senses are “asleep” (1.237). His answer sounds very modem and scientific, saying that a 
satisfactory answer will ultimately require “further investigations” and that the final 
answer will probably be related to the stmcture of the nervous system. It is puzzling that 
Upham did not address the apparent tension between his assertion that the activities of 
sleepwalkers are voluntary, and yet often happen outside of conscious awareness and
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control. He was nevertheless more deferential in this section, holding out hope that 
science would shed light on the problem.
The Internal Intellect and the Will
Having completed the first part of his analysis of the human intellect, i.e., the 
“Extemal intellect,” Upham moved to a consideration of the “intemal intellect.” To 
review, the extemal intellect is designed to gain knowledge of the “material world around 
us.” God gave “material eyes” and “material hands” to human beings so that they might 
know the world around them. But he also gave human beings the ability to know the 
“super-sensational” world. Some of what Upham said in this context was related to the 
topic of the will.
Here Upham educates his readers on the contemporary meaning of the terms 
“intellectualism” and “sensationalism.” The term intellectualism, o f course, is 
enormously important in the history of the psychology of will. But, while intellectualism 
is contrasted with voluntarism when considered as a theory of will, Upham’s antithesis, 
“sensationalism,” suggests that the term was being used in a different way in the early 
nineteenth century.
The terms intellectualism and sensationalism were for Upham epistemological 
terms. Sensationalism is the doctrine that humans derive knowledge through the senses. 
Intellectualism “ .. .accepts sensationalism as far as it goes, but.. .affirms that there is 
something beyond it.” The human soul has “ .. .hidden fountains o f knowledge...” in 
itself, which go beyond the information inputted by the senses. For corroboration, 
Upham quoted Locke and Cudworth expressing similar opinions, and, in a footnote, 
argued that “many other writers, as Stewart, Degerando, Brown, Coleridge, Price,
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Jouffroy, and Cousin, advocate this general doctrine. Many German writers, with 
Leibnitz at their head, take the same view” (1.248). He also mentioned Kant as an 
advocate of this doctrine.
“But it ought not to pass unnoticed, that there have been writers who have 
objected to the doctrine of an intemal source of knowledge in distinction from that 
knowledge which is outward, and is dependent, not only for its occasion, but for its very 
nature, on the senses” (1.248-249).
Among those arguing that “ .. .all our knowledge might be traced to the senses, 
and that, of course, no other origin of it need be sought,” (1.249) were Hobbes, Gassendi, 
Condillac. Upham’s problem with this line of thought was that it was “to lower the 
mind’s position; not only to limit the range, but to depress the character of its powers.” 
Particularly troubling is the way it by consequence “.. .rejects the doctrine of a Moral 
Sense and of the frnmutability of Moral Distinctions” (1.250). Upham agreed that 
sensation was certainly required to activate the powers of mind, and eould “ .. .justly be 
considered the OCCASION of the introductory step to all our knowledge” (1.251). 
Sensation could never, however, account for “the whole amount of...” our knowledge. 
Where the senses give a knowledge of color and smell and hardness, the super-sensuous 
abilities of the mind suggest concepts such as “the ideas of right and wrong, of unity and 
number, of time and space, order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom, power, 
obligation, succession, cause, effect, and many others...” (1.253).
Upham thought that the intemal intellect could be divided into “four leading 
Cognitive principles,” Intuition, Consciousness, Judgment, and Reasoning. He 
summarized these four powers thus:
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The Intuitional or Suggestional power, which gives us a knowledge of things in 
the absolute; Consciousness, which gives us a knowledge of mental states and 
operations; Relative Suggestion or Judgment, by means of which we become 
acquainted with the immediate relations of objects; and Reasoning, which gives 
us a knowledge of relations that are more remote. (1.255)
Intemal Intellect: Intuitional Power
Of the “four leading Cognitive principles,” Upham thought that Intuitional was 
“first in nature,” since it “ .. .deals with those elementary tmths which are fundamental to 
all others” (1.256). The “intuitional power” gives rise to knowledge by “its own original 
activity and vigor,” depending neither on sensation or reasoning. The “appropriate 
objects” of the intuition are “things in the absolute,” which have three characteristics. 
They are “necessary in their origin,” “essential and immutable,” and “are objects which 
are common to all.” Examples of ideas with “intuitional origin” are those of existence, 
mind, matter, self-existence, personal identity, motion, duration, space, power, right and 
wrong, and others. His writing on right and wrong illustrates his line of thinking here:
“ .. .whenever objects fitted to excite a moral approval or disapproval are presented to our 
notice, the ideas of RIGHT and WRONG naturally and necessarily arise within us” 
(1.276). Although our five senses do not directly perceive right and wrong, our minds are 
designed nevertheless to know it. More directly related to the topic of the will, the idea 
of “power” is also suggested by the mind to all people. Although human beings can see 
that “there is indeed a Power, unexplored and invisible, which has reared the moimtains, 
which rolls the ocean, and which propels the sun in his course,” and that human power is 
therefore relatively limited, it is also tme that man “ .. .possesses, as an attribute of his
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own nature, an amount of real efficiency suited to the limited, sphere which Providence 
has allotted him.” For Upham this intuition was an axiomatic and . .simple statement of 
the fact.” Power is a necessary part of being an intelligent and accountable creature of 
God. “There is no accountable existence without power...” (1.274). Upham’s assertion 
here, consistent with the sentiments of nineteenth century theology, hut divergent from 
the Calvinism of Ames and Edwards, is that fallen human beings possess the requisite 
moral powers for right living.
How is it that a human mind leams that it possesses such power? Upham outlined 
three ways. First, human beings naturally assign causes to all events in the world, and 
these causes imply power. Second, humans are aware of the fact that they have control 
over their muscular actions, and third, “within certain limits and to a certain extent...” the 
will appears to have control over mental states (1.274). Although the idea of power “ .. .is 
not seen by the material eye, nor reached by the sense of touch...” it nevertheless 
emerges . .of itself from the mind, like a star from the depths of the firmament, it 
reveals itself distinctly and brightly to the intellectual vision” (1.275). As it will become 
clearer as we proceed, this “star from the depths of the firmament,” is precisely that 
“modem prevailing notion” of the will that Edwards so despised.
Upham closed his discussion of the intuitional power with an “additional practical 
remark” on how the intuition is capable of receiving “inspiration from higher sources.” 
Again, his comments reveal that Upham the mental philosopher advocated a form of 
Pelagianism, or the notion that human beings are capable of satisfying moral 
requirements. How does one open himself to receive inspiration from God? Upham 
outlined three steps here. First, a person simply needs “faith in this great fact, that there
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is thus an open door of communication between God and man,” second, . .a sincere 
desire that God, who never violates our freedom, will by means of his inspirational 
influences come into communication with us,” and, third, . .a freedom from all biases 
and prejudices of self-will-in other words, unselfishness.” While Calvinists such as 
Ames and Edwards would have attributed the requirement to be unselfish as impossible 
apart from the regenerating work of God’s Holy Spirit, Upham apparently thought that 
his audience simply needed a nudge to use powers they already possessed. Further, 
Upham’s comment that God will never violate human freedom is also a radical departure 
from Calvinism, and an enthusiastic embrace of the “Arminian” and enlightened 
viewpoints of the age. Finally, the comments also reveal the way in which mental 
philosophers naively universalized their now obviously contextualized intuitions. Again, 
this nonsectarian intuitional strategy could maintain a religiously informed understanding 
of human nature before the Civil War because it was implemented by evangelical 
Protestants in the evangelical Protestant culture of the academy. Yet, as the culture of the 
academy changed, so to would the results of this method.
Intemal Intellect: Consciousness
From intuition, the first source of knowledge belonging to the extemal intellect, 
Upham proceeded to the “second source,” consciousness. Just as intuition provides 
knowledge of “things in the absolute or unconditional,” consciousness is “ .. .the way or 
method in which we obtain the knowledge of those objects which belong to the mind 
itself, and which do not, and cannot, exist independently of some mind” (1.282). Acts of 
consciousness include three “notions or feelings:” first, the idea of the self (which is 
supplied through the intuitional power), second, “ .. .some quality, state, or operation of
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the mind, whatever it may be. . and, third, the sense that that “quality, state, or 
operation” belongs to the self. Upham reiterated the point made in the introduction that 
consciousness is “ .. ..a ground or law of belief, ” such that “it appears to be utterly out of 
our power to avoid believing beyond a doubt that the mind experiences certain 
sensations, or has certain thoughts, or puts forth particular intellectual operations, 
whenever, in point of fact, that is the case” (1.282). Upham’s intent here appears to have 
been epistemological, affirming that since God designed the mind in such a way, that 
such beliefs could be seen as trustworthy. The mental states which consciousness knows 
include perception, conception, memory, judgment, desires, and emotions, which 
constitute the subject matter of mental philosophy. For this reason the power of 
consciousness was crucial to Upham. In view of the enormous importance of 
consciousness for Upham’s psychology, it is interesting that he does not address in any 
significant way the potential shortcomings of this faculty’s knowledge of mental states. 
On the other hand, Upham’s neglect of this topic is perhaps predictable for that very 
reason.
Intemal Intellect: Judgment
The third of the cognitive powers following intuition and consciousness is 
judgment, which is “ .. .the power of bringing [the mind’s] thoughts together, and of 
placing them side by side, and comparing them.” As is typical of Upham, he shows how 
other mental philosophers have approached the topic, and that some have called this 
power “relative suggestion,” while others have named it “judgment.” Like intuition and 
consciousness, judgment is “.. .an ultimate faet in our mental nature,” that is, it “ .. .cannot 
be resolved into any other” mental fact. When different physical or mental objects are
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presented to the mind, the power of judgment immediately perceives relations such as 
being . .equal or unequal, like or unlike, as being the same or different in respect to 
place and time, as having the same or different causes and ends, and in various other 
respects” (1.290). Upham provided a detailed analysis of the different types of relations 
that the judgment suggests, and the occasions in which these relations arise. An example 
related to the will is the relation of cause and effect between objects. The process begins 
“when the antecedence to [an].. .event, or the sequence of any kind, is our own 
volition...” (1.301). As we learned in his section on intuition, this brings about the 
“.. .new idea of POWER.” This notion of power leads naturally to a notion of cause, and 
the invariable consequences of the volitions leads to a notion of effects.
Intemal Intellect: Association
Having discussed intuition, consciousness and judgment as three of the four 
sources of knowledge located in the intellect, Upham put the consideration ofthe fourth 
source (reasoning) on hold to discuss certain “powers of the mind” which are 
“subordinate to the reasoning power” yet which are “essential to its action.” These 
powers are association and memory. Association is related to the fact “ .. .that our 
thoughts and feelings follow each other in a regular train.” Upham took this to be a 
universal experience. After providing few examples from leading mental philosophers, 
he outlined the basic laws of association, i.e., resemblance, contrast, contiguity, cause and 
effect, which are “the primary laws.” Upham also outlined “secondary laws” of 
association, which include lapse of time, which is the idea that “ .. .our trains of thought 
and emotion are more or less strongly connected and likely to be restored, according as
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the lapse of time has been greater or less.” In other words, as time passes, all else equal, 
the chains of association grow weaker.
Upham, like Edwards, also duly noted how the powers of association can lead to 
intellectual errors. When “ .. .the power of association so combines one object of thought 
with another that the object cannot readily be looked at and examined by itself, it so far 
has the effect to perplex and hinder correct judgment” (1.327). Although the powers of 
association are a kind adaptation granted by Providence as a means of “ .. .secur[ing] 
protection where it seems to be most urgently and frequently needed” (1.328), individuals 
need to leam “ .. .to separate ideas which our situation and habits may have intimately 
combined together” (1.336), in order to avoid being mislead by this power. Such an 
intellectual practice is crucial “ .. ..not only in pursuing the study of mental philosophy, 
but in the conduct of life” (1.336).
Upham, like James after him, was concerned with the deterministic implications 
of the powers of association. Indeed, Upham thought that a consideration of the powers 
of association naturally leads to the following question: “what is the degree of influence 
which we are able to exercise by mere volition or will over associated trains of mental 
states?” (1.337). Upham conceded that the will does not have a direct control over these 
mental events. Further, it is also true, given the nature of the will, “ .. .that we evidently 
can never will the existence of anything without knowing what it is which we will or 
choose.” In other words, “ .. .the act of volition necessarily implies a perceived or known 
object of volition...” (1.337). This is the case in recollection. We cannot will to 
remember a particular event, for example, without first having some notion of that even
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in mind. Despite these hindrances to the power of the will over association, Upham 
argued that the will does have an indirect power in this regard.
Although the will does not have the power to originate associations, “ .. .its 
influence is very considerable...” (1.338). Upham named two ways the will has indirect 
power over association. First, the will has “.. .the power of checking or delaying the 
succession of mental states” (1.338). While suspending thought in this way, the mind is 
presented with “.. .different trains of thought...” If there is a desire to do so, the will can 
fixate upon certain elements in the train, and ignore others. In this manner “ .. .we are 
able to exercise a considerable indirect power in calling up associations,” (1.339) as well 
as the power to select among them. Another way one can gain control over association is 
through habit, which, in tum, can be formed through the action of the will. Upham’s 
examples in this regard, e.g., developing the power of rhyming or effective public 
speaking, are more intellectual than moral.
Intemal Intellect: Memory
Upham’s treatment of memory, another power of the mind which does not 
originate knowledge but is necessary to advance it, does not deal directly with the will. 
After laying down some principles for the improvement of memory, however, he makes 
suggestions regarding the education of children. These suggestions shed light on the 
nonsectarian Protestant religious context in which he wrote.
First, the idea that children were fragile and in need to careful nurture is manifest 
in his comment that, given the laws of memory:
.. .a single remark of a profligate and injurious tendency, made by a parent or 
some other person in the presence of a child, though forgotten and neglected at
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the time, may be suddenly and vividly recalled some twenty, thirty, or even forty 
years after. It may be restored to the mind by a multitude of unforeseen 
circumstances, and even those of the most trifling kind; and even at the late period 
when the voice that uttered it is silent in the grave, may exert a most pernicious 
influence. It may lead to unkindness; it may he seized and cherished as a 
justification of secret moral and religious delinquencies; it may prompt to a 
violation of public laws, and in a multitude of ways conduct to sin, to ignominy, 
and wretchedness. Great care, therefore, ought to he taken not to utter unadvised, 
false, and evil sentiments in the hearing of the young, in the vain expectation that 
they will do no hurt, because they will be speedily and irrecoverably lost. (1.373) 
Although Upham in other places would put great stress on the powers of the human will 
to accomplish moral purposes, his depth of conviction on this point is striking. More to 
the point, however, is the nonsectarian Christianity that Upham encouraged his readers to 
inculcate;
.. .great care and pains should be taken to introduce truth into the mind, and all 
correct moral and religious principles. Suitably impress on the mind of a child the 
existence of a God and his parental authority; teach the pure and benevolent 
outlines of the Redeemer’s character, and the great truths and hopes of the 
Gospel; and these instructions form essential links in the grand chain of memory, 
which no change of circumstances, nor lapse of time, nor combination of power 
can ever wholly strike out. They have their place assigned them; and, though they 
may be concealed, they cannot he obliterated. They may perhaps cease to exercise 
their appropriate influence, and not be recalled for years; the pressure of the
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business and of the cares of life may have driven them out from every prominent 
position, and buried them for a time. But the period of their resurrection is always 
at hand, although it may not he possible for the limited knowledge of man to 
detect the signs of it. Perhaps, in the hour of temptation to crime, they come forth 
like forms and voices from the dead, and with more than their original freshness 
and power; perhaps, in the hour of misfortune, in the prison-house, or in the land 
of banishment, they pay their visitations, and impart a consolation which nothing 
else could have supplied; they come with the angel-tones of parental reproof and 
love, and preserve the purity, and check the despondency of the soul. (1.373) 
Although it had been traditional in Protestantism generally speaking, and in 
American Puritanism to encourage parents to inculcate religious and moral values, this 
was traditionally done through the doctrinal specificities of catechism. Here Upham 
takes the broad approach, speaking to a variety of Protestants, encouraging the 
inculcation of the existence of “a God,” and focusing on the ethical elements of the 
gospel (e.g., the Redeemer’s character) rather than the doctrinal elements (e.g., the 
Redeemer’s work and “offices” as in Ames). Again, it was this broadly evangelical 
arrangement in American colleges that sustained the introspective psychology of the 
antebellum period. Yet, one should not interpret Upham as doctrinally indifferent: he 
closed his section on memory reminding his readers that “ .. .the Scriptures plainly and 
explicitly teach that the Savior in the last day shall judge the world, and that all shall he 
judged according to the deeds done in the body, whether they he good or whether they he 
evil.” Although some had questioned whether this judgment would he fair given defects 
in human memory, Upham’s psychology assured his readers that, on that day, the mind
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. .will summon up thought and feeling from its hidden recesses, and will clearly present 
before us the perfect form and representation of the past” (1.374).
Internal Intellect: Reasoning
Having covered the auxiliary powers of association and memory, Upham then 
retums to the internal cognitive powers, this time to discuss the fourth and final cognitive 
power: reasoning. Knowledge of the powers of reasoning is derived from consciousness. 
Over and above the powers of intuition and judgment, reasoning is “ .. .a new and distinct 
fountain of thought,” and “.. .sustains the higher office of bringing to light the great 
principles and hidden truths of nature” (1.376). Although an interesting section, Upham 
deals with volition in only the most superficial ways in this section.
Disordered Intellectual Action and the Will 
Upham’s consideration of disordered intellectual action has little to do with the 
will. There are two brief points that may be made, however. In view of the influences of 
brain on mind, Upham argued that “ .. ..it seems to be certain that this part of the bodily 
system is connected, in a very intimate and high degree, with the exercises of the mind, 
particularly with perception and volition” (1.472). Upham’s belief that brain disorders are 
particularly harmful to volitional processes may refer back to his account of the 
seemingly paralyzing effects of having too much blood in the system. Upham thought 
that the importance of the brain in mental life had to do mostly with the proportionally 
high volume of blood processed there.
Upham’s distinction between partial insanity and total insanity is also instructive 
regarding volitional processes. Upham defined the term insanity broadly, meaning 
“ .. .simply a want of soundness or want of health.” Its application to mental processes
387
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was likewise exeeedingly general, . .it indieates an unsound or disordered state of the 
mental action.’ Yet, these unsound and disordered states of mind could vary a great deal. 
In the worst ease, the disordered condition characterizes the entire mind, intellect, 
sensibilities, and will. Yet, some eases of “partial insanity” only affect certain 
“departments or subdivisions of departments.” In this ease, the mind is “ .. .essentially 
free and undisturbed in some of its departments and in some of its modes of action.” In 
this first volume of his Mental Philosophv, Upham proceeded to show how “insanity” can 
affect the subdepartments of the intellectual department of the mind. For example, he 
considers the insanity of the sensations, perceptions, and of consciousness.
Given that cases of partial insanity include the retention of some of the faculties of the 
mind, Upham thought that partially insane people could still be held accountable for their 
actions. In eases of total insanity, that is, when, all of the faculties of the soul are 
perverted, Upham thought that mercy and understanding were in order. In total insanity, 
the afflicted person suffers from “.. .total disorganization,” and “ .. .a chaotic mingling 
together of the mental elements, without regard to law or order; perception, 
consciousness, association, memory, reasoning, all conflicting with themselves and with 
each other in one wild mass of irretrievable ruin” (1.490). Interestingly, in this section 
Upham has little to say about the will, indicating that he did not believe simple willpower 
to be the remedy of all ills of society.
The Appendix on Language
Upham concludes volume one with an appendix on language. Since thoughts and 
feelings are communicated through the means of language, and, therefore, language
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contains important information about the mind, Upham offered a somewhat lengthy essay 
on the subject of language, which has little to do with the subject at hand.
Summary and Conclusion 
In the preface of Mental Philosophy, Upham reyealed himself to be yery much 
within the tradition of Enlightenment and nonsectarianism which had come to 
characterize the American academy. Early on, he outlined some primary truths that 
would be both assumed and fundamental to the entire system. Sounding much like 
Edwards, Upham placed uniyersal causation among these tmths. Yet, sounding much 
like the Arminian psychologists that Edwards attempted to refute, Upham also argued 
strongly for the immateriality of the mind on the basis that any strict correspondence 
between brain and mind would make humans machines. The mind may haye “laws” but 
these laws include the power of self-determination, which sets it apart from matter. 
Upham gaye a superficial introduction to physiological considerations to show that for all 
intents and purposes physiology was irreleyant to psychology. Upham reyealed a strong 
intellectualist bent in describing the laws of belief.
Upham argued that the classic dichotomous distinction of mental faculties (i.e., 
into will and intellect) was not in accord with the uniyersal experience of humanity. 
Although justified on psychological grounds, Upham used a trichotomous psychology to 
free the will from a necessary cormection to either intellect or emotion. Arminian 
sensibilities therefore droye the yery shape of Upham’s psychology.
In addition to these prefatory materials, the majority of this chapter focused upon 
the content of the first yolume of Upham’s two yolume Mental Philosophy, which dealt 
with the topic of intellect. Although much of what Upham said in this yolume is not
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related to the related themes of will and determinism, much is relevant. Since Upham’s 
psychology is systematic, building upon itself, this chapter therefore attempted to outline 
the contours of Upham’s system while paying attention to the issues most relevant to the 
will, particularly the loss of will in American psychology.
Upham divided his consideration of the intellect into three parts: the external 
intellect, the internal intellect, and disordered intellectual activity. He concluded the first 
volume with an appendix on language. This chapter focused primarily on those aspects 
having to do with will or other considerations relevant to this thesis.
The external intellect has to do with the intellect’s contact with the outside world. 
Although arguing that the origins of knowledge are external, Upham also passionately 
defended against the idea that knowledge can be reduced to external inputs since he 
wanted to think of the mind as a kind of nonsectarian repository for ultimate (i.e., non­
observable, moral) truths. He discussed sensation in general, perception, and the senses, 
all of which I briefly summarize. Upham’s science is clearly “doxological” (Bozeman, 
1977) missing no opportunity to praise the creator for the wisdom and benevolence 
manifested in the human structure. Following the Scots, Upham decries idealism as 
leading necessarily to skepticism. The concern with skepticism may have been greater 
than his concern with materialism, which, as Guelzo (1989) pointed out, may have been a 
severe miscalculation on the part of Protestant scientists, given that materialism would be 
the threat to eventually destroy Protestant hegemony in American academic and 
intellectual life.
Upham also discusses habit in this context. Habit is a powerful force that applies 
to all aspects of mental life. A sure sign that things had changed considerably since
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Edwards’ day is the way that Upham opposes habit to volition. In Ames and Edwards, 
habits were a species of volition. Far from impeding volition and freedom, good habits 
were seen as the epitome of moral freedom, the very definition of a good will. Upham, 
embracing the “Arminian” assumptions of contemporary mental philosophy, however, 
thought that the “dignity” of will had to do with its contingency and self-determination. 
So, while Upham tended to look at habits in a generally positive light (and, predictably, 
praised God for the wisdom of habit), he also somewhat awkwardly attempted to find a 
place for volitions in seemingly automatic behavior. Whatever was “mechanical or 
automatic” was seen as necessarily opposed to volition. Therefore, the reach of habit 
(and other mechanical inputs) needed to be limited. The failure to limit the powers of 
determination over human action would be to “wrest” powers “from the control of the 
will.” This fear that the will was losing territory would be even more evident in the 
psychology of William James.
Upham closed his discussion of external intellect by considering conception, 
abstraction, simple vs. complex thoughts, abstraction, attention, and 
dreaming/somnambulism. Several aspects of Upham’s analysis are worth mentioning 
here. First, Upham made a distinction between simple and complex thoughts. Simple 
thoughts, xmpolluted through the combinations of the human mind, were considered 
objects of knowledge. Complex ideas do not lead to certain knowledge. This is relevant 
to the topic of will only in that the acts of the will, unlike the acts of the intellect and 
sensibility, are always simple. Therefore Upham could be assured that his introspections 
on the topic of volition would be trustworthy, a sentiment problematized by Edwards who 
had a century earlier briefly called attention to the fact that introspective reports may
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contradict one another. The distinction between simple and complex ideas also served as 
a foundation for mental science. Although we cannot know what “lies back of 
phenomena,” we can know enough to put morality and even religion on a firm 
nonsectarian foundation.
Second, Upham’s consideration of attention offers some initial insights into his 
psychology of will, particularly the distinction between desire and choice. Finally, his 
treatment of dreaming sheds further light upon Upham’s understanding of will, i.e., as the 
faculty by which we exert control over the self.
The second major section of Upham’s discussion of the intellect was concerned 
with “internal intellect,” which gives knowledge of the non-material, “super-sensational” 
world. The internal intellect is divided into four “Cognitive principles,” intuition, 
consciousness, judgment and reasoning. His comments on intuition are most relevant to 
the subject at hand. Intuition, Upham explained, gives knowledge of “elementary truths.” 
For example, the intuition goes beyond the mere data of sense and offers the notions of 
right and wrong. The intuition also reveals to us the idea of “power,” first of divine 
power which created all things in wisdom, and secondly of human power. The notion of 
human power gets to the crux of the Arminian impulse: the desire to somehow rise above 
normal human limitation by one’s own strength. The intuition, then, like a non-sectarian 
textbook (because accessible to all minds) supported the Arminian impulses of Thomas 
Upham. The mind “possesses” power in itself, “an amount of real efficiency suited to the 
limited, sphere which Providence has allotted him” (1.274). Whereas both Ames and 
Upham thought of efficiency as derivative, Upham seemed to conceive of it as a human 
possession which now exists autonomously and can be utilized apart from God, for good
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or evil. Moral accountability in the Arminian mind depended upon having a power that 
God would not tamper with.
Consciousness provides knowledge of internal states. The only thing remarkable 
about Upham’s treatment of this topic is his lack of consideration of the role of bias in 
introspection. Edwards had challenged Arminian introspections concerning the will, 
claiming that he had no experience of self-determined and contingent freedom. Upham 
predictably does not address the possibility of self-deception here.
Finally, Upham also described the powers of association by which “our thoughts 
and feelings follow each other in a regular train.” True to his Arminian impulses, Upham 
was concerned with the power that the will exerts over this otherwise deterministic 
process. Upham assured his readers that the will’s influence can be “considerable” in this 
regard.
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE SPRINGS OF ACTION, BACK OF THE INTELLECT
This chapter is a commentary and analysis of roughly the first two-thirds of the 
second volume of Upham’s (1869) Mental Philosophy, which deals with the faculty of 
the sensibilities. Although not entirely original in his separation of the soul into three (as 
opposed to two) faculties (Upham had, for example, given credit to the American 
minister Asa Burton for preceding him on this), Upham’s division was the one that stuck. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, following Upham’s groundbreaking treatment in 
1834, the tripartite division would be hailed as the long-awaited answer to Edwards’ 
dominance on the question of the freedom of the will (see, e.g., Mahan, 1846). Since it 
was “the sensibilities” that were removed from the domain of the will in the tripartite 
division, Upham’s treatment of the same is of particular relevance to the question 
regarding the loss of will in American psychology.
One immediate and obvious implication of Upham’s maneuver was that the 
psychological territory assigned to the will shrank. Indeed, if the sensibilities used to be 
part of “the will,” and two-thirds of volume two (which dealt with sensibilities and will) 
consisted of an analysis of the faculty of the sensibilities, one might even be tempted to 
say that the will was less than half the faculty it used to be. But for Upham and other 
‘Arminian’ psychologists the tripartite division was no laughing matter. His sober 
intention was to elevate and even save the faculty of will. The end result, however, may 
have been to render it largely irrelevant.
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The Importance of the Sentiments
Concerning the validity of making a distinction between the intellectual powers 
and the sentimentive, Upham reiterated some of his arguments from the Introduction, 
including the universal “structure of languages” and the testimony of consciousness. The 
activity of the sentiments depends upon the activity of the intellect: “as a general thing, 
there is and can be no movement of the sensibilities, no such thing as an emotion, desire, 
or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect” (11.25-26).
At the very least, the intellect must first specify an object for the sentiments to react to. 
More than that, the intellect’s provision of more particular and sophisticated views of 
objects lead to deeper feeling.
Although the intellect is a wonderful creation of God, it is incomplete without the 
sentiments. If humankind “had been formed of intellect only, of cold and unimpassioned 
perceptivity; if  he could merely have perceived, compared, associated, and reasoned, 
without a solitary emotion or desire, without any of the various affections of our nature, 
without sorrow for suffering or sympathy in joy; in a word, if he had been all head and no 
heart, the human soul would have shown not only a different, but a depressed and inferior 
aspect, compared with what it does at present” (11.26). More than that, the sensibilities 
are “ .. .the secrets of men’s actions” (11.27), the necessary but not sufficient condition of 
voluntary activity. Somewhat surprisingly, Upham thought that human beings are best 
understood as affective rather than rational creatures:
A knowledge of human natxxre, in the common apprehension of the phrase, does 
not so much imply a knowledge of the powers of perception and reasoning as a
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knowledge of the springs of action, back of the intellect, which, in the shape of 
the emotions and passions, give an impulse and a character to the conduct both of 
individuals and communities. In other words, a knowledge of human nature is 
essentially a knowledge of the HEART... (1.27)
Given the priority of the intellect, however (i.e., the sentiments are in “back of the 
intellect”), Upham did not go so far as to claim that the sentiments were more important 
than the intellect, but rather saw the two “departments” as equally worthy of careful 
attention.
Unlike the cool and controlled operations of intellect, the careful observation of 
the sentiments is complicated because the inherent “excitement” of the sensibilities 
“ .. .seems.. .inconsistent.. .with that calm and critical examination which is desirable” 
(11.28) in sound mental philosophy. Although a difficult situation, Upham did not believe 
it to be insurmountable, particularly if  the mental philosopher relied upon memory of the 
workings of the sentimentive nature rather than “direct consciousness” (11.28).
“Arminian” Classification of the Sensibilities 
Upham divided the sensibilities into two subdivisions, “ .. .the great divisions of 
the Natural or Pathematic [Upham borrowed the term “pathematic” from Sir James 
Mackintosh], and the Moral,” or the difference between heart and conscience. These 
subdivisions are separate but often run parallel with each other. The natural or 
pathematic sensibilities are “first in the order of time” (11.31) because they provided the 
basis for the moral sensibilities. The natural sensibilities also are “ .. .the great seat of the 
motives of men’s actions, and consequently furnishes a principal field of operations for 
the conscience to act upon” (11.31). More specifically, the natural sensibilities provide
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...a large portion of the subjects which it is the business of our moral constitution to act 
upon, scrutinize, and judge.” Still, Upham saw the development of the moral and natural 
sensibilities as occurring simultaneously (i.e., in” parallel” fashion), and therefore have a 
relation similar to that between the external and internal intellect.
It is worth noting that Upham’s familiar sounding distinction between what is 
natural and what is moral is reminiscent of Edwards’ contrast between natural and moral 
necessity. Recall that in Edwards’ thought natural and moral necessity depended upon 
natural and moral causes. Moral causes were, in brief, the manifold psychological 
phenomena associated with the will. Inclinations, desires, liking, disliking, loving, 
hating. Natural causes were, in brief, everything that stood outside of the will and could 
thwart the purposes of the will. Actions caused by moral causes are culpable, actions 
caused by natural causes are not. In Upham’s thought, the first thing to notice is that the 
entire domain of “the sensibilities” would have fallen under Edwards’ notion of moral 
causes. The fact that some of these “moral causes” may be operative in animals was 
immaterial. The inclinations in humans were of a different sort than the inclinations of 
animals because human beings posses are “moral agents,” made in the image of God and 
possessed of a “moral sense” which gives them a sense of right and wrong. Yet, it is the 
inclinations which are classified as moral and serve as the springs to action.
For Upham, the inclinations (emotions and desires) are classified as “natural.” 
Yet, since the “moral” sensibilities (i.e., the conscience) stand in judgment of the natural 
sensibilities, Upham clearly thought there was a moral element to the natural sensibilities. 
It would not be possible for the conscience to render a moral judgment of the natural 
sensibilities if this were not the case. The distinction, therefore, is peculiar and a bit
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forced. As we shall see, however, this distinction was a crucial part of Upham’s 
Arminian psychology. This Arminian psychology came at a cost, however, by narrowing 
the sphere of human impulses that can be considered “moral.” In Edwards’ universe, all 
impulses, including fleshly and earthly ones, were moral because man is the imago del.
In Upham, the moral status of impulses is brought into question because the fleshly and 
earthly ones seemed too similar to the rest of the earthly world—impulses that were fine 
for animals, but hindrances to those who would aspire to be gods.
Another way of understanding the difference between the moral and natural 
sensibilities is that they have different objects:
The one considers objects: chiefly as they have a relation to ourselves; the other, 
as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of 
their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. 
The one asks what is GOOD; the other what is RIGHT. (11.32)
So the distinction between natural and moral sensibilities has to do with the 
difference between feeling that an object is desirable and feeling that it is morally right. 
By virtue of the “moral nature” of humans, they are enabled “ .. .to act with exclusive 
reference to God, his fellow-men, and the universe” (11.33). Not surprisingly, then, the 
moral sentiments are one of the chief distinctions between brute and man. Animals have 
natural sensibilities just as humans [this contention is problematized by considering the 
sentiments Upham places under “natural,” many of which seem unique to humans], but, 
since humans also have a sense of their moral duties, they are not constrained to follow 
pleasures only. The moral sentiments can therefore be considered to be worthy of greater 
honor than the natural. From a Calvinistic perspective, however, the implications of this
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construction were undesirable. Calvinism argued that human beings ought to consider 
God their chief good. Gpham seems to he saying that it is better to consider God right 
than to love him as one’s chief good.
Upham divided the natural sensibilities into the emotions and desires, and argued 
that the former precedes the latter. Emotions “ .. .are exceedingly numerous and various,” 
and have to do with being pleased or displeased with a particular object. Desires translate 
these emotions into a want to possess. The need for this two-step process seemed quite 
obvious to Upham—after all, “to desire a thing which utterly fails to excite within us the 
least emotion of pleasure seems to be.. .impossible, from the nature of things, under any 
conceivable circumstances” (11.35-36).
The moral sensibilities have a division analogous to that of the natural or 
pathematic sensibilities. First are the moral emotions which are feelings of approval or 
disapproval, followed by feelings of obligation, or the desire to do the right thing.
The Natural Sensibilities 
The Natural Sensibilities: Emotions
Concerning the general nature of the emotions, Upham understandably thought it 
“ .. .extremely difficult to explain by words what their precise nature is,” although “we do 
not suppose.. .that any one is ignorant of what is meant when we have occasion to speak 
of an emotion” (11.39). This inability to verbally describe an emotion is due to the fact 
that they are in themselves “truly simple” (i.e., without parts) and definitions necessarily 
break up the thing defined into parts. Given the simple nature of emotion, the mental 
philosopher’s best access to emotions is through consciousness.
Nevertheless, it is possible to deepen our understanding of emotions by
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considering “circumstances” which . .throw an indirect light on them” (1.40). The order 
in which emotions appear in consciousness is such an example. Emotions (natural and 
moral) follow intellections and precede desires or feelings of moral obligation.
Upham was aware that some might find his manner of subdividing the 
sensibilities either erroneous or pedantic, or both. As if to confront this objection at an 
early stage, Upham affirmed, “These divisions we hold to be fundamental.” Forgoing 
these careful distinctions could lead to serious misunderstandings of human nature. 
Upham’s example of this focuses on volition: “important points.. .in the doctrine of the 
Will, will be found to depend upon distinetions which are asserted to exist in the 
sensibilities” (11.44). Given that Upham’s explication of the sentiments is carried out 
with a concern for volition, it is important to carefully consider this explication.
Given the great variety of emotions, Upham selected only a few for detailed 
analysis. The first emotions he chose to consider were the aesthetic—the emotions of 
beauty or taste. Emotions of beauty are always pleasing, and refer always to something 
extemal. We consider certain objects beautiful because they excite “ .. .within us pleasant 
emotions, which, in the circumstances of the ease, we cannot well ascribe to any other 
cause” (11.46). Although this psychological definition of a beautiful object might seem to 
lead in the direction of denying the reality of objective beauty, Upham did “not feel at 
liberty” (11.47) to make such a bold contention, but rather believed that God had designed 
a correspondence (or a “mutual adaptation,” 11.52) between the mind and beauty such that 
we are able to appreciate the beauty that exists in nature, in art, etc. Upham entered into 
a consideration of the objects that bring about emotions of beauty. Certain material 
objects, “ .. .such as woods, waters, cultivated fields, and the visible firmament” (11.50)
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excite these emotions, as do artistic representations of beautiful material objects. Not 
only do material objects arouse a sense of beauty, but so too do certain “intellectual and 
moral objects” (11.51). Whenever we encounter “ .. .intelligence, wisdom, truth, honour, 
magnanimity, benevolence, justice, or other traits of a mind acting as it was created and 
designed to act,” emotions of beauty are created. “Moral traits” (1.51) are also revealed 
through the relief of the poor and the defense of the weak, and these similarly awaken 
emotions of beauty. Upham recognized that people differ in their abilities to experience 
these emotions, but, since his tendency throughout the work is to focus on universals, he 
spent a good deal of time dealing with universally beautiful forms, such as the circle, and 
other things which generally bring about aesthetic emotions, such as certain colors and 
sounds.
Upham closed his chapter on aesthetic emotion asserting that “ .. .in the present 
life intellectual and moral objects are brought before our contemplation only in a 
comparatively small degree, surrounded and almost encumbered, as we are, with material 
things” (1.74). Among these intellectual and moral objects is the most “pleasing and even 
enrapturing” object that one can contemplate, “ .. .the Supreme Being.” True to his 
Protestant roots, Upham argued that when God is considered “ .. .we do not contemplate 
an outward and accessible picture, or a statue of wood and stone, but merely a complex 
internal conception, which embraces certain intellectual and moral qualities and powers, 
and excludes everything of a purely material kind” (11.74-75). The contemplation of 
“ .. .infinite wisdom, of infinite benevolence, of unsearchable power and justice...” brings 
great delight to the mind.
Although the preceding summary of Upham’s consideration of the objects which
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are associated with aesthetic emotions is not directly related to volition, it is nevertheless 
indirectly related. As we saw in the writings of Ames and Edwards, the psychology of 
volition was always closely associated with objects, usually moral ones, most typically 
God. Here too we find that Upham is able to name several moral objects. We find that 
this had changed considerably in William James.
Upham turned next to “associated beauty,” or the way objects become beautiful 
(or more beautiful) by being associated with inherently beautiful objects. Examples 
include songs and colors that are especially meaningful to particular peoples. He treated 
“emotions of sublimity,” which do not differ from other emotions of beauty in kind but in 
degree. The progression is from the “gentle and pleasant” feelings typical of general 
emotions of beauty to the “powerful and even painful” emotions of sublimity (1.91).
This topic is also related to the difficulty of “naming the object.” Upham believed 
that some objects were capable of producing such sublime emotions. For example, some 
objects are “.. .characterized by vast extent or expansion; in other words, by the attribute 
of mere horizontal amplitude.” For this reason, it was fitting that “ .. .Mr. Stewart makes 
a remark to this effect, that a Scotchman, who had never witnessed anything of the kind 
before, would experience an emotion approaching to sublimity on beholding for the first 
time the vast plains of Salisbury and Yorkshire in England” (11.92). The ocean is “one of 
the most sublime objects” (11.93) that can be contemplated. Great height, great depth, a 
lion’s roar, a choir, the trumpet, power, etc. are all examples of sublime objects.
Likewise, heroic moral action is a sublime object:
The man who, in support of some great moral or religious principle, not only 
surrenders his property, but calmly and triumphantly sacrifices his life, is, in the
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highest sense, a sublime object of contemplation. (1.98)
In the midst of his discussion of the emotions of sublimity, Upham also 
introduced another category used to describe emotions based upon objects which are too 
full and expansive to be called objects of beauty, yet not full and expansive enough to be 
called sublime. These objects produce ''emotions o f grandeur" (1.100). “The meandering 
river is beautiful; as it becomes deeper and wider, it assumes an appearance, not of mere 
beauty, but of grandeur; but the ocean only is more than either, is sublime.”
Upham was careful to guard against the supposition that emotions of sublimity are 
merely subjective states with no correspondence to reality. “We have good reason to 
believe that the Creative principle of the universe, who gave birth in the mind to the 
faculty or susceptibility of these emotions, has also established certain objects, and 
certain forms and conditions of objects as antecedent, by a fixed and original law of 
correspondence, to THE SUBLIME within us” (I.lOl).
A characteristic that separates Upham’s treatment from Ames, is that Ames’s text 
is an in-depth contemplation upon the ultimate Object of the universe, and a 
consideration of how human subjects are to react to that being. Upham spoke of God in 
more general terms than Ames, and was interested in how a variety of meaningful and 
even sublime objects influence the soul. This difference touches upon some significant 
differences between a sectarian and nonsectarian approach to psychology. The God- 
centered approach of Puritan sectarianism was perhaps quite narrow compared to the 
world-affirming psychology of Thomas Upham. Not only is Upham capable of admiring 
God, but he also stands in awe of oceans and works of art. Yet, while both psychologies 
were dependent upon culturally-accepted norms, only one psychology was based upon a
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culture with mechanisms which could sustain these norms. While Ames carefully 
described the theological and institutional requirements for the propagation of the gospel, 
Upham attempted to secure his moral world on the shifting sand of consciousness.
Another topic related to the “object” is Upham’s consideration of “Taste,” which 
he defined as the “ .. .the power of judging of the beauty or deformity of objects, founded 
on the experience of emotions, particularly those of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity”
(11.105). This was a hit of a digression for Upham since he considered taste to he an 
intelleetual rather than an emotional power. Taste “ .. .sit[s] in judgment on emotions...”
(11.106). Although all people have the raw equipment to develop taste, only a few 
actually develop it. If one desires to become a “ .. .man of taste,” it is necessary to 
undergo “ .. .a course of training and discipline,” which includes the examination of the 
“ .. .emotions which are excited in his own bosom,” and a comparison of these emotions 
to those of others (II. 107).
Considering the question of the “permanency of beauty,” Upham asked 
“.. .whether we are to regard beauty as truly real and permanent, or as accidental and 
transitory.” Upham was convinced that beauty (i.e., non-associated beauty) “ .. .has its 
foundation in nature, possesses its fixed causes and relations, and may justly be regarded, 
in respect to the human mind at least, as something permanent” (11.109). To prove the 
point, Upham referred to the fact that “ .. .beauty in the first instance is original, and not 
associated.” If this were not the case, our conceptions of beauty would change rapidly. 
Secondly, notions of beauty have remained fairly consistent “ .. .from the beginning of 
time down to the present hour” (II.l 10). A twenty-first century reader of these arguments 
will likely read them with a degree of skepticism, an indication that the “foimdations”
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which Upham was laying were not nearly as secure as he had originally thought.
Upham closed his section on the emotions with a chapter on the emotions of the 
ludicrous, which are based upon . ..our perception of some incongruity in the person or 
thing which is the cause of [the emotion]” (II. 111), and on “other simple emotions.” The 
chapter on other simple emotions briefly focused upon feelings which were “not less 
important,” but which are not generally difficult to explain. Cheerfulness, joy, gladness, 
melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, wonder, dissatisfaction, displeasure, 
disgust, diffidence, modesty, shame, regard, reverence and adoration are all given a brief 
description. Adoration involves an object “ .. .without weakness and possessed of every 
possible perfection.” This emotion is properly ascribed only to “the Supreme Being.” 
His description of this object is helpful once again to gain insight into the religious 
element of Upham’s thought;
The wisdom of the wisest men is often perplexed with errors; the goodness of the 
best of men is marred by occasional infirmities; how much deeper, therefore, and 
purer, and more elevated will be our sentiments of veneration, when directed 
towards Him whose wisdom never fails, and who is not only just and kind in his 
administrations, but the original and inexhaustible source of beneficence and 
rectitude! (1.124)
Upham concluded this section by reminding his readers that his treatment of the 
emotions was not intended to be exhaustive.
The Natural Sensibilities: Desires
The second aspect of the natural sensibilities that Upham discussed was desire. 
Desire, like emotion, is a simple state of mind and therefore resists definition and can be
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known only through consciousness. Yet, as was the case in his eonsideration of emotion, 
Upham turned to the “circumstances” which surround desires to shed light upon the topie.
One primary reason Upham thought that a careful consideration of desire was 
important was that it is closely related to the topic of will. Desires never follow 
intellections immediately, but are always preceded by emotions, i.e., mental states which 
predicate a degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness to the object. Upham thought it a 
“fixed law of the mind” that “ .. .no man ever desired an object, or could by any 
possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always 
been in a state of perfect indifferency” (11.129). Upham’s rejection of indifference as a 
spring of action is certainly reminiscent of Edwards. Yet, as we see, Upham thought of 
desires (or motives) much as Chubb had: in a way that Edwards found incomprehensible: 
motives only potentially but not infallibly move the will. At this point Upham offered a 
brief summary of his entire psychological system which is worth quoting simply for that
reason:
The general division of the Mind, it will be recollected, is into the Intellect, the 
Sensibilities, and the Will. The Extemal or Sensuous Intellect is first brought into 
action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the development of the 
Intemal or Super-sensuous. The subsequent process of the mental action, when 
earried through in the direction of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, is from 
intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts 
of the will. When earried through in the direction of the Moral sensibilities, it is 
from intellections to emotions (not natural, but moral emotions); and then, 
diverging into a different track, and avoiding the appropriate domain of the
406
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral obligation, and from the 
Obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the sensibilities, to the 
region of the Voluntary or Volitional nature. (11.130)
The only exception to this pattern is that of instinctive action which appears at times to 
take place without emotion.
Desires also “ .. .always have an object,” usually “ .. .a distinct and well defined 
one” (11.132). The relation between desire and the object of desire is quite close. “The 
desires lean upon the object which they have in view as a sort of pillar of support; they 
may be said, with strict truth at the bottom of the expression, to cling around it, as the 
vine encircles and rests itself upon the elm.” This is different from emotions that are less 
stable and move more quickly from object to object. There is also a hedonic element to 
desire: the attainment of the object desired is accompanied with pleasure. Desires vary in 
intensity, and are made more intense indirectly through more distinct and clear 
conceptions, which have an influence on the emotions.
The characteristic of desire most relevant to the topic of volition is that it is “as 
Mr. Hobbes would term it, a motive state of the mind.” The existence of desire increases 
the probability of motion, and places the mental and bodily faculties “in the attitude of 
movement.” Here Upham again provides a glimpse into the multi-step psychology of 
volition that he will expound. In order for desire to actually produce movement, a “more 
remote” power of the mind “ .. .must be consulted...,” that is, the Will. “If the Will 
decidedly opposes the desire, its tendency is, of course, frustrated in the object aimed at.” 
Nevertheless, the “tendency” of the desire towards its object remains even after the will 
squelches its expression.
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This tendency toward action is unique to the desires (and, in the case of the moral 
sensibilities, the feelings of moral obligation). Intellectual states and emotional states do 
no have this characteristic. If intellect existed apart from desire, human beings would be 
reduced to “.. .being[s] of speculation merely.” Likewise, if emotion existed apart from 
desire, human nature “ .. .would be like a ship anchored in the centre of the ocean, 
agitated, and thrown up and down on the rising and falling billows, but wholly incapable 
of any movement in latitude or longitude” (II. 134). The only thing that keeps desire 
from expressing itself is the will, which acts like a doorkeeper. “It is the office of the 
Will, as a separate and relatively a higher part of our nature, to act in reference to this 
tendency, either in checking or aiding, in annulling or consummating it” (11.134).
These are the basic characteristics of desire, and Upham conceded that the 
discussion could be concluded at that point were it not for the fact that desire is “subject 
to many modifications” (11.135). Upham argued that there are four basic variations of 
desire in the human experience: Instinets, Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections, 
and spend the vast majority of his time on this topic analyzing each of these topics. With 
the exeeption of the instincts, Upham believed that each of these desires ean exist in 
instinctive and in voluntary forms. When “inquiry and reflection” are not possible, the 
desires take on an instinctive quality, as we shall see. Upham thought this was significant 
when considering the mind from “a moral point of view” (11.136).
The Varieties of Desire: Instincts. Instincts are desires “ .. .existing under a 
particular and definite modifieation.” More specifically, instincts “ .. .are fixed or 
invariable tendencies to do certain things, without previous forethought and deliberation” 
(11.136). They exist in human, but to a lesser extent than in animals. This is part of
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God’s design in nature. The lower animals lack reason, but “the provident oversight of 
the Supreme Being, without whose notice not a sparrow falleth to the ground, has met 
this deficiency by endowing them with instincts, the most various in kind, and strikingly 
adapted to the exigencies of their situation.” Examples of this are found in bird nests, 
beaver houses, migrational patterns and “.. .in a multitude of other instances” (II. 137). 
Although the topic of animal instincts is a “ .. .one of exceeding interest both to the 
philosopher and the Christian,” Upham thought the topic was off-topic given that instinct 
does not play a large role in human activity. Still, humans do have instincts. For 
example, respiration, sucking and swallowing, and the desire for self-preservation are all 
instinctual. Although Upham thought that over-emphasis on instincts in human beings 
“undoubtedly” could be carried “too far” (11.142), he saw these things as God-given 
adaptations. Although less admirable than other characteristics of human nature, their 
usefulness was great. They were designed to “...protect us in those cases where reason 
cannot come seasonably to our aid,” and are therefore a “ .. .necessary part of our 
constitution” (II. 143).
The Varieties of Desire: Appetites. Next up the ladder of desires are appetites, the 
primary examples being hunger and thirst. Consistent with Victorian propriety, sex is not 
even mentioned as an appetite. These desires are found in man and brute and “ .. .take 
their rise from the body,” are occasional (i.e., not constant) in their appearance, and are 
accompanied with uneasiness. Appetites, like instincts, are God-given and therefore 
cannot be considered selfish or morally wrong, although they are susceptible to being 
misused. Prolonged gratification of an appetite can lead to “slavery.” Upham quoted 
Dugald Stewart to this effect: “In proportion as this passion is gratified, its influence over
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the conduct becomes the more irresistible (for all the active determinations of our nature 
are strengthened by habit), till at last we struggle in vain against its tyranny. A man so 
enslaved by bis animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and 
contemptible forms” (11.146). The moral import of the appetites is magnified by the fact 
that “artificial” appetites can be developed through the immoderate consumption of 
things such as tobacco, opium, and “inebriating liquors.”
Appetites can also be instinctive or voluntary. When an object is pursued as an 
ultimate end, the impulse to that object can be considered instinctive. But when an object 
is pursued not as an end itself, but for the pleasure that accompanies the object, the 
appetite can then be considered voluntary. Although this pursuit of pleasure can lead to 
“turbulent and violent” appetites, Upbam thought that “ .. .we may avail ourselves of the 
aid of other principles of the mind to subject them to a degree of restraint, to regulate, 
and, in a certain sense, to cultivate them.” This ability renders these appetites voluntary. 
As merely instinctual desires, appetites are neither good nor bad, but are simply adaptive. 
“It is only so far as they are voluntary, so far as they can be reached and controlled by the 
will, that they can by any possibility be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious.” Only 
those “exercises.. .which are subordinate to the influence of the will” can be considered 
moral exercises (11.148).
The Varieties of Desire: Propensities. The Propensities come next in the 
hierarchy of desires. Upbam did not attempt to define the propensities, but began to 
simply list examples. His first example is the propensity for self-preservation, or “the 
desire for continuance of existence” (1.149). The exercise of this propensity can be either 
instinctive (e.g., protecting oneself against a sudden and unexpected fall) or voluntary
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(i.e., when done with deliberation). As long as the exercises of self-preservation do not 
violate “an unperverted conscience,” they are “always morally good” (11.151).
Curiosity, or the love of knowledge is another propensity Upham considered from 
a moral point of view, determining when its exercises are instinctive and when voluntary. 
Imitativeness, approhativeness (the desire for esteem), and acquisitiveness (the desire to 
possess) are discussed. The discussion of acquisitiveness advocates private ownership: 
“What sin can there possibly be in desire to expand the range of that existence.. .provided 
it be done with a suitable regard to the relations and the claims of all other beings! So far 
from being a sin, it is a duty” (1.163). The desire to possess can become “inordinately 
strong,” and must he controlled. Similarly, the propensity and desire for power is 
morally good unless it becomes inordinately strong:
If it [the desire for power] be kept in subordination to the dictates of an 
enlightened conscience, and to the feelings and duties we owe to the Supreme 
Being, its exercise is virtuous. If, on the contrary, it acquires inordinate strength, 
as it is very likely to do, and is excessive in its operation, pushing us forward to 
the pmsuit of forbidden objects and the invasion of others’ rights, it then becomes 
vicious. (II.167)
Upham’s consideration of the propensity to “utter the truth,” is telling on a 
theological level. Truth telling is human nature, there is “ . . ..abundant reason to regard as 
original or connatural to the mind.” Ljdng, on the other hand, is “against nature,” and 
violates the very “ .. .structure of the Pathematic.. .[and] the Moral Sensibilities.” A 
person deliberately lying goes against “ .. .the natural current of the Desires.” Exceptions 
to this rule are rare. Upham listed two cases in which lying become more common.
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First, when the impulse to tell the truth is . .perverted by the influence of evil example 
or some other unfavourable cause;” and second, when there is some . .original mental 
malformation.” Upham thought that the consequences of lying were quite serious, since 
“ .. .the utterance of a very few falsehoods will be likely to destroy.. .[a person’s] 
reputation forever” (11.168).
This passage is very clearly a departure from the notions of human sinfulness held 
by Ames and Edwards. Ames, like all theologians, thought that the Decalogue was still 
morally binding, including the command against lying. Yet, far from being the “natural 
current of the Desires,” Ames thought that disobedience to the ninth commandment was 
the norm rather than the exception. As such, Upham appears as a kind of pathologizer of 
sin, one who sees sin as applying to a few sorry individuals, but not himself.
Further, Upham’s distinction between instinctive and voluntary truth-telling is 
also very helpful in distinguishing his psychology from the Puritan model that prevailed 
in the texts of Ames and Edwards. In the ease of instinctive truth-telling a person simply 
utters the truth, as they do “a thousand times a day.. .without stopping to reflect whether 
it is a matter of duty...” This is not a morally virtuous action. When a person is tempted 
lie, however, “ .. .an effort of the W ill...” is made to “check” the evil impulse. This 
checking actually runs counter to the desire to lie, and is based upon “the mere dictates of 
conscience” (11.169). Only in this case is the action meritorious.
It may be recalled that Edwards’ understanding of the case was exactly opposite.
It is more virtuous to tell the truth without any inclination to lie than with such an 
inclination. Further, Edwards thought that it would be impossible to resist the temptation 
to lie if  it indeed were the strongest motive. Upham’s comment about “the mere dictates
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of conscience” sheds light on a crucial distinction here. For Edwards, motives were like 
weights in a balance: the balance will tip to the side with the most weight. Upham’s 
ingenious if implausible solution was to make a rigid distinction between types of 
motives: natural and moral motives. The “mere dictates of conscience” in Upham’s 
psychology were, in actuality, not “mere” at all. Rather, since they remained unscathed 
and unmixed by the natural desires, they could usually provide a way out of a tempting 
situation.
Such a partitioning of the motives would seem implausible in the era of the New 
Psychology, given its desire to refer mental states to the nervous system. Since there is 
no indication that there are two completely independent types of motives, Upham’s 
Arminian psychology would eventually fall.
Upham also briefly mentioned the propensity to self-love, or “ .. .the desire of 
enjoyment or happiness,” which he considered to be as natural as the desire for 
knowledge or the esteem of others. This powerful motive causes people to plan for the 
future, and to flee from danger. Even Scripture sanctions the pursuit of happiness in God. 
When self-love is perverted it is called selfishness, and “ .. .is always sinful, as existing in 
violation of what is due to others, and at variance with the will of God” (1.171). Upham 
summarized, “self-love is the principle which a holy God has given; selfishness is the 
loathsome superstructure which man, in the moments of his rebellion and sin, has erected 
upon it.” The fact that human sinfulness is confined to “moments” is another indication 
that Upham’s view of human nature was worlds away from that of Edwards and Ames.
Selfishness is an inordinate manifestation of self-love, and, manifests itself in 
“pride, vanity, and arrogance.” For example, pride is “ .. .a desire that others.. .should be
413
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
made sensible of what we suppose to be our superiority” (1.172).
Upham’s final propensity, “the desire for society,” or sociality, likewise illustrates 
some of the important theological differences between Upham and his Puritan forebears, 
differences which are all highly relevant to the shape of Upham’s psychology and to the 
plausibility of his psychology in the late nineteenth century. Further, the political 
motivations in this section reveal that Upham was indeed a public philosopher, interested 
in maintaining the belief that democracy is not only a feasible system of government, but 
also one that is required by human nature itself.
Upham thought that sociality was a subject worthy of careful consideration 
because of its great importance. Upham argued that people have “ .. .a desire of the 
company or society of their fellow-men” (11.175). He took objection to calling this desire 
“selfism” because the propensity to society is as an ultimate end, rather than something 
that is pursued for the pleasure that accompanies it. True enough, pleasure accompanies 
the satisfaction of this desire (as is the case in all desires), but this pleasure is not the end 
of the desire in its pure form. Upham apparently thought that this propensity typically 
remained pure, but that it could turn into a selfish desire when perverted. Not 
surprisingly, Upham took exception to the view of Thomas Hobbes, who thought that 
human beings do not enjoy one another’s company and live in society simply because the 
cost of living alone is too high. To the contrary, Upham thought “ .. .the general rule.. .is, 
that man is a social being, seeking and delighting in the society of his fellow-men”
(11.177). Upham had theological motivations for upholding this doctrine. If humans are 
not social creatures, then one could impugn the Creator:
If he be destitute of this principle, it may be said, with no small degree of
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plausibility, that he is not fitted with entire wisdom to those circumstances in 
which he is actually placed. But this state of things would obviously be at 
variance with the analogy of nature in other cases, and would seem to imply not 
only a deficiency of wisdom, but a want of goodness also in the Supreme Being.
(11.177)
Just as “the wing of the bird is precisely adapted to the air,” so too is man well 
adapted to the social situation in which he is found. If, on the contrary, human beings are 
actually repulsed by one another, society would be “scatter[ed].. .in a thousand 
directions!” (11.178). After providing proof after proof of humanity’s social nature, 
Upham returned to . .the strange notion of Hobbes.. .that man is kept in society only by 
the fear of what he significantly calls the Leviathan; that is to say, of Civil Society in the 
exercise of force” (11.190). Although the civil government has a role, the true 
foundations of society are to be found in the human propensity for society. Interestingly, 
and appropriately, Upham concluded his chapter on the love of society, and the section 
on the propensities, with a brief consideration of hope. When we believe that the thing 
that we desire is attainable, we have a “pleasant emotion” and a “glow of happiness.” 
Perhaps Upham’s strong resistance to Hobbes’ notions was in the interests of preserving 
hope in the American way (Delbanco, 1999).
The Varieties of Desire: Affections. For Upham, the affections held the highest 
place among the natural sensibilities. The hierarchy of our sensibilities is rooted in 
consciousness. “It may be difficult to explain how it happens, but it is unquestionably the 
fact, that there is a difference in the sentiments of esteem with which we contemplate 
different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less
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honour” (11.193). Upham against felt entirely comfortable utilizing the universal “we” as 
a foundation for his moral views.
Generally speaking, following Kames, affections are emotions accompanied with 
desire. Yet the affections can be divided into two major subgroups, the malevolent and 
benevolent. Upham began his analysis of affections with the malevolent type.
Malevolent affections generally “ .. .include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire 
of evil to the unpleasant object.” By way of contrast, benevolent affections are generally 
characterized by pleasant emotions “.. .accompanied with a desire of good to the pleasing 
object.” The term “passions” can be considered with affections thus understood.
“Resentment or Anger” is the foundational malevolent affection. Anger is 
composed of an unpleasant feeling “ .. .accompanied with the desire of inflicting 
unpleasantness or pain on the object towards which it is directed” (11.194). Resentment 
or anger can be instinctive, occurring “without thought” (11.195). This form of character 
is neither morally good or evil and is, like the other instinctive reactions, implanted in us 
by the Creator for our protection. The fact that instinct occur without thought is the key to 
their amorality. Only acts which originate in the intellect can be considered moral: “It is 
the glory of the moral nature that it lays back, if  we may be allowed the expressions, of 
the intellective nature; and that it does not and carmot act, independently of the 
antecedent action, to a greater or less extent, of the intellect” (11.196). Upham here leans 
in an intellectualist direction, since the work of the intellect in moral acts goes beyond 
mere specification of an object. Instead the “ .. .perceptive and comparing acts of the 
intellect” are always involved in moral action.
Voluntary or “deliberate” anger or resentment is opposed to the instinctive
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variety. In instinctive anger the final cause (i.e., the ohject) of the anger is protection. In 
voluntary anger the final cause is “ .. .not only protection, but justice.” Only this 
retributive form of anger can be judged from a moral point of view. Upham thought that 
resentment could be justified morally on natural (as opposed to Scriptural) grounds, but 
that this affection “is particularly liable to a perverted and excessive action” (II.197-I98). 
Upham argued that “nature.. .herself instituted some checks on the undue exercise of this 
passion” (11.198). For example, the feeling of resentment is painful and unpleasant. 
Secondly, resentment contradicts our natural desire for the esteem of others, and third, it 
contradicts our desire to esteem ourselves. Upham thought the outward expression of 
anger was most unbecoming: “the mere outward signs of the angry passions give a shock 
to our sensibilities, and are hateful to us, while those of an opposite character beam upon 
the soul with the pleasantness of a tranquil morning’s light” (11.199). Not able to 
constrain himself to nature’s helps, Upham also turned to “reason and Scripture” to 
further assist his reader in conquering resentment. The passion of anger prevents a 
person from reasoning correctly, leads us to incorrectly impute vicious motives to others, 
and offends “the Supreme Being.” Indeed, the consideration of one’s own sinfulness 
should prevent taking inordinate offense:
If we ourselves were without sin, if we could boast of perfect purity of character, 
there might seem to be some degree of reasonableness in our exacting from others 
the full amount of what is due to perfect and inflexible rectitude. But the actual 
state of things is far different from this. Every one who knows his own heart must 
see and feel himself to be a transgressor. How unsuitably, therefore, to the 
circumstances of his own situation does that man conduct, who talks largely of
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satisfaction and revenge, when he is every moment dependent on the clemency 
and forgiveness of a Being whom he has himself so often sinned against. (11.200) 
Given Upham’s tendency to stress the general innocence of human nature and the general 
ability of human beings to live moral lives, this comment is indeed surprising. It is an 
illustration, perhaps, of the awkward task of reconeiling two incompatible approaches to 
human nature: the Reformed Protestant and the Enlightened. To be fair, Upham most 
probably did not see any contradiction in his assumptions.
These considerations gave Upham an opportunity to exult in the superiority of 
“the Christian Code,” sinee the command to love our enemies is “ .. .one of the great and 
striking characteristics of the Gospel revelation,” which “obviously” sets the gospel apart 
from “every other” code. Upham, continuing in this strain, offers a rare 
acknowledgement of the exclusivity implied in this explicitly Christian morality. “But it 
is to he remembered,” Upham reminded his readers, that the commands of Christ “ .. .are 
addressed to his own followers.” Sounding now like William Ames, Upham argued that 
these followers of Christ are “ .. .destined to be fashioned over his own pattern and 
image.” These Christians therefore exist “ .. .on a different and higher plane of being” 
(11.201).
Upham assumed that most of his readers were among those destined to be 
fashioned into Christ’s image. Given this “ .. .supposition that we are Christians after the 
pattem of Christ, and that our life is a life of truth, and goodness, and love.. Upham 
thought that he could admonish his readers as Christians. So, “while those who are on a 
lower plane” may be expected to “return blow for blow,” the “true Christian” is disposed 
to show mercy. Although Upham thought that this was “not merely an imperative
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dogmatism” but also “a divine philosophy,” the Calvinistic dogma of this passage is 
unmistakable. Yet so too is the desire to propagate a nonsectarian Christianity manifest 
in his assumption that all his readers would embrace his diffusive and tepid theology.
The explicit inclusion of such Calvinistic dogma highlights one of the central 
conundrums faced by the “old psychology:” the relation between religion, science, and 
society. Upham, consistent with Ames and Edwards, acknowledges here that there is a 
difference between Christian and other forms of morality, and strongly affirms the 
superiority of the Christian form. Yet, more often than not, the moral reasoning of 
Upham was supposed to be “neutral” and “universal,” based upon natural rather than 
special (i.e., biblical) revelation. Upham rarely thought that the two moralities 
contradicted, which is evidence that Upham’s “neutral” moral intuitions were shaped by 
Christian doctrine. Upham would probably have acknowledged this on some level. After 
all, at the very beginning of Mental Philosophv, Upham acknowledged that his book was 
written with a desire for and faith in “Divine assistance” (I.ii), indicating that he wanted 
his work to be done in accordance with the will of the Christian God. Therefore we can 
perhaps assume that “neutrality” and “imiversal” were terms regarding the nonsectarian 
intuitions of evangelicals rather than the intuitions of all people. As such, the shape and 
content of Upham’s nonsectarian psychology could be sustained in the evangelical world 
of the antebellum American college. Yet, in an increasingly diverse American, non­
evangelical psychologists could and would use the same language of universality to very 
different ends.
However surprising Upham’s forays into the negative side of human nature may 
be, he more than adequately made up for this unpleasant digression in his section on the
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benevolent affeetions. A simple indication that Upham preferred to emphasize the 
“positive” side of life is that his chapter on the benevolent affections (48 pages) is three 
times as long as his chapter on the malevolent affections (16 pages). It is perhaps also 
telling that he seems to fall back into a more Calvinistic line of thinking only when 
considering the negative side of human feeling.
Just as resentment is the basic malevolent affection, love is the foundation of the 
benevolent affections. Like all affections, love is a complex mental state whieh includes 
a pleasant feeling or emotion and a desire to do good to the object which elicits this 
feeling. Therefore, the object loved will always appear to have “some quality” which 
seems lovable.
There are, of course, many degrees of love, from weak to strong, and exists in 
different forms. He distinguishes love for children, parents, siblings, humanity, country, 
and also friendship, gratitude and sympathy.
As was the case with appetites, propensities and the malevolent affections,
Upham thought that love could be divided into voluntary and instinctive forms. Parental 
affection can serve as an example. Parental affection is the strong love that parents have 
toward their children, in which the child is seen “.. .not so much a distinct and 
independent being as a reproduction and continuance of himself ’ (11.210). Parental 
affection, which is among the deepest loves that a human being can experience, also 
serves to enable parents to carry out parental duties. Upham thought it an “acknowledged 
fact” that this affection is “implanted” in the human mind by “the Author of the mind 
himself.” Voluntary exercises of parental affection depend upon the exercise of the will 
and arise from “mere volitional determination.” This quote again agrees with the idea
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that Upham believed in a self-determining will. Yet his psyehology of volition was also a 
modified intellectualism, sinee . .voluntary action [is] based upon inquiry and 
reason...” In contrast to all this, instinctive parental love “has no other support than in 
nature” (11.211).
Upham applies this kind of analysis to two other family-related affections, the 
filial affection (love to parents), the fraternal affection (love to siblings). These three 
types of affection fall under the general head of “the Domestic affections,” and are
.. ..evidence of that benevolence and wisdom which are seen so frequently in the 
arrangements of our mental nature. These affeetions are not only sources of 
happiness to individuals and families, diffusing an undefinable but powerful 
charm over the intercourse of life; they also indirectly exert a great influence in 
the support of society generally. (11.218)
Upham’s comment that domestic affection is a great “support of society” is distinguished 
from that “strange notion” of Plato that domestic affections somehow are somehow in 
tension with “the love of country” (11.218). To the contrary:
It is unquestionable, that one of the great supports of society is the family relation. 
Who is most watchful and diligent in his business? Who is the most constant 
friend of public order, and is most prompt in rallying to the standard of the law? 
Who, as a general thing, is the best fiiend, the best neighbour, and the best 
citizen? Not he who is set loose from family relationships, and wanders abroad 
without a home; but he, however poor and unknown to fame, who has a father and 
mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters; who sees his own sorrows and 
happiness multiplied in the sorrows and happiness of those around him; and who
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is strong in the advocacy and support of the common and public good, not only 
because it involves his own personal interest, but the interest and happiness of all 
those who are linked arm in arm with himself by the beauty and sacredness of 
domestic ties. (11.219)
Upham here not only supports the nineteenth-century American “cult of domesticity,” but 
also takes the role of public philosopher supporting the American way of self-government 
and democracy. Regarding the cult of domesticity, Upham did have the tendency to 
idealize motherhood, as will become clear below. Still, he did not advocate a strict moral 
difference between men and women:
.. .the testimony of the traveler Ledyard, who expressly says: “I have always 
remarked that women, in all countries, are civil and obliging, tender and humane.- 
To a woman, whether civilized or savage, I never addressed myself in the 
language of decency and friendship without receiving a decent and friendly 
answer.” In man, undoubtedly, there is more hardihood of character, and the 
benevolent affections are less lively. There are some things in his situation, also, 
as the defense of the community rests chiefly upon him, which are calculated to 
draw out and to impart inordinate strength to the resentful feelings. But it is 
absurd to suppose that there is a radical difference in the benevolent sensibilities 
of man and woman; and while sentiments of the most friendly and affectionate 
regard towards the human race are acknowledged to exist in woman’s heart, that 
man is naturally either indifferent or hostile to his fellowman. The language in 
both cases, from man as well as from woman, and from black as well as from 
white, when nature, unperverted by adverse influences, is left to itself, is the
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same. “ The poor white man, faint and weary, came and sat imder our tree. Let us 
pity the white man.” (11.227).
Another important part of Upham’s analysis is whether the benevolent affeetions 
could be considered morally meritorious. Although he thought that the benevolent 
affections were “certainly” the highest of all the natural sensibilities, and were “innocent 
and good” they still were not necessarily to be considered morally meritorious. Once 
again, Upham made recourse to the distinction between instinctual and voluntary action. 
When a mother hears a child’s scream of pain she automatically and “.. .impetuously 
rushes to its relief.” Although a "naturally" good action, it is still not virtuous since 
many “brute animals” are capable of similar behavior. As is the case in other instances, 
Upham says that the mother’s love is virtuous only when voluntary, and the classic 
“Arminian” example is when affections are actually at a low ebb and the choice is made 
to act lovingly anyway. Again, this notion of virtue is quite opposed to that advocated by 
Edwards, in which strong and unmixed desire for the good is most meritorious.
In the context Upham thought it “proper” to mention that “a theological or 
religious difficulty is presented...” in view of these issues. Christian experience often 
points to an external source of virtue, i.e., God. Since virtue is a “gift of God” it seems 
improper to consider it “ .. .a thing of their own voluntary creation.” Although Upham 
conceded that “ .. .Christian love.. .is the gift of God rather than a purely volitive or 
voluntary product...” (11.221), he also argued that there is no contradiction with his 
psychological system on this point. The harmony between the two viewpoints if  found in 
the fact that “ .. .Christian love...” always includes “.. .the consent of the understanding 
and the harmonious concurrence of the W ill...” (11.222). How this answers the objection
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is unclear. What is clear is that Upham had a sense of the tension that his Arminian 
impulses created vis-a-vis Calvinism. Upham’s godlike will did have a degree of 
autonomy that Ames, for example, would have claimed denied God the glory of being the 
sole source of efficiency.
This passage is another example of the fuzzy boundaries between religion and 
psychology in Upham’s thought, and the awkward and ultimately unreconcilable dual 
role of being both a “Christian” and a “neutral” psychologist at the same time. As such 
this passage illustrates the awkward and gradual transition from a thoroughly religious to 
a thoroughly secular form of psychology in America. Upham typically writes as if virtue 
is possible for all people, i.e., he never explicitly says that he is writing only about 
Christians. Yet, in this passage he embraces, in a manner entirely consistent with Ames 
and Edwards, the Puritan paradox that Christian love originates in God, yet also, because 
of God’s work, exists in the soul as well. It seems that there are two possible ways that 
Upham could have explained this apparent contradiction. One is to say that non- 
Christian virtue is also the “gift of God,” yet to do this would be to contradict his earlier 
assertion that Christian operate on a higher moral level than non-Christians. The other 
resolution would be to simply say that non-Christian virtue does not require God’s help: 
that non-Christians have an autonomous source of virtue that Christians simply do not 
possess. Neither position would have been unacceptable to Upham.
Regarding the question of love for humanity, Upham argued that there are three 
possibilities in this regard: Indifference, hostility, or love. Upham accepted a qualified 
version of the third position—although humans do possess a love for humanity, it is a 
weak affection that “ .. .falls far short of the Scriptural requisition...” (11.224) since it is
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always hindered by selfishness. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to find someone so 
selfish that he does not subordinate his interests to the interests of the . .universal 
brotherhood...” of mankind (11.225). Further examples of this universal benevolence, 
Upham argued, in the general kindness that one experiences while traveling abroad, and 
in the existence of “benevolent institutions,” such as hospitals, asylums, and charity 
schools. Upham’s desire to find benevolence in all people is evidenced by his comment 
that although benevolent institutions thrive most in “Christian countries” (11.228; and 
undoubtedly Upham thought America a Christian country), one may still find such 
institutions in other lands. Yet, not to be caught making an overly controversial 
statement, Upham re-affirmed that “ .. .those nations not enlightened by Christianity...” 
manifest a form of benevolence that is sub-standard (11.228). “Fleathen or Pagan” 
benevolence may be “a feeble existence,” but the fact that it exists at all was significant 
to Upham— h^e devotes several pages to prove the point that people do have a measure of 
benevolence, confronting the major arguments against the assertion (e.g., the existence of 
war) as he proceeded. Yet, although Ames and Edwards would have given the credit for 
such benevolence to God’s “common grace,” Upham seems to think it is simply an 
“attribute of human nature” (11.228).
“One of the most important modifications” of the love of mankind is patriotism, 
or the love of country. Although Upham does duly note the potential harm associated 
with a “disproportionate” patriotism that exalts country over humanity, he did endorse 
patriotism. When good is done to one’s own country, good is done to all humanity 
(11.236-237). Upham closes his consideration of benevolent affeetions to humans with a 
brief consideration of pity and gratitude.
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Given that this dissertation hopes to demonstrate continuity between the four eras 
represented in this textbook, Upham’s next section is of particular interest. This section 
deals with the most exalted of all the benevolent affections, love to God. The 
consideration of love to God is necessary “in order to preserve the other principles of 
human nature in the position which the great Author of that nature has assigned to them, 
and to render their action just in itself and harmonious in its relations” (11.243). Upham 
believed that humanity was created to function best when it loved God the most. He 
hoped to base this belief on rational argumentation from “Analogy.” As he argued in 
volume one, argument by analogy is based upon observed consistencies and imiformities 
in nature. These known consistencies which apply in one known thing are applied to an 
unknown thing.
Upham began his argument from analogy noticing that “in all the departments of 
the mind, so far as it has hitherto passed under our examination, we have seen evidences 
of contrivance and wisdom; everything has its place, adaptations, and uses; and nothing, 
so far as we can judge, is done imperfectly.” The Intellect and the Sensibilities both 
exhibit this exquisite adaptiveness and design. The affections in particular are well 
adapted to sustain family, country and humanity. If this is the case that we have love 
implanted toward these comparably lower entities, then surely we must also have a love 
toward the infinitely great being. There seems to be a lack of consistency in this 
argument. Upham makes a good case that there is an adaptiveness to human-oriented 
loves, but he does not argue that there is an adaptiveness in loving God. Perhaps he 
thought such an adaptiveness were self-evident, but this again would show the degree to 
which he relied upon shared cultural assumptions.
426
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
upham also turned to Scripture to argue that human beings have a naturally 
implanted love for God. His argument is at odds with Ames and Edwards because he 
argues human beings were created with a love to God, but does not mention the fall of 
man. Instead, he stresses that we are made in God’s image, and this image includes the 
intellectual capability for “ .. .a wise and full consideration of the relations of things” 
(11.245). Guided by this capability, human beings must have been created with love for 
God since intellect shows that God is most worthy of love. After developing an argument 
from scripture, Upham cautiously concludes that “originally” love to God “was an 
essential element of human nature...” (11.247). At the present moment, this love to God 
“is, or ought to be” operative in human nature. When humans love God they operate in 
the way they were designed to operate. Further, it is the lack of love to God which 
explains human evil.
Like the other affections, love to God can be found in instinctive and voluntary 
forms. The instinctive form is found in the fact that “all nations.. .are foimd groping after 
God” in the multiplicity of human religious expression. Voluntary love to God is 
understood as something that is added to the dictates of reason and the affections of the 
heart. Upham’s Arminian God created humanity with a free will that God himself could 
not override:
But God.. .in giving man the mighty and crowning power of the will, which, in 
thus constituting the completion of his being, made him a true son of God, gave 
him a power which He could not violate. It is a great truth, which we propose 
more fully to consider at a future time, that God does not, and cannot, interfere 
with the action of the human will in any sense which implies a violation of its
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freedom. (11.248)
This highly revealing quote demonstrates how far Upham was from Ames and Edwards. 
For these theologians, God was the fountain of every good thing, including the efficiency 
to do good. God’s efficiency was uncaused, originating only in himself. Yet, for the 
sake of his own glory would communicate efficiency to human beings. Calvinists were 
therefore content with possessing a derived efficiency. Upham, manifesting the same 
spirit as Chubb when he argued that “nothing that is an action, can be the effect of the 
action of another...” {Freedom o f the Will, IV.2.2), wanted to exercise Arminian self- 
determination. Indeed, Upham appears to thing that such godlike status was part of what 
it meant to be a “true son of God.” The son of God must have a “mighty and crowning 
power of the will” like God himself. Just as the purposes of the efficient Puritan could 
not be thwarted, the purposes of the efficient Arminian will could never be thwarted, not 
even by God himself.
In this context Upham recapitulates his rendition of the story of the fall of man.
In the Garden, God tested man’s “ .. .willingness to harmonize his will with the divine 
will” (11.248). The result of this test is well known. “Human history, which proclaims 
everywhere the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, is the record of the 
result.” It is significant that Upham does not say that the evil of human history testifies to 
the result of this choice, which is what an Ames or an Edwards would have said. Instead, 
in saying that “the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, is the record of the 
result” Upham indicates that he, like many nineteenth century theologians, did not 
believe that Adam’s sin could be imputed to all mankind (Noll, 2002). Sin spreads 
around the world because individuals choose to sin.
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Upham is very quick to move on from this point, perhaps from a desire to avoid 
being ensnared in theological controversy, “we do not propose, however, to delay upon 
these thoughts.” Leaving the detailed interpretation of the Genesis text to the 
theologians, Upham laid the foundations for a natural religion by asking,
.. .Is it too much to say.. .that man is still bom in the garden of Paradisal beauty, 
the garden of a mother’s love? Is it too much to believe that he is bom also with 
religious instincts.. .which in their tendencies lead him in the direction of the 
Infinite, but at the same time with a tme and effective freedom of the will, which, 
by possibility at least, in the exercise of the great power that is given it, may lead 
him in a different direction? And is it possible to doubt that the command of God, 
uttered alike by the voice of nature and the voice of the great Master and 
Teacher.. .Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour 
as thyself; is still uttered in his hearing, and is still binding upon the responsive 
action of his heart? (11.248-249)
Here again Upham leans away from the traditional notion of original sin, arguing that 
human beings possess all that they need to live virtuously: a knowledge of God’s law and 
the power to keep it. Consistent with the nineteenth century “cult of domesticity,”
Upham is also captivated with the notion of “a mother’s love.” Whatever tmth there may 
have been in the traditional notions of original sin were simply overridden by the 
sanctifying influences of domesticity.
Given these considerations, Upham concluded that belief in the wisdom of the 
mental stmcture rests upon the reality that a supreme love to God was, at the very least, 
part of man’s original constitution. Conceming the existence of the continuation of this
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state, Upham seems to have been ambivalent. On the one hand he seems to take a 
nonsectarian and noncommittal position. On the other hand, he needs to assume that this 
principle still exists in human nature in order to proceed:
And now, supposing this principle to exist in the human mind, either by being 
originally implanted, as in Adam, or by being restored under the name of a 
Regeneration or New Creation, or in any way and by any true spiritual process 
which enlightened wisdom may suggest, we naturally proceed to inquire what 
relation it holds to the other’ principles in this department of the mind, and what 
results are likely to attend upon it. (11.249)
The thing that stands out about this passage is Upham’s relative indifference to theology. 
He wants to assume that human being are constitutionally wired to love God and that 
they therefore should strive to do so. At this point in his writing, it is almost as if he is 
saying that one may believe in regeneration or new creation (as Ames and Edwards did) 
or not. As long as we agree that such love to God is possible, we may move on. Yet 
since the Calvinist mental philosophers thought that regeneration was an absolute 
necessity for truly loving God, they would never have moved through this material so 
flippantly, or considered the new birth optional. (Indeed, it is not clear that Upham did 
consider new birth optional—in another place he says that both reason and revelation 
testify that love to God is a characteristic of the “original and.. .the renovated constitution 
of.. .mind,” 11.251.) This is therefore an example of the way nineteenth American 
mental philosophy attempted to retain elements of the Christian faith while 
simultaneously rejecting theological nicety. It also illustrates the ambiguity of his 
mission: was he writing as a Christian minister to Christians, or was he writing as a
430
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
neutral mental philosopher to all people? Both goals seem to be present, and yet are 
blended in strange ways.
Love to God is the highest of all human affections. To prove this, Upham quotes 
Matthew 10:37, “He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and 
he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me” (11.250). This love has 
tremendous psychological benefit, for “when it is in its full exercise.. .it may be regarded 
as a matter of course, that all the subordinate principles will be kept in their place.” That 
is, all of the natural sensibilities will be kept from exceeding their God-given boundaries. 
The person who loves God supremely is a properly balanced person. Upham proved this 
proposition from a consideration of the way “the Savior” lived. Since Christ was human 
he too experienced all of the natural sensibilities, but because he loved God supremely 
these natural sensibilities never lead him into excess or sin. Further, since this supreme 
love for God existed in Christ, it can also exist in humans more generally. Rejecting the 
Calvinist notion that sinfulness necessarily influences even the most holy Christian, 
Upham thought that his readers, by imitating Christ’s holy love, could enter into the 
perfection of the Savior.
It is a lack of this love to God that explains “ .. .what has sometimes been called 
the Depravity of human nature.” Here he offers what has been called a “privative” notion 
of sin: i.e., it isn’t that sin is bad “stuff’ that is infused into human beings, but rather is 
due to a lack of the good. A lack of love leads to the manifold “disorders” found in 
human nature. These disorders may influence all of the parts of our affective nature. The 
most common form of the disorder is, as Ames would have said, inordinate desire. For 
example, the appetites may break “ .. .over their allotted limits,” and the propensities may
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become “inordinately intense” (11.252). Upham apparently did not believe that he was 
subject to these “disorders,” but referred to a rather vague “they.” For example, although 
the conscience and will retain some proper function even when the sensibilities are 
disordered, the battle against sin is ultimately lost for “them” since “ .. .they are not 
sustained by the love of the Supreme Being...” (11.252). Among other things, Upham 
here seems to pathologize sin, speaking of abnormity as belonging to a strange and 
ambiguously defined group. The oft-quoted passage of Ovid which Puritan voluntarists 
believed applied to all, now applies only to those poor souls who, unlike Upham and for 
whatever reason, do not have a supreme love to God: “Video meliora proboque, 
Deteriora sequor” (11.253). [“I see and approve the better course; I follow the worse,” 
Fiering, 1981, p. 104]. As we shall see, William James would also use this passage to 
describe pathology rather than normal human experience.
It should be stressed that Upham’s logic on this point led him to implicitly deny 
the freedom of the will to those people who lacked a supreme love to God. When 
arguing the point by analogy, Upham tried to show what would happen to a person who 
was devoid of domestic affections. This person would be “much more likely than 
another to fall under the dominion of the lower appetites,” than a person not so inflicted. 
Without these affections the will would be unable to engage in normal domestic activities 
in a proper way, and “all hope is gone.” By analogy, Upham was arguing, the removal of 
the supreme love of God would also tend to remove the freedom of the will, at least in 
religious exercises. The tendency of this doctrine would be to recapitulate the Calvinist 
idea that human beings who do not love God actually lack freedom of the will. Upham 
does not attempt to clarify this issue in any meaningful way. Here again we confront
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upham’s ambiguous role as an enlightened Protestant American mental philosopher.
Habit and the Natural Sensibilities. Upham closed his discussion of the natural 
sensibilities by considering the role of habit. After reiterating points previously made that 
habits are formed through repetition of activity and that habit is an ultimate and essential 
part of human nature, he considered the way habits shape the appetites, propensities, and 
affections. Much of what is said in this chapter had been discussed in other contexts. 
Appetites begin as instincts, but when voluntarily overindulged they become “more and 
more intense” until they finally “acquire a complete ascendancy.” (11.257). The fact that 
overindulgence can actually lead to “captivity” (11.258) again suggests that Upham 
thought that freedom of the will could be lost in this manner.
Upham argued that human beings are bom with the abilities to remain in control 
of the natural sensibilities. If appetites are not overindulged, he said, humans retain their 
“masteiy” over them. Regarding the propensities, “ .. .we have the power.. .to 
subject.. .[them] to suitable regulation.” Further, habit (as he pointed out in numerous 
other places) is also a great ally in the battle against sin. A woman may grow in her love 
to God, for example, “ .. .going on from one degree of brightness and strength to another.” 
Upham, here dealt with the traditional notion of sanctification or growing in holiness 
(which Ames dealt with, see above), seems to say that people may effect their own 
sanctification through habit formation: “The more we think of God, the more frequently 
we connect him with all our ordinary transactions, the more will the broad orb of his 
glory expand itself into our conceptions, and call forth the homage and love of the heart” 
(11.261). Once again, compared to Ames and Edwards who argued that sanctification was 
impossible apart from God’s help, Upham appears to be “Pelagian” in his orientation, and
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perhaps enamored with his godlike efficiency.
The Moral Sensibilities 
At first glance, Upham’s distinction between moral and natural sensibilities may 
seem a bit strained. After all, although Upham thought that the natural sensibilities were 
originally implanted in human nature, it is very clear that he believed these sensibilities 
were important on a moral level. In particular, his tendency to analyze each desire from 
the instinctive and voluntary viewpoint kept moral questions wide open in the foregoing 
section. The boundary between psychologist and moral philosopher is quite fuzzy in his 
consideration of the natural sensibilities.
So if  the natural sensibilities were infused with moral import, how did Upham 
justify partitioning off a separate “part” of the sensibilities which he called “moral”? In 
the first chapter of his section on the moral sensibilities (entitled “proofs of a moral 
nature”) he set out to justify this approach. Just as the natural sensibilities are divided 
into emotions and desires, so to the moral sensibilities are analogously divided into 
emotions of approval and disapproval and feelings of moral obligation. But how does 
one justify this division moral and natural sensibilities? Upham thought the division was 
justified because human beings possess a “moral nature.”
The first proof that we have a moral nature is consciousness of “ .. .an intemal 
sanctioning or condemnation, approval or disapproval” of our own or other’s actions. 
These “emotions of approval and disapproval” are elementary and simple, and are 
evidenced in the natural reactions of children to stories of cmelty, the everyday discourse 
among adults, and the structure of language. The very fact that humans have feelings of 
remorse is itself a feeling of moral disapproval and is further proof that we do indeed
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have a moral nature. Additionally, we are capable of . .framing the abstract conceptions 
of moral merit and demerit,” which are impossible to frame “ .. .without possessing the 
antecedent notions of right and wrong” (11.278). Thankfully for the nonsectarian moral 
philosopher, there is also the “unanimity of mankind in respect to the great principles of 
right and wrong,” evidenced in the laws of various nations. Even “Savage tribes” 
although evidencing “great perversions of the moral nature” still do manifest vestiges of 
this “essential attribute.. .[of] the universal mind of man” (11.283).
Upham’s discussion of how “civil or political society” functions is a nice 
illustration of what he meant when he said that our “moral nature” was an irreducible 
component of human nature:
Society, in its civil or political form, is supported, in a very considerable degree, 
by the sentiment of moral obligation. If we are asked why obedience is rendered 
to the civil laws, the answer is, because they are enacted by the society or social 
body. If we are asked why we render so much deference to the will of the society 
or social body, the answer is, because we have agreed to. In other words, we have 
promised, have pledged ourselves, either expressly or by implication, to conform 
to it. If we are asked why we so strictly fulfill our promise, why we so 
scrupulously conform to our word, all the answer we can give is, that we feel 
under a moral obligation to do it. In other words, in order to give anything like a 
satisfactory answer to this question, we are obviously thrown back upon our 
moral constitution. (11.286)
Upham also argued that the doctrine of man’s moral nature is “fully recognized in 
the Scriptures.” In particular, “all those passages in which men are called upon to do
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what is just and right.. .imply not only that there is a right and wrong, but that men are 
capable of understanding what is right, and that they are under obligation to do what is 
right. The term CONSCIENCE, in particular, as expressive of the fact of man’s moral 
nature, is frequently used in the Scriptures.” Upham quotes Roman ii.14-15 to prove his 
point:
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained 
in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the 
work of the law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and 
their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another. (11.289) 
Given all these evidences Upham thought it was safe to conclude that man does indeed 
have a moral nature. Indeed, he wondered why there had been so much doubt on the 
topic at all.
From an Edwardsean perspective, however, Upham’s notion of a moral nature is 
constricted. Edwards’ use of the term will was very broad, subsuming Upham’s natural 
and moral sensibilities. Everything found rmder this term was considered moral by 
nature. In Upham, only a small portion of these psychological phenomena (i.e., feelings 
of approval and disapproval) are given the label. One wonders if there is a parallel 
between the loss of will in American psychology, and the constriction of what American 
mental philosophers considered “moral.”
Emotions of Approval and Disapproval
Having satisfied the general question of whether humans have a moral nature, 
Upham moved on to discuss precisely what that nature is. For one, the moral nature of 
humans is “less complicated” than the natural sensibilities because the moral sensibilities
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do not divide into nearly as many subdivisions as the natural. Upham was convinced 
that, strictly speaking, only the moral emotions and the feelings of moral obligation ean 
actually be considered moral sensibilities per se. Of all the emotional states a person can 
undergo, only feelings of approval and disapproval can be considered moral. These 
emotional states are simple and therefore not capable of being defined. These emotions 
are “ .. .immediately successive to intellections, or acts of the intellect,” in the same way 
that natural emotions follow the intellect. To put the issue in seholastic language, the 
intellect at the very least must specify an object to evaluate: “it is, for instance, 
impossible for us to feel the beauty of an object, which is an act of the Natural 
sensibilities, without first having a perception or knowledge of the object itself. In like 
manner, it is impossible for us to approve or disapprove a thing, in the moral sense of the 
terms, without first having some perception, some knowledge of the thing approved or 
disapproved” (11.292-293). Just as natural emotions are followed by the various desires, 
the moral emotions are followed by feelings of moral obligation. The “position” of the 
moral emotions is therefore always between “intellective acts” and feelings of moral 
obligation. Without the intellect the moral emotions cannot exist. Without these 
emotions the feelings of moral obligation carmot exist. Understandably, changes in the 
way the intellect perceives an object determines which moral emotions are experienced. 
There is no freedom in this relationship.
Since moral emotions are always concerned with the judgment of moral actions, 
the “objects” of the moral emotions are always “voluntary agents” (11.295), i.e., agents 
endowed with the three departments of the human mind. As Edwards had argued, 
animals are therefore never the objects of emotions of moral approval and disapproval.
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Still, and going beyond Edwards here, Upham thought that something more than 
voluntary agency is needed in order to levy moral judgment. These voluntary agents also 
need to he “moral agents” in the sense that the actions which we Judge are “truly in their 
power” (11.295). In other words, “so far as we can regulate our outward actions, we are 
accountable; that is to say, we are the proper objects of the emotions of moral approval 
and disapproval. So far as we can regulate the action of the intellect, the sensibilities, and 
the will, we are accountable also” (11.295-296). An action is not susceptible to moral 
judgment when it is either instinctive or involuntary.
Upham also tacked the question of the basis of moral judgment, and gave an 
honest answer that revealed the shaky foundations upon which his system rested. One 
person may say that an action is approved because is commanded by God, another 
because it is useful, another because it agrees “to the fitness of things” (11.196). None of 
these answers is ultimately satisfactory because the force of each position is diminished 
when one asks why utility or God’s command “excite[s] within us” such moral emotions. 
Ultimately, when pressed, a people must admit that they approve of a certain action 
simply ''because it is right' (11.298). Yet the right, like other simple ideas, cannot be 
defined. It is curious here that Upham would stick so closely to his natural epistemology 
on this issue when he so willingly brings scripture in at other points. The shaky 
foundations of Upham’s ethics seem particularly clear here.
Upham argued that there is a strict distinction to be made between intellect and 
consciousness, yet that there is also a very close relationship. When our intellects are 
convinced that a person committed a theft in cold blood, our conscience automatically 
condemns the action. But if the intellect subsequently learns that the theft occurred after
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a period of prolonged deprivation and struggle, the condemnation of consciousness if 
diminished. If we finally leam that there was no theft at all, but only a mistake, 
conscience automatically exonerates the accused. Although Upham thought that 
conscience “will vary in exact concordance” with the dictates of the reasoning power, 
Upham then curiously concludes the reasoning power is “the servitor and handmaid of 
the moral power” (11.302). The strict determination of the sensibilities by the intellect in 
this case is reminiscent of scholastic intellectualism. Upham thought the fact that the 
moral sensibilities are “placed behind the Intellect” was evidence of “great wisdom” of 
the mind’s designer (11.303). Given this design, Upham concluded that it is crucial “to 
know much, to think much, to compare much” (11.305) in order to render the best moral 
choices.
In this “intellectualist” context Upham explicitly states the moral ability of human 
beings. Since there is such a close connection between intellect and conscience, we can 
therefore conclude that the moral nature is “in some measure under our control.” Since 
we have the ability to think rightly we have the ability to possess a “right conscience.” If 
we deny this fact we excuse ourselves unjustifiably. The worst crimes of human history 
such as “ .. .the cruelties of the Inquisition.. .all the persecutions of the Protestants by the 
Catholics.. .all the persecutions of the Protestants by each other.. .all the acts of 
unkindness and tyranny which have ever been exercised upon individuals and 
communities” (11.306) can all be laid at the feel of wrong thinking. Even the Apostle 
Paul’s pre-conversion persecution of the Christians was due to ignorance. Paul “ .. .had 
not made himself acquainted with all the facts of the case,” but was instead “too bigoted” 
and “too passionate” to make a right choice (11.307). If people have “within their reach
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neglected sources of knowledge” (11.306) that could better inform their moral choices, 
they are culpable for wrong decisions. Instead, human beings are obliged to do what the 
Apostle Paul did not; “ .. .to make a full and impartial investigation of the merits and 
demerits...” (11.307) of the case at hand.
The differences between voluntarist Puritan thinking on this issue and Upham is 
strikingly illustrated in Upham’s considerations of the Apostle Paul. Puritan/Augustinian 
voluntarism thought that the heart, not the intellect was the primary impediment to 
correct moral action (Fiering, 1981). It is possible to know the right thing, and yet still do 
the opposite. Fiering has pointed out how often the Puritans quoted Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, “video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor (I see and approve the better 
course; I follow the worse)” (p. 104). Although Upham claims that Paul’s “passions” 
were too strong, but that was not what kept him from doing the right thing. The problem 
was that “ .. .he had no correct knowledge of the life, miracles, and doctrines of Jesus 
Christ, or the belief, practices, and character of Christians. His conscience, accordingly, 
as is its nature, acted in view of what he actually knew, and not in view of what he might 
have known.” His conscience was therefore determined by the intellect to disapprove of 
Christ. Although he was certainly not “ .. .to blame for acting according to his 
conscience,” yet he was “.. .exceedingly to blame, for not having, as on proper inquiry he 
might have had and would have had, a right conscience.” Not only is this similar to the 
intellectualist view of volition, but also seems to presage the salvation-by-knowledge 
sentiment that would characterize the scientism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
Upham addresses the topics of “Moral Beauty” and “Moral Sublimity” as
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“incidental to the main subject [of the moral sensibilities],” (11.307, 314) and I will 
therefore not treat that here.
Feelings of Moral Obligation
Upham expressed some frustration that the feelings of moral obligation were 
often confounded with the moral emotions. The distinction was crucial in Upham’s 
mind, for various reasons, particularly because of the close proximity of the feelings of 
moral obligation to the will (1.327).
Upham made an appeal to consciousness to validate the existence of the feelings 
of moral obligation. Upham thought that most of his readers would have had the 
experience of having desire to move in a particular direction, but, simultaneously, a 
feeling that one ought not to move in that direction. In other words, the feelings of moral 
obligation act as a counterweight to certain immoral desires. Further, these feelings help 
individuals move “in opposition to their fears, in opposition to their sjmipathies, and their 
apparent interests.” In short, feelings of moral obligation have the potential of overriding 
desire and so prevent the mind from fatally following the strongest desire. A “man of 
true uprightness and honour” is defined by following the feelings o f moral obligation 
rather than “motives of an inferior kind” (11.329).
Feelings of moral obligation are also simply necessary. . .What would men be, 
or what would society be, without the basis of moral obligation? There must be 
somewhere a foundation of duty.” Instead of finding this foundation in God or scripture, 
Upham thought that this foundation must be within. “We need within us not only a 
monitor which shall assure us what right is, but something also which shall speak, as it 
were, with a voice of authority, and strongly urge us to do what is right” (11.331-332).
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Feelings of obligation (which follow the emotions of approval and disapproval) provide 
this foundation.
Unlike complex states of mind, feelings of obligation cannot be resolved into 
parts. These feelings “always imply action, something to be done” (11.333). Seemingly 
denying the Puritan paradox (as defined above), these feelings of moral obligation only 
arise when we believe that the thing to be done is within our power. Upham does not 
make a distinction between natural or moral ability here like Edwards, but he does say 
that feelings of moral obligation usually approach “the character of enforcement or 
compulsion; yet not by any means in the material sense of those terms” (11.334). These 
feelings are “fitted” by their “very nature strongly to control our volition.” Upham 
thought that his readers would certainly know this by experience. To put Upham’s 
psychology in Edwardsean language, feelings of moral obligation move the person out of 
a state of indifference, and put the agent under a kind of moral necessity to act virtuously.
Unlike the emotions which are fleeting, these feelings of obligation and duty tend 
to be more permanent. Further, these feelings “have special reference to the future,” 
while emotions “pronounce upon the character of object and actions that are either past or 
present” (11.335). These feelings are also always subsequent in time to the emotions and 
“cannot possibly exist unless preceded by them” (11.336). Feelings of obligation can also 
be distinguished from desires. Consciousness obviously makes the distinction.
The “fixed, permanent, and radical distinction between desires and feelings of 
obligation” is absolutely pivotal to the maintenance of morality. Without this “radical 
distinction” there would be “an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in 
theory.” Upham here reiterated his psychological system, revealing the moral import of
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the structure he posited:
It will readily be conceded that morality implies a will, a power of choice and 
determination. But the mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, 
do not of themselves reach the Will. They operate on the Will through the 
feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter 
feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the 
Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate 
cognizance o f only two classes o f mental states, viz.. Desires and Feelings o f  
obligation. (11.338, italics mine)
Upham’s mind, then, was designed in such a way that no matter what wickedness the 
natural desires may suggest to the will, the feelings of moral obligation left the person 
with the possibility of a moral choice. Since “brute animals” also have desires, it is the 
feelings of moral obligation that set human apart. Upham does not here address the 
apparent tension between this statement and his previous contention that nearly all the 
natural desires can be considered from a moral point of view, and that some desires, such 
as love to God, clearly seem imique to human beings. Nevertheless, Upham was 
convinced that it was the feelings of moral obligation that formed the basic of moral 
agency, and so formed that basis for “moral accountability” (11.338).
There is a strict relationship between intellect and the moral nature. Except in 
cases of insanity, the “decisions” of the moral nature of humanity “w/7/ in all cases 
conform to the facts perceived, in other words, will conform to the facts and their 
relations, as they exist in the view of the intellect” (11.339). This contention is consistent 
with what he said about conscience. Differences in moral judgments are therefore due to
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differences in intellectual perception of the facts. The person with the most aceurate 
judgment will levy the most correct moral judgment. Yet, in all cases, the moral nature 
will follow the understanding. In every instance, “the moral nature.. .pronounces 
aecording to the light which is placed before it ...” (11.342). Upham’s analysis here has 
the intelleetualist flavor which describes moral differenees between people as being due 
to differences in information or opinion. Some people possessed the “speculative belief’ 
that “the Negroes were an inferior race” (11.348), a belief which led to heinous 
consequences. Upham does not entertain the idea that prejudicial belief may be driven by 
“a bad heart,” or more visceral and less intellectual considerations, as Edwards might 
have. While Ames and Edwards thought redemption was from start to finish an act of 
God touching primarily the heart, for the more optimistic Upham the cause and therefore 
the solution to all sinful action is in the intellect.
Upham’s goal here appears to have been to diligently defend the belief that all of 
humanity possess a moral sense or natural conscience. Even “Savages” are not destitute 
of “natural conscience” but are rather held in bondage by ignorance. By arguing that it is 
simply bad belief that causes sinful activity, Upham was assuring his readers that nothing 
is broken in the moral and psychological infrastructure of humanity. Instead of arguing 
that humans need new desires, like Edwards and Ames, Upham thought they simply need 
new information. And, while Edwards and Ames thought that only God could effect such 
a momentous change as changing a human heart, the task of remediation suggested by 
Upham seemed well within the capabilities of nineteenth century man. Redemption 
could be effected without God’s help.
Upham did admit, however, that there are times when moral judgment is distorted
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by “a state of excited passion” (11.354). This occasional state of mind prevents the mind 
from taking “a right [intellectual] view of the suhject” (11.355). Yet the fact that Upham 
considered these states abnormal supports the contention that his psychological system 
was more analogous to the “intellectualism” of centuries past than “voluntarism.”
Although the feelings of moral obligation are usually strong enough to compel 
action, Upham also acknowledged that these feelings are limited and “carmot overcome 
everything” (11.355). If desires become overly strong, “there is a possibility, at least, of 
the sentiments of duty being overcome” (11.356). The optimism in these passages is 
astounding when compared to the thought of Ames or Edwards. While the Puritan 
psychology of the past thought that sinfulness was the norm, Upham seemed to think that 
feelings of moral obligation usually held sway in human nature. They “so frequently 
predominate” (11.356). How is it that the sentiments of duty may be overcome? Only 
through the “instigation of the desires” which provide a “distorted view of things” to the 
intellect. Upham here indicates that the feelings may distort the intellect, a theme that is 
not common in his psychology. He also does not deal with the following question: if the 
intellect is distorted by desire, will not the feelings of moral obligation then also be 
distorted? And if  this is the case, how will there be any contradiction between desire and 
the sentiments of duty?
Upham’s desire to defend the “moral nature” of humanity at times seems to 
amount to a denial of the doctrine of original sin. For example, he notes that some object 
to the idea of a moral nature because of “the conduct of robbers and outlaws from 
society” (11.357). This objection did not discourage Upham since, first, there are 
relatively few robbers and outlaws in society, and second, these people may have been
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subjected to “cruel disappointment and poverty, combined with contempt, injustice, and 
oppression on the part of their fellow-men” (11.358). Further, even “among the most 
depraved and hardened of mankind” we find “the remains of a moral nature” expressed in 
kindness and promise keeping within their own circles. Yet, more than a denial of 
original sin, Upham, writing outside of the constraints and protection of a confessional 
system, was trying to prove in secular terms what the theological systems of the past took 
for granted: human beings are moral beings.
Human Foundations for Immutable Moral Distinctions
Just as he was concerned to prove that human beings possess a moral nature, 
Upham was also concerned with providing a secular proof for the fact that judgments of 
right and wrong have an absolute standard, i.e., that there actually is “a great standard of 
Rectitude, by a reference to which the morality of every action is to be measured”
(n.363). The idea that right and wrong really exist was important to Upham in “the 
highest sense.”
Perhaps part of the problem that people had in gaining a clear idea of right and 
wrong was that these things are not “perceptible by the senses.” Although right and 
wrong are not “object[s] of the mere outward perceptivity,” humanity may gain a firm 
knowledge of these things through the working of the “Internal or Pure Intellect.” This 
pure intellect, working “independently of the direct instrumentality of the senses” puts 
the person in touch with eternal standards of right and wrong. Here Upham clearly has 
embraced the Enlightenment project of putting absolute moral standards on nonsectarian 
and universalistic grounds. The articulation of a universally acceptable morality is 
possible through introspective psychology.
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The moral sensibility or conscience takes its lead from this internal intellect. Just 
as right and wrong is “revealed” in this internal intellect (11.364), the conscience can 
therefore base its moral judgments upon absolute standards of Rectitude. Further, Upham 
argued that “men universally form the notions of RIGHT and WRONG,” and that each of 
these notions has a “distinctive nature.” The concepts are fundamentally opposed to one 
another and are not interchangeable: “they are placed ever apart” (11.369). Upham 
thought this consideration of “notions” could be used to oppose Hobbes who argued that 
“nothing either right or wrong in its own nature.” How he moved from “notions” of right 
and wrong to the actual existence of right and wrong is less clear: unless one remembers 
that he argued on the premise that the structure of the human mind will reliably tell us 
something about the nature of the universe. Similarly, he argued that since human 
languages invariably contain words meaning right and wrong, and this reality “must have 
its adequate cause” (i.e., God), then we can be assured that right and wrong really do 
exist. Morality is written in “the very structure and action of the human mind,” (1.372), 
and this structure is the design of the “God of truth” (11.373). Upham also thought that 
anger and gratitude were also evidence of the “immutability of moral distinctions,” as 
well as the common notions that human beings typically have of God. “ .. .The opinion 
which mankind generally form of the Supreme Being.. .always include[s] the idea of 
right, equity, or justice” (11.381). As he typically did, Upham finished his lengthy 
justification of the immutability of moral distinctions by considering the claims of 
scripture.
Upham concluded his defense of the reality of right and wrong criticizing the idea 
“sometimes taught in books and in places of education” (11.387) that right and wrong are
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not tied to the nature of things, but are related rather to personal interest or the commands 
of others. This belief “greatly lowers the standard of moral excellence” (11.387-388), and 
greatly endangers the character of youth. Instead, the young should be taught to “honor” 
and “love” the right as a moral object worthy in itself. If this happens, the outcome 
would be much the same as the outcome that James thought would follow solid habits: 
And youth... should be so imbued with the love of virtue as to inquire, as it were 
by a sort of instinct, not whether an action is required by one high in power or 
promises to be of some personal benefit, not whether it will advance the interests 
of a particular sect or party, but, in all cases, whether it is RIGHT. With such a 
training of their moral dispositions, they will stand firm when everything is 
shaken and in commotion around them; they will have strength in themselves, a 
strength not of earth; they will go forth amid the darkness and perplexities of life, 
surrounded with a light emanating from their own bosoms, and under the smiles 
of an approving God. (11.388)
The only difference between this outcome and the outcome predicted by James, is that 
God is somehow involved and pleased in this steadfast righteousness.
The Application of a Nonsectarian Restoration: Moral Education 
Upham closed his discussion of moral sensibility with a consideration of moral 
education, a type of education that had unfortunately “held a subordinate rank compared 
with that purely intellectual education which deals wholly with the mere acquisition of 
knowledge” (11.388). Upham looked forward with great interest to the time when “moral 
education shall at least be put on a footing with intellectual” (11.389). Upham thought 
that his psychological system, positing an intellect capable of forming notions of right
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and wrong, and a conscience which issues in moral emotions and feelings of obligation, 
was “basis enough for a consistent and durable moral education” (11.389). Despite the 
arguments of Rousseau that children are not able to receive moral instruction, Upham 
thought that children at an early age ought to “be made subjects of assiduous moral 
culture” (11.390).
The “outlines of a system of moral culture,” i.e., the specific characteristics of a 
“course of training” are diffieult to specify in few words. Upham therefore offered a few 
pointers. Given the fact previously asserted, of the preeminancy of the intellect in moral 
behavior, it is no wonder that Upham suggested, “suitable pains ought to be taken to 
introduce into the young mind correct speculative opinions” (11.393). Given the 
“amazing power” (11.393) of belief, one ought to “consider well what truths we adopt” 
(11.394). For example, and most importantly, “the speculative opinion that Jesus Christ is 
the great teacher and redeemer of men” is of great benefit to youth, having “already 
changed the face of domestic and civil society, and, like a little leaven which leaveneth 
the whole lump, is secretly regenerating the whole mass of human nature.” Upham here 
attempts to retain a nonsectarian Christianity, once again stressing Christ’s moral 
teachings over the specifics of doctrine.
Upham’s version of nonsectarian Christianity was also consistent with the 
intellectualist flavor of his psychology. Upham pointed out “the important remark of the 
Saviour to his diseiples, ‘and ye shall know the TRUTH, and the TRUTH shall make you 
free,’” as being particularly relevant to the issue of moral education. He repeated his 
contention that “the false practices of heathen nations” are “based on false speculative 
opinions” (11.395). Yet, in this vein, and somewhat surprisingly, Upham thought that it
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would be “the Word of God, filled as it is with moral and religious truth, which is 
destined to be instrumental, under the superintendence of a beneficent Providence, of the 
rectification of the moral errors of the human race” (11.395). Here again we find 
Upham’s ambiguous simultaneously Christian and secular moral project. Moral revival 
can be accomplished through teaching correct speculative opinion, yet this revival also 
needs to be through the Word of God, and God’s beneficent providence.
Also along these lines, Upham insisted that “all morality must necessarily be 
defective.. .which proceeds on the principle of excluding RELIGION” (11.395). Although 
it is possible for a nonreligious person to do some things well, “he [still] comes short in 
the most essential part.” Lacking religion, that is, failing “in infinitely the most essential 
point,” renders whatever good one does seriously flawed. (11.395). Given the centrality 
of religion, it is curious that Upham does not get very specific about what this religion 
might look like. On a general level, “moral education must include, as a leading element, 
some instruction in regard to the existence and character of God, and those religious 
duties which are involved in the fact of his existence and character” (11.396). Upham 
names God as “an object infinitely exalted,” but his God was, compared to Ames and 
Edwards, a nonsectarian moral object. Still, belief in this object accompanied “with 
perfect love in the heart, is beyond all question the great foundation and support of a truly 
consistent moral life” (11.396).
Upham thought that habit was also a crucial part of moral education, for many of 
the same reasons that James did. “The more scrupulous and exact we are in the 
observance of the practical part of morals, the more easy it will become. Every repetition 
of morality, in whatever acts it may show itself, will strengthen the moral tendency. SO
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that, at last, the whole life will run easily and vigorously in the path of rectitude” (11.396). 
After giving examples of this in terms of truth-telling, Upham noted, like James, that “the 
effects of HABIT.. .may be seen frequently in the outward deportment,” and seen “in the 
various exercises of the appetites and passions” (11.398). Again, sounding very much like 
James, Upham, in view of potentially negative consequences, urged his readers to 
translate moral precept into action:
Our moral principles, however correct they may be, will be of but little value to 
us, imless they are put into practice by being incorporated into the daily and 
hourly series of living acts. It is thus that habits are formed, which give strength 
for the present, and abundant encouragement for the future.-Nor is this all. If our 
habits are the opposite of conscientious; in other words, if  we disregard the 
suggestions of the moral sense, and, in repeated and frequent instances, throw 
contempt upon its authority, the probability is, that the edge of its perception will 
be blunted, and that it will be partially paralyzed and weakened in its operation. 
(11.399)
Upham, ever more optimistic than James, maintained hope even for the moral sloucher 
who frequently acts against conscience. Although the powers of the mind may suffer 
from such neglect, they (especially the conscience) very rarely “suffer an absolute 
extinction” (11.399).
Finally, in an apt illustration of the blending of evangelicalism, common sense, 
and republicanism which Noll has argued is the unique characteristic of nineteenth 
century American religion, Upham thought that the preceding comments were of 
particular importance for “the citizens of this country” (11.400, italics mine). Other
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governments that do no rely on the virtue of the citizenry “may by possibility sustain 
itself amid the prevalence of loose moral principles.” But in a government that depends 
upon “the opinions of the people,” this is certainly not the case. “If there be any truth 
which the history of all ages has clearly established, it is, that a republican form of 
govemment cannot be sustained for any length of time without purity in the public moral 
sentiment.” Upham closed his consideration of the moral sensibilities with a meditation 
that would certainly bring pause to any patriotic nineteenth century American:
How deplorable, then, will be our situation, if the time shall ever come when the 
people of the United States shall permit themselves to disregard or to underrate 
the important subject of correct morals! (11.400)
Imperfect Sentimentive Action 
Upham closed his section on the second “department” of the mind, the 
sensibilities, with a consideration of abnormality. The following will be a brief 
consideration of this relative brief section of Mental Philosophv. I have already noted a 
tendency in Upham to pathologize states that were considered sinful and normal by the 
Calvinist authors. Further, James does not explicitly deal with abnormality, so a 
comparison of the two on this point is not possible.
Upham clearly thought that the sentiments typically have a “salutary restraint” 
upon human activity. Still, there are occasionally “disastrous deviations” from this norm. 
Disordered activity exists on a continuum. A person may manifest a “mere” or minor 
“irregularity of action,” or a full-blown case of “insanity” (11.403) in which the irregular 
action “becomes so great, so pervading, and so deeply rooted in the mind that the 
individual has no power of restoration in himself’ (11.404). The idea that an individual
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typically has a “power of restoration in himself’ contradicts his other less typical 
contentions that the source of restoration is found in God, and is a clear contrast with 
Ames and Edwards who more consistently maintained that God is the fountain of all 
virtue. The quote also reveals that Upham thought of insanity in terms of volition, as a 
kind of loss of ability to keep the self on the straight and narrow.
Like his analysis of the intellect in which Upham described disorders of each 
cognitive power, so too Upham applied his analysis to the sentimental powers, i.e., the 
appetites, propensities, and affections. Here too Upham pathologizes what Calvinists 
would have considered normal moral struggle. Alcoholics are in bondage to their sin and 
soon leam that “in their own strength there is not hope” (11.405), lessons which all 
Christians of previous generations would have been taught. Example after example, 
Upham frames abnormal sentimentive action as a loss of volitional control over one’s 
own behavior. Whether the “ruling passion” (11.414) of one’s life be acquisitiveness 
(11.409), or the desire of esteem (11.413), or power (11.415), the disordered mind is a mind 
deprived of normal voluntary power. The mind is then subject to “irresistible impulse” 
(11.432).
For the same reasons, Upham was also concemed about “sympathetic imitation,” 
devoting an entire chapter to the topic. Sympathetic imitation can influence one person 
or a group of people. In all cases, the affected persons are “strongly agitated by some 
internal emotion, desire, or passion; and this inward agitation is expressed by the 
countenance, gestures, or other extemal signs.” This natural (i.e., not supematural) 
phenomenon can also spread from person to person. The substance of this agitation is 
that “we both act and feel as others” (11.418). Examples of sympathetic imitation include
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the way our faces tend automatically assimilate the sudden facial expressions of others, 
the way we twist and tum our bodies as we watch a tight-rope walker, or the way children 
will cry when the see other children cry. This phenomenon may also explain the 
“tremendous power of mobs” (11.420). The contagion of extraordinary symptoms 
associated with Mesmer’s “animal magnetism” experiments can likewise be explained as 
cases of sympathetic imitation.
In all of these cases, the most noteworthy effect of sympathetic imitation is the 
loss of voluntary control over one’s own actions. Upham thought that sympathetic 
imitation may have certain “beneficial ends,” yet, most often, it is “very likely” to have 
produce negative effects. The power of the will was a precious thing to Upham, and 
anything diminishing this power was to be avoided.
It is even possible for a person to enter into a state of “moral derangement” by 
continually ignoring the dictates of the conscience. Although the conscience will not 
easily give up the battle, it is still true that “multitudes have prepared themselves for the 
greatest wickedness, and have become, in fact, morally insane, by their own voluntary 
doing.” In these cases, the conscience is almost “annihilated.” Yet, Upham, always the 
optimist, put the stress on the word almost. No matter how heinous the sin, “the 
conseience never dies.” Indeed, “it seems to gather vivification and strength in the period 
of its inaetivity” (II.44I). Still, since the person is to blame for ignoring the dictates of 
conscience, he is still accountable for his evil acts while in the state of enthrallment. 
Upham, like Edwards, did not think that the will needs to be in a state of perfect 
indifference to be culpable. Yet, Upham was only willing to concede this point in the 
most extreme cases, when the agent could easily be blamed for his enthrallment. Also
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similar to Edwards who argued that natural necessity overrules accountahility, Upham 
considered the case of “natural or congenital moral derangement” in which the person’s 
understanding of moral matters is limited or ohliterated by nature, Upham argued that 
accountability is limited or erased.
Summary and Conclusion 
Upham discussed the topics of sensibility and will in the second volume of his 
Mental Philosophy, an approach that reflects Upham’s theologically momentous although 
not entirely new practice of dividing the soul into three rather than two faculties. By 
dividing what had been known as “the will” into two parts, Upham automatically 
“shrunk” the psychological meaning of the concept while attempting to elevate its 
importance. One reason for carefully considering Upham’s cogitations on the 
sensibilities, then, is that these cogitations would have, in Edwards and Ames’s thinking, 
been cogitations on the will. Yet, as it will become evident, Upham even reorganized the 
sensibilities in such a way as to increase the importance and autonomy of the will. Cnee 
again, however, the ironic outcome of this attempt to elevate the will was to create a 
faculty that was frequently irrelevant to the everyday psychology of the person.
The intellect is, by itself, incomplete. Its otherwise cold powers cannot impel 
action—and action was important for all four of our authors. The sentiments then add the 
needed additional thrust to move the person beyond mere useless intellection. They 
therefore serve as “the springs of action, back of the intellect.” The sensibilities therefore 
require the action of the intellect, but are distinguished from that action.
Upham proposed a peculiar “division” of the “sensibilities” which, as we shall 
see, was designed to elevate the status of the will. This distinction was between the
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“natural” sensibilities and the “moral” sensibilities. Although this distinction 
immediately recalls Edwards’ distinction of natural and moral causes, closer 
consideration reveals how very different the two distinctions were. For Edwards all 
inclinations and “sensibilities” were moral. For Upham, only some sensibilities were 
moral. Indeed, only a very small portion of them. Here too Upham may have 
contributed to the “shrinking” of the moral agent in American psychology.
The natural sensibilities precede the moral sensibilities in order of time. This is 
because the moral sensibilities (i.e., the “conscience”) stand in judgment of the natural 
sensibilities. Natural sensibilities have to do with objects as they appear desirable to us 
personally, and moral sensibilities as they appear right or wrong in a universal sense.
The natural sensibilities divided into emotions and desires. Natural emotions always 
follow intellections and always precede desires. Emotions are feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure that we associate with various objects. Upham’s discussion of natural 
emotions is revealing because it shows that Upham had a broad vocabulary of “objects” 
which were worthy of attention. Included among these objects was God, which 
demonstrates the awkwardness of Upham’s labeling these emotions “natural” i.e., those 
we share with the animals. The crucial assertion concerning the emotions, however, is 
that they cannot move the will. Emotions are not impulsive.
The impulsive force of the natural sensibilities is found in the desires. Natural 
desires follow natural emotions, vary in strength, and have a tendency toward movement. 
The only thing that prevents desires from issuing in action is the will. As such the will 
serves as a kind of gateway for the desires. Once again, Upham in the interests of
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elevating the will, restricts its role here, although we have not yet come in this summary 
to the moral sensibilities which clarify the role of will in decision-making.
Upham listed four types of natural sensibilities. Upham analyzes each of the 
natural sensibilities from a moral perspective, which is strange given the fact that “moral 
sensibilities” are a separate category. First, were the instincts, a type of God-given desire 
that help functioning when reason can’t come to the aid. The appetites are also God- 
given and good but can he abused. When an appetite is pursued for itself, the action is 
instinctive and free from moral judgment. When pursued for the pleasure of it, the action 
is voluntary and morally culpable. The propensities include the desire for self- 
preservation, for property, or for power. When these are kept in subordination to duties 
we owe to God these propensities too are good.
The class of natural sensibilities on which Upham spent most of his time was the 
affections. Upham discussed anger and malevolence, and the times when such affections 
can be considered sinful.
Throughout this section Upham makes several telling theological and ethical 
assertions. He asserted that the Christian moral code is superior to other codes, consistent 
with the nonsectarian Protestantism of the nineteenth century American college. He 
sings the praises of family-related affections, and is particularly effusive about a mother’s 
love. As such Upham reveals himself to have been sympathetic with and reflective of the 
nineteenth century “cult of domesticity” (Cott, 1997, pp. 84-98) which stressed the 
importance of the mother’s efforts in the spiritual destiny of her children. There is also a 
cautious advocacy of patriotism, consistent with Noll’s (2002) thesis that American
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religion had by the nineteenth century become a synthesis of common sense reasoning, 
republican virtue, and evangelical Christianity.
Consistent with the “Arminianism” portrayed by Edwards, Upham argued that the 
exercise of the domestic affections was only virtuous when done effortfully, i.e., when 
there is some contrary inclination pulling the person away from their natural duty. This 
emphasis on effort would, from the perspective of William James, be profoundly well- 
placed. In his Principles of Psvchologv, James placed great importance on the experience 
of effortful will, seeing the experience as the only foundation for free will. In so doing, 
however, James contributed to the ‘shrinking’ and disappearance of the American will. 
But this must be deferred until later chapters.
Upham also stressed hmnan abilities throughout, manifesting the “Arminian 
impulse” described above. Conscious that he may have been transgressing the ways of 
his native Calvinism, he explicitly addressed the question as to whether his psychology 
denied that God is the author of all moral goodness. Upham, not surprisingly, denied this 
to be the case. Upham seemed to desire to find a native benevolence in human souls, and 
frequently seemed to move away from Calvinistic notions of original sin. The Arminian 
impulse to find in humanity a self-determined sovereignty and in God a wiliness to defer 
to that sovereignty, Upham argued that “ .. .God.. .in giving man the mighty and crowning 
power of the will, which, in thus constituting the completion of his being, made him a 
true son of God, gave him a power which He could not violate. It is a great truth, which 
we propose more fully to consider at a future time, that God does not, and cannot, 
interfere with the action of the human will in any sense which implies a violation of its 
freedom” (11.248). Human efficiency was therefore theologically necessary. Being a son
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of God meant being godlike (in the Amesian sense), i.e., possessing a will that is 
unthwartahle. Because human beings are little pictures of God, they possess a limited hut 
real self-determined efficiency. Upham did not address the Calvinistic objection that 
God’s will is free, hut still necessarily good.
Upham’s Arminian sensibilities also led him to limit the application of the 
favorite saying of the Puritans from Ovid, “Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor” 
(11.253) [“I see and approve the better course; I follow the worse,” Fiering, 1981, p. 104]. 
Instead of applying to all people (as the Puritans thought), Upham thought the saying 
applied only to the pathological. Significantly, Upham included love to God as one of 
the most important “natural” (as opposed to moral) sensibilities, and thought that lack of 
love to the deity is the cause of much misery in life.
Upham closed his section on the sensibilities by analyzing the “moral 
sensibilities.” The moral sensibilities or conscience pronounce judgment on the natural 
sensibilities. A person may desire a cookie (natural sensibility), for example, and the 
conscience (moral sensibility) says whether that desire is good or evil. Conscience, 
Upham thought, is determined by the intellect. Since a good conscience is necessary for 
morally virtuous activity, evil is due to intellectual error. Since human beings are free to 
purse the truth and correct their intellectual errors, we therefore have control over a right 
conscience.
As was the case in the natural sensibilities, in which the intellect moves the 
emotions which in tum influence the desires, moral emotions follow the intellect 
immediately, while the feelings of obligation follow the moral emotions. These feelings 
of obligation are analogous to the natural desires, and serve as an impetus to morally
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appropriate action (so long as the intellect correctly perceives the issue). Although these 
distinctions may seem tedious, Upham’s system ingeniously created an enormously 
important role for his “Arminian” will. The will acts as the ultimately undetermined 
arbiter between the natural desires and the feelings of moral obligation. Since the will is 
free, the person almost always has the ability to act according to conscience.
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CHAPTER IX 
THE APOTHEOSIS OF WILL
The True Nature of the Will
Upham thought the will to be “a subject difficult in itself, and the occasion in past 
times of more controversy than any other,” yet, when “placed in its true position,” the 
topic is “rendered comparatively easy.” Although last in his analysis, the will is in a 
“higher and more authoritative position” relative to the Intellect and Sensibility. The will 
is the foundation for personal responsibility and serves as “an authoritative center” of the 
person. He thought that Home Tooke’s verse expressed well the centrality of the will: 
“‘Tis the last keystone That makes the arch; the rest that there were put Are nothing, till 
that comes to bind and shut” (11.459).
Although Upham’s compartmentalized psychology certainly lacks the unity of 
Edward’s conception, he still did insist that the “three great departments” of the mind are 
connected together in many ways. Not only do the three departments influence each 
other, but subdepartments within departments are also interconnected.
Intellect and Will
The intellect is “the foundation, the basis of the existence and of the action both of 
the Sentimentive and of the Volitional nature.” It is impossible to be pleased or to love or 
to hate (actions of the sensibilities) without first perceiving an object with which to be 
pleased, etc. “If we approve or disapprove a thing, it is very evident that we must have a 
knowledge of some object of approval or disapproval; that there must be something upon
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which these emotions can fasten” (11.460). This is also the case with the will. There 
must be some “object of knowledge before the mind” for the will to operate at all. Here 
Upham follows both Ames and Edwards.
Upham thought that most agreed that the mind is “evidently framed for 
movement.” Instead of being “essentially dormant,” the mind was “designed to be an 
attendant and ministering angel to the great Being who made it ....” It is in this activity 
that the will is most clearly seen, since the will is “the immediate and proximate seat and 
source of action,” particularly ''outward action” (1.462). The will is the end and purpose 
of the intellect. Indeed, if the understanding were not somehow connected to the will, all 
of its activity would be to no avail—it would be a useless faculty of the mind. But this 
does not diminish the dignity of the intellect: its crucial role is evidenced by the fact that 
people address one another’s intellects when they desire to produce some action. “We do 
not address the Will directly and alone, nor do we directly address ourselves to the 
emotions...” (1.463). Instead, we hope to move a person by influencing first the intellect.
The connection between intellect and will is indirect. This should be clear from 
the preceding chapters, where Upham carefully laid out the step-by-step pattern of mental 
activity. The work of the intellect is always “carried on through the mediation of the 
sensibilities.'" Further, the appropriate object of the intellect is always “knowledge,” but, 
as Ames and Edwards loved to point out, knowledge itself does not move the will. For 
example, a person may after a train of reasoning conclude that a particular investment 
would be a benefit to himself and his family. This conclusion will fail to influence the 
will unless it first sparks some emotion indicating that the idea is a good one, and then a 
desire to pursue the object. Upham considered it one of the great errors of earlier mental
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philosophy that intellect and will were in direct, unmediated contact. Although Locke 
committed this error at first, he did “on more mature examination” (11.467) repent of this 
erroneous viewpoint, acknowledging that desire must connect intellect and will. Upham 
closed his chapter arguing that the powers of will and intellect are “not perfectly 
correspondent to each other” in particular individuals, i.e., that some people with great 
powers of intellect may have relatively weak wills, and vice versa.
Sensibilitv and Will
As he stated frequently in his chapter on the Sensibilities, Upham reiterated that it 
is this department of mind that “sustains a direct connexion with the Will” (11.471). 
Upham reminded his reader that the sensibilities are divided into the natural and moral. 
The natural sensibilities are further divided into emotions and desires, while the moral 
sensibilities are divided into moral emotions and feelings of obligation. Upham thought 
that the division between natural and moral sensibilities was based upon the fact that 
human beings “have a moral nature” as well as a natural or “pathematic” nature. The 
problems with this distinction, i.e., that many of the “natural” sensibilities are clearly 
moral in their nature, have been discussed in chapter eight. Nevertheless, Upham 
maintained this distinction firmly, insisting that these two types of sensibility exist “side 
by side.” The fact that they exist simultaneously guaranteed that the will always had the 
potential of being presented with the morally right choice (based upon the mind 
possessing correct information). No matter how perverse one’s natural sensibilities, the 
moral sentiments preserved moral accountability. There is here no Edwardsean notion 
that the “strongest” desire (natural or moral) will determine the will. As we shall see, the 
will retains its autonomy and acts as a self-determined arbiter among these motives.
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Upham was not afraid to use deterministic language when it came to the relation 
between intellect and sensibility. The intellect determines the emotions, which in turn 
determine desire. “This may be regarded as an ultimate fact or principle in our mental 
constitution” (11.474). The correspondence between intellect and emotion is strict: “there 
will generally be an entire correspondence between the two.” Emotions are usually “the 
true and precise measure of the natural and moral beauty of objects, and of their 
deformity.” Upham’s optimism is again evident in this conjecture. Neither original sin 
nor human limitation nor any other factor may inevitably distort the mind’s direct link to 
natural and cosmic reality. Still, the correspondence does frequently break down, but not 
because of the structure of the mind. Instead, human “carelessness” is the culprit 
(11.475).
Emotions are “one step nearer the Will” than the acts of the understanding. Yet 
these are still incapable of influencing the will. As an example, Upham invited the reader 
to consider a person who “contemplates some picture of excellent workmanship, which 
appears to him beautiful and sublime, and excites within him emotions of that character.” 
Still, these emotions do not bring forth an action, a volition:
He stands, and gazes, and the tide of emotion swells in upon him, and he is 
overwhelmed with it. But while this portion of his Sensibilities alone is awakened 
and called into exercise he will remain as inactive as if  he had been formed of 
intellect merely. He will take no measures to possess the painting, or to do 
anything else in respect to it, until he is under the influence of another portion of 
the Sensibilities entirely distinct from emotions. (11.476).
This passage highlights another interesting difference between Upham and his Puritan
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forebears. Both Ames and Edwards stressed that the will need not be expressed in 
outward action. Changing Upham’s example slightly will help to illustrate the difference. 
If the aforementioned feeling of sublimity were directed at God, both Ames and Edwards 
would have considered the “tide of emotion swell[ing]” and the being “overwhealmed” as 
virtuous acts of the will. Perhaps it is an indication of the pietistic and practical strain of 
American Protestantism (described by D. G. Hart) that Upham insisted that acts of will 
must manifest themselves in outward actions. Still, Upham’s notion of volition is more 
narrow than the notion of Ames and Edwards, and so too is Upham’s understanding of 
the moral side of human nature: for the feeling of sublimity was simply a natural, i.e., not 
a moral, emotion in his frame of thinking.
Upham thought that his step-by-step understanding of the mind revealed “the 
admirable economy of the mind,” and he exulted in the “wisdom which pervades its 
wonderful structure.” If emotions cannot move the will, they at least “lay the foundation 
of other mental states which can.” These states are, of course, the “desires,” or the 
“feelings of moral obligation.”
It is the desires that stand in direct proximity to the will. The emotions indicate 
that an object is good or bad. From this information, the desires to approach or avoid the 
object then take hold. In the case of the moral nature (as opposed to the natural), it is the 
feelings of moral obligation that follow the moral emotions. The whole drama of volition 
is found in the fact that “not infrequently these two classes of mental states stand before 
the Will in direct and strong opposition to each other.” Upham thought that his 
psychological system was superior because it allowed for this tension. A system in 
which “desires and obligations held the relations of antecedence and sequence,” for
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example, would not allow for this tension. Neither would a system like Edwards, whieh 
lumped all motives together onto a single scale. In the Edwardsean psychology, both 
desires and obligations would he among the many motives competing for preeminence, 
and the will would be determined by the cumulative preponderation of motives.
Upham’s Arminian ingenuity was to create a view of mind that kept tension and 
indecision at the heart of things, creating the need for an internal Arbiter to make the final 
decision.
The Will, then, for Upham, “is the great result, to which they [the various 
faculties and sub-faculties] all, in their appropriate position, contribute, and with which 
they all, therefore, sustain an established connexion, though not with the same degree of 
neamess” (11.479). By positing that “both desires and obligations.. .[stand] side by side 
in equal proximity, and with equal psychical or mental possibilities and rights,” he 
assured that there would be not only “a basis for the operations of the Will,” but also a 
basis for “moral accountability.”
And hence it follows, in accordance with what is constantly presented to our 
notice, that, in the exercise of volition, men are not shut up to one form of action, 
but are enabled and required, in all eases where such a distinction actually exists, 
to discriminate between the UTILE and the HONESTUM, between the desirable 
and the just, between what is merely profitable or pmdential, and what is virtuous. 
(11.479)
The Edwardsean question at this point would be: how, precisely, do these desires 
determine the will? When the will is presented with a desire of a certain strength and a 
feeling of a certain strength, can we then predict which direction the will will move?
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upham believed that the strength of these two great motives to volition may vary and at 
times be incommensurate with one another. He enumerated factors which determine the 
strength of these motives, particularly knowledge. It is knowledge which largely 
determines the strength of desire and the strength of the felling of obligation. Upham was 
not uncomfortable positing a deterministic relation between knowledge and motive 
strength. But what is the relation between motive strength and the will? Upham leaves 
his reader hanging at this point, awaiting the answer to the Edwardsean question. Recall 
that Edwards had criticized Chubb for creating a psychology in which motives were 
necessary to move the will, yet motive strength was largely irrelevant to the will’s 
ultimate decisions. The problem with this approach is that motives are really only given 
lip service, and motive strength is in the end meaningless. Upham, like Whitby, would 
move in this Arminian direction.
Volitions
Given Upham’s psychologizing up to this point, he could confidently ask, 
“destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident.. .that man would be an inefficient and 
useless being?” (11.483). Since the mind is designed by God to produce two sometimes 
contrary motives to action, desire and feelings of moral obligation, the person would, 
without a will, move “hither and thither, in various and contradictory directions.” It 
logically follows, then, that the mind must possess some power to pull the mind out of its 
natural ambivalence. “ .. .There must be somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the 
complicated variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and controlling swajf ’
(11.484). To put the matter a bit differently:
.. .It is the authoritative voice of the Will, which, holding a central position in
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relation to the conflicting claims of interest and passion on the one hand, and of 
conscience on the other, prononnces the decisive and final arbitrament. (11.484) 
The will is “the cumulating point in man’s spiritual nature,” sitting “as the witness and 
arbitress over all the rest.” The sentiments “revolve around” the will like a gravitational 
center, laying the foundation for the activity of the will, yet also being “harmonized” and 
“controlled” by its magical powers.
Upham here uses language that seems to conceive of the will as a reified separate 
existence exerting control over the mental phenomena. He tried to deny that he was 
doing this, interposing “a word of caution” immediately after his rhapsodizing over the 
powers of will:
It is not to be inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind in distinction from 
another, and of passing from one part or power to another, that the mind is a 
congeries of distinct existences, or that it is, in any literal and material sense of 
the terms, susceptible of division. (11.485)
The fact that the mind is divided into several seemingly independent compartments does 
not “imply a want of unity in the principle from which they originate” (11.485). Given the 
unity of the mind, the term will is not meant to signify “anything separate from the mind” 
(H.485).
Despite Upham’s qualifications, he thought that the term will was meant to 
describe “the mind’s ability to operate in a new and specific way.” He further defined the 
will as “the MENTAL POWER OR SUSCEPTIBILITY BY MEANS OF WHICH WE 
PUT FORTH VOLITIONS.” The will, therefore, is the power to will. This will 
possesses “a causative relation to its appropriate results” (11.485). So, since the results of
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the will are volitions, and it is the will that causes these volitions, Upham seemed to 
define the will as a self-determining power. Upham never addressed Edwards’ argument 
on this point in Mental Philosophv.
Upham thought that since volitions are simple states of mind they were by 
definition indefinable, yet still known by consciousness. Still, he could posit that “every 
act o f the will must have an object f  and that we must perceive these objects of will to he 
within our reach (11.487). Further, volitions have to do with “our own action, either some 
bodily movement or some act of the mind” (11.489). Here Upham seems to use Amesian 
and Edwardsean language, positing that the will does not necessarily issue in outward 
action. Acts of will are also geared toward the future, always “reach[ing] forth its hand to 
grasp objects which have not as yet a being” (11.491).
Volitions also differ in terms of their strength. In considering what determines the 
strength of volitions, Upham posited that strong desires increase the strength of volition, 
indicating a “common sense” view of motive strength and an apparent openness to a 
deterministic view of the will on some occasions.
The Distinction Between Desires and Volitions
Whatever role motive strength has in determining volition, Upham was quick to 
argue that it is not an absolute role, as Edwards had argued. The last chapter of his 
section on the basics on the psychology of volition was dedicated to making this point 
absolutely clear. Although some would argue that the distinction between volitions and 
desires is not absolutely clear, and in other writers the two were equated (such as 
Edwards), Upham maintained that the separation was “essential and indispensable.”
Most of the “obscurity” associated with the debates on the will have been due to the fact
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that many authors had made the “mistake” of failing to adequately separate desire and 
volition. While acknowledging their close relation, Upham thought that a failure to 
maintain that these two are “entirely distinct” prevents even “the greatest minds” from 
reaching the truth in mental philosophy. Perhaps Upham had Edwards in mind as he 
wrote this. Regardless, it is clear that theological concerns had a profound influence on 
Upham’s psychology.
One reason mental philosophers fail to make the proper distinction between desire 
and volition is that the latter usually follows the former seamlessly. “And, in 
consequence of this regular consecution, which is also, for the most part; very quick or 
rapid (so much so, in fact, as hardly to furnish any basis for remembrance), we gradually 
fall into the habit of confounding the two together, and at last come to believe that there 
is, in truth, no difference between them” (11.496). Upham thus conceded that in most acts 
of volition there is indeed no act of arbitration, no conflict between motives. Yet in 
conceding this, Upham also seemed to concede that the will is, in “perhaps a considerable 
majority of cases” (11.496) irrelevant to mental life. The consequence of this was that the 
Arminian will was a shrinking will, although Upham may not have noticed.
Upham thought that consciousness clearly testified to the distinction between 
desire and volition. Although the two are very closely related to each other “in their 
consecutive relations,” consciousness pronounces “an entire separation” of the two “as 
far as their nature is concerned” (11.497). Upham invited his readers to reflect upon their 
own conscious experience to see that this is the case, tipping the scales perhaps in his 
favor by suggesting that these introspections focus upon “those various circumstances of 
enticement, and temptation, and action in which we daily find ourselves placed” (11.497),
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i.e., focusing upon conscious experiences in which a difference between will and desire 
seems most plausible. (James, too, thought that cases of temptation were the most 
quintessential acts of will). Upham was confident of the results of this introspective 
experiment. “ .. .Will not consciousness not only clearly indicate a distinction, but even 
assert the impossibility of an identity in the case under consideration? We cannot 
entertain a doubt that it will.” Upham here perhaps did not recall Edwards’ comments 
about the weakness of relying upon “experience” in order to make universal assertions. 
Just as Edwards denied having ever experienced a self-determining power within his own 
mind, so too he probably would have failed Upham’s thought experiment here.
Upham offered other proofs that desire and volition differ from one another. For 
one, desires tend to linger while volitions are momentary. Also, language also seems to 
support the distinction. The fact that we esteem those who have resisted a strong desire 
to do evil is further support. Here Upham’s description of such a virtuous person is 
illustrative of his understanding of how the mind works in such situations:
The wine sparkles before him; his tongue and throat are parched, and the strongest 
desires arise. But conscience at the same time urges upon him the claims of his 
family, his country, and his God. After enduring this inward conflict for a season, 
he resolves, he wills, he acts, and dashes the alluring bowl to the ground. Every 
one rejoices at, and honours the deed. But it cannot be because the desire has been 
gratified, but because the person has willed and acted against desire; because, in 
the opposing array and contest of the powers of his inferior nature, desire has 
been beaten, and the sense of obligation and duty has triumphed by the award of 
the only possible umpire, viz., the Will. We evidently make a distinction, in all
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such cases, between the cravings of a man’s appetite, which necessarily involve 
desire, and the act of volition, by which the tendency of such desire is 
counteracted. (11.500)
Upham does not entertain or challenge the Edwardsean possibility that the desire to 
refrain was simply stronger than the desire to imbibe, making refraining the strongest 
motive. Further, Upham does not address the possible challenge, along the same lines 
but assuming Upham’s divisions, that conscience was simply the strongest motive in this 
case. In either case, “the will” as defined by Upham is an utter superfluity, contributing 
nothing to the process. One can see in this light that the Arminian will, purportedly 
elevated by libertarian concerns, actually became quite expendable in this scheme of 
thinking.
Upham did field some similar accusations regarding a quote from Thomas Reid, 
in which Reid talks about a judge who desires that a criminal live, but still wills him to 
die. In his defense of Reid, Upham argues that there are “two conflicting principles 
within him [the judge]; the desire on the one hand.. .and the feelings of moral obligation 
on the other.” Both of these are in “immediate contact with the will.” Given this 
conflict, only the will is left to arbitrate a decision. Yet, considered from an Edwardsean 
perspective, one might question whether Upham and Reid here confound the “proper 
objects of the will.” If indeed will and desire are opposed to each other as Upham frames 
the issue (i.e., the judge desires the person to live [x] and wills the person to die [not x]), 
then he would be justified in his contention that the two move in opposite directions. But 
perhaps the proper object of the will in the judges’ decision is not the man’s death but is 
rather justice. So the immediate object of the will is justice, and in this will and desire
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agree. The “remote” object of will is the life of the criminal, and although the judge 
desires that the criminal continue to live, he does not actually will it. Upham does not 
take into consideration such Edwardsean possibilities. Upham offers a litany of such 
examples, such as the case of a father punishing his child although he desires to refrain, 
and the case of Abraham offering his son Isaac although he desired to spare his life.
Upham also contended that if will automatically follows desire, the possibility of 
moral action is excluded, because the feelings of moral obligation are automatically left 
out of the process. These conclusions are of course true given Upham’s definitions of the 
mind [as Guelzo (1989) pointed out, Edwards similarly loaded the definitional deck in 
favor of Calvinism]. Upham also argued that if will and desire are not separate, there is 
no room for simultaneous experiences of satisfaction and sorrow, as would be the case in 
the moral conundrums described below.
Finally, Upham argued that scriptural examples support the separation of desire 
and volition. God is often portrayed as judging his people and yet being grieved by this 
act, i.e., God’s will and desire conflict. Upham, like Ames, therefore makes an analogy 
between the divine and the human minds. Man is made in the image of God, “and it is as 
true of God as of man, that there are elements in his nature which lead him to determine 
or will that which He does not desire.” God, like humans, possesses a strict distinction 
between will and desire. Given that God too possess intellect, one might conclude that 
God also possesses a tripartite soul.
The Laws of the Will 
The second part of Upham’s discussion of the will dealt with “the laws of the 
will.” This is perhaps the most difficult part of Upham’s treatment on will. While
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sounding very much like an “Arminian” in the rest of the book, Upham in this section 
makes several Calvinistic-sounding arguments concerning, for example, the necessity of 
volitions based upon God’s foreknowledge. Here Upham draws selectively from 
Freedom of the Will. This section of the book does not represent a shift in thinking, 
however, for Upham upholds his libertarian/incompatibilist formulations even in his 
discussion of law, as we shall see. Still, the contrast (and, perhaps, the contradiction) is 
striking.
Having established the “important principles” of Part I, Upham thought he could 
move on to cover more controversial issues surrounding the topic, particularly the laws 
and the freedom of the will. These topics have been characterized by great “difference[s] 
of opinion” and since they “lie.. .closely at the root of human accountability” they “are as 
important as they are interesting” (11.514). These topics are important because:
If a man, for instance, adopts the opinion that there is no such thing as freedom of 
the will, and that men are the subjects of an irresistible fatality, it will generally 
follow that his practice will be correspondent to such a belief. Placing an 
erroneous interpretation on the words of Solomon, that “ time and chance happen 
to all men,” such persons throw themselves upon the wave of their destiny, and 
are floated onward with an utter disregard of the issue, whether it be good or evil, 
shameful or glorious. No matter what takes place, say they; it is all from a higher 
power; and it would be wholly ineffectual and presumptuous in mere insects to 
prescribe plans for the Deity. The greatest circumspection, the most arduous 
labours, the most invincible determination, will effect nothing against the allotted 
and predestined course of events. (11.514).
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Upham therefore defines necessity in a manner repugnant to Edwards; as something that 
runs counter to effort. Indeed, in the conclusion to Freedom of the Will predicted that 
Arminians would simply “renew” the old arguments against Calvinism, that it posits a 
“‘fatal,’ ‘unfrustrable,’ ‘inevitable,’ ‘irresistible,’ etc.” necessity. (Conclusion, 1), without 
actually engaging his arguments. This is what Upham appears to do throughout Mental 
Philosophv, quoting “President Edwards” for support, and either ignoring his opinions 
when they disagree, or avoiding mentioning his name when he explicitly disagreed.
Yet, reflective of his Calvinistic background, Upham was also uncomfortable with 
overconfidence in one’s autonomous abilities, which “leads to a presumptuous self- 
confidence” (11.515). Such people live unrighteously and autonomously, failing to ask 
“aid from on high” (Although it is at times unclear why asking for help is necessary when 
one possesses the power of will as described by Upham). Therefore, in order perhaps to 
instill some needed humility, Upham went about demonstrating that the will is not an 
entirely self-sufficient faculty allowing for entirely autonomous action.
Attempting to steer a middle ground between rejecting free will on the one hand 
and rejecting dependence upon God on the other, Upham attempted to show that the will 
“has its laws” (11.515). The will’s freedom (which he explicitly assumed) must therefore 
be understood and interpreted in this light.
Upham’s first argument to this effect was “from the general analogy of nature.” It 
is clear that the “outward universe” (e.g., planetary motion) and even the mind is 
controlled by law. Therefore, it would seem to follow that law also applies to volition. 
Upham approvingly quoted Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws to illustrate this point. “All 
beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences
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superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws” (II.517). Upham also 
gathered quotes from Cicero and Hooker to reiterate the point.
Sounding much like Edwards, Upham argued that lawfulness (i.e., necessity) is 
essential to the divine nature. God is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and sovereign. 
But, “Can that wisdom properly be called omniscient, which knows not what will be the 
determinations and acts of men in all assignable circumstances, in all time and place?” 
(II.519). Can God’s government of the world fail to control all things? Upham thought 
the answer to these questions was obvious. Further, by positing God’s perfect knowledge 
of the future volitions of all people, Upham entered into territory well trodden by 
Edwards, who argued that God’s foreknowledge of events implies their necessity. Yet, 
apparently in tension with this sentiment, is Upham’s previous association of necessity 
with “irresistible fatality” (11.514).
Given the universality of law, even in the divine nature, it follows that the will 
itself must have its laws. If this were not the case, we would have an “anomaly” on our 
hands. Reiterating Edwards point concerning the dire consequences of contingency in 
acts of will, Upham argued that “if  the Will acts accidentally or contingently, by which is 
meant out of and beyond the sphere of law, then the man acts contingently.” Upham 
drew a theological conclusion here, one that flavors Edwards’ entire treatise:
.. .he stands in a position in which he cannot be controlled even by the Deity 
himself. He has suffered a revulsion from the parent stock; he has gone off and set 
up for himself; he has established an empire of his own, where even the Most 
High must not enter. (11.520).
In Upham’s mind, like Edwards, both common sense and piety demanded that human
476
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
beings acknowledge their dependence upon the living God. Yet, how his belief that God 
“cannot” violate hiunan free will is compatible with the idea that it is evil to establish a 
place “where even the Most High must not enter” is not clear. By given humanity an 
Arminian “power of will,” God himself seemed to be establishing a place where he could 
not enter.
Moral Government
Even in the days of Jonathan Edwards, Calvinists were concerned that the 
doctrine of God’s moral government of the world was under attack. Upham, again 
reflecting his Calvinistic background, also desired to hold on to this notion, as opposed to 
the idea that the world is governed simply by “mere physical control.” He thought there 
was “perhaps.. .no subject more important” for the young student. If one accepts that 
God governs the world, one must also accept that the will is under law. Upham explicitly 
assumed that his readers did make this assumption. Still he argued that there is “ample 
evidence” apart from the Bible to prove this doctrine.
The doctrine of the moral government of God meant “that there are some things 
being governed” (11.522). To be governed, Upham explained, “is obviously to be 
regulated, guided, or controlled, in a greater or less degree” (11.523). The will is under 
this regulation; therefore the will is not free to move in any direction. Still, the existence 
of “ a higher or ruling power” implies the existence of an inferior power that is able to 
obey the demands of the higher power. Here Upham is speaking of a moral ability, or the 
power of will to obey God’s commands. By insisting that humans must have the moral 
ability to obey God’s commands in order to be accountable, Upham differed here from 
Edwards who argued in detail that a natural ability was sufficient to maintain
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accountability.
The fact that human beings possess intellect which in turn influences the will not 
only assures accountability, but also implies the existence of law: the will is lawfully 
connected to the intellect. Further, consistent with Edwards, Upham noted that “motives” 
or promises and threatenings imply that the acts of the will are lawfully related to such 
things. If the will were unable to respond to such promises or threats, it would be 
impossible for human beings to influence one another for the good. A lack of lawfulness 
in human volition would render the person unable to predict even her own activity, 
making it impossible to hold that person accountable for her actions. Randomness and 
accident in volition would make it impossible even for temptation to influence the will in 
any predictable pattem, for the predictableness is the very thing that lawlessness in 
volition denies.
Finally, the denial of lawfulness in voluntary action, i.e., the existence of 
contingency in voluntary action, undermines the very foundations of “VIRTUE and 
VICE” (11.528). Since it is a “common maxim” that the virtue or vice of an action is 
related “to the designs, intentions, or motives with which they originated,” any postulate 
which excludes such things must undermine virtue and vice. Yet this is precisely what 
contingency does. Designs, intentions, and motives exert a lawful and predictable 
influence on the will. Contingency denies that there can be any such lawful influence. 
Therefore the foundations for virtue and vice are eradicated. Upham’s’ argumentation 
here is very similar to Edwards’s refutation of contingency, and Upham quotes him to 
this effect (11.530). Upham’s usage of Edwards is quite selective.
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God’s Foresight and Volition
Reiterating another argument of Edwards in Freedom of the Will, Upham argued 
that God’s foresight of volitions implies the necessity of these volitions. Upham, like 
Edwards, assumed that most of his readers embraced the fact of God’s foreknowledge, 
yet he still offered a few arguments to buttress the point: the ideas “which all men” form 
of God include foreknowledge, and God had designed the mind in such a way that the 
idea of foreknowledge “arises in it naturally and certainly” given the correct 
developmental pathway. Upham again proceeds on rational grounds to make theological 
points. Yet, as he usually did, the last word was given to scripture. Upham shows that 
the Bible teaches God’s omniscience, which implies foreknowledge. Further, since God 
knows all events, he certainly foreknows the volitions of human beings and the effects of 
volitions on other volitions. If God foreknows the volitions of people, it follows that 
these acts of will shall certainly occur, and therefore the will has its laws. There is no 
contingency or randomness possible in this system. Upham’s unwavering determinism is 
shocking and disarming at this point.
Finally, the fact of divine influence implies that the will has its laws. Both the 
Bible and “sound philosophy” hold that God “has the power, and, when in his providence 
he sees fit, exerts the power, of enlightening, purifjdng, and guiding the minds of men” 
(11.536). Ete quotes several passages of scripture to this end. Upham concluded:
All these passages, and others like them, necessarily and clearly imply, although 
there is no doubt, as we shall see hereafter, of the fact of man’s freedom and of 
the possibility of moral disobedience, that the human mind, nevertheless, is 
circumscribed and overruled in its operations to some extent; that it is susceptible
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of divine influences and guidance; and that it is held, by means of relational 
forces and adjustments consistent with Ixeedom, in subordination to the all- 
pervading and transcendent control of the Supreme Intelligence. (11.537)
Despite the general agreement between Upham and Edwards in this section, this 
particular passage is revealing, and Edwards would have disagreed with it in three ways. 
First, although Edwards agreed that God’s control of human action did not overrule “the 
fact of man’s freedom,’’ Upham defined freedom in the libertarian sense. Edwards 
argued that such a definition of freedom does not cohere with the affirmation of God’s 
providence. Second, Upham’s use of the phrase “to some extent’’ to describe God’s 
control over the universe would have been unacceptable to Edwards. If God’s control is 
only partial, Edwards might have said, he does not have real control at all. Finally, and 
relatedly, the idea that God’s control of human action somehow “overrules” human 
activity implies that there are some actions that God does not control, and that his 
providence entails entering into an autonomous system. In Edwards’ universe, all events 
are determined either by God’s efficiency or his permission. Human motives are always 
involved and always subordinate to this government.
Human Foresight
The laws of the will are also evidenced by the fact that human beings can to some 
extent forecast their own volitions and the volitions of others. A man goes to New York 
or Boston on a business trip. The successful completion of this trip and the business it 
includes “implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions” (11.538). Still, 
the man proceeds on his trip with confidence, believing that he will be able to execute the 
necessary volitions.
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In terms of the volitions of others, one may easily predict the response of “a 
confirmed and inexorable miser” to a request for charity (11.539). Quoting Paley, Upham 
noted that humans continually count on the volitions of others:
Every hour of our lives we trust and depend upon others; and it is impossible to 
stir a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and 
dependence. 1 am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or, rather, never 
distrusting, and, therefore, never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send 
in the joint of meat which 1 ordered; that his servant will bring it; that my cook 
will dress it; that my footman will serve it up. (11.540)
Benevolent associations, which depend upon charitable donations for their survival, make 
plans and predictions for the next year based upon the previous year’s giving; i.e., the 
volitions of people are in this case also lawful and predictable. Indeed a variety of 
statistics indicate that human behaviors are patterned. On the basis of these statistics,
“ .. .one may predict at the beginning of each year what number will be brought before the 
criminal tribunals,” for example (11.546).
The Nature of the Will
A consideration of the very nature of the will reveals that the will has its laws.
For example, consciousness testifies of a lawful connection between motive and volition. 
The fact that the will always requires an object is another example. Further, the will can 
only act in connection with motives, and only when the person believes that the thing in 
question is actually attainable. Lawfulness is exhibited in those occasions in which 
passion becomes strong enough “as to encroach upon the domain of the voluntary power, 
and to bring it into subjection” (11.553). This quote, by the way, is another helpful hint as
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to why an Arminian will could be “lost.” By positing that the will has a “domain” that 
can be invaded, it is possible that that territory can be lost. In the Edwardsean notion, 
passions, desires, feelings of moral obligation, etc. were all motives subsumed under the 
blanket term will. The determinants of the will may change from moment to moment and 
time to time, but the will remains. In Upham’s psychology, it is possible for the will to 
have “lost its power” (11.554). Upham’s point here, however, is simply that the will has 
its laws. If the will may at times be taken captive by the passions, it follows that the will 
is lawfully related to the passions.
Motives
Upham’s final point in demonstrating that the will has its laws centered upon “the 
law of motives,” or the idea that “the Will never acts.. .except in connexion with 
motives” (11.556). Motives are either internal or external. Internal motives include the 
propensities, the affections and the moral motives. External motives include “all external 
objects, which excite within us either approbation or disapprobation, joy or sorrow” 
(11.557). These external objects only affect to the extent that they influence our internal 
states, and so external motives only influence the will through the mediation of the 
internal motives. The way in which objects influence individuals is at least partially 
idiosyncratic, dependent upon the characteristics of the person. In all of these ways, the 
will is shown to operate in lawful ways.
Motives are not the efficient cause of volition, however, but rather act as 
“preparative causes,” or the “prerequisite antecedents, which furnish the occasions and 
lay the foundation for acts of the will” (11.561). Motives do not “compel” acts of the will, 
but rather make volitions possible in the first place. Here Upham soimds like the Chubb
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that Edwards attempted to refute in Freedom of the Will. Edwards argued that Chubb 
actually undermined the role of motives by arguing that volitions are not determined in 
any predictable way by these motives.
Consistent with his treatment of the sensibilities, Upham divided motives into the 
natural (or personal) and the moral. The natural motives are found in the natural 
sensibilities or “the heart” (11.560). Moral motives are found in the moral sensibilities or 
conscience. More specifically, natural motives are desires, and moral motives are 
feelings of moral obligation. Not only do these two types of motive influence the will 
lawfully, but Upham here reiterates his point that it is the conflict between these two 
types of motive which constitute the drama of the moral life. Upham, purportedly 
speaking of all humans, infuses this struggle with Christian meaning, further blurring the 
line between the secular and religious nature of this psychology:
And it is here, in the relative position and strength of these two classes of motives, 
which sometimes unite in their influence, but are very often antagonistical, that 
we find the basis of that inward spiritual conflict, upon the right settlement of 
which depends our harmony with God, and the conscious knowledge that ‘the 
kingdom of God is within us.’ (11.562)
The fact that salvation depends upon our rightly settling the issue was a most un- 
Amesian, un-Calvinistic conclusion.
The Freedom of the Will 
Having established that the will is subject to law, Upham then turned to establish 
a seemingly incompatible reality: that the will is free. Showing that these two things are 
consistent with each other was, of course, one of Edwards’ main goals in The Freedom of
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the Will, but he had defined freedom in compatibilist terms, i.e., freedom is being able to 
act according to desire. To support that notion, Edwards bad utilized the distinction 
between natural and moral causes and necessity, arguing that “common sense” sees 
natural necessity (e.g., being tied down) as opposed to freedom, but moral necessity (e.g., 
being inclined in a particular direction by motives) is not opposed to freedom. A morally 
necessary act, such as an intentional murder or lie, is still a morally culpable act.
The first thing Upham does in bis section on the freedom of the will is to 
challenge the dichotomy between natural and moral freedom. Switching the terms a bit, 
be noted, “it has sometimes been the method of writers on the Freedom of the will to 
introduce the subject with remarks in illustration of what may be termed bodily, in 
distinction from mental freedom.” Bodily freedom, according to Upham is simply 
freedom from restraint, analogous to Edward’s natural freedom. Still, Upham did not 
think this notion very helpful in the freedom of the will controversy.
Perhaps, then, mental freedom was the crucial concept for Upham, and he, like 
Edwards thought that a proper definition of this type of freedom was crucial to resolving 
the issue. This was not the case. Previous definitional attempts in this area, Upham 
thought, had “proved unsuccessful,” due in part to the use of incorrect “methods”
(11.566). Freedom, like all simple ideas, cannot be defined. It is something we know 
from the mind alone. “Verbal explanation” of freedom is therefore “utterly futile” 
(11.567-568). Yet, Upham was confident that he knew the occasion of the idea’s 
occurrence: “the occasion on which the abstract idea of Freedom is suggested to the 
intellect, and becomes a part of our knowledge, is nothing else than the mind’s action 
itself, in those favoured moments when its operations are in fact free.” Upham was
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therefore left with a foolproof method of determining the freedom of the will in particular 
actions: does the mind suggest that a particular act was free? If yes, then it is free. The 
mind is “so constituted” that this method “always” succeeds (11.569).
Given that freedom is a simple idea and therefore indefinahle, Upham argued that 
attempts at definition are necessarily futile. Hobbes’s definition, that “Liberty is the 
absence of all impediments to action...” was faulty because the phrase “absence of all 
impediments” is “obviously synonymous” with the term we are trying to define.
Likewise, Buffier’s definition that “Liberty is the disposition a man feels within himself 
of his capacity to act or not to act.. .at the same moment” was faulty because the word 
“capacity” does not appear to have a meaning distinct from liberty. Still, it is strange that 
Upham appeared to choose two fundamentally opposed definitions of freedom to 
illustrate the idea that definition is meaningless. The first definition seems to advocate a 
compatibilist definition of freedom, i.e., a person is free if they can act according to 
desire. The second definition seems to advocate a libertarian definition of freedom, i.e, in 
any given situation a person may act in different ways. Philosophers today continue to 
consider these definitions meaningful. And, as we shall see, Upham did actually take a 
position on this issue.
Upham took Reid to task for using language that leaned in that direction. His 
point about the difficulty of defining liberty is also better made here:
The definition given by Dr. Reid is this: ‘By the liberty of a moral agent, I 
understand a POWER over the determinations of his own Will.’ It is difficult to 
make anything of this definition, because it seems to imply the existence of a 
Volitional power or Will back of that, whose decisions are the immediate
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precursors of our actions. If it do not imply this, then all that is meant is, that the 
liberty of a moral agent is his POWER to put forth voluntary determinations or 
acts of the will. And in that case, POWER is the synonymous expression, and, of 
course, gives us no new light in the case. And if it he not so, the difficulty is not 
at all removed; for, if we suppose the term power to have a distinct meaning from 
liberty, that idea or meaning, whatever it may be, is simple and undefinable. 
(11.570).
Upham closed his preliminary chapter on the freedom of the will on a pietistic 
note. There is a great difference between forming an abstract notion of liberty on the one 
hand, and actually possessing liberty on the other. The idea of liberty is the product of 
pure intellect (the intellect’s operation independent of sensory inputs), and is an 
“intellectual entity.” Yet, “this is merely the idea of the thing, and not the thing itself’ 
(11.571). So, while the metaphysician may possess sophisticated notions of liberty and 
yet lack it, the simple believer, lacking the sophisticated notions, may actually possess 
liberty. Clearly the latter reality is superior to the former. Although this rhetoric is 
similar to Edwards’ at the end of Freedom of the Will (i.e., the weak prevailing over the 
strong), Edwards had at least attempted to argue for the cogency of his position before 
using it. Upham here seems to have slipped into a kind of fideism at this point, knowing 
what he knows because he knows it, and believing what he believes because he believes 
it. This approach to liberty may have failed to given future libertarians any intellectual 
ammunition to defend their own libertarianism. One is reminded of James’s famous 
fideistic saying that his first act of free will would be to believe in free will, regardless of 
his ability to actually defend the position intellectually.
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Mental Harmony
Although defining liberty is impossible, it is possible to describe the mental 
conditions that accompany it (just as it is possible to describe the conditions that limit 
freedom). Preliminarily, Upham noted that freedom exists in degrees. A person with 
strong desires for alcohol is less free than a person with weaker desires, yet the one with 
the stronger desires is still free “so long as be is not absolutely beyond the possibility of 
self-recovery” (11.575). This person is free and accountable, although less free than 
others. Here Upham’s description clearly puts him at odds with Edwards, who explicitly 
argued that strength of desire does not impede freedom. One of the problems with this 
line of thinking, Edwards wrote, is that it undermines praise and blame. A sinful act 
performed under strong motives is less culpable than the same act performed under 
weaker motives. Conversely, a virtuous act performed under strong motives is less 
praiseworthy than the same act performed under weaker motives. Edwards thought it 
was this way of thinking actually contradicted common sense. Yet this is what Upham 
seems to be saying here.
Curiously, after affirming that freedom exists in degrees, Upham indicated that 
his comments on the circumstances of mental freedom were meant to apply to the case of 
perfect freedom, i.e., when freedom exists “in the highest degree" (11.575).
People can easily see that “all things are in harmony, or were designed to be so.” 
Among these many harmonies is the harmony of the mind, in which every part is 
perfectly adapted to the other parts, each part having its own duties and sphere. “Now, 
when each part operates in this way.. .when each power performs its functions.. .we are 
then conscious of a liberty in the highest sense of the term” (11.575). Again, it is
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“useless” to reason about this experience, only those who have experienced this freedom 
can know what Upham speaks of here.
Since some powers of the mind are “higher” than others, a person experiences 
liberty when there is a proper subordination and preponderation among the powers. The 
will “is the presiding and controlling power” over all of the mental activities (11.576). 
Acting as the leading advisor and consultant in cases of greatest mental harmony is the 
conscience, “the viceregent of God in the human breast” (11.576). When the other powers 
of the soul are submitted to the conscience, the action of the will proceeds smoothly, in 
liberty. Indeed, “the occasion on which we are conscious of mental freedom in the 
highest degree is to be found in a condition of the mental acts, conformed to the 
requirements of the Supreme Being. Here Upham seems to agree with Edwards that the 
most virtuous acts are those that are most necessary. When all other powers are 
submitted to the dictates of conscience, the likelihood that conscience will be obeyed is 
greatest. So, here again Upham would deny the “Arminian” contention that freedom 
consists in indifference. Yet, Upham’s definitions here shed further light on the 
trichotomizing of the mind in view of the “loss of will” in American psychology. In the 
case of perfect freedom and perfect mental harmony, what does the will do? It has 
nothing to arbitrate since all powers are in proportion and point in the same direction. 
There is therefore no need for a power of will in the perfectly virtuous person. 
Interestingly, Upham’s description of Christ immediately following this description of 
harmony does not include the word will or volition. We learn that Christ’s mind 
experienced:
entire and perfect harmony. The appetites, the propensities, the affections.. .never
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violated their due boundaries, but always acted in complete uniformity with the 
law of rectitude in the soul [conscience]. As there was perfect harmony, there 
was perfect liberty; and as there was liberty, there was peace—even that peace 
‘which passeth understanding’ (11.579).
Since this Christ is an example to “us” (again, the “us” is always ill-defined in Upham), 
one should not rule out perfection. Yet, since Christ’s appetites, propensities and 
affections were always perfectly in balance, he did not apparently ever need to exert an 
arbitrating power of will. How imperfect people such as those to whom Upham wrote 
were to imitate this he did not indicate. Upham did indicate that the Holy Spirit could 
communicate this perfect liberty to the believer, but this too would have overridden any 
need for a power of will, since the harmony communicated would have overridden any 
need for an internal arbiter.
Freedom of the Will
Moving from the general notion of liberty to its application to the will, Upham 
reaffirmed that this liberty, like all liberty, is better known through experience than 
described verbally. “ .. .It is impossible for me to explain what the Freedom of the Will is 
in words, but I know what it is in experience and in fact...” (11.583).
Trickier yet is the difficulty of explaining how the will can be “subject to law” 
and yet free. Sounding like Edwards, Upham contended that the will’s freedom actually 
depended upon its subjection to law. Without law, the will would be subject to “mere 
contingency and accident” which would really be no different than “a fatalism of the 
worst kind, an xmintelligent fatalism” (11.584).
Like liberty in general, the will is free when the mind enjoys “perfect harmony in
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the other parts of the mind” (11.585). The best example of this is God, who possesses the 
greatest degree of freedom of will, and the angels too exemplify this freedom. Upham’s 
description of the angels further illustrates the redundancy and uselessness of the will in 
such creatures:
The will of angels, and of any and all other orders of holy beings, formed as they 
are in the image of their Maker, possesses, within the appropriate sphere of its 
action, the highest degree of freedom. All the various elements which go to 
constitute them intelligent and moral beings are restricted to their proper place, 
and operate in their due proportion. Their perceptions, so far as they go, are in 
perfect accordance with the truth of things. Their emotions are such as God, who 
takes supreme delight in perfect rectitude, can entirely approve. Every desire 
which they exercise is in its right place; their love to God is just such as it should 
be; their love to other holy beings corresponds precisely to the nature of the object 
towards which it is directed; their aversion to sin and sinful beings is just such, 
and fully and entirely such, as is appropriate and right; and it is precisely the same 
in respect to every other emotion and desire. And the consequence is, there is no 
disturbing force in the neighbourhood of the Will; there is no possible motive to 
sway it from the line of perfect rectitude; and hence it is true, that their Will, 
although it always operates in the direction of the highest rectitude and good, is 
always at liberty; and this liberty exists, too, in the highest possible degree. 
(11.585-586)
One might wonder: does the angel really need a will in this situation? If all systems are 
‘go,’ does the angel need the will to simply repeat the ‘go’? As was the case with
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Upham’s Christ, Upham’s angels seem to possess a thoroughly useless will. The true 
usefulness of the Arminian will best appears when the soul is under deep conflict and 
actually lacks harmony. This, as we shall see, was the use to which James applied his 
Arminian will.
The best evidence of freedom of the will is found in consciousness. Quoting 
Dugald Stewart, “Our own free will.. .we know by consciousness; and we can have no 
evidence of any truth so irresistible as this” (11.587). Upham noted that some people 
report experiencing the opposite, i.e., “a consciousness of internal compulsion or 
slavery.” Although Puritans of old frequently complained of experiencing this slavery to 
sin in their efforts to be holy, as did the apostle Paul in Romans 7, Upham reported that 
this sort of experience was exceedingly rare, the experience of “thousands and even 
hundreds of thousands to one” (11.587). Instead of being part of the normal Christian 
experience, blame for this bondage to sin could be placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
ones possessing the aberrant experience since their condition is the result of habitual sin. 
Arminian psychology may therefore also have tended toward a kind of “self- 
righteousness.”
Although Upham thought that motives are necessary for the will to function 
properly, he rejected the idea that the will is controlled by the strongest motive. The 
reason for this is that the motives presented to the will are “different in kind” and cannot 
be directly compared.
Man’s Moral Nature
Upham thought that freedom was implied in “man’s moral nature.” The fact that 
God gave humans an ability to conceive of wrong and right implies that humans have an
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ability to do wrong and right. Further, our feelings of approval or disapproval also imply 
freedom of the will. If we disapprove of an action that a person committed only later to 
learn that that person did not have free will in that act, we take back our disapproval. 
Therefore, disapproval implies a belief in freedom of the will. Our feelings of remorse 
are also evidence that we believe we could have done better, that we could have done 
“otherwise” (11.593). Upham’s libertarianism is clear here. Similarly, feelings of 
obligation imply that we are able to do what we should. Contrary to his Calvinist 
forebears who thought that people are obligated to keep God’s law even though original 
sin keeps them from doing so, Upham insisted that “no man ever does or ever can 
experience in himself the feeling of moral obligation, to do a thing, so long as he feels 
himself to be actually destitute of liberty to do it” (11.595). “Crimes and punishments” 
(n.596) are administered on the basis of an assumed liberty of will. Finally, Upham, like 
Edwards, argues that “common sense” dictates that “men are morally accountable,” and 
that men possess the freedom requisite to that accountability. Still, Edwards had argued 
that common sense notions of freedom are actually compatibilist rather than libertarian. 
Upham does not address this criticism, assuming that the common notions of freedom are 
libertarian.
Although there are passages in Mental Philosophv that seem to lean in 
compatibilist directions (11.603), it is clear that overall Upham’s notion of freedom is 
libertarian or “Arminian.” For example, speaking of the Bible, Upham refers to “all 
those passages which call upon men to consider their ways,” which “obviously imply that 
there is no obstruction in the way of their considering and they are free either to do or not 
to do it” (11.604). Here Upham conveniently forgets to mention favorite Calvinist
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passages that speak of humans as “slaves to sin” such as Romans 7 or Ephesians 2.
Upham concludes this section with a statement that Edwards would have agreed 
with, “in all ages of the world, the doctrine in question [the freedom of the will], with few 
exceptions, has been fully and universally admitted” (11.605). Yet, by failing to 
adequately define freedom, Upham was free to confuse issues here. Is the common sense 
notion of freedom libertarian or compatibilist? In this passage he seemed to assume that 
the common notion is libertarian, and that the only alternative to libertaianism is hard 
determinism. He quotes Diderot to this effect, “the word liberty is a word devoid of 
meaning” (11.605). Then rejecting this extreme statement of a determinist, Upham 
assumed that his version of libertarian freedom was the only acceptable alternative. 
Upham closes the section with a quote that further confuses issues: what is the source of 
human liberty, regardless of its nature? Who is the audience?
Let us, then, take that true position, which is clearly pointed out both by reason 
and the Scriptures, of humble dependence on God on the one hand, and of solemn 
responsibility for our conduct on the other. It is impossible for us to form too high 
notions of the power, wisdom, and superintendence of the Deity; nothing is more 
favourable to virtue than the conviction of his constant presence and oversight; 
but, at the same time, we ought ever to remember that lie has seen fit to impart to 
us a moral nature, embracing the elements both of power and liberty; and, 
whether we account this gift as ten talents, or five, or only one, he holds us 
responsible for its use, and will punish the slothful servant who hides it in the 
earth. “For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more 
abundance; but whosoever hath not from him shall be taken away even that he
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hath ” fll.606).
Consistency of Law and Freedom
Upham turned next to the question of the compatibility of the lawfulness of will 
and the freedom of the will. Recall that Edwards had reconciled the two by positing a 
compatibilist notion of freedom: freedom as the opportunity to do as one pleases. 
Upham’s task here seems much more complicated. How does one simultaneously affirm 
a libertarian view of freedom and a deterministic view of the will’s operations? Upham 
reminded his reader that these topics had been considered as “separate subjects of 
contemplation” (11.607), and both doctrines proved “beyond doubt” (11.608). With the 
determination to “go firmly and frankly wherever the evidence conducts,” and to remain 
“bound by the evidence,” Upham concluded that the truth simply lead him into “a great 
mystery” (11.609).
Upham was convinced that he was not embracing a contradiction. “If we define 
freedom to be an exemption from law, then no doubt the proposition of the will’s 
subjection to law implies the exclusion of liberty” (11.610). Yet Upham did not believe 
that he had made the will exempt from law, even though he did makes its final 
pronouncements finally inexplicable on the basis of law (i.e., we know the will embraces 
either desire or feeling of moral obligation, but the ultimate determination is not final 
until the autonomous will makes its choice).
Since he thought there was no contradiction, he felt comfortable arguing that the 
issue was a mystery. This was nothing to be ashamed of: the human mind has many 
things that it cannot fully understand, and it is a sign of wisdom to admit when one runs 
against these limitations. For support Upham quoted Locke:
494
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that, though it he 
unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, and 
though I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free, yet I 
cannot make [meaning undoubtedly that he could not explain and clear up in all 
respects how it should he so] freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and 
omniscience in God, though I  am as fully persuaded o f both as o f any truth I  most 
firmly assent to', and therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that 
question, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if  it be possible for God to 
make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it. (11.611)
Upham could not help but inteiject his ecstatic opinions at this point.
.. .in the midst of a universe under the government of God, where the minutest 
things are under his superintendence and control, it seems to me not only a thing 
possible to be done, but that it is one of his greatest works, that He has created a 
being who is formed and sustained with law as the basis of his existence, and at 
the same time with the birthright and the glorious inheritance of liberty. (11.611- 
612)
One possible understanding of Upham’s universe is that God has control and yet doesn’t 
have total control, and the human will is subject to law and yet is not completely subject 
to law. Whether this ability to reconcile apparent contradictions was to God’s credit is an 
open question.
Upham reminded his reader of the limitations of human knowledge, and of other 
mysteries of the Christian religion such as the resurrection and the union of body and 
soul, in order to make room for his potentially dissatisfying reconciliation.
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Although Upham was very clear about what he meant by the will being subject to 
law, he was less clear about what he meant by freedom. I have portrayed him as a 
libertarian, however, citing the various passages in which he says that the ability in any 
given situation to will more than one way is an instance of freedom. Yet Upham 
sometimes used compatibilist language, and at other times, used the language of spiritual 
freedom, the freedom that comes from God. Upham closed his discussion of the 
compatibility of law and freedom by slipping back to the notion of spiritual freedom:
.. .the truest and highest philosophy is to be found in that passage of Scripture, 
“Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God which 
worketh in you both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure.’ It expresses the 
great truth, and we may add, the great mystery, o f the harmonious combination of 
power and dependence. And it is the same in other things as in religion, that, if 
we will act for ourselves under the impulse of right feelings, our Maker will take 
compassion upon us, and act in our behalf; that, if  we faithfully do our duty, God 
will be as faithful to help us. (11.616-617).
Yet even in the case of spiritual assistance, this quote shows that God’s intervention 
depends upon the free choice of the believer. This passage is also interesting in that 
Upham applies New Testament scriptures which the Puritans would have thought applied 
only to the church to his entire readership. Here Upham, again following his Puritan 
forebears, blurs the lines between religious and secular concerns.
Slavery of the Will
Reiterating his point that mental freedom is only known through consciousness, 
yet is occasioned by mental harmony, Upham argued that the precise opposite of this
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harmony will occasion mental slavery. “Whenever one power overleaps its bounds... we 
are conscious of a want of freedom” (11.618). For example, if one’s life is endangered, 
the fear may become so excessive and controlling in relation to the other powers of the 
mind that the person fails to keep a promise made earlier. Upham notes that we tend to 
forgive that person because “the individual is not himself responsible” given the 
imbalance in his mind (11.621). The same sort of effect takes hold in cases of torture, 
strong appetites (such as the appetite for alcohol), inordinate ambition, indulgence of the 
passions, and other occasions.
As long as the balance and harmony among the various mental powers is not 
totally destroyed, moral accountability remains intact. “If we permit the undue and 
unholy exercise of any appetite or passion, we are indeed ENSLAVED.. .by such appetite 
or passion; but we are not, therefore, removed beyond.. .guilt” (11.630). As long as ''any 
powers o f right judgment and resistance’'’ remain, the person may still be held 
accountable for his enthrallment. But, in the most extreme cases, when these powers of 
judgment and resistance are finally destroyed, so too is moral accountability nullified.
The Indomitable Power of the Will
In Upham’s opinion, the concepts of freedom and power had frequently been 
confounded. This was a major source of confusion in the controversy over the will. In 
order to proceed rightly, the two things need to be kept separate. Upham attempted to 
demonstrate the difference between freedom and power through several examples, 
including that of the child who has great mental freedom yet limited power when 
compared with, say, a philosopher. A virtuous person will have more freedom than a less 
virtuous person, but the less virtuous person may have more mental power. Further,
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since consciousness allows us to form “distinct ideas” (11.637) of power and freedom, 
they must really be distinct. Language also testifies to this difference. Moral agency also 
implies mental power, i.e., the power to carry out the duties to which we are obliged.
Power, like freedom, is a simple idea and is therefore indefinable and known only 
through consciousness. Although complex ideas may be “chimerical,” God has designed 
the mind so that its simple ideas reveal truth about existence, so our knowledge of power 
is therefore a trustworthy intuition. Power is not a faculty of mind but is rather 
“diffused.. .through all its faculties” (11.642). And humanity, being made in the image of 
God, is possessed of a power of the same kind, albeit of limited degree.
Power of the Will
Since power is “not only predicable o f the mind in a general way, but.. .is 
predicahle of its parts...” (11.644), Upham thought it appropriate to consider the power of 
the will itself. Every mental ability is associated with power. Certain people have strong 
powers of perception, others have strong powers of memory. Therefore it follows that 
there must be “an innate energy” associated with the will also.
We “feel and know” that our wills have a degree of power (11.645). Volitions 
appear to come from within us; they do not seem to be wrought within us “by an 
extraneous cause.” We have a feeling of effort when we will something. We feel there is 
an energy we put forth. Consciousness therefore “assures us that the action of the 
Will.. .truly originates in its own power. It wills, because it has the power to will.” 
Upham quoted Shakespeare to this effect, “The cause is in my Will, I will not come” 
(11.645). Once again, Upham seems to use the language of self-determination here: The 
will acts because it wills to act. And the energy for the act is found within the will itself.
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The power of the will is manifested in the fact that when different “trains of 
thought” pass through the mind, we possess the ability to attend to certain aspects of that 
train, and to ignore other aspects. Although association pulls the train in certain 
directions, the power of the will can pull the train in other directions. This innate power 
of the will is also manifested during certain difficult situations, such as “hunger and 
thirst, and torture, and exiles, and death...” (11.646). In all these situations the power of 
will has often been seen helping people to maintain “a most astonishing fortitude and 
calmness” (11.647). Some famous people in history were distinguished by their great 
powers of will, such as Howard, Columbus, Cromwell, and Napoleon. These men shared 
a great “intensity of determination” (11.647-648) in their endeavors, manifesting the 
power of will.
When people exhibit great patience when undergoing suffering, or when they 
exercise control over their tempers or other violent feelings, the power of will is manifest. 
So too does the steadfast execution of “some general plan,” complete with “fixedness of 
purpose” and “unalterable resolution” manifest this power of will. As an example of this 
Upham discusses the case of “a poor Irish girl” who leaves her country to seek wealth for 
her family. The girl is conlronted with many obstacles, but her “filial piety” (11.654) is 
finally rewarded in the end. The unclear point here is why the Irish girls’ behavior 
cannot be understood as being due to strong domestic affections as Upham described in 
his volume on the Sensibilities. Here again, the will seems a redundancy. So too this is 
the case in his examples of those who resisted the slave trade, or the first settlers in New 
England. Perhaps their desires for these various objects were simply very strong. What 
the power of the will adds to this is unclear.
499
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Fittingly, Upham offered an explanation of what the phrase “self-determining 
power of the will” at this point:
The self-determining power of the will, as we understand it, cannot be made to 
mean anything more or otherwise than this, that the will, possessing, in the fact of 
its own existence, and as an element of that existence, the attribute of power, does 
of itself, in view of the different and sometimes conflicting motives around it, 
arbitrate, determine, or decide among them. In other words, and philosophically 
more exact, developing itself in action at its appropriate time, and standing central 
in the midst of the motive forces around it, and by virtue of that which is in itself, 
and not extraneous to itself, it simply acts in the time of its action; it simply 
decides in the time of its decision; and in this simplicity of action, with motives 
before it, and with nothing behind it hut the sustaining power of God, it fulfils the 
great unitive and executive function which God and nature have assigned it. 
(11.657)
Whatever ambiguity there was concerning Upham’s view of the self-determination of the 
will, this passage certainly clears it up.
Individual Differences in the Power of the Will
If it is true that there is “an original and substantive efficiency, lodged in the 
Will,” Upham thought it only made sense that “we should find degrees and diversities in 
this power” among individuals (11.658). Some individuals, Upham thought, manifest a 
“constitutional weakness of will.” These people exhibit “a feebleness of resolution, a sort 
of vacillancy.. .between one thing and another” (11.658). If this is the case, then our 
expectations of these individuals ought to be adjusted accordingly. We don’t require
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people of limited intellect to produce “a Principia,” so why ought we require 
steadfastness of purpose from the weak-willed? The “great Dispenser of mental gifts” 
(11.659) does not ask for a harvest where he has not sown. And some weak-willed 
individuals have been given great intellectual gifts, such as Cicero. Upham’s tone in this 
section is not as judgmental as it is compassionate; he seems to feel for the weak-willed. 
Nevertheless, governmental leadership requires more than intellect, and Upham would 
not recommend the weak-willed for this type of service.
Just as there are those lacking in the power of the will, there are those who 
possess great power of will. These people have a “marked decision and vigour of the 
will” (11.662). Examples here included Archbishop Cranmer;
In an unguarded and unhappy hour he had subscribed to doctrines which he did 
not believe; an act which he afterward deeply repented of, as the greatest 
miscarriage of his life. And when he was subsequently led to the stake, he 
stretched out the hand which had been the instrument in this false and 
discreditable subscription, and without betraying, either by his cormtenance or 
motions, the least sign of weakness or even of feeling (such are the very words of 
the historian), he held it in the flames till it was entirely consumed. (11.663) 
Upham also marveled at the energy of will exhibited by certain people in “imminent 
danger o f death” (11.664), and by the Christian martyrs. It is clear in his discussion that 
he admires these exemplars of willpower. When one reads “the history of Martyrdoms” 
one cannot help but be moved by “the moral sublimity of their fixed and immutable 
resolve” (11.665). He also seemed to admire the public speaker whose control over the 
self was total. When these speakers need to, “they suddenly call to their aid the
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supremacy of the volitional power.” When they do so “all outward agitation ceases; a 
calm succeeds to the tempest; there is nothing perceptible but a quiet dignity and 
unruffled self-possession” (11.668). Similar self-control is exhibited by the man serving 
in the military, who “stands unmoved and calm in the day of battle.” Upham concluded 
his consideration of differences in the power of the will with a word of admonition to 
those whom God had given great power of will. Just as one given a great intellect must 
use that to serve God, so too one with a great will must also inquire “what our adorable 
Maker would have us to do” (11.671).
Consistencv of Character
Upham next turned to apply these foregoing analyses toward the issue of 
character formation. It is interesting that he chose the attainment of a consistent 
character, “which is .. .one of the most interesting as well as important mental traits” 
(11.671), as his focus at this point. Consistency of character is a broader concept than 
individual decisions, having to do with behavior over “ a long series of events” (11.672). 
This trait is opposed to the “restlessness,” “uncertainty,” and “inequality of temper” 
which is found in some. Upham criticized “Lord Bacon” for inconsistency and weakness 
of will. So too he discussed the connection between weakness of will and inconsistency 
in belief. Despite these things, Upham thought that “it is in the power of all” to resist 
these impulses associated with inconsistency and to develop more consistent characters. 
Failure to do so minimizes one’s own usefulness in life.
Upham’s comparison of the differences between persons of steady and unsteady 
character further reveals the blending of religious and republican goals so typical of 
nineteenth century America (Noll, 2002). While the plans, beliefs and affiliations of the
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“inconsistent man” change from day to day, “the consistent man is directly the reverse” 
(11.673). He is cautious in making plans and in embracing beliefs, but sticks to them after 
the choice is made. More importantly, the consistent character sticks to his moral 
principles even when doing so hurts. Because of his great virtue, he maintains peace and 
happiness even when monetary wealth is lacking.
Upham picked two Revolutionary leaders to illustrate his point. George 
Washington’s reputation was spotless because of his constant character. His powers of 
mind were in harmonious balance. “He had but one rule of conduct, that of an 
enlightened moral sense” (11.675). Lafayette was also worthy of great admiration. His 
consistency of character flowed from his steadfast commitment to the ideals of liberty 
and order. Although he was subject to the most tumultuous changes in his outward 
circumstances, his commitment to “the same noble object” (11.675) did not change.
Just as consistency had beatified the lives of these political leaders, so too 
consisteney also beatifies the religious life. There is “perhaps” no greater requirement in 
the Bible than eonsistency of character. “Again and again, Christians are commanded to 
wateh, to stand fast, to continue groimded and settled in the faith...” (11.676). A person 
of consistent character has ‘‘'self-possession or self-government" (11.681). This person is 
in control of the passions and quietly accepts the difficulties and struggles of life without 
complaining. In addition to having “some great objects before him .. .towards which his 
efforts tend,” he also is able to resist the inevitable temptations and obstacles that would 
otherwise pull him off-course. Upham clearly thought this steadiness of purpose 
throughout life was one of the most admirable traits one could possess, and that “if  we 
would possess the rich reward and the high honor of a consistent course through life,” we
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must “endeavor to understand the nature of the will, and the means of strengthening and 
regulating it” (11.681).
Discipline of the Will
Upham was concerned that books on “mental discipline” focused too much on the 
intellectual powers (perhaps reflecting nineteenth century intellectualism). The affections 
had been neglected to some extent, and the will neglected even more. Certainly this was 
due in part to the general ignorance and misunderstanding that had accompanied previous 
studies. But, given the advances contained in Upham’s system, and the pressing need for 
consistency of character, it followed that the discipline of the will was an endeavor to be 
seriously pursued. Upham was glad to find an ally in the “eminent writer” Good, who 
thought that discipline of the will was the great duty of the “moralist” and educator,
“since it is designed by nature to be the governing power, and to exercise an absolute 
sway over the rest...” (11.685).
Recounting his previous assertion that mental harmony and balance is prerequisite 
to proper activity, Upham thought that most individuals do not possess this balance. 
Instead, “the parts of the human mind.. .exhibit at the present time but too mournful 
evidence of a dislocated and jarring movement” due to inordinate desires such as “the 
love of the world.. .contesting against the love of God and of heavenly things” (11.686). 
Given this sorry state of things, Upham noted that the will, which was designed by God 
to control the entire mental structure, is often following the lead of these disproportionate 
and unsubmitted passions. “ .. .This is a state of things which ought not to be” (11.686).
Yet how does one remedy this difficult situation? The Puritan Christianity of 
Ames and Edwards had answered this question in terms of conversion and growth in
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grace. Upham even framed the issue in similar terms: “How shall we redeem ourselves 
from our voluntary thralldom, and walk forth in the light of our own conscience and in 
the smiles of an approving God, regenerated and free?” (11.686). Although Ames and 
Edwards may have objected to the way the question was posed, there could be no more 
important question in their minds than the question of redemption.
Upham’s answer would have struck Ames and Edwards as Pelagian. The first 
step that a person should take is “to keep the appetites, propensities, and passions in due 
subjection.” The overindulgence of any appetite or propensity can lead not only to the 
enthrallment of the will, but the entire mind as well. “If, therefore, we duly estimate the 
great object of securing to the will a free, unperplexed, and vigorous action, we shall 
seriously endeavor, by the use of all those means which have a relation to a result so 
desirable, to restrain every appetite, propensity, and passion within its due bounds” 
(11.688). Whenever these sentimentive impulses assert themselves beyond their proper 
boundaries, “let them be subjected to a rigid supervision and repression.” Like James, he 
warned that gratifjdng these desires just once makes it more difficult to repress them the 
next time: “it is in their very nature, when they have once transgressed, to insist on 
repeated and continued transgression” (11.688). In addition to repressing the bad, Upham 
added that the good impulses should be gratified, including “those of a purely religious 
kind.”
Two things about Upham’s solution to the problem of the sinful will would have 
been particularly troublesome to Ames and Edwards. First, perhaps, might have been 
“the great object” of all these more endeavors. Instead of a God-centered goal (i.e., the 
glory of God, or obedience to God’s commandments, or love to Christ), the great object
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of Upham’s moral strivings was himself. He simply desired to develop his own 
willpower. Just as he had earlier rhapsodized the virtues of the person in total control of 
his emotions, so too Upham desired to have complete control of his passions so that he 
might engage in “free, unperplexed, and vigorous action.” While Upham had at certain 
points in his Mental Philosophv named God as the great moral object of volition, here 
willpower is the great object of veneration. He thought it worthwhile to expend great 
energy in “securing the great object of freeness, vigour, and rectitude in the mental 
operations...” (11.688). The will was beeoming both the subject and the object of 
American moral psychology.
Perhaps the second point that would have troubled Ames and Edwards is 
Upham’s indifference toward the means of obtaining a strong will. As quoted above, he 
encouraged “the use of all those means which have a relation to a result so desirable,” but 
did not specify the means. Ames, on the other hand, spent a great deal of time specifying 
the means to the end of worshipping God: preaching, prayer, sacraments, and church 
discipline. For Upham, the church was useful if  it could lead to the development of an 
indomitable will. Yet, such Calvinistic means of grace designed to remind the sinner of 
his or her weakness on a weekly basis were probably not the sort o f thing Upham had in 
mind.
Upham’s apparent intoxication with the strong will manifested itself in a strange 
way: looking down upon individuals that Christians had historically admired. Upham 
discusses the English poet and hjmin writer William Cowper, a person well-known for his 
bouts with depression. Upham thought that “while in some respects” Cowper was a great 
man, in other respects “he sunk.. .to the grade of infantile weakness...” Upham did not
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seem to have patience for weakness. Even the apostle Peter is chastised for his “often 
strangely anomalous and inconsistent” life. Both Cowper and Peter were weakened by 
“the passion of fear.” To avoid looking like William Cowper and the apostle Peter, 
Upham had some words of advice:
We repeat it, therefore, that we should carefully study the nature of the appetites, 
propensities, and affections; we must make them the objects of a patient and 
assiduous culture; we must, in particular, subject them to a strict supervision and 
control; otherwise, in some unexpected hour, they will arise in their might, and, in 
defiance of the clamours of conscience and the struggles of the volitional power, 
will bring the whole man under their dominion. (11.691)
In view of this passage, and the passages preceding, there appears, then, to be a kind of 
self-righteousness in the Victorian psychology of Thomas Upham. The sense of strong 
moral duty, combined with sense that this moral duty is well within the ability of a 
moralist willing to work hard enough at it, created a situation in which moral victory 
could easily issue in pride, and moral failure in great shame. William James seems to 
have shared that great burden and therefore wavered between “strenuous” moral effort on 
the one hand, and an “antinomian impulse” in which he desired to simply be set free from 
the demands of such an unforgiving universe, on the other.
Indicative of the intellectualism that prevailed in nineteenth century moral 
philosophy (Hoopes), Upham indicated that “a prominent and leading view” of the 
■ subject of the discipline of the will had to do with controlling the intellect. He had earlier 
noted that he thought the affections and especially the will had been neglected here, but 
conceded that “among the most available and decisive methods of aiding and regulating
507
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the action of the w ill.. .[is] the illumination of the intellect” (11.694). Although he 
reminded his readers that the effects of the intellect on the will are always mediated 
through the sensibilities, he still thought it true that “as a general thing.. .the will 
corresponds to the intellect; the action of the will is in a line with the action of the 
intellect; and changes in the intellect will almost necessarily induce corresponding 
changes in the sentient and volitional parts of the mental constitution” (11.696).
Approaching once again that vague line between evangelicalism and secularism, 
Upham’s first example to illustrate the problems associated with an un-enlightened 
intellect was “indifference to the spread of the Gospel” (11.695).
Hundreds of millions of the human race are living and dying without any of those 
aids and consolations which a knowledge of the religion of Jesus Christ is 
calculated to impart. And yet it is universally admitted, both in consideration of 
the reasonableness of the thing and of the commands of Scripture, that it is a duty 
incumbent on Christian nations to see that blessed Gospel sent to them without 
delay. But why is it that so few feel in heart what they acknowledge 
speculatively, and that almost none are found to offer themselves as personal 
labourers in this great and glorious work? It is because (at least this is one great 
and prominent reason, if  it be not the only one) their inquiries have been too 
limited; they have been satisfied with generalities and abstract truisms, without 
carefully and seriously estimating, even in a single instance, the extent of that 
degradation and suffering which are incidental to the state of heathenism. (11.694- 
695).
Indicative of the times also is Upham’s second example of the effects of a lack of
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thoughtfulness: complacency ahout the “dreadful atrocity” of war (11.695).
Many of the great themes encountered in this consideration of the psychology of 
Thomas Upham are found in the last few pages of Mental Philosophv, in which he 
considers the importance of habit and religion in strengthening the will. Recall that 
Upham’s treatment of the power of the will contains a subtle shift concerning the moral 
object of volition. Upham seems in these pages to be obsessed with the cultivation of the 
will itself as an end in itself. He associates this power of will with personal strength. 
Indeed, he recommends that his students always obey “that higher power within us, the 
Moral Sense” so that they may become “tower[s] of strength” (11.698). Virtue is worthy 
of pursuit because "^rectitude is strength” (11.699). So too “the great principle or law of 
habit” is worth learning because it can greatly increase the power of the agent. “ .. .We do 
not fully understand the secret of our own strength till we have learned...” the power of 
the law of habit. In a lesson that William James would share with his students, Upham 
taught his own that “every act of the Will in this right direction gives vivacity and 
strength to the succeeding act” (11.703).
Upham closed his consideration of the topic of the will in what might have 
seemed an idolatrous fashion to Ames and Edwards: a consideration of how religion can 
serve the great “object” of the will. All things “of a religious nature” (such as God’s 
attributes, the love of Christ, the mercies of the gospel, the shortness of time on earth), 
can be used to strengthen the will. Indeed, religious sources of truth can impart “a 
strength which can be derived from no other source” (11.703). Certainly it is true that 
“other considerations” may impart a measure of “strength” to the will, “but those of 
religion give more” (11.704).
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Summary and Conclusion 
Given the crucial role that the structure of the mind played in Upham’s 
psychology, it is not surprising that he began his consideration of the will reaffirming the 
importance of the tripartite approach: the mind is composed not of intellect and will, but 
intellect, sensibilities, and will. In this context he expresses the “Arminian impulse,” re­
affirming the godlike nature of the human will, that it is an uncaused cause of action, an 
original source of human efficiency.
Secondly, Upham affirmed that the will operates in discemibly predictable ways: 
i.e., the “has its laws.” He reiterates several Edwardsean arguments to this effect, such as 
the notion that God’s foreknowledge implies necessity. Upham’s point in this section is 
quite simple and does not need great elaboration. The notion that the will is determined 
is, of course a continuity with Edwards, and can be seen, in part, as a vestige of his 
Calvinistic background. Nevertheless, the discussion does not truly advocate the 
thoroughgoing determinism of Edwards. Upham, for example, argued in this section that 
the will is lawfully connected to motives and is not contingent, but it is significant that 
Upham does not say the will is determined by motives.
Upham argued that the will is free. It is true, however, that some acts of the will 
are freer than others. Although Upham thought that the will was self-determined and free 
to arbitrate among different motives, Upham curiously defined freedom in such a way as 
to make the will non-essential in moral activity. Freedom takes place when there is 
harmony among the parts of the soul. So if  the intellect and the natural and moral 
sensibilities all point in the same direction, the person is undivided, and the will is free. 
Yet, one may wonder, if  all systems say go, why do you need another faculty to say go?
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Upham insists that Christ’s soul was harmonious, and, tellingly, Upham did not seem to 
have much of a place for will in Christ’s psychology.
The final section of Upham’s section on the will dealt with the “powers of the 
will,” in which Upham reveals a real respect for human willpower. The treatment 
becomes so expansive at times that Upham seems to engage in a form of will worship. 
Although he is compassionate towards the poor souls with little willpower, he marvels at 
those with fortitude. In Upham’s psychology the will becomes an object of veneration 
itself. Will is both the subject and the object of moral activity, the end of its own actions. 
Upham even mentions ways that religion can be brought into the service of the will, a 
contention that Ames and Edwards might have found idolatrous.
The irony of Upham, then, was that he spoke of will as a godlike power; an 
uncaused cause like God. He venerated the powers of willpower arguing that religion 
can serve the will. Yet, in the process, he reduced the sphere of the will so substantially 
that a holy person would not even need one. Remember, the great use of the will in 
Upham’s system was to mediate the conflict between natural desire and feelings of moral 
obligation. In a holy person, no such conflict existed. The will, at least in this case, 
became a redundancy.
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USE II:
WILLIAM JAMES’S PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY
. .We believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends on our not being pure 
effect, hut a cause...”
William James, Principles o f Psychology, (1.447-448).
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INTRODUCTION TO USE II
A central assumption of this dissertation is that American psychology did not 
begin in 1890. As Evans (1984) has noted, psychological thought in America before 
William James was more “fertile and active” than one might imagine. “To deny that 
there was a psychological tradition in the United States before James is like denying such 
a tradition in Germany before Wilhelm Wundt, in France before Alfred Binet, or in 
England before James Ward” (p. xliii). It was not, however, Evans’ goal to show 
precisely how James’s text might be a part of that American tradition.
Evans (1984) did explain what made James’s psychology different than the 
indigenous psychology, however. The thing that separated James from his American 
forebears was his rejection of faculty psychology. “American society,” at the time,
“.. .was still saturated with concepts of mental powers and faculties” (p. xliv). James’s 
job was to apply the new naturalistic approach to the American context and to debunk the 
old Cartesian notion of the soul. In addition to an opermess to experimental science, 
James also moved psychology into its modem period by rejecting the notion of a 
substantial soul, yet still arguing that one could speak of a self which was rooted not in a 
soul but in the brain itself (p. Iviii). One thing that Evans does not mention is why the 
rejection of the faculty approach might have struck terror into the hearts of Americans, 
and why James made such a valiant attempt to find a place for the self.
Coon (2000), I think, helps to answer this question. James’s project was to forge 
a replacement for the outdated notion of the soul in a secularizing and industrializing 
society. The soul had served several vital functions: it was, among other things, the
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center of human identity and had made the hope of eternal life plausible. More than this, 
and, from the perspective of this dissertation, more importantly, the soul had 
“account[ed] for the ability of the mind to act and not merely he a passive receptacle” 
(Coon, 2000, p. 89). The notion of soul has supported a belief in:
.. .the activity of the mind, especially its ability to attend selectively and to chose 
among alternatives. Selective attention was an ability that James thought had 
been crucial to our evolutionary survival, and it was a hard thing to explain 
without recourse to a will and an underlying soul or some such source of activity 
that could direct the attention, (p. 94)
Unable to abide by the deterministic approach of the associationists who made mind 
passive, James needed some replacement for the soul in order to defend human 
efficiency. Coon notes that James’s convictions were such that in his chapter on the will, 
James was “simply unable to resist resurrecting the soul” (p. 94), and slipped back into 
the usage the older term.
James’s desire to protect human efficiency is explained to some extent when one 
consider the way in which the “Arminian impulses” of American society were being 
challenged in the post-Civil war era. Upham’s text, thoroughly shaped by the “Arminian 
impulse” which had come to characterize American psychology and theology before the 
Civil War, would continue to be used in American colleges into the 1880s and 1890s. 
This meant that there were some traditional sources that preached the Americanized 
gospel of God, country, family, and self-determination (see also Delbanco, 1999). But 
the War had changed things considerably. Although the Union had been preserved, the 
overwhelming violence and unspeakable toll of countless human lives had wreaked
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havoc upon the beliefs of many Americans (Menand, 2001). One of these beliefs, I 
believe, was that precious “Arminian” belief in hmnan efficiency.
Bennett Ramsey’s (1993) contextualization of William James’s thought expresses 
very well how the intellectual changes after the Civil War challenged the Arminian 
impulse. Consistent with the idea that the Arminian impulse had become dominant prior 
to the Civil War years^^ (when, as noted above, Upham’s text dominated in American 
colleges), Ramsey describes American culture before the 1860s as an “anxious bench” in 
which Americans attempted to live out “the gospel of strenuous activity” (p. 18). 
Possessed of self-determined wills, Americans could pursue their destinies with 
confidence that they had a God-given but autonomous power to achieve those ends.
After the War, the metaphor changed to “.. .the S-shaped couch by the parlor 
window.. .its curvilinear sweep, mirroring the invalid body” (p. 18). Americans were 
beginning to feel quite inefficient.
As Ramsey (1993) explains it, America “had lost its sense of ultimate grounding, 
its understanding that American life was well founded” (p. 19), and “there was agreement 
that ideas of societal order had become all to indefinite” (p. 21). There was, “a decline in 
clarity of the point and direction of individual life” (p. 22). This anomie was exacerbated 
by industrial forces and natural science which came to challenge the idea that humans 
were masters of their own destinies. Human power could no longer be understood as
Another quick way to justify the proposition that the “Arminian impulse” became dominant prior to the 
Civil War is the ascendancy o f Methodism in early nineteenth century America. Mark N oll’s (2002) 
definition o f “Arminianism” reads like this: “Arminianism: For this book, the doctrines o f Methodists who 
held with John Wesley that God gave prevenient grace (a grace coming before full salvation) to all people 
so that original sin could be overcome and all could make a free choice for God. Wesleyan Arminianism 
also included a belief in Christian perfection, or that it was possible for believers to be liberated from all 
known sin” (p. 563). Although I use the term “Arminian impulse” in a much broader sense in this 
dissertation, it is significant that the fastest growing denomination (between the years 1770 to 1860) and the 
denomination which had the most churches in 1860 should be equated with Arminianism by a leading 
historian o f American religious thought (p. 162).
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“sovereign;” human activity “ceased to be defined in terms of spontaneous action.” 
Instead, “human effort was conceived as mechanical, as automatic rather than creative” 
(p. 22).
In view of these things, Ramsey describes what I would interpret as a loss of 
confidence in American’s own “Arminian impulses.” “With technical rationality gaining 
ascendancy in the culture, the consent of the human will to do or not, seemed beside the 
point.” Just as Upham’s text continued to be used after the Civil War, “ .. .the culture 
continued to hold out images of self-determination...” (p. 23) but the forces of 
mechanization and industry undermined these Arminian vestiges. In short, Ramsey 
sums, the culture was suffering from a loss of the sense of self-determination (p. 25).
The American will was in danger of being lost.
The Arminianized Protestant worldview was crumbling among elites. Although 
Ramsey does not explicitly claim these late nineteenth century things as vestiges of the 
Arminian impulse (although his comments about self-determination imply it), he does 
note that old Calvinist notions of “the relationship between human and divine activity” 
were no longer tenable. Further, there were no other theological systems available to 
replace Calvinism: “ .. .there was a common recognition that theological structures of 
belief were completely unable to shore up the self.” Just as the forces of nonsectarianism 
tended to whittle away the traditional components of the psychology of volition, so too 
the forces of industrialization and mechanization left nothing but a vestigial Arminian 
sensibility: “what appeared to be left was a religious heart without imagination, patterns 
of piety without convincing expression or authority” (Ramsey, 1993, p. 30). Although 
the old psychology of Upham and others continued to offer cultural resources for
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continued reassurance that human beings did possess a real efficiency, it was also true 
that the European version of psychology was challenging these very notions. It was in 
this context of cultural and spiritual crisis that William James set about his project of 
validating the Arminian impulses that so many Americans had embraced.
Just as Coon (2000) noted that James’s theorizing on the self had helped to 
preserve space for human efficiency, Ramsey (1993) also sees James’s psychological 
project as having to do with the preservation of human self-determination in light of the 
seemingly overwhelmingly deterministic forces in play. Indeed, I think Ramsey’ second 
chapter (“Reweaving the Self’) confirms the basic assertions of the chapters that are to 
follow. Just as I argue that one of James’s major goals was to face the deterministic 
postulates of European psychology head-on and to emerge with a fresh justification of the 
Arminian impulse, Ramsey also finds James validating notions of self-determination 
throughout the Principles of Psvchologv (Ramsey, 1993, pp. 42, 47, 52). The chapters 
that follow, then, aim to support the contention that William James’s “secular” 
psychology textbook shared the ‘Arminian’ goals of the indigenous psychological 
tradition.
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CHAPTER X
“THE CONQUESTS OF PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORY”
AND THE CLAIMS OF HUMAN EFFICIENCY
Thomas Upham died the same year that William James beeame an instructor of 
physiology at Harvard, in 1872 (Salter, 1986; Myers, 1986). While Thomas Upham had 
the luxury of making only superficial note of physiological developments in his widely 
adopted Mental Philosophv. William James would begin his professional life immersed 
in the burgeoning field of physiology. As one who shared Upham’s Arminian conviction 
that morality requires a power of original efficiency, James knew that the lazy days of 
American mental philosophy were over. If the Arminian impulse were to survive, the 
mounting threat of European physiology would need to be confronted. And James, with 
a little help from other American friends with similar concerns (such as G. T. Ladd—see 
Mills, 1969), was just the one to do it. The importance of this project to James is 
evidenced by the fact that the first five chapters of The Principles of Psvchologv were 
given in part to meeting this threat to the free Arminian will. This chapter, then, is a 
commentary and analysis of James’s attempt to soften the blow of European 
physiological theory for an American and ‘Arminian’ audience.
The Scope o f  Psychology  
James defined the subject matter of psychology in strictly psychic terms, 
“Psychology is the Seience of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and their conditions.” 
Later in the Principles. James would use the term consciousness, but early in the
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Principles he simply gave examples of mental phenomena: “The phenomena are such 
things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like...” He 
further noted that the two leading approaches to studying the mind, or consciousness, 
faculty psychology and associationist psychology, neglected the “conditions” of mental 
life, particularly the physiological conditions, of mental life. Noting that “unifying” these 
diverse mental states is difficult: “...their variety and complexity is such as to leave a 
chaotic impression on the observer,” James distanced himself from faculty psychology, 
and, by implication, the indigenous psychological tradition (including Thomas Upham) 
thus:
The most natural and consequently the earliest way of unifying the material was, 
first, to elassify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to affiliate the diverse 
mental modes thus found, upon a simple entity, the personal Soul, of which they 
are taken to be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance, the Soul 
manifests its faculty of Memory, now of Reasoning, now of Volition, or again its 
Imagination or its Appetite. This is the orthodox ‘spiritualistic’ theory of 
scholasticism and of common-sense. (I.l)
Yet, implicitly, James affirmed that American mental philosophy had at least defined 
psychology correctly, i.e., as the science of mental life. James also distanced his 
psychology from European associationist psychology:
Another and a less obvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common elements 
in the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them, and to explain 
them constructively by the various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one 
explains houses by stones and bricks. The ‘associationist’ schools of Herbart in
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Germany, and of Hume the Mills and Bain in Britain, have thus constructed a 
psychology without a soul by taking discrete ‘ideas,’ faint or vivid, and showing 
how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms of succession, such things as 
reminiscences, perceptions, emotions, volitions, passions, theories, and all the 
other furnishings of an individual’s mind may be engendered. The very Self or 
ego of the individual comes in this way to be viewed no longer as the pre-existing 
source of the representations, but rather as their last and most complicated fmit. 
(1.1-2)
The problem with faculty psychology is that it explained psychological phenomenon 
simply by referring these phenomenon back to a reified, self-determined faculty:
Any particular cognition, for example, or recollection, is accounted for on the 
soul-theory by being referred to the spiritual faculties of Cognition or of Memory. 
These faculties themselves are thought of as absolute properties of the soul; that 
is, to take the case of memory, no reason is given why we should remember a fact 
as it happened, except that so to remember it constitutes the essence of our 
Recollective Power. (1.2)
An irony of rejecting the faculty psychology approach, however, was that James was 
relinquishing what had become for the indigenous psychological tradition the main 
source of human power or efficiency (Kosits, 2002c). In the psychology of Thomas 
Upham, faculties served as springs of action (in the sensibilities) and of libertarian 
freedom (in the will). The question then became: where would a secular Arminian like 
William James find the self-determined efficiency that he so desired? The ironic answer 
is that he appears to have found it in the very source that seemed the most threatening:
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the brain itself. The brain, as we shall see, was a threatening to the hope of autonomous 
human efficiency, because of the possibility that it was simply a purposeless machine that 
simply reacted to its environment. Yet, James was able (with the help of certain 
European physiologists) to articulate a view of the nervous system that kept alive the 
hope that real, purposive choice was a possibility. Yet, he would not be entirely content 
with the answer, as we shall see in chapter 12.
The major problem with American faculty psychology was its unwillingness to 
consider physiological causes. Although we noted that Upham did spend some time 
considering physiology, we did conclude that his incorporation was quite shallow. 
Upham, in a manner understandable for someone who began writing psychology 
textbooks in the 1820s, saw the momentous implications of physiology only through a 
glass darkly. Even the 1869 edition of Mental Philosophv which we analyzed made 
mention of physiology only in passing, and seemed to think it relevant only in cases of 
pathology. Upham was not alone in his neglect of European physiological science, 
either. James McCosh, the “American” mental philosopher who made the best effort of 
to take physiology into consideration, still approached the topic as something largely 
irrelevant to mental life. James therefore seems justified in his contention that the 
“faculty psychology” had neglected physiology. Further, if the “New Psychology” of 
James et al. has any claim to really being new, it may very well be the way in which 
physiological reality systematically shaped its psychological theorizing.
James thought the unwillingness of mental philosophy to consider the machinery 
of the mind left certain important questions unanswered- questions which, James was 
certain, physiological considerations could handle. For example, “...why should this
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absolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events of yesterday than those of 
last year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago?...Why should illness and exhaustion 
enfeeble [memory]?...Why should drugs, fevers, asphyxia, and excitement resuscitate 
things long since forgotten?” (1.2-3). James understandably thought that merely saying 
that “the faculty of memory is so peculiarly constituted by nature as to exhibit just these 
oddities,” was of minimal usefulness, shedding little or no light on the subject. He 
concluded that ^\..the faculty does not exist absolutely, hut works under conditions; and 
the quest o f the conditions becomes the psychologist’s most interesting task.” The 
“conditions” that James would most closely rely upon would be physiological.
Despite his progressiveness, James was also liable to make deep presumptions 
which are easier to see in hindsight. The quote above, "the faculty does not exist 
absolutely, but works under conditions ” contains a seed of irony, when we keep the loss 
of will in mind. What are the conditions of the faculty o f willl James thought that 
focusing upon the physiological conditions would be a sufficient explanation for all the 
psychological faculties. Nevertheless, it is a thesis of this paper that the “conditions” of 
will were primarily moral and even theological, and that the removal of these conditions 
actually endangered the very existence of the faculty. As we shall see from time to time, 
James thought that the existence of the will could be taken for granted. This was a 
presumption. Just as psychologists no longer speak of Plato’s “thumos,” so too we rarely 
hear talk of “will.” This is, I think, due in part to the fact that our understanding of the 
structure and function of the mind depends a great deal upon the stories and worldviews 
that we carry in to our psychologizing. The concept of a faculty of will emerged in a 
particular historical context, just as it was lost in another context.
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Just as the faculty psychology approach was lacking, James also thought the 
associationist explanation of memory was not satisfactory. The associationist claims that 
“an idea” precedes and activates our memories. Whatever merit this theory has, James 
thought that associationist thinking still failed to explain “...the effects of fever, 
exhaustion, hypnotism, old age, and the like.” Like the faculties of the “pure spiritualist,” 
ideas exist as absolute entities in the associationist system, and are as entities therefore 
“almost as bewildering.” James did not deny that ideas are often found “clinging 
together.” He simply wanted to ask, “...whence do they get their fantastic laws of 
clinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do?” Again, the associationist 
school is likewise faulty for failing to take physiology into account. The following quote 
summarizes James’s overall rationale for the preeminence of physiology in psychological 
explanation:
For this the associationist must introduce the order of experience in the outer 
world. The dance of the ideas is a copy, somewhat mutilated and altered, of the 
order of phenomena. But the slightest reflection shows that phenomena have 
absolutely no power to influence our ideas until they have first impressed our 
senses and our brain The bare existence of a past fact is no ground for our 
remembering it. Unless we have seen it, or somehow undergone it, we shall 
never know of its having been. The experiences of the body are thus one of the 
conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is. And a very small amount of 
reflection on facts shows that one part of the body, namely, the brain, is the part 
whose experiences are directly concerned. (1.3)
James thought the importance of the brain to the mental life so obvious, and “so
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universally admitted nowadays” that he did not need to spend considerable time 
illustrating it. He considered it a fundamental “postulate” of psychology. “The whole 
remainder of the book will be more or less of a proof that the postulate was correct” (1.3- 
4). Always ecumenically-minded, James did not call for psychologists to abandon their 
preferred approaches. Yet, he thought, all psychologists would have to grapple with 
physiology. “The spiritualist and the associationist must both be ‘cerebralists, ’ to the 
extent at least of admitting that certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own 
favorite principles are explicable only by the fact that the brain laws are a codeterminant 
of the result” (1.4). So, James concluded, “our first conclusion, then, is that a certain 
amount of brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in Psychology” (1.5).
Significantly, James did not say that brain physiology is psychology or that it 
replaces psychology. Rather physiology comes alongside psychology as a necessary aid 
to the psychologist. Indeed, as he reiterates throughout Principles, psychic phenomena, 
which are the proper subject of psychology, are strictly separated from physiological 
phenomena.
European psychology had exceeded American in its awareness of the automaticity 
of action: “Standing, walking, buttoning and unbuttoning, piano-playing, talking, even 
saying one’s prayers, may be done when the mind is absorbed in other things” (II.5).
Even so, these automatic actions seem purposive yet are actually mindless. This fact 
raised the difficult constitutive question of psychology: which phenomena are to be 
vmderstood as psychological? Automatic behaviors still “resemble intelligent acts” 
because they manifest “the same ends ” as consciously produced activity (1.5-6). James 
did not affirm that automaticity is necessarily a psychological phenomenon. But his
524
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
approach was open-minded, saying that physiology will help the psychologist understand 
mental phenomena:
The boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, 
but to let the science be as vague as its subject, and include such phenomena as 
these if by so doing we can throw any light on the main business in hand. It will 
ere long be seen, I trust, that we can; and that we gain much more by a broad than 
by a narrow conception of our subject. (1.6)
From the perspective of this dissertation, the vagueness of the boundary between 
machine-like automaticity and mental operation is highly significant. At stake were the 
limits of human efficiency. If our actions are mindless, we are not really the cause of 
them. Yet, rather than take refuge in the armchair speculations of “Rational Psychology” 
which treated mind as if it had no connection to the physical world, James took the brave 
step of considering the difficult facts. Was human activity mechanical? “I shall therefore 
feel free to make any sallies into zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem 
instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists” 
(1.6).
Before completing these initial comments, James difffised some of the anxiety 
that might attend such a study by offering a sneak preview of what was to come. James 
reported on European physiologists who designed experiments to detect purposive as 
opposed to mechanical behavior. The difference is illustrated by the difference between 
bubbles rising to the surface of the water and a frog doing the same thing. The bubbles 
do not act with a purpose. If unhindered, they will rise to the surface, but if hindered 
below a cup, they will remain caught indefinitely. A frog, however, when hindered from
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reaching the surface will search frantically for another way. The frog’s behavior is 
purposive, mindful, and efficient activity.
In the same way, physiological experiments were being performed which could 
detect purposive activity even in headless frogs. Strange as it may seem, James seemed 
to take comfort in this fact. There was a clear distinction between purposive physiology 
and merely automatic, reflexive, mechanical physiology. This will become clearer 
below. But, given these insights, James adopted the viewpoint of these physiologists; 
‘\..n o  actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice o f means, can be 
called indubitable expressions o f Mind.’’ But science was showing that Mind, and its 
correlative “choice of means” was somehow written into the nervous system. Minds are 
not dumb, predictable machines, but seek ends through choice. The physical world, 
which served as a substructure to Mind, therefore could serve the ends of volition and 
efficiency.
James related the apparent reality of Mind and purpose to the very broadest 
philosophical (and theological) issues. In most un-Darwinistic fashion, James stated:
Just so we form our decision upon the deepest o f all philosophic problems: Is the 
Kosmos an expression of intelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute 
external fact pure and simple? If we find ourselves, in contemplating it, unable to 
banish the impression that it is a realm of final purposes, that it exists for the sake 
of something, we place intelligence at the heart of it and have a religion. If, on 
the contrary, in surveying its irremediable flux, we can think of the present only 
as so much mere mechanical sprouting from the past, occurring with no reference 
to the future, we are atheists and materialists. (1.8)
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Although Darwin did not need final purposes in order to explain purposive behavior, 
James apparently did, and so was a much better fit in the American context which had 
grown used to a theological functionalism under mental philosophers such as Thomas 
Upham. James apparently counted himself among those with “religion.” In this quote, 
James apparently opposes purpose with purposelessness, not libertarian freedom and 
determinism. As Edwards had argued, purpose and motivation were themselves 
deterministic concepts; the frog’s desire to find the surface of the water was certainly 
determined by its purposive desires. At this stage, therefore, James does not fully reveal 
his Arminian stripes. It will become apparently, however, that the power to pursue our 
own ends, the power to do as we desire, was not a sufficient efficiency for James. James, 
like Upham before him, would desire to find an underived efficiency: a power to do some 
good all his own.
The Functions of the Brain 
In true American fashion, James began his discussion of “the functions of the 
brain” (chapter II) on a functional note, arguing that the mere presence of a nervous 
system gives great advantage to those creatures so bestowed: “If I begin chopping the 
foot of a tree, its branches are unmoved by my act, and its leaves murmur as peacefully as 
ever in the wind. If, on the contrary, I do violence to the foot of a fellow-man, the rest of 
his body instantly responds to the aggression by movements of alarm or defense” (1.12). 
The adaptive defensive movements of his fellow-man are due, James argued, to the fact 
that “...the man has a nervous system whilst the tree has none.” A nervous systems has a 
particularly adaptive “function” which is “..to bring each part into harmonious co­
operation with every other” (1.12).
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The first thing James reveals of this nervous system, and a recurrent point of 
reference throughout the Principles, is the distinction between “afferent nerves” (or those 
‘sensory’ nerves traveling toward the spinal cord and brain), and the “efferent nerves” (or 
those ‘motor’ nerves moving away from the spinal cord and brain). Instead of simply 
explaining this distinction, he immediately shows how this simple arrangement may 
result in purely mechanistic, albeit functional, activity. “The afferent nerves, when 
excited by some physical irritant, be this as gross in its mode of operation as a chopping 
axe or as subtle as the waves of light, conveys the excitement to the nervous centers. The 
commotion set up in the centres does not stop there, but discharges itself, if at all strong, 
through the efferent nerves into muscles and glands, exciting movements of the limbs and 
viscera, or acts of secretion, which vary with the animal, and with the irritant applied” 
(1. 12).
James, fighting off the monstrosity of mechanism, was very concerned with 
differentiating the more mechanical responses of the nervous system with the more 
“spontaneous” activities. (Spontaneity, recall, was one of the concepts used by Arminian 
psychologists to describe the soul. Edwards argued that a general characteristic like 
spontaneity cannot predict particular acts). This concern led James to introduce the 
concept of volition at this very early of the Principles. James, positing a kind of 
continuum from involuntary to volimtary activities, distinguished three kinds of response 
to sensational stimuli. Things such as “the closure of the eye and the lachrymation... 
and...the disturbance of the heart,” are considered “involuntary” or “‘reflex’ acts.” Other 
actions, such as moving the arm to “...break the shock of falling” are, like reflex acts, 
non-deliberate, yet are “less automatic” than reflex activity. One’s execution of these
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movements can improve through education or he suppressed. These actions “...have been 
called ‘semi-reflex.’” Actions such as “...running towards the train...” are devoid of 
instinct and proceed “purely” from “education.” These actions are ‘“voluntary.” If these 
three kinds of actions are understood as lying along a continuum, one can see how “...the 
animal’s reflex and voluntary performances shade into each other gradually, being 
connected by acts which may often occur automatically, but may also be modified by 
conscious intelligence” (1.13, italics mine). This comment also shows that James 
believed there to be linkage between consciousness and volition. Consciousness allowed 
the agent to move beyond automaticity. It allowed the self to exert some efficiency.
As will become clearer when discussing the “automaton theory,” James was 
interested in European debates concerning the relation between consciousness and will. 
What is the link, if any, between “appropriateness” (adaptive, functional action), feeling, 
and volition? The answer was complicated by the fact that an “outside observer” has 
difficulty discriminating between automatic, mechanical action and voluntary action.
Both actions have the appearance of purpose; both are appropriate given their context. 
Since the outward observer has no access to the mind of the actor, it is impossible to 
ascertain the role that consciousness may or may not play in the process. Therefore, 
“choice of the proper means” cannot be considered a sufficient criterion of the mind’s 
existence because reflex actions are highly functional and give the appearance of 
voluntary choice or efficiency.
These considerations led to “...two quite opposite theories about the relation to 
consciousness of the nervous functions,” both of which James found problematic because 
they challenged the very notion of will. Both theories insisted that the apparent lack of
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difference between reflex and voluntary action outwardly translated into a lack of 
difference inwardly. One position, stressing the importance of consciousness, maintained 
that since “higher” voluntary processes “...seem to require the guidance of feeling,” then 
the reflexes must also have some degree of feeling, “...though it may he a feeling of 
which we remain unconscious.” The other extreme, mechanistic position denied the 
necessity of consciousness altogether. Since reflex action seems to proceed without 
consciousness, then the adaptiveness or “appropriateness” of voluntary actions “...owes 
nothing to the fact that consciousness attends them,” hut are rather the passive “...results 
of mechanism pure and simple” (pp. 13-14). James, on the other hand, thought that 
consciousness was the sine qua non of volimtary action, and that the experimental and 
introspective evidence for consciousness related to the lower parts of the nervous system 
was inconclusive. More on this topic is discussed helow. In sum, however, European 
theories had cast human efficiency into douht.
Armed with the irrefutable evidence of his own consciousness, James explored 
the link between brain and mind. Although the study of the brain was still very young 
and subject to rapid change, James argued that there was a consensual “way of 
conceiving the organ” that not only promised to “stand” hut also offered insight into the 
link between mind and brain. This scheme was known as the “Meynert Scheme,” a 
viewpoint that James found helpful but overly simple.
To begin the discussion, James told his readers that “the best way to enter the 
subject will be to take a lower creature, like a frog, and study by the vivisectional method 
the functions of his different nerve-centres.” James describes the behavior of the frog 
after being lesioned in various places along the central nervous system,, a procedure
530
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
which helped to lay down basic differences “...between the cerebral hemispheres and the 
lower lobes.” Warned that the generalizations generated from this initial procedure are 
“too simple a formula,” James hoped to lay down general principles that could help solve 
the mysterious link between nervous physiology and consciousness.
If the frog’s nervous system is reduced to the spinal cord, “ .. .the frog will still 
continue to live, but with a very peculiarly modified activity.” That is, it stops breathing, 
does not sit up, remains on its back when tumed over. Yet, the frog is still able to engage 
in some reflexive, “appropriate” action, such as wiping away an irritant applied to its 
skin. When only the cerebral hemispheres of a frog are removed, the scope of 
appropriate, teleological action broadens, so much so that “an unpractised observer” 
would not immediately notice anything wrong. But closer inspection reveals that the 
frog’s activities have been made mechanical. They are completely predictable, 
containing no “incalculable element.” There is an “...almost entire absence of 
spontaneous motion-that is, motion unprovoked by any present incitation of sense.” For 
example, the decorticate frog would swim when placed into water, but this activity 
seemed “...to be the fatal result [italics mine] of the contact of that fluid with its skin....In 
a word, [the frog had become] an extremely complex machine whose actions, so far as 
they go, tend to self-preservation ; but still a machine... ” The activity of the decorticate 
frog is completely predictable: “...by applying the right sensory stimulus to him we are 
almost as certain of getting a fixed response [italics mine] as an organist is of hearing a 
certain tone when he pulls out a certain stop” (1.17).
The situation changes, however, when the cerebral hemispheres of the frog are 
held in tact. “In addition to the previous responses to present incitements of sense, our
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frog now goes through long and complex acts of locomotion spontaneously, or as if 
moved hy what in ourselves we should call an idea” (1.17-18). Ideas, a crucial and 
precious concept to James, were the source of all human efficiency. The result of 
possessing hemispheres, then, is something analogous to thought, and the result of 
thought is unpredictable and spontaneous, as opposed to mechanical, behavior. Thought 
allowed the creature to exert itself against the tides of fatal determination. “His conduct 
has become incalculable. We can no longer foretell it exactly. Effort to escape is his 
dominant reaction, hut he may do anything else, even swell up and become perfectly 
passive in our hands.” Given James’s concern with the problems of determinism, 
monism, and “fatality,” James’s scientific prose here takes on spiritual significance, 
which will be seen more clearly as this explication of James’s psychology of will 
continues. In passing, however, note that the apparently simple difference between the 
decorticate and full-hrained fi*og contained potential answers to cosmic questions. If the 
normal frog was capable of non-fatal spontaneity, how much more capable are human 
beings, endowed with the most developed “hemispheres” in all of nature! Experimental 
results such as these, which James continued to flesh out in the Principles in greater detail 
(see helow), would form the biological basis for James’s hope for free will.
Maintaining his scientific standpoint, James argued that “certain general 
conclusions follow irresistibly” to the experimental results described above. First, he 
noted that “the acts o f all the centres involve the use o f the same muscles."’ That is, the 
decorticate frog may engage in precisely the same behavior- at least outwardly. The 
crucial difference is that although the cerebral hemispheres bring “...no new elementary 
form o f movement... ” they do make “...the usual stimuli less fatal and machine-like...”
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Stating a principle that was central to his psychology of volition, James noted that 
possession of the “hemispheres” kept muscular activity from slavishly following certain 
stimuli. When the organism is in possession of the full cortex, muscular movements 
occur, for example, only “...when the mandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by the 
hemispheres, that a current goes straight to the wiping-arrangement in the spinal cord, 
exciting this arrangement as a whole” (1.18-19; Italics mine). James would later explain 
that his activity-deteimining “mandate,” which is a perception analogous to the 
aforementioned “idea,” is, in humans, to some degree controllable and indeterminate. By 
fixating upon certain morally desirable ideas, a human being can gain a measure of 
control over his or her behavior.
James then gives a “general notion of the hemispheres.” The mechanistic 
reactions are the result of the lower centers of the brain, while the less predictable 
volitional reactions are in the hemispheres, which have “ideas” or perceptions as their 
conscious correlates. He summarizes thus: “All these facts lead us, when we think about 
them, to some such explanatory conception as this: The lower centres act from present 
sensational stimuli alone; the hemispheres act from perceptions and considerations... ”
These “perceptions and considerations” which serve as the spring of the actions of 
the hemispheres are built up gradually though experience. “Past experience provides the 
essential raw material for perceptions and considerations.” With the hemispheres intact, 
which are the “seat of memory,” the organism is enabled to “obey” absent objects as well 
as present objects. Again, without the hemispheres, behavior is automatic. With the 
hemispheres intact, however, the animal may resist the pull of a given stimulus for other, 
broader concerns. The hemispheres thereby serve the eminently practical function of
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facilitating survival. On a moral level, James made evident later in the book, the 
hemispheres are the place in which the pull of lower desires may be resisted by higher 
ones. In either case, the hemispheres are the physiological location of human efficiency.
To illustrate the adaptiveness and freedom of hemispheric input, he uses the 
example of feeding. “Take the prehension of food as an example and suppose it to be a 
reflex performance of the lower centres.” If one supposes that the “prehension of food” 
takes place strictly in the “lower centres,” and, by consequence, does not involve the 
hemispheres, “the animal will be condemned fatally and irresistibly to snap at it 
whenever presented, no matter what the circumstances may be; he can no more disobey 
this prompting than water can refuse to boil when a fire is kindled under the pot. His life 
will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony” (italics mine). The “lowest” animals 
are characterized by this lack of reflection. He gives the example of a fish, which eats the 
worm on the hook reflexively, even after it has been caught before.
His lack of all thought by which to weigh the danger against the attractiveness of 
the bait, and of all volition to remain hungry a little while longer, is the direct 
measure of his lowness in the mental scale. And those fishes which, like our 
cunners and sculpins, are no sooner thrown back from the hook into the water, 
than they automatically seize the hook again, would soon expiate the degradation 
of their intelligence by the extinction of their type, did not their exaggerated 
fecundity atone for their imprudence. (1.22)
By contrast, the feeding activities of “higher vertebrates,” have “...consequently 
become...functions of the cerebrum.” The degree to which behavior is located in the 
hemisphere is the degree to which an animal has the potential for choice. For example,
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“the sexual function” of birds “...devolves exclusively upon the hemispheres. When [the 
hemispheres] are shom away the pigeon pays no attention to the billings and cooings of 
its mate.” By way of contrast, “...in frogs and toads this [sexual] passion devolves on the 
lower centres. They show consequently a machine-like obedience to the present 
incitement of sense, and an almost total exclusion of the power o f choice’’ (1.22, italics 
mine).
Like the birds, human beings can thank their hemispheres for the “prevalence of 
chastity” in the human race. “Hardly any factor measures more than this the difference 
between civilization and barbarism. Physiologically interpreted, chastity means nothing 
more than the fact that present solicitations of sense are overpowered by suggestions of 
aesthetic and moral fitness which the circumstances awaken in the cerebrum ; and that 
upon the inhibitory or permissive influence of these alone action directly depends” (1.22- 
23). James’s moral concerns seep through here, as they often do. An implicit but ill- 
defined morality is infused into the cerebrum.
James links cerebrum with the ability to live life for “remote” as opposed to 
“immediate” considerations. Implying a link between moral choice and size of cortex, 
James not only makes clear moral distinctions between lifestyles, but also implies that 
these lifestyles may be linked to variations in size of cortex, and, therefore, choice:
In all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most 
distant ends has been held to possess the highest intelligence. The tramp who lives 
from hour to hour; the bohemian whose engagements are from day to day; the 
bachelor who builds but for a single life; the father who acts for another 
generation; the patriot who thinks of a whole community and many generations;
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and finally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for humanity and for 
eternity,—these range themselves in an unbroken hierarchy, wherein each 
successive grade results from an increased manifestation of the special form of 
action by which the cerebral centres are distinguished from all below them. (1.23) 
In sum, James had looked squarely at brain physiology which at first glance seemed to 
rob humanity of all efficiency, but found that physiology actually undergirded efficiency. 
The Education of the Hemispheres
James summarizes the simplified scheme in this way: “Nerve-currents run in 
through sense-organs, and whilst provoking reflex acts in the lower centres, they arouse 
ideas in the hemispheres, which either permit the reflexes in question, check them, or 
substitute others for them.” The power of volition here is to be found in this power of 
permission, checking or substituting. Since the ideas aroused through sensory inputs are 
kinds of memories, James addressed the question o f  How can processes become 
organized in the hemispheres which correspond to reminiscences in the mind ? ” With 
this question, linking material, physiological activities to conscious experiences, James 
addresses the mind/body problem directly. He argued that the answer to this question is 
easy, if  four assumptions are granted:
1) The same cerebral process which, when aroused from without by a sense- 
organ, gives the perception of an object, will give an idea of the same object when 
aroused by other cerebral processes from within.
2) If processes 1, 2, 3, 4 have once been aroused together or in immediate 
succession, any subsequent arousal of any one of them (whether from without or 
within) will tend to arouse the others in the original order. [This is the so-called
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law of association.]
3) Every sensorial excitement propagated to a lower centre tends to spread 
upwards and arouse an idea.
4) Every idea tends ultimately either to produce a movement or to check one 
which otherwise would be produced. (1.24)
It is worth noting that point four seems to leave open the possibility that ideas may 
“suspend” volitions, an idea that Arminian psychologists took great comfort in. As 
Edwards noted, the ability to suspend was thought by some to be the essence of human 
freedom. For James, the fact that an idea can “check” a movement was comforting in 
much the same way; it gave the human being the power or efficiency to resist the 
otherwise “fatal” tides of determinism.
With these assumptions in place, James described how a baby learns to refrain 
from touching a flame. At first, the child is instinctually drawn to the flame, reaches out 
and gets burned. The baby reflexively pulls back. Two reflex acts are in play. Without 
the hemispheres, which make memory and association a possibility, the child would 
simply continue to engage in the same reflexive activity, and continue to get burned. But 
with the hemispheres, sensations are represented and stored in the cortex, and contiguous 
sensory experiences are linked together through association. The next time the child sees 
the flame, the impulse to reach out is inhibited by the stronger inhibitory idea of being 
burned.
This model, which James calls the “Meynert scheme,” is intuitively obvious. So 
much so that it “...almost.. .impose[s] itself on our belief.” After reviewing the available 
physiological evidence on the localization of function in the hemispheres, James
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concluded that the Meynert scheme “is on the whole most satisfactorily corroborated by 
subsequent objective research,” (1.64), but that it “...makes the lower centres too 
machine-like and the hemispheres not quite machine-like enough...” (1.27).
“We thus see that the postulate of Meynert and Jackson which we started with on 
p.30 is on the whole most satisfactorily corroborated by subsequent objective research. 
The highest centres do probably contain nothing but arrangements for representing 
impressions and movements, and other arrangements fo r  coupling the activity o f  these 
arrangements together. Currents pouring in from the sense-organs first excite some 
arrangements, which in turn excite others, until at last a motor discharge downwards of 
some sort occurs” (1.64-65).
In his chapter on will, James reveals a concern about whether efferent nervous 
impulses can be felt. In that chapter, James argues that they cannot. In this chapter,
James makes a comment that seems to contradict this later assertion by saying that all the 
currents in the cortex have feelings going with them. A closer look, however, reveals that 
James is consistent on this point. James argued that “the whole cortex” is both sensory 
and motor, because the afferent and efferent currents “run through” the cortex. “All the 
currents probably have feelings going with them, and sooner or later bring movements 
about.” “All the currents” here are the afferent currents because they are distinguished 
from those which, occurring later, “bring movements about” (1.65).
When he describes how consciousness accompanies the stream of innervation, he 
again makes reference to afferent impulses. The stream is “...mainly of things seen if  the 
stream is strongest occipitally, of things heard if it is strongest temporally, of things felt, 
etc., if the stream occupies most intensely the ‘motor zone’” (1.65).
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James turned next to a different but related question. “But is the consciousness 
which accompanies the activity o f the cortex the only consciousness that man has? or arc 
his lower centres conscious as well?'’ Although he admitted that “This is a difficult 
question to decide...” and that there is evidence that consciousness may be associated 
with subcortical structures in nonhumans, he concludes that “For practical purposes, 
nevertheless, and limiting the meaning of the word consciousness to the personal self of 
the individual, we can pretty confidently answer the question prefixed to this paragraph 
by saying tbat the cortex is the sole organ o f consciousness in man. If there be any 
consciousness pertaining to the lower centers, it is a consciousness of which the self 
knows nothing” (1.66-67).
Given these considerations, James proposed a revision to the Meynert Scheme. 
Originally, it will be remembered, James’s inspection of the data on frogs led to the 
conclusion that “the lower centres” served as machines responding only to “present 
sense-impressions,” while the hemispheres served as “organs of action from inward 
considerations or ideas. ” His account was initially overly-simplified, however, in that 
“...following Meynert, we supposed the hemispheres to have no native tendencies to 
determinate activity, but to be merely superadded organs for breaking up the various 
reflexes performed by the lower centres, and combining their motor and sensory elements 
in novel ways.” With this simplistic model and the experimental evidence before him, 
James set out to make a few corrections to this scheme. In sum, “wider and completer 
observations show us both that the lower centres are more spontaneous, and that the 
hemispheres are more automatic, than the Meynert scheme allows” (1.74).
The Meynert scheme is a fair fit for lower animals: “Even in the lower animals.
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then, there is reason to soften down that opposition between the hemispheres and the 
lower centres which the scheme demands. The hemispheres may, it is true, only 
supplement the lower centres, but the latter resemble the former in nature and have some 
small amount at least of ‘spontaneity’ and choice.” For higher animals, “monkeys and 
man” specifically, “...the scheme well-nigh breaks down altogether..,” Instead of the 
hemispheres simply repeating “...voluntarily actions which the lower centres perform as 
machines,” the hemispheres are actually found to be crucial for any engagement in 
activities that were, in lower animals, limited to the lower centers. “It would seem, then, 
that in these higher creatures the lower centres must be less adequate than they are farther 
down in the zoological scale...” (1.75). This physiological fact was good news for human 
efficiency. Human beings possess control even over our most basic instinctual drives.
As will become clear in chapter 12, the opposition between instinctual and ideal drives 
was in James’s mind the basic moral struggle, and here he outlines the physiological 
basis for this struggle.
Just as the lower centers do not exert an autonomous influence over basic human 
activities, the hemispheres are correspondingly found to be subjected to more mechanical 
and instinctual laws. “The plain truth is that neither in man nor beast are the hemispheres 
the virgin organs which our scheme called them.” Instead of being “unorganized at 
birth,” the hemispheres “...have native tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort.”
These tendencies are the emotions and instincts, and are a hindrance to the freedom of 
human volition; “Both instincts and emotions are reactions upon special sorts of objects 
of perception-, they depend on the hemispheres; and they are in the first instance reflex, 
that is, they take place the first time the exciting object is met, are accompanied by no
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forethought or deliberation, and are irresistible’" (italics mine). This diversion from the 
Meynert scheme was certainly a stumbling block in the path toward autonomous human 
efficiency. But James quickly showed that these “irresistible” and instinctual reactions 
could be subject to the control of the person.
The pre-organization of the brain is not, however, absolutely determinative. 
Thankfully (James might say), these instinctual, automatic, hemispheric reactions “...are 
modifiable to a certain extent by experience, and on later occasions of meeting the 
exciting object, the instincts especially have less of the blind impulsive character which 
they had at first” (italics mine). We take back some control. James addresses this 
phenomenon in his chapter on Instinct. Although “the multiplicity of emotional and 
instinctive reactions in man” form the raw material from which a mind may be built, they 
do “...permit of extensive recouplings of the original sensory and motor partners,” 
particularly though the “...extensive associative power...” of the human brain. This 
“education” of the hemispheres does not require a blank slate, as the Meynert scheme had 
argued. With these constraints in mind, James concludes that “...we can no longer hold 
strictly to the Meynert scheme. If anywhere, it will apply to the lowest animals; but in 
them especially the lower centres seem to have a degree of spontaneity and choice” (1.78, 
underline mine).
In concluding his chapter on the functions of the brain, James pulled together the 
concepts of consciousness, mechanism, desire and will. He once again contrasts 
consciousness with mechanism, and argues that “the centres” in animals may have some 
degree of consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a hierarchy in terms of the degree to 
which animals possess consciousness. Humans, it is implied, have the most.
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Consciousness is crucial to the “development of will.” To explain this linkage, 
the concept of desire is utilized, which James had not, up to this point, substantially 
utilized in chapter II. Nevertheless, the concept of desire is linked to “ends,” which had 
been part of the discussion, so James is not being inconsistent here. In a very Calvinistic- 
sounding quote, James describes the linkage between consciousness, desire and will is 
expressed thus;
The consciousness must everywhere prefer some of the sensations which it gets to 
others; and if it can remember these in their absence, however dimly, they must be 
its ends of desire. If, moreover, it can identify in memory any motor discharges 
which may have led to such ends, and associate the latter with them, then these 
motor discharges themselves may in turn become desired as means. This is the 
development of will... (1.78)
Just as Edwards and Ames tended to view will as a broad concept having to do with the 
desiring and inclining aspect o f the self, so too James defines will broadly—at least here, 
that is. Consciousness has preferences and tendencies to move in particular directions. It 
is these preferences and ends which are the will. The degree of the development of will 
is related to the sophistication of the consciousness of the given animal. On a very low 
level, “even the spinal cord may possibly have some little power of will in this sense, and 
of effort towards modified behavior in consequence of new experiences of sensibility.”
In a footnote, he speaks of how the spinal cord “...may, in its dim way, both feel, prefer, 
and desire” (1.78).
James ties the issue to evolutionary history in such a way that he appears to 
impute a degree of purpose to the “development” of consciousness and, by implication.
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the human race, which by virtue of having the most consciousness, are the highest of all 
earthy beings. James thereby provided a kind of secular, biological creation story which 
was consistent with the continuing late nineteenth-century belief of the superiority of 
human beings. In his account, he continues to contrast consciousness and mechanism, 
and he continues to link consciousness to the hemispheres.
The nervous centers have “one essential function...‘intelligent’ action.” These 
centers “...feel, prefer one thing to another, and have ‘ends.’“ The process of evolution 
is that of a growing automaticity in the lower centers, and of growing freedom and 
“intellectuality” in the higher centers:
Like all other organs, however, [the centres] evolve from ancestor to descendant, 
and their evolution takes two directions, the lower centres passing downwards 
into more unhesitating automatism, and the higher ones upwards into larger 
intellectuality. Thus it may happen that those functions which can safely grow 
uniform and fatal become least accompanied by mind, and that their organ, the 
spinal cord, becomes a more and more soulless machine; whilst on the contrary 
those fimctions which it benefits the animal to have adapted to delicate environing 
variations pass more and more to the hemispheres, whose anatomical structure 
and attendant consciousness grow more and more elaborate as zoological 
evolution proceeds. In this way it might come about that in man and the monkeys 
the basal ganglia should do fewer things by themselves than they can do in dogs, 
fewer in dogs than in rabbits, fewer in rabbits than in hawks, fewer in hawks than 
in pigeons, fewer in pigeons than in frogs, fewer in frogs than in fishes, and that 
the hemispheres should correspondingly do more. This passage of functions
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forward to the ever-enlarging hemispheres would be itself one of the evolutive 
changes, to be explained like the development of the hemispheres themselves, 
either by fortunate variation or by inherited effects of use. (1.79)
Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity 
In the third chapter of Principles, James quickly disposed of the notion that 
“ideas” or parts of ideas are somehow contained in cells and then associated by nerve 
fibers. He would take associationist psychology to task several times in the Principles; 
this particular refutation was biology-centered:
Too much anatomy has been found to order for theoretic purposes, even by the 
anatomists; and the popular-science notions of cells and fibres are almost wholly 
wide of the truth. Let us therefore relegate the subject of the intimate workings of 
the brain to the physiology of the future, save in respect to a few points of which a 
word must now be said. (1.81-82)
More relevant to the topic of volition, if only tangentially so, is James’s 
discussion of the “summation of stimuli.” James asserted that this was an “extremely 
important” aspect of the nervous system, and shed light on “...a great many phenomena of 
the neural, and consequently of the mental, life.” The law of summation of stimuli is “...a 
stimulus which would be inadequate by itself to excite a nerve-centre to effective 
discharge may, by acting with one or more other stimuli (equally ineffectual by 
themselves alone) bring the discharge about.’’ Although the subject “belong[ed] too 
much to physiology” to give a detailed summary of the evidence for this phenomena, 
James included a simple but convincing account of how stimulation of the cortex by a 
single, weak electrical current is insufficient to trigger a motor response, but how a
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succession of weak stimuli is sufficient to produce the motor response. To make this 
seemingly irrelevant phenomena interesting to his readers, James offered some down-to- 
earth examples to illustrate the phenomena. We use the principle of summation of 
stimuli “eonstantly.” For example, a “strange person” or “darkness” may, by themselves 
be insuffieient to trigger “fear and mistrust,” (1.84) but when the two are encountered at 
the same time, fear and mistrust ensue. “Street-hawkers” also demonstrate an implicit 
understanding of this phenomenon, “...for they arrange themselves in a line upon the 
sidewalk, and the passer often buys from the last one of them, through the effect of the 
reiterated solicitation, what he refused to buy from the first in the row.” Relevant to the 
topic of volition, James promised to utilize this coneept in his chapters on “...Instinct, the 
Stream of Thought, Attention, Discrimination, Association, Memory, Aesthetics, and 
Will...” (1.85).
Reaction Time
Just as James had examined brain physiology and determined that there was no 
insurmountable threat to human effieiency, so too James tumed to eontemporary attempts 
to study volition experimentally with the intention of safeguarding the dignity of 
volitional processes. The inelusion of the topic of reaction time under the heading of 
“general conditions of brain activity,” is telling and ironie. James believed that reaction­
time experiments (whieh will be explained below) were helpful strictly a measures of 
physiologieal activity. The irony of this understanding, is that some of the proponents of 
the reaction-time experiments (most notably Wilhelm Wundt) believed they were 
shedding light on the topic of volition. The irony is multiplied when one eonsiders the 
canonical origin story about scientific psychology, i.e., that experimental psychology was
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started in Leipzig. In this chapter at least, James calls into question whether Wundt’s 
procedure is a measure of mind at all. James’s challenge of Wundt’s draws on the crucial 
distinction between reflex and conscious activity, and sheds light on James’s own 
psychology of volition.
James situated the reaction-time experiments historically as a continuation of 
Helmholtz’s measurements of “the rapidity of the current in the sciatic nerve of the frog.” 
This approach led to “one of the lines of experimental investigation most diligently 
followed of late years,” that is, “...the ascertainment of the time occupied by nervous 
events.’'’ These methods were subsequently “...applied to the sensory nerves and the 
centres, and the results caused much popular scientific admiration when described as 
measurements of the ‘velocity of thought’” (1.85). He found “...the phrase ‘velocity of 
thought’” to be “misleading,” because it was “...by no means clear in any of the cases 
what particular act of thought occurs during the time which is measured.” James thought 
that the experiments really measured “...the total duration of certain reactions upon 
stimuli” (1.86). James therefore thought that reaction-times were better measurements of 
reflexive activities than cognitive ones.
James gave a succinct summary of the reaction-time experimental procedure:
The method is essentially the same is all these investigations. A signal of some 
sort is communicated to the subject, and at the same instant records itself on a 
time-registering apparatus. The subject then makes a muscular movement of some 
sort, which is the ‘reaction,’ and which also records itself automatically. The time 
found to have elapsed between the two records is the total time of that 
observation. The time-registering instruments are of various types. (1.86)
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After describing several types of time measuring machines, James related his own 
“personal experience” of the reaction-time methodology. He felt that this method 
reduced the human subject to a kind of mechanistic state, precluding the possibility of 
actually measuring higher volitional processes:
The subject of experiment, whenever the reactions are short and regular, is in a 
state of extreme tension, and feels, when the signal comes, as if  it started the 
reaction, by a sort of fatality, and as if no psychic process of perception or 
volition had a chance to intervene. The whole succession is so rapid that 
perception seems to be retrospective, and the time-order o f events to be read off in 
memory rather than known at the moment.
Although James admitted that this was his “...own personal experience in the matter,” he 
also added that he “...[found] others to agree” with this assessment (1.88).
James went to lengths to show that it is very difficult to tell precisely what sort of 
conscious experience accompanied the reaction-time experiments. Despite the 
ambiguities, James reported, with a degree of bewilderment, that “Wundt has little 
difficulty in deciding that it is consciousness of a quite elaborate kind...” that was being 
measured in his experiments. To elucidate the difference of opinion, James offered an 
explanation of the Wundtian terminology. Wrmdt’s distinction between perception and 
apperception was quite important, “...likening the one [perception] to the mere entrance 
of an object into the periphery of the field of vision, and the other [apperception] to its 
coming to occupy the focus or point of view.” James, who had earlier in the Principles 
confessed confusion over Wundt’s use of terms, offered his own interpretation of the 
Wundtian terminology: '''Inattentive awareness of an object, and attention to it, are, it
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seems to me, equivalents for perception and apperception, as Wundt uses the words.” 
Although perception and apperception were to James unobjectionable, although perhaps 
conceptually unclear, Wundt’s belief that “the conscious volition to react” also attended 
the experimental process was quite troublesome. Wundt argued that perception, 
apperception, and the conscious volition to react occur sequentially, and, taken together, 
constituted “‘psycho-physical’ processes.” (1.90). James thought that “...no such 
succession of conscious feelings as Wundt describes takes place,” and, therefore,
Wundt’s procedure was unable to access volitional and other higher aspects 
consciousness. “Feeling of the impression, attention to it, thought of the reaction, 
volition to react, would, undoubtedly, all be links of the process under other 
conditions...” Given the spontaneity and unpredicableness of higher processes, these 
other conditions would lead to “the same reaction” but only “after an indefinitely longer 
time.” Drawing upon a principle that was near and dear to the Puritan psychology of 
William Ames, and reiterating a point from chapter II, James asserted that “...it is 
mythological psychology...to conclude that because two mental processes lead to the 
same result they must be similar in their inward subjective constitution.” The inward 
subjective experience of the experimental subjects was “...no articulate perception...” but 
was rather “...the mere sense of a reflex discharge. The reaction whose time is measured 
is, in short, a reflex action pure and simple, and not a psychic act.” This did not mean 
that consciousness was not involved in the Wundtian experiments at all. To the contrary, 
“a foregoing psychic condition is, it is true, a prerequisite for this reflex action.” The 
subject had to prepare his attention and volition, to anticipate the signal, to make his hand 
ready to move at the moment of the signal. Under these conditions, however, the subject
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was transformed into a sub-human and mechanistic “arc of reflex discharge” (1.91).
Although James reported that Wundt had “converted to the view which I defend” 
after he wrote his criticism of the Wundtian methodology, this conversion was 
incomplete. Wundt now admitted that in “...the shortest reactions ‘there is neither 
apperception nor will, but that they are merely brain-reflexes due to practice.'''''’ The 
occasion of Wundt’s conversion was the experimental work of “Herr. L. Lange, who was 
led to distinguish between two ways of setting the attention in reacting on a signal, and 
who found that they gave very different time-results.” The extreme sensorial’ way...” of 
setting the attention involved keeping “...one’s mind as intent as possible upon the 
expected signal” (italics mine). The ‘"‘extreme muscular^ way...” of setting the attention 
involved focusing upon the anticipated movement. Reaction-times for the muscular way 
were “much shorter” than the sensorial ones. Although this distinction was helpful,
James thought that Wundt’s interpretation did not go far enough. While Wundt agreed 
with Lange that the shorter muscular reactions were “mere reflexes,” he insisted that the 
sensorial way was the proper method of measuring volition. James pointed out, however, 
that the sensorial method typically led to highly variable and frequently prolonged 
responses, unless introspectors were trained to respond in the proper way. This training 
brought reaction times closer to the “extreme muscular” method. James concluded that 
the trained introspectors were “probably” engaged in “...another sort of reflex, less 
perfect than the reflexes prepared by straining one’s attention towards the movement.” If 
volitional processes were to be found in these experiments, James speculated, it would 
have been in the spontaneous, unpredictable, “...excessive and ‘untypical’ times...”
James concluded that “It is obvious that Herr Lange’s distinction between the two
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types of reaction is a highly important one...” (1.93) and is useful in “comparative 
investigations,” but that “these reaction-time experiments are... in no sense measurements 
of the swiftness of thought. Only when we complicate them is there a chance for 
anything like an intellectual operation to occur” (1.94). The reason for including 
reaction-time experiments in a chapter on the “general conditions of brain activity” is 
thus made clear. “...The simple reaction-time remains...the fundamental physiological 
constant in all time-measurements.” James therefore concludes with a brief overview of 
“its own variations...” He notes, for example that reaction-times vary with individuals 
and age, with practice, with concentration (1.95), with intoxicants (1.97), etc. James 
finished his review with a kind of dismissive summary: “An immense amount of work 
has been done on reaction-time, of which I have cited but a small part. It is a sort of work 
which appeals particularly to patient and exact minds, and they have not failed to profit 
by the opportunity.” Clearly, however, the profit gained by these experimentalists had 
not, in James mind, included a knowledge of the will.
In this chapter, James also included a consideration of “cerebral blood-supply” 
and “cerebral thermometry,” neither of which had a great deal to do with volition. James 
did make a passing reference to his chapter on Will in discussing a leading hypothesis 
conceming the relation between intellectual activity and brain temperature. Researchers 
had found that “...any intellectual effort, such as computing, composing, reciting poetry 
silently or aloud, and especially that emotional excitement such as an anger fit, caused a 
general rise of temperature, which rarely exceeded a degree Fahrenheit” (1.100). The rise 
in temperature was greatest when the poetry was recited silently, rather than aloud. A 
leading explanation of this phenomenon was that “‘in intemal recitation an additional
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portion of energy, which in recitation aloud, was converted into nervous and muscular 
force, now appears as heat.’” James foreshadowed his discussion in his chapter on Will:
“I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory, that the surplus of heat in recitation to 
one’s self is due to inhibitory processes which are absent when we recite aloud. In the 
chapter on the Will we shall see that the simple central process is to speak when we think; 
to think silently involves a check in addition” (1.100).
James finished this chapter pointing to another chapter that had a great deal to do 
with the topic of volition:
There remains another feature of general brain-physiology, and indeed for 
psychological purposes the most important feature of all. I refer to the aptitude of 
the brain for acquiring habits. But I will treat of that in a chapter by itself. (1.103) 
Habit as a Loss of Arminian Efficiency 
James’s chapter on habit makes it very clear that James’s concept of will, as far as 
it was an existentially and religiously meaningful concept to him, was “Arminian” in 
nature. This becomes particularly evident when he equates will with mental effort 
against alternatives, and when he opposes will with character. The Calvinistic view of 
will seen in Ames and Edwards included the ideas of habit and character, and would have 
seen the equation of will with deliberate effort as being much too constricting. Further, 
James’s Arminian tendencies (again, using the term very broadly), combined with a 
general lack of hope for theological intervention, lead to an expansion of the “self- 
righteous” moralism found in Upham, and a surprisingly unmerciful tone. The physical 
world was unforgiving and so James preached this truth as forcefully as he could. Their 
very “salvation” was at stake.
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In his chapter on habit, the first thing James desired to establish was the fact that 
“...habit covers a very large part of life...” (1.104). Since Arminian volitions are defined 
as being separate from habitual actions, this expanding domain of habit in James may be 
considered part of the loss of will. “When we look at living creatures from an outward 
point of view, one of the first things that strike us is that they are bundles of habits” 
(1.104). Recall that Upham also had voiced concern about habit intruding on the domain 
of the will.
James conceived of habit broadly, as including things such as instincts, “The 
habits to which there is an innate tendency are called instincts...”, and also “acts of 
reason,” which are the result of “education” (1.104). Habit involves “...the fundamental 
properties of matter” (1.104). Indeed, the laws of nature can be understood as habits: 
“The laws of Nature are nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary 
sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other” (1.104). By 
contrast, the habits found in the world of living creatures are not so inflexible and fatal. 
Instincts vary from individual to individual, and within individuals instincts may be 
modified. This flexibility in living creatures, James argued, is consistent with a 
mechanistic theory of matter:
The habits of an elementary particle of matter cannot change (on the principles of 
the atomistic philosophy), because the particle is itself an unchangeable thing; but 
those of a compound mass of matter can change, because they are in the last 
instance due to the structure of the compound, and either outward forces or 
inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure into something 
different from what it was. That is, they can do so if the body be plastic enough to
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maintain its integrity, and be not disrupted when its structure yields. (1.104-105) 
Given James’s distaste for fatal necessity, the prospect of turning a “...structure 
into something different from what it was,” was a source of hope for James. He therefore 
laid great emphasis on the concept of plasticity, defined as “...the possession of a 
structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at 
once.” James found “...a very extraordinary degree of plasticity...” (1.105) in the nervous 
tissue of this sort. James therefore offers a first proposition for understanding habit: “t/ze 
phenomena o f habit in living beings are due to the plasticity o f the organic materials o f  
which their bodies are composed’’' (1.105). James therefore argued that “...the philosophy 
of habit...” is, at first, “...a chapter in physics rather than in physiology or psychology.” 
James claimed to have the backing of “all good recent writers on the subject,” in claiming 
that habit “...is at bottom a physical principle.” These writers utilized memorable 
imagery to draw the parallel between physical events and habits. Quoting “M. Leon 
Dumont, whose essay on habit is perhaps the most philosophical account yet published,” 
a hahit is compared to “...a garment, [which] after having been worn a certain time, clings 
to the shape of the body better than when it was new” (1.105). Similarly, “It costs less 
trouble to fold a paper when it has been folded already....” (1.105-106). Both the garment 
and the paper possess a degree of plasticity. They possess an alterable structure, i.e., a 
structure weak enough to yield to the influence of body or hand, but the structure is 
strong enough to resist immediate conformity.
James admitted that it is not easy to ascertain precisely how the nervous system 
mimics the behavior of the worn garment or folded paper. He did, however, attempt 
“...to frame easily an abstract and general scheme of processes which the physical
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changes in question may be like” (1.107).
“If habits are due to the plasticity of materials to outward agents, we can 
immediately see to what outward influences, if to any, the brain-matter is plastic” (1.107). 
The most relevant way to influence the brain, James argued, was through the input of the 
sensory nerves. Once these currents arrive in the brain, they “must find a way out.” As 
these currents depart, they “...leave their traces in the paths which they take,” either 
“...deepen[ing] old paths...” (1.107), or making new paths. The plasticity of the brain is 
understood in this light, as the ability of the brain to create stable paths which do not 
easily disappear. Although there is a difference between a “simple habit” such as biting 
one’s nails, and “complex habits,” the tendency of the brain to form paths is a constant.
The main difference between simple and complex habits is that complex habits 
involve the “concatenat[ion]” of reflexes, “...so organized as to wake each other up 
successively...” (1.108). When series of reflexes are concatenated, “...the impression 
produced by one muscular contraction serv[es] as a stimulus to provoke the next, until a 
final impression inhibits the process and closes the chain” (1.108).
James thought that “...nothing is easier than to imagine how, when a current once 
has traversed a path, it should traverse it more readily still a second time.” The thing that 
puzzled him, however, is what makes a current traverse a path for the first time. Again 
diminishing the role of the Arminian will, James did not believe that volitional processes 
could receive credit for this. Although many if not most human habits are at one point 
voluntary actions, these voluntary acts are not primary or originative. “While an habitual 
action may once have been voluntary, the voluntary action must before that, at least once, 
have been impulsive or reflex.” James attempted to account for the “very first occurrence
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of a i r  (1.109).
James’s answer to this problem was that new pathways of habit are started by 
random. Generally speaking, the transformation of sensory input into motor output 
follows the path of least resistance, thus prohibiting the formation of a new habit. Yet, 
since “...a given point of the system may belong, actually or potentially, to many different 
paths, and, as the play of nutrition is subject to accidental changes, blocks may from 
time to time occur, and make currents shoot through unwonted lines. Such an unwonted 
line would be a new-created path, which if traversed repeatedly, would become the 
beginning of a new reflex arc. All this is vague to the last degree, and amounts to little 
more than saying that a new path may be formed by the sort of chances that in nervous 
material are likely to occur. But, vague as it is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in 
the matter” (1.109).
James also called attention to the fact that plasticity, the invaluable phenomenon 
that allows structures to change, decreases with age. Quoting Carpenter, “It is a matter of 
universal experience that every kind of training for special aptitudes is both far more 
effective, and leaves a more permanent impress, when exerted on the growing organism 
than when brought to bear on the adult” (I.l 10). To James, this was a fact of utmost 
moral significance, and led him to engage in impassioned exhortation to his readers, who 
were still in “the plastic state” (1.127). “Dr. Carpenter’s phrase that our nervous system 
grows to the modes in which it has been exercised expresses the philosophy of habit in a 
nutshell” (1.112).
After tracing some of the basic postulates of the mechanism of habit formation.
James does not develop the concept o f “nutrition” very well in this text. (The word appears 2 times in 
chapter 2; 0 times in chapter 3; 3 times in chapter 4).
555
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
James laid down several “practical applications.” This first of these was that habit 
simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate 
and diminishes fatigued  This is an eminently useful function of habits, allowing a person 
to move from basic to more important activities (I.l 12). Recall that Upham had similarly 
stressed the usefulness of habits.
Since the number of tasks a normal human being must perform are “so 
enormous,” they cannot be “automatic” as is the case in animals, but are rather “...the 
fruit of painful study.” A human being unable to form habits would be “in a sorry 
plight,” because he would continually need to re-leam the most basic tasks, and could 
make no developmental progress (1.113).
The next application that James drew was directly related to volition. Contrary to 
Ames and Edwards, habits are by nature opposed to volitional actions: habit
diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed.’’ For James, 
volitional activities were necessarily conscious, intentional activities. When a complex 
habit, i.e., an act requiring a chain of “successive nervous events,” (such as walking, 
skating, or swimming) is being formed, each link in the chain must in its first 
performance be an effortful activity of “the conscious will.” Soon, however, a habit is 
formed when “...each event [in the chain] calls up its own appropriate successor without 
any alternative offering itself, and without any reference to the conscious will, until at last 
the whole chain...rattles itself off as soon as... [the initiating event] occurs...” (1.114). 
Although “...learning to walk, to ride, to swim, skate, fence, write, play, or sing” 
involves mistake-laden effort, these activities gradually become automatic, freeing the 
person to engage in other activities, even while performing the now habitual activity
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(1.114).
This freeing up of cognitive resources has a biological substrate. The habitual 
actions, occurring outside of immediate conscious awareness take place in the “lower 
centres” of the brain, while the “higher thought-centers,” oblivious to the habitual goings- 
on perform other activities. To demonstrate the largely unconscious nature of habitual 
activity he asked his readers to consider how “few men can tell off-hand which sock, 
shoe, or trousers-leg they put on first. They must first mentally rehearse the act; and even 
that is often insufficient—the act must be performed’’ (I.l 15).
Unlike truly volitional actions, which are instigated by thoughts or perceptions, 
habitual action is started by “...the sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just 
finished^ James summarizes thus, “A strictly voluntary act has to be guided by idea, 
perception, and volition, throughout its whole course. In an habitual action, mere 
sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper regions of brain and mind are set 
comparatively free” (I.l 15-116).
James thought the notion that volition is involved in habitual activity was 
antiquated. If the will is present at all in habitual activity, it “...limits itself to a 
permission that they exert their motor effects...” (I.l 18). James’s notion of will here is 
constricted compared to the notion entertained by Ames and Edwards. Habitual activity, 
reflective of a person’s character, was considered part of voluntary activity. Since James 
partitioned habit and will, he thought that the only role left for will when it came to habits 
was “permission.” This recalls my criticism of Upham’s view of Jesus Christ and of 
angels: since their characters were set and they possessed perfect harmony among all the 
faculties, they seemed to possess an entirely redundant and therefore useless will. James,
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content with his Arminian presuppositions, approvingly quoted Carpenter, whose 
argument again expresses the diminishing role of Arminian volition in human 
psychology:
There may still be metaphysicians who maintain that actions which were 
originally prompted by the will with a distinct intention, and which are still 
entirely under its control, can never cease to be volitional; and that either an 
infmitesimally small amount of will is required to sustain them when they have 
been once set going, or that the will is in a sort of pendulum-like oscillation 
between the two actions - the maintenance of the train of thought, and the 
maintenance of the train of movement. But if only an infinitesimally small amount 
of will is necessary to sustain them, is not this tantamount to saying that they go 
on by a force of their own? (1.118).
Although habitual activity takes place outside of immediate awareness, James was still 
not convinced that consciousness was totally removed form habitual activity. If habits 
are not “...distinct acts of will...” James thought that the “...immediate antecedents of each 
movement of the chain are at any rate accompanied by consciousness of some kind.” We 
do not usually pay attention to this consciousness, unless something goes wrong. An 
example of walking, borrowed from Schneider, shows the idea here. We are aware of our 
muscles and “certain impulses to keep our equilibrium” while we walk Indeed, these 
feelings are necessary in order to walk (I.l 18).
So, in the case of walking or other habitual activity, the attendant sensations are 
“very faint” but still “necessary.” Without these faint sensations, habitual activity would 
break down, for the elements in the chain of habitual activity are connected by these
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sensations. “Imagine your hands not feeling; your movements could then only be 
provoked by ideas, and if  your ideas were then diverted away, the movements ought to 
come to a standstill, which is a consequence that seldom occurs” (1.119). Instead, the 
faint sensations keep the whole habitual activity moving:
An idea makes you take, for example, a violin into your left hand. But it is not 
necessary that your idea remain fixed on the contraction of the muscles of the left 
hand and fingers in order that the violin may continue to be held fast and not let 
fall. The sensations themselves which the holding of the instrument awakens in 
the hand, since they are associated with the motor impulse of grasping, are 
sufficient to cause this impulse... (1.119)
Although it is possible to detect ethical undertones in James’s preliminary 
remarks on habit, he makes his moral concerns quite explicit in the last half of the 
chapter. The “very natural transition” from these physiological considerations was to 
“...the ethical implications o f  the law o f habit.” Given that half of this chapter is 
dedicated to these implications, James appropriately noted that “they are numerous and 
momentous.” To justify this overtly moral section of the Principles. James cited 
Carpenter, “whose ‘Mental Physiology’...has so prominently enforced the principle that 
our organs grow to the way in which they have been exercised, and dwelt upon its 
consequences, that his hook almost deserves to be called a work of edification, on this 
account alone.” Since Carpenter had gone the way of moral exhortation, James thought 
he needed to “...make no apology, then, for tracing a few of these [ethical] 
consequences...” himself (1.119).
James frequently contrasted determinism, mechanism, and fatality with
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possibility^^. The topic of habit was important because habit defined and constrained 
possibility. The “veteran soldier” can attest to the power of habit to fashion “...a man 
completely over again...” so as to reorganize “...the possibilities of bis conduct” (1.120). 
He also wondered at bow “trained domestic animals seem to be machines almost pure 
and simple, undoubtingly, unhesitatingly doing from minute to minute the duties they 
have been taught, and giving no sign that the possibility of an alternative ever suggests 
itself to their mind” (1.119-120). The fact that James thought ‘alternatives’ were 
important for volition is telling. In Edwards and Ames, acting “undoubtingly, 
unhesitatingly” and without awareness of possibilities was an expression of will. Indeed, 
when the course taken is virtuous, Edwards argued, there is less likelihood of considering 
options. Edwards argued that God’s character, which never considers evil as an 
alternative, is an obvious example that acts of will do not require alternatives. Yet, for 
James, true to his Anninian impulses, volitions have to do with choices among 
alternatives. Will is the center of exertion and effort.
Given that habit limits decisions among alternatives, James siuprisingly saw habit 
in positive light as “...the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent.” The limitation of possibility could thus serve society. Habit maintains order in 
society, and “...saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor.” 
Habit keeps those engaged in “...the hardest and most repulsive walks of life...” from 
leaving their difficult stations in life. It keeps potential enemies from mobilizing hostile 
efforts. It prevents “...different social strata from mixing.” In short, “it dooms us all to 
fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice...” Although it 
may seem that James was arguing that habit was negative in this sense, and he
'^'See his essay, “The Dilemma o f Determinism,” for example.
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undoubtedly did feel for those who had inherited the worst lots in life, he still 
acknowledged that this conservative function of habit was a positive thing; “On the 
whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the 
age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again.” On the other 
hand, this somewhat stark portrait must have also served to frighten his students, and 
make them more attentive listeners to the moral exhortations which would follow. If we 
place James within the tradition of American pietism, we can see links between this 
strategy and the structure of the revivalistic sermon, which vividly portrayed the pains of 
hell before the good news of redemption was preached. The only difference is that the 
gospel could be preached to all. Given the constraints of neurology, however, James’s 
gospel could only be preached to the young.
Expanding the stark portrait, James linked the setting of the character to the loss 
of plasticity, and vividly described the immutability of habit after plasticity is lost. It 
therefore becomes clear that James’s previous discussions about plasticity do not apply to 
all. The “plastic state” lasts only into early adulthood. After that the person’s character 
is set, and chances of changing are minimal. Before the final setting of the character “by 
the age of thirty,” the “professional mannerism[s]” are locked in by twenty-five. These 
professional habits are utterly inflexible: “...the man can by-and-by no more escape than 
his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds” (1.121). Here again James 
opposes character and will, an Arminian move. If one is to use more appropriate 
theological terms, James actually outlines a more “Pelagian” notion of salvation here: 
character is not in any way a gift, but is rather earned through effort and willpower.
Before the age of twenty, the personal habits are fixed, “such as vocalization and
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pronunciation, gesture, motion, and address” (1.122). Even if a young adult has the good 
luck to be “transferred [into]...the society of his betters,” he will be unable to actually 
“...unlearn the nasality and other vices of speech bred in him by the associations of his 
growing years....” By implication, this young adult would never fit in. Habit thus serves 
as “an invisible law, as strong as gravitation,” which keeps the person “...within his orbit, 
arrayed this year as he was the last...” (1.122). Habit was a limiting factor, decreasing 
the possibility for self-determined and noncontingent action. A constraint of the freedom 
of the Arminian will.
James’s students thereby firmly seated on a physiological anxious bench, James 
articulated his doctrine; “The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous 
system our ally instead o f our enemy” (1.122). Past behavior determines future 
possibilities. Store up useful actions. Avoid harmful ones. “It is to fund and capitalize 
our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund” (1.122). “For this we must 
make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and 
guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we 
should guard against the plague” (1.122). James is, then, arguing for the moral usefulness 
of automatism: “The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the 
effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for 
their own proper work” (1.122). By implication, opposed to the “effortless” nature of 
habit, volition is always effortful.
Like Upham, James expressed concern with indecisiveness. Indecision may be a 
habit. “There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual 
but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the
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time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are 
subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the 
deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically not 
to exist for his consciousness at all” (1.122). He therefore directly exhorts his readers.
“If there be such daily duties not yet ingrained in any one of my readers, let him begin 
this very hour to set the matter right” (1.122).
Although the preceding seemed a bit hopeless for those over thirty-five, he does 
seem to leave a way out...but it is a very difficult road. To this end, James outlines four 
moral precepts or maxims which could be interpreted as applying not only to those still in 
the plastic state, but all people. Still, this is not certain. It is clear, however, that each of 
these maxims have to do with the Arminianized will. If one desires to form good habits, 
one must go through the means of the will. “In Professor Bain’s chapter on ‘The Moral 
Habits’ there are some admirable practical remarks laid down. Two great maxims emerge 
from his treatment. The first is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of 
an old one, we must take care to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative 
as possible.” (1.122-123). Effortful choice among alternatives, the essence of Arminian 
will, was crucial.
Still, James didn’t think we could rely on naked will power. A proper 
environment is important: “accumulate all the possible circumstances which shall re­
enforce the right motives; put yourself assiduously in conditions that encourage the new 
way; make engagements incompatible with the old; take a public pledge, if the case 
allows...” (I.I23). Yet, at base will power needs to be employed, and environmental 
considerations are meant to support the “resolution” made by the will. Environmental
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manipulations add “momentum” to the resolution of the will, and prevent the reforming 
person from breaking down in the face of “temptation.” Although the possibility of 
“breakdown” in the face of temptation is strong, James thought that such breakdowns 
could be postponed, which added “...to the chances of [the breakdown] not occurring at 
all” (1.123).
James increased the anxiety as he described the “second maxim,” which was: 
“Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life." 
Although a person may engage in long periods of moral striving, “each lapse is like the 
letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single slip undoes more 
than a great many turns will wind again.” As he was wont to do, James linked this 
principle to the nervous system, arguing that “continuity of training is the great means of 
making the nervous svstem act infallibly right” (1.123). To substantiate this scientific- 
soimding claim, he approvingly quoted Bain, whose admonitions seem to recapitulate the 
classic distinction between the sinful human nature and the spirit that had been standard 
fare for American Protestants for over two hundred years. Yet, the emphasis on the 
importance of effort to overcome the rivalry had been characteristic of the Arminian 
impulse:
The peculiarity of the moral habits, contradistinguishing them from the 
intellectual acquisitions, is the presence of two hostile powers, one to be gradually 
raised into the ascendant over the other. It is necessary, above all things, in such a 
situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on the wrong side undoes the effect of 
many conquests on the right. The essential precaution, therefore, is so to regulate 
the two opposing powers that the one may have a series of uninterrupted
564
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
successes, until repetition has fortified it to sueh a degree as to enable it to cope 
with the opposition, under any eircumstances. This is the theoretically best career 
of mental progress. (1.123)
Given the unforgiving nature of our physiology, James eoncluded that “the need of 
securing success at the outset is imperative. Failure at first is apt to dampen the energy of 
all future attempts, whereas past experience of sueeess nerves one to future vigor”
(1.123).
The unpitying realities of habit formation led James to diseourage the gradual 
abandonment of bad habits. Although “tapering-off’ is appropriate in certain situations, 
the best approach is, “in the main...that abrupt acquisition of the new habit is the best 
way, i f  there be a real possibility o f carrying it ou t” Although it is important to keep the 
limits of will-power in mind so as “...not to give the will so stiff a task as to insure its 
defeat at the very outset,” it was better by far to endure a “a sharp period of suffering,” 
than to prolong the life the of bad habit by eontinuing to engage in the undesired act. 
James encouraged his students to give it a try: “It is surprising how soon a desire will die 
of inanition if it be never fed” (1.124).
hr addition to Bain’s wisdom, James added two additional maxims. James 
believed that human beings were liable to experienee morally decisive moments in which 
a would-be reformer has opportunity to reform, if he or she complies with the graee given 
in the moment. The argument is similar to the Methodist idea of prevenient grace, that 
God by virtue of the universality of Christ’s atonement gave graee to all people which 
then enabled the sinner to turn to God in faith. As we have seen, Upham offered a 
modified understanding of this doctrine, and James offers what may be called a
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naturalistic doctrine of prevenient grace.
James’s third maxim, then, was to ‘‘'Seize the very first possible opportunity to act 
on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in 
the direction o f the habits you aspire to gain’ (1.123). Reealling his discussion of the 
physiology of hahit formation, he reminded his students that “it is not in the moment of 
their [i.e., the habit’s] forming, but in the moment of their producing motor effects, that 
resolves and aspirations communicate the new ‘set’ to the brain” (1.124).
Recapitulating the familiar American pietistic refrain against mere head 
knowledge, James warned that habit formation did not necessarily follow having a 
“...full...reservoir of maxims... ” Following the teaching of mental philosophers such as 
Upham, James insisted that virtuous acts of will would not follow upon the mere 
possession of pious sentiment. Rather, in order to reform the “character,” one must take 
advantage of “...every concrete opportunity to act... ” These opportunities take the form 
of “...a resolve or a fine glow of feeling...” (1.125) which tend toward the desired 
outcome. In his chapter on the will, James alludes to other similar occasions of 
naturalized prevenient grace.
James forcefully condemned those who did not take advantage of such 
opportunities. When opportunities are allowed to pass by “...without bearing practical 
fhiit...” the individual is actually worse off than before. The failure to comply with the 
benevolent propensity “...works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions 
from taking the normal path of discharge” (1.125). Indeed, neglect of particular moral 
impulses leads to general moral dissipation (1.126). Further, such neglect of opportunity 
leads to a “...contemptible type of human character...” which James called “...the
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nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer...” This person “...spends his life in a weltering sea 
of sensibility and emotion, but...never does a manly concrete deed.” Practically speaking, 
James warned against “the hahit of excessive novel-reading and theatre-going...” which 
frequently produce sentiment without action. If unchecked, this hahit could result in 
moral “monsters” (1.125). The harshness and self-righteousness of Arminian morality is 
evident once again in this passage.
Since it is only the person who responds to virtuous impulses that becomes 
virtuous, James encouraged his students to actively express each impulse. Even if  the 
impulse is to a minor good, such as “...speaking genially to one’s aunt, or giving up one’s 
seat in a horse-car...” the action must take place if a moral character is to be formed 
(1.126).
The fourth maxim is related to the third. Just as neglect of virtuous impulse tends 
to worsen the character, so too a neglect of opportunity to exercise moral effort 
diminishes the strength of future effort. “...If we often flinch from making an effort, 
before we know it the effort-making capacity will be gone...” Similarly, “...if we suffer 
the wandering of our attention, presently it will wander all the time.” The concepts of 
effort and attention were crucial aspect of James’s psychology of volition, and he 
expands on these concepts in other chapters, particularly his chapters on attention and 
will. The fourth maxim, then, is to ‘‘'Keep the faculty o f effort alive in you by a little 
gratuitous exercise every d a / ’ (1.126):
That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every 
day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, so 
that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not urmerved and
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untrained to stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a 
man pays on his house and goods. The tax does him no good at the time, and 
possibly may never bring him a return. But if the fire does come, his having paid 
it will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has daily inured himself to 
habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary 
things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when 
his softer fellow-mortals are wirmowed like chaff in the blast. (1.126-127)
James thus concluded his biologizing of ethics with the assertion that “the physiological 
study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful ally of hortatory ethics” (1.127).
The bleak picture he painted at the beginning of the chapter was no mistake: the 
dismal effects of poorly formed habits are equivalent to hell on earth. “The hell to be 
endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for 
ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way” (1.127).
Given the realities of plasticity, James thought his insights into habit formation 
were particularly relevant to his students. “Could the young but realize how soon they 
will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct 
while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be 
undone” (1.127).
Unlike the revivalistic sermons of American pietism, James did not offer hope for 
those who had lived shamefully. Grace may be found in heaven, but there is no mercy in 
biology. The nervous system records every infraction, and, over time, becomes 
increasingly unwilling to forgive:
Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar. The
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drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson’s play, excuses himself for every fresh 
dereliction by sajdng, ‘I won’t count this time!’ Well! he may not count it, and a 
kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. Down among 
his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it 
up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, 
in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. (1.127)
But hope still remained for the young, and James chose to close his chapter on 
habit on a positive note. Just as morally contemptible habits are formed through 
successive poor choices, so too are virtuous habits formed through moral constancy. 
Therefore, James encouraged his young readers, “let no youth have any anxiety...,” for as 
long as they “...keep faithfully busy each hour of the working-day, [they] may safely 
leave the final result to itself’ (1.127).
The Automaton Theory and the Efficiencv of Consciousness 
In chapter V of The Principles of Psvchologv, James turned his attention to yet 
another threat to human efficiency: the so-called “automaton-theory.” Here, as was the 
case in his chapter on the functions of the brain, it is not as clear that James is defending a 
particularly “Arminian” will, although he does at one point lean in that direction. Since 
the automaton-theory challenged the causal efficacy of consciousness, a postulate that 
both Calvinists and Arminians had embraced, James’s refutation maybe seen as a 
defense of the entire indigenous tradition.
Earlier in the Principles. James had apologized in a footnote for mixing mental 
and physiological language. Although this mixing was quite intentional, James was still 
concerned that certain “racially physical” readers would criticize him for his
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anachronistic inconsistency. “I hope that the reader will take no umbrage at my so 
mixing the physical and mental, and talking of reflex acts and hemispheres and 
reminiscences in the same breath, as if they were homogeneous quantities and factors of 
one causal chain.” James agreed that there was a eertain parsimony in speaking of 
physiological events only (i.e., ignoring mental events), but thought that such an 
undertaking would be “an unreal abstraction,” since it appears that mental events may 
aetually “guide” physical events. James then promised to offer in another chapter 
“...reasons for not abandoning this common-sense position” (1.24).
In his chapter on the automaton theory, James kept his promise to address the 
concerns of his more radical readers. If we take the materialistic approach and limiting 
our view to the nervous system, we suppose that the brain is an extraordinarily complex 
machine, and that there are physiological events corresponding precisely to each mental 
event. It is unimaginable to the materialist that this could not actually be the case. 
However, this way of thinking, James argued,/orceJ the radical physiologist to take 
another, more radical step: to assume that reference to mental events is superfluous. 
Utilizing the “principle of continuity” the radical physiologist may thus argue: “The 
conception of reflex action is surely one of the best conquests of physiological theory; 
why not be radical with it? Why not say that just as the spinal cord is a machine with few 
reflexes, so the hemispheres are a machine with many, and that that is all the difference?” 
(1.129).
James challenged this way of thinking on functional grounds. What possible use 
would consciousness have in this scheme? It would certainly have no mechanical 
function, for all activity would take place at the physiological level. Consciousness in
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this respect would be reduced to a bystander or an “inert spectator,” incapable of 
contributing anything to the process. It would, correspondingly, be impossible to speak 
of purposes or “considerations” guiding the behavior of the animal. To be consistent, the 
radical physiologist would need to employ strictly physiological language to describe 
animal behavior: “We ought to have said ‘paths left in the hemispherical cortex by former 
currents,’ and nothing more.”
James was convinced that contemporary readers did not fully understand the 
implications of such a radical viewpoint. In order to help bis readers, be actually 
attempted to express the theory in as compelling a way as possible before be articulated 
bis refutation. As be often did throughout the Principles. James plays historian to bring 
bis student up to date. It was Descartes who was first “...bold enough to conceive of a 
completely self-sufficing nervous mechanism which should be able to perform 
complicated and apparently intelligent acts.” But Descartes imposed an “arbitrary” 
distinction between humans and animals such that animals could be understood as pure 
machinery without consciousness, but that “...the higher acts of man were the result of the 
agency of his rational soul” (1.130). One of the implications of Descartes’ theory is that 
“...the nervous system per se might work the work of intelligence...” Although it took 
over two hundred years for this possibility to take hold, the rise of the notion of reflex 
action made the radical idea plausible in James’s time. The radicalism started in 1870 
with Hodgson’s “decisive step,” which was to deny the “causal efficacy” of the feelings. 
Other radical theoreticians followed. Two of these radical thinkers figured prominently 
in James’s mind. The quotes that James includes in his text show that the challenge to 
efficacy of consciousness was above all a challenge to the notion of will itself. First,
571
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
James quoted Huxley:
The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their 
body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely 
without any power of modifying that working as the steam-wbistle which 
accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence on its 
machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical 
changes, not a cause of such changes....The soul stands related to the body as the 
bell of a clock to the works, and consciousness answers to the sound which the 
bell gives out when it is struck... Thus far I have strictly confined myself to the 
automatism of brutes....It is quite true that, to the best of my judgment, the 
argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and, therefore, 
that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by 
molecular changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, 
there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the 
motion of the matter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows 
that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes 
which take place automatically in the organism; and that, to take an extreme 
illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the 
symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are 
conscious automata. (1.131, underlines added)
James then quoted Clifford:
All the evidence that we have goes to show that the physical world gets along 
entirely by itself, according to practically universal rules.. . .  The train of physical
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facts between the stimulus sent into the eye, or to any one of our senses, and the 
exertion which follows it, and the train of physical facts which goes on in the 
brain, even when there is no stimulus and no exertion, - these are perfectly 
complete physical trains, and every step is fully accounted for by mechanical 
conditions. . . .  The two things are on utterly different platforms - the physical 
facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves. There 
is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference of one with the other. 
Again, if  anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, 
but it is nonsense. Such an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the 
savage. The only thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding 
matter or the motion of surrounding m atter.. . .  The assertion that another man’s 
volition, a feeling in his consciousness that I cannot perceive, is part of the train 
of physical facts which I may perceive, - this is neither true non untrue, but 
nonsense; it is a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go 
together.. . .  Sometimes one series is known better, and sometimes the other; so 
that in telling a story we speak sometimes of mental and sometimes of material 
facts. A feeling of chill made a man run; strictly speaking, the nervous 
disturbance which coexisted with that feeling of chill made him run, if  we want to 
talk about material facts; or the feeling of chill produced the form of sub- 
consciousness which coexists with the motion of legs, if we want to talk about 
mental facts.. .  .When, therefore, we ask: ‘What is the physical link between the 
ingoing message from chilled skin and the outgoing message which moves the 
leg?’ and the answer is, ‘A man’s will.’ we have as much right to be amused as if
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we had asked our friend with the picture what pigment was used in painting the 
cannon in the foreground, and received the answer, ‘Wrought iron.’ It will be 
found excellent practice in the mental operations required by this doctrine to 
imagine a train, the fore part of which is an engine and three carriages linked with 
iron couplings, and the hind part three other carriages linked with iron couplings; 
the bond between the two parts being made up out of the sentiments of amity 
subsisting between the stoker and the guard.” (1.131-132, underlines added) 
Huxley argued that consciousness is cased by physiological events, and that the 
feeling of volition is simply one state of consciousness. Huxley goes out of his way to 
challenge the authenticity of the feeling of conscious will. Clifford likewise argues that 
the physical world is self-contained and the mental world is self-contained. The two 
worlds cannot influence each other. To ask if the will causes a physical event to happen 
is nonsense. Either way, by reducing volition to an effect of the nervous system, or by 
separating volition from psychical events through a strict parallelism, is to make the will 
as understood by James irrelevant. Since in both arguments consciousness simply “run[s] 
alongside” (1.133) brain physiology James saw these two quotes as enunciating the same 
“dogma,” which he found the doctrine incredible, particularly when applied to “...the 
most complicated examples.” For example, did the automaton theorists really believe 
that Shakespeare’s mind had nothing to do with the way “...his hand came to trace on 
certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which we for shortness’ sake call 
the manuscript of Hamlet”? (1.132).
Another implication of the belief that consciousness was a by-product of the brain 
was that feelings cannot cause each other. Instead each successive feeling, which
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“common sense” perceives to be causally related to each other, is simply a result of 
successive changes in physiology alone. James’s recourse to common sense, of course, 
represents another continuity with the indigenous tradition.
James noted that a main reason for believing in the “conscious automaton-theory” 
was based upon an argument from continuity. For example, these theorists would take 
the frog’s spinal cord as the starting point, noting how the organism can produce 
intelligent action while unconscious. Then, by continuity, the automaton theorists would 
say that an organism with hemispheres likewise acts intelligently without consciousness. 
But this reasoning was a double-edged sword, for an “...exact counter-argument from 
continuity...” could be made, that just as organisms with hemispheres act intelligently 
because of consciousness, so too the intelligence of spinal cord-related activity must 
involve some small degree of consciousness. Since, “all arguments from continuity work 
in two ways,” James argued that belief in either theory depends upon a kind of faith, 
which is, at base, an aesthetic need. The simplicity of a purely materialistic or 
spiritualistic hypothesis meets this need. Yet, James thought that the reality of the 
situation was messier and more difficult to understand (1.134).
More than an aesthetic need was at stake however. James acknowledged that we 
simply cannot understand how a “volition or other thought” might actually influence the 
nervous system. Given this difficulty, the strong temptation was simply to turn 
consciousness into a superfluity. Although “one may bow her out politely, [and] allow 
her to remain as a ‘concomitant,’“ yet one still “...insists that matter shall hold all the 
power.”
Given James’s predilection for mystery, it is not surprising that he approvingly
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quoted Charles Mercier, who argued that mind and brain not only occur together, but 
influence one another; “but why the two occur together, or what the link is which 
connects them, we do not know, and most authorities believe that we never shall and 
never can know” (1.136. Italics mine). Given the close connection between mind and 
brain, James thought it “...quite inconceivable that consciousness should have nothing to 
do with a business which it so faithfully attends” (1.136).
James further believed that psychology had a “plain duty” to consider 
consciousness as a causally efficacious phenomenon. It was wrong-headed and one-sided 
for the automaton-theorists to argue that the causal connection between consciousness 
and neurology is unintelligible because this neglects the philosophical achievement of 
Hume and others who had shown that material causation is ultimately inexplicable as 
well. So, for the reductionists “...to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject only” 
(1.137), is to be irresponsibly arbitrary. One must reject causality entirely, or be naive to 
both kinds of causes. To take a one-sided position was to take a metaphysical position, 
which was out-of-bounds for a science of psychology, which, like physics, must take a 
philosophically naive viewpoint. Given that “common-sense” and introspection testifies 
to the causal efficacy of mental states, [and given that introspection is the pre-eminent 
psychological method] psychology must therefore study states of consciousness.
Like the mental philosophers before him, James appeared to be blind to the degree 
to which his consciousness was shaped by his religious background. He took it as a 
given that consciousness, including volition, matters. This undoubtedly still seems a 
reasonable assumption for most people. But it is clear that another kind of consciousness 
was emerging on the world scene which was learning to see its conscious states as mere
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epiphenomenon. And James’s arguments could do nothing to hold this emerging 
subjectivity from holding sway. James prophesied that “it is probable that for years to 
come we shall have to infer what happens in the brain either from our feelings or from 
motor effects which we observe” (1.137-138). Probable, that is, if  the need for parsimony 
and the aversion to mystery did not take over American psychology.
James summarized his position thus: “my conclusion is that to urge the 
automaton-theory upon us, as it is now urged, on purely a priori and ^wa^'z-metaphysical 
grounds, is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state o f psychology’'’ (1.138).
James also offered positive reasons for believing in the causal efficacy of 
consciousness. Specifically, “the particulars o f the distribution o f  consciousness, so far 
as we know ihem, point to its being efficacious" (1.138). James’s main argument was a 
Darwinistic account of the need for consciousness. It was universally assumed that some 
animals have a greater degree of consciousness. James compares the oyster to the human 
as an example. In Darwinistic terms, consciousness must offer some advantage to those 
so endued. Fmther, one can assume that this advantage must make up for some lack in 
the other equipment that a given animal possesses. If one knows the weaknesses of a 
given animal, then one may inductively determine what kind of equipment may make up 
for the lack.
In order to understand the “defects” of the neural equipment given to animals with 
highly developed consciousness, James referred his readers back to his chapter on brain 
structure and function. It may be recalled that James argued that the main difference 
between a decorticate and whole frog was the indeterminacy of its behavior when fully 
functioning. When reduced to a spinal cord, the responses of the frog were highly
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predictable, but the responses become much less predictable when the hemispheres of the 
frog were left intact. This indeterminacy is increased in more complex animals, i.e., 
animals with larger hemispheres. James thought that consciousness was “added” so that 
the complexity and indeterminacy of this evolved neural machinery would he put to the 
greatest advantage. But, if this neural machinery is considered abstractly, i.e., without 
the directing force of its concomitant consciousness, the behavior of an animal with well- 
developed hemispheres must be unstable, even random. “The brain is an instrument of 
possibilities, but of no certainties” (1.141). Surely, James thought, mere possibility of 
survival is not enough; unstable behavior does not facilitate survival. When 
consciousness is added to the mix, however, the complex neural machinery is put to best 
use because consciousness by its very nature seeks its own preservation: “Every actually 
existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter fo r  ends” (1.141). And 
this is the great difference between consciousness and mere machinery. Machinery 
cannot pursue or desire ends. Machinery is hy nature indifferent to its own survival. So, 
although James admitted to not knowing how consciousness and brain worked together, 
he was quite certain that it had an indispensable use for the survival of the animal.
To this rather involved argument, James added several other simpler arguments. 
He noted the link between certain “nerve proeesses” and consciousness. Consciousness 
is nearly absent during habitual action, i.e., in situations that require little effort or 
attention. But, when many possibilities are presented to the animal, and “...nerve- 
processes are hesitant,” the proper choice is not clear to the animal so consciousness 
intervenes, guiding the animal through the difficult situation.
James had commented on the restitution of function in chapter 11, the process
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whereby the loss of function due to cortical injury is restored eventually. One theory to 
explain this restoration was the vicarious theory, which held that the remaining, non­
injured parts of the brain eventually picked up the slack, so to speak, and performed the 
task that had been assigned to the damaged part of the brain. James, in what seems to be 
his weakest argument on this topic, appears to have argued that consciousness may have 
something to do with this restitution. He notes that a broken machine will not fix itself. 
The teleological character of consciousness may actually “...exert an efficient pressure...” 
in the restoration process.
Finally, James noted that ''...pleasures are generally associated with beneficial, 
pains with detrimental, experiences’" (1.143). “Starvation, suffocation, privation of food,” 
etc. are associated with pain, while “...filling the hungry stomach, enjoying rest and sleep 
after fatigue, exercise after rest...” are felt as pleasurable. James thought that these 
conscious states must have had causal efficacy. “But if  pleasures and pains have no 
efficacy, one does not see...why the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give 
thrills of delight, and the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony.”
James concluded this chapter by saying that the evidence was clearly in favor of 
the usefulness of consciousness, and that the usefulness of consciousness must be by way 
of its causal efficacy. Therefore, “...the automaton-theory must succumb to the theory of 
commonsense.” But it is noteworthy how significantly the great American tradition of 
commonsense reasoning had evolved in James. James, like the American mental 
philosophers before him, thought that the causal efficacy of consciousness was clear.
Yet, by employing a Darwinistic rationalization, James moved further away from the 
rationalizations that had sustained the topic of will per se, and offered no compelling
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reason to consider the topic valid. This subtle transformation is home out in the way the 
word ‘volition’ was used in this chapter. When speaking of human consciousness, e.g., 
in the quotes by Huxley and Clifford, volition was clearly at stake, and the term was 
utilized. But, when James shifted to speak of the adaptive nature of consciousness, he 
clearly no longer needed to speak of human beings. The question that was not answered 
in James’s refutation of the automaton theory, then, is: Although it is clear that 
consciousness is a necessary part of human and animal experience, is there any reason to 
believe that “the will” is a necessary part of consciousness?
Clearly, James arguments were not sufficient to keep Huxley et a/.’s sentiment 
from dominating American psychology. And, with the advent of behaviorism, all 
consciousness would be removed from psychology’s purview, including volition. But, 
given James’s argument for consciousness, there would be no reason that will should be 
included in any future revival of interest in the topic of consciousness.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter sought to affirm that James was indeed justifying or at least 
providing the groundwork for the “Arminian impulse” by confronting, as George 
Trumbull Ladd once put it, “ all that modem materialism has to offer” (Mills, 1969, p. 
100) and emerging victorious. This chapter dealt with chapters I-V of Principles of 
Psvchologv, which, in tum, dealt with physiology. These chapters in the Principles were 
consequential from vantage point of the loss of will because the very efficiency of 
consciousness was being called into question by some leading European thinkers. James 
faced this challenge squarely.
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James criticized leading contemporary approaches to psychology for failing to 
take physiology into account. Certainly this critique applied to Thomas Upham, who 
made only passing mention of physiology in his text, and seemed determined to show 
that it did not really matter much for the psychologist. Such a critique is, of course, a hit 
presentist, hut the fact that James was breaking new ground on the American scene 
cannot be denied. Yet, since both Upham and James had the “Arminian impulse,” the 
goals of the two psychologies were not, after all, that different. Even at this early stage in 
Principles, James argues that the employment of physiology does not mean the 
eradication of purposive choice from the rmiverse.
In his long chapter on the functions of the brain (chapter II), James argued that 
brain physiology, far from implying that human beings are mere machines, shows that 
purpose and consciousness are intimately linked. In the third chapter of Principles. James 
dealt with reaction time experiments that purportedly dealt with voluntary processes. 
James argued that these experiments reduced voluntary exercises to reflexes: a position 
imacceptable to a secular “Arminian” like William James. He therefore offered an 
extended analysis of the Wundtian methods to show that they indeed do not measure 
what they say they do.
James’s chapter on habit also reveals the Arminian side of his psychology. Habits 
are part of the “character” of the person, and have a physiological basis. A person 
remains in the “plastic state” (in which the underlying physiological substrate of action is 
pliable) only until young adulthood. When this plasticity is lost, the character hardens. 
Given these physiological and moral realities, James passionately exhorted his readers to 
engage in effortful habit formation and encouraged youth to use their wills to shape good
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character while they can. The imagery is sometimes threatening. In this chapter, then, 
James does not deny that physiological characteristics imply a loss of will, hut he offers 
ways that will may use these physiological constraints to the advantage of the person. 
Yet, implied throughout is an Arminian definition of will: effortful choice among 
altematives. Habit and will are entirely different things. In the older conception 
espoused by Ames and Edwards, hy contrast, will was a broad concept that would have 
included habit/character.
James chapter on the automaton theory (chapter V) challenged the European 
theory that consciousness is useless, possessing no causal efficacy. For an “Arminian” 
psychologist such as James, who relied on great exertions of the will to effect meaningful 
moral change, such a conception could not be left unchallenged. His refutation included 
accusing the automaton theorists of being arbitrary in their insistence that only material 
causes can be known.
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CHAPTER XI
“ALL THAT THE.. .ADVOCATE OF FREE WILL NEED DEMAND”
It was not until dispensing with “the physiological preliminaries of our subject...” 
that James felt ready to move on to study “the mental states themselves” (1.183). Yet, 
just as James’s forays into physiology were performed with the intent of carving out 
some space for human efficiency, so too James’s study of mental life preserves and 
protects a space, a small space, for that precious but elusive “Arminian” idol, a non­
derived, uncaused efficiency. As James moves through the concepts of the stream of 
thought (chapter IX), the self (chapter X), attention (chapter XI), association (chapter 
XIV), and belief (chapter XXI), he consistently finds a place for libertarian freedom in 
the otherwise overwhelmingly determined territory called the human mind.
The Methods and Snares of Psychologv 
It is perhaps surprising that James did not begin to address mentality until the 
seventh chapter of The Principles of Psychology. A natural question to ask would be. 
Why did he wait? As 1 have argued above, one reason may have been the concern that 
physiology was impinging upon human freedom, and the need to find freedom within the 
constraints of physiology. Another reason was James’s acknowledgement that 
physiology really does define the “cerebral conditions and concomitants” of 
consciousness. Yet another reason, it is possible that there was a rhetorical advantage to 
delaying the detailed study of consciousness. It helped to establish the newness of the 
New Psychology. Finally, it was consistent with his goal of making psychology a natural
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science, free from metaphysical concerns.
Describing psychology as a natural science, James immediately excluded the 
ontologically grounded psychology of a William Ames, who began his Marrow with a 
careful examination of the mind of God, in terms of his will and counsel. The 
psychologist “has nothing to do” with “...absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a 
particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time...” Rather, the kinds of minds 
that a scientific psychology must limit itself to are the minds of “...distinct individuals 
inhabiting definite portions of a real space and of a real time” (1.183). James did not 
reject the other kind of study, but, adopting his typical irenical tone, limited the domain 
of psychology to the empirical observable realm (including consciousness in that 
observable realm). Just as non-denominational irenicism is a crucial aspect of the 
American mental philosophy tradition, James’s philosophically noncommittal stance 
represents a further continuity with the indigenous tradition. Instead of mediating 
differences between Christian denominations like Upham, James was mediating 
differences between schools of philosophy.
The psychologist considers all minds as objects, including his own.
Consciousness is object when the psychologist “reflects on his own conscious states,” 
and when he considers the conscious states of others. James further distinguished the 
role of the psychologist as natural scientist from that of the philosopher. Unlike Upham, 
who was concerned with epistemological issues (particularly in volume 1 of Mental 
Philosophy), James said that the psychologist simply assumes that knowledge is possible, 
and so avoids the perplexing issues of epistemology (which demonstrates Guelzo’s 
[1989] contention that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American preoccupation
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with skepticism was misplaced. The real threat on the horizon was materialism, the very 
materialism that James was grappling with).
Four things constitute “...the irreducible data of psychology.” The first is the 
psychologist. The second, third, and fourth things are the “total object” of the 
psychologist: the thought studied, the thought’s object, and the psychologist’s reality. As 
such, the psychologist is not troubled with “...the puzzle of how he can report [mental 
phenomena] at all” (1.184). The assumption that thought always has an object had, of 
course, been a central aspect of psychological thought in America since the time of 
Ames. Yet, as I will develop more fully later, the most crucial shift that we find in this 
psychological thinking is a movement away from the Object of faith to the multiplicity of 
objects that capture the attention of consciousness on a moment-to-moment basis. This 
shift from Object to objects is related both to the phenomenon of pluralism and to the 
ultimate loss of will in American psychology. The exclusive focus on a particular object 
of faith, such as the efficient God of William Ames was not possible as American 
colleges became more denominationally diverse. Rather than focusing attention on how 
the mind perceives and reacts to the Object, then, the focus shifted to non-controversial 
objects. As will become more clear below, this difficulty in “naming the object” of 
volition may have been one of the factors leading to the loss of will in American 
psychology.
This transformation was relevant to the loss of will in American psychology. Just 
as the notion of a faculty of will arose in Augustine’s thought vis-a-vis the Christian God 
and the origin of evil, so too was the concept sustained in American colleges vis-a-vis 
some permutation of Protestant thought. The notion of will, in other words, had required
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some Object of ultimate choice, some object which made a demarcation between good 
and bad decision. Without this demarcation, it becomes difficult to distinguish will from 
simple desire.
Methods of Investigation
James’s discussion of “the methods of investigation” contains clues as to why this 
chapter was placed so far into the book. Contiguous with the indigenous mental 
philosophy tradition^^, James believed that ^"Introspective Observation is what we have to 
rely on first and foremost and always’^  (I. 185). Introspection is simply “...the looking 
into our own minds and reporting what we there discover.” The fact that one discovers 
“states of consciousness” through introspection was to James one of the only truths that 
remained beyond doubt in an age that had learned to question almost everything else.
All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves thinking, and that they 
distinguish the mental state as an inward activity or passion, from all the objects 
with which it may cognitively deal. I  regard this belief as the most fundamental o f  
all the postulates o f Psychology... (1.185)
James addressed the “question of nomenclature,” i.e., the decision concerning 
what words to use in describing mental states. His discussion is also relevant to the loss 
of will in American psychology. His goal was to utilize “some general term... to 
designate all states of consciousness merely as such, and apart from their particular 
quality or cognitive function.” All terminology is imperfect, however, and inevitably
^^Introspective analysis was not limited to the American scene, o f  course. As James noted, “The English 
writers on psychology, and the school o f Herbart in Germany, have in the main contented themselves with 
such results as the immediate introspection o f single individuals gave, and shown what a body o f doctrine 
they may make. The works o f Locke, Hume, Reid, Hartley, Stewart Brown, the Mills, will always be 
classics in this line ; and in Professor Brain's Treatises we have probably the last word o f what this method 
taken mainly by itself can do.” This is a good example o f  how acknowledging continuity with the 
American tradition does not imply that the American tradition always had a causal relation to the New  
Psychology.
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some people will object to the terminology chosen. The choice of terminology should he 
as “impartial” as possible, and certain terms actually “implicitly assert theories.” This 
too, 1 think, is a crucial insight for understanding the loss of will in American 
psychology. Historically, the term “will,” as utilized in American college textbooks, had 
implicitly asserted a theory, i.e., some form of Protestant theology. The use of the term 
“will” by the New Psychology was in this sense uncritical, failing to inquire what 
assumptions the construct had required. This is an issue that has, of course, arisen 
throughout the dissertation.
Additionally, James argued that the general term used to apply to consciousness 
in general should also he able to incorporate bodily sensation. Due to the fact that 
‘colder’ words such as “thought” do not adequately convey such sensation (“can the 
expression ‘thought of a toothache’ ever suggest to the reader the actual present pain 
itself? It is hardly possible;” 1.186), James thought that a “pair of terms” is probably best 
to satisfactorily encompass the mental content of consciousness. James preferred to use 
the terms thought and feeling. “The mind’s relations to other objects than the brain are 
cognitive and emotional relations exclusively, so far as we know. It knows them, and it 
inwardly welcomes or rejects them, but it has no other dealings with them” (1.216). He 
went on to explain that, “the mental states usually distinguished as feelings are the 
emotions, and the sensations we get from skin, muscle, viscus, eye, ear, nose, and palate. 
The ‘thoughts,’ as recognized in popular parlance, are the conceptions, and Judgments” (I. 
222). James was, I think, consistent in his introspective musings with this general 
assertion. His distinction, for example, between mere thought and belief reflected this. 
Belief was, as we might call it today “hot cognition,” i.e., affect-infused thought (e.g..
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Forgas, 1995).
More importantly, this affirmation of a pair of terms would imply that James in 
some sense affirmed the traditional dichotomization of faculties that dominated American 
thought until the nineteenth century. James did, of course, criticize faculty psychology, 
but this criticism, focusing on the problems of reification and self-determination (Kosits, 
2002c), did not apply to the way the term was used by Ames and Edwards, who used the 
terms intellect and will to describe different functions of the soul rather than different 
reified beings. James’s “Arminianism,” however, may have lead him to recapitulate the 
very fallacy that he repudiated, as we will see in the discussion of James’s chapter on the 
will. Yet this tension is evident in his thinking about will. As we shall see throughout 
this chapter, James sometimes speaks of will in a broader, more Edwardsean sense, as the 
inclining and preferring aspect of consciousness, while, at other times, speaks in a more 
“Arminian” sense, presenting will as effortful choice among alternatives.
James was well aware of the bias involved with the introspective method. James 
tried to steer a middle path between those who would deny that introspective knowledge 
of the mind is impossible and those who claimed that introspective knowledge is 
infallible. Following John Mill, James thought that mental events were knowable 
through memory, even if they are not directly observable. His conclusion was that 
although ‘'...introspection is difficult and fallible... ”, that difficulty is not limited to 
introspective analysis, but “all observation” (1.191).
It is evident throughout the Principles that James also affirmed the experimental 
method. As is well known, James was a bit ambivalent about the experimental approach 
to psychology, and, as we shall see below, doubted its ability to access higher-level
588
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cognitive functions like volition (see comments on chapter 3). James explained the 
experimental aspect of psychology to his readers thus: “Within a few years what one may 
call a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by experimental 
methods, asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their 
uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical means.” The adjective 
“microscopic” illuminates James’s ambivalence about this methodology. Given his 
comments on the inherent uncertainty of introspection, his comment that experiment 
attempted to eliminate uncertainty is also instructive; it shows that James thought that the 
European experimental psychologists were perhaps trying to accomplish an impossible 
task. After unleashing his famous critique of experimentalism as being a method that 
“...taxes patience to the utmost...” and which “...could hardly have arisen in a country 
whose natives could be bored," (1.192) James did, however, offer some comments that 
suggested that he did perhaps see some good in the method.
James saw the comparative method as a supplement to introspection and 
experimentation. Comparative psychologists studied various animals and non-normal 
humans in order to throw light on the development of the features of consciousness. 
James thought a measure of humility was needed in comparative psychology since it 
possessed “...great sources of error...” (1.194), not the least of which was that the 
subjectivity of observers tended to skew the reported results.
Finally, James expressed concern about “the great snare of the psychologist,” 
which is “7%e Psychologist’s Fallacy.” His overriding concern here may be summarized 
as the worry that the psychologist imposes his own viewpoint on his subject, and so 
misses out on the full range of human experience. The fallacy keeps the psychologist
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from understanding what people really think and do and say, etc. Faulty psychological 
vocabulary also keeps the psychologist from understanding the object of his 
investigation. In some sense, I think, even James committed this fallacy when speaking 
of the will. He assumed that other people shared his belief that “will” was a valid 
subjectivity. More specifically, he assumed that others shared his “Arminian” 
consciousness of will as moral struggle and self-effort.
The Stream of Thought 
It is not until chapter IX “The Stream of Consciousness” that James began his 
“...study of the mind from within” (1.224). He noted that most psychological texts began 
their analysis with sensation, as “...the simplest mental facts, and proceed synthetically, 
constructing each higher stage from those below it.” The problem with this approach is 
that it an abandonment of the empirical approach to psychology. James wanted to stick 
to consciousness, and what consciousness actually contains. Beginning with sensation or 
some other preconceived psychological a priori does violence to psychology by distorting 
its subject matter: “no one ever had a simple sensation by itself,” When James looked 
within himself, he found “...a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations...”
As previously noted, James thought that the basic assumptions of psychology 
include the psychologist, the thought studied, the object of the thought studied, and the 
reality of the psychologist. The observation was made in passing that James’s concern 
with the totality of psychological experience, and the correlative interest in a plurality of 
objects of thought, represented an important difference from the theological psychology 
of an Ames or an Edwards, who were concerned with the motions of the mind in relation 
to the “efficient” Object, or a Thomas Upham, who “named” several worthy moral
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objects of volition. The chapter on the stream of thought expands upon this pluralistic 
approach to mind, and James’s comment, quoted above, that consciousness is “...a 
teeming multiplicity of objects and relations...” typifies James’s approach.
Focusing on the full range of psychological experience can be understood as 
contiguous with the irenical nature of American mental philosophy, which, as we have 
seen, had to move away from an exclusive focus on a particular definition of the Object. 
As I hope to make clear, this irenical impulse and its pluralistic concomitants did, 
however, put the topic of the will on increasingly shaky ground.
Introspection clearly testifies to the fact that ^"thinking o f some sort goes on... ” 
(1.224), and James listed five specific ways that thinking “goes on.”
1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.
2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.
3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.
4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.
5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and
welcomes or rejects - chooses from among them, in a word - all the while. (1.225)
Here James again uses the word “choice” broadly (i.e., in a more Edwardsean manner), as 
he had in chapter 2, on the functions of consciousness. Yet, as the chapter progresses his 
usage takes on a more decidedly “Arminian” tone.
James proceeded to discuss each of these characteristics of thought in turn, 
admitting that he would have to use psychological jargon that “every one knows.” The 
first four characteristics of consciousness are less relevant than the fifth, so I will briefly 
summarize them. Regarding the first characteristic, James perceived that “each of these
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minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them.” 
This implies that, in some sense, each mind is an island unto itself, and so there is an 
“irreducible pluralism” (1.226) in consciousness. The second characteristic, that within 
each personal consciousness thought is “in constant change,” is that “...no state once 
gone can recur and be identical with what it was before." There is, nevertheless, a 
continuity regarding the object perceived: '''What is got twice is the same OBJECT” (1.231). 
It is the way of seeing and perceiving the object that changes from moment to moment. 
Third, the fact that thought feels continuous within an individual’s consciousness implies 
that consciousness is a “stream” rather than being a series of disconnected bits (1.239). 
Furthermore, one important aspect of this continuous stream is that it is teleological: it 
tends toward a particular direction, “...having [for example] some topic or subject about 
which all the members of thought revolve” (1.259). Fourth, we believe that thought has 
to do with objects that have “independent” existence. The fifth aspect of consciousness 
is most relevant to James’s notion of will.
Consciousness ‘‘...is always interested more in one part o f its object than in 
another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks." The similarity 
between this way of conceiving consciousness and the Edwardsean approach to volition 
is striking. Edwards equated will with the soul as welcoming or rejecting, choosing or 
refusing. “For the soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively," Edwards said. 
This fifth Jamesean aspect of consciousness from the Edwardsean standpoint is volition. 
To some extent, James thought of it the same way, conceiving of “the phenomena of 
selective attention and of deliberative will...” as “...patent examples of this choosing 
activity” (1.284; emphasis mine). But, whereas Edwards was more inclusive in terms of
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what he included under the term “will,” James thought it best to limit the province of the 
will. The term “deliberative will,” which may well be a redundancy in Jamesean thought, 
illustrates this fact. Will’s function is to deliberate and choose among alternatives.
James thought that the ‘welcoming or rejecting’ aspect of consciousness was pervasive. 
Consciousness is “incessantly...at work” in this elective fashion, although it was 
contemporary practice to apply other labels to this elective function of consciousness.
“Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we have. We find it 
quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a number of impressions” 
(1.284). Even more than emphasis and accentuation, the mind also necessarily ignores 
the majority of things available to its view. As he would explain in his chapter on the 
perception of reality, this selection and correlative ignoring of events was synonymous 
for what was important to the individual agent. In the Puritan mind, of course, it was the 
duty of humanity to make God most important. James’s “antinomian” approach to 
psychology simply emphasized the fact that we do emphasize certain things without 
actually stating what we should emphasize. Indeed, James was fascinated with the 
diversity of patterns of attention and interest among different individuals, and how these 
“habits of attention” actually defined reality for them:
Let four men make a tour in Europe. One will bring home only picturesque 
impressions - costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, 
pictures and statues. To another all this will be non-existent; and distances and 
prices, populations and drainage-arrangements, door-and window-fastenings, and 
other useful statistics will take their place. A third will give a rich account of the 
theatres, restaurants, and public balls, and naught beside; whilst the fourth will
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perhaps have heen so wrapped in his own suhjective hroodings as to tell little 
more than a few names of places through which he passed. Each has selected, out 
of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and 
has made his experience thereby. (1.286-287)
In Edwardsean thought, these habits of attention would have constituted a great part of 
the person’s character and will. In James’s “Arminian” scheme, habits and will are 
opposed.
James applied this elective aspect of consciousness to rationality, aesthetics, and 
ethics. His comments on ethics are most relevant to volition. In the realm of 
“Ethics...choice reigns notoriously supreme.” The “ethical quality” of acts depends upon 
whether they are selected from several “equally possible” choices. James agrees with 
Upham here, hut clearly contradicts Edwards on this point, who went to great lengths to 
show that moral goodness actually reduces the possibility of evil action. Yet this 
definition of ethical action was required for James’s libertarian, indeterminist, 
intellectualist, and Victorian notion of free will: “To sustain the arguments for the good 
course and keep them ever before us, to stifle our longing for more flowery ways, to keep 
the foot unflinchingly on the arduous path, these are characteristic ethical energies” 
(1.287-288). The libertarianism and indeterminism here are found in the idea that two 
paths are equally plausible in ethical choice. The Intellectualist element (which will 
become more clear as we move through the Principles) is found in the idea that sustaining 
a representation (i.e., keeping good arguments “ever before us”) is the key to action. 
Finally, the Victorian element here is found in the idea of resolute will-power, 
“...keepi[ng] the foot unflinchingly on the arduous path.” James recapitulates some of his
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statements in his chapter on habit in this chapter, saying that ethical choices determine 
what kind of character the chooser will take on. “What we shall become is fixed by the 
conduct of this moment” (I. 288). Yet what we become is something separate from the 
exercises of the Arminian faculty of choice.
In his summary of the chapter, James reiterates his indeterminist viewpoint. 
“Looking back, then, over this review, we see that the mind is at every stage a theatre of 
simultaneous possibilities” (I. 288). At this point, James speaks of consciousness in ways 
reminiscent of nineteenth century trichotomy: as an arbiter that stands apart from the 
possible routes of conduct. “Consciousness consists in the comparison of these 
[possibilities] with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by 
the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention.” There is no fatality to this process. 
“The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his 
block of stone.” Although it is true that, “in a sense,” the sculpture “...stood there from 
eternity,” it is equally true that “...there were a thousand different ones beside it, and the 
sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one from the rest” (1.288). James’s 
language here strongly indicates a belief in a “sovereign,” Arminian, self-determining 
power of mind, and perhaps typifies the sentiment that Edwards was most solidly against: 
the desire for an entirely autonomous efficiency.
Although James does not address at this point the late-nineteenth century version 
of the Edwardsean argument against indeterminism (See Bain, 1880), one gets the sense 
that the overwhelming impossibility of predicting the specific course that a young soul 
would select from the seeming innumerable available possibilities was sufficient 
argument for indeterminism in James’s mind:
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Just so the world of each of us, howsoever different our several views of it may 
be, all lay embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the mere 
matter to the thought of all of us indifferently. We may, if  we like, by our 
reasonings unwind things back to that black and jointless continuity of space and 
moving clouds of swarming atoms which science calls the only real world. But 
all the while the world we feel and live in will be that which our ancestors and we, 
by slowly cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, 
by simply rejecting certain portions of the given stuff. Other sculptors, other 
statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same 
monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million... (1.288- 
289)
The Self
When considered from the perspective of the loss of will in American 
psychology, perhaps the most interesting things about James’s discussion of the self is 
how much of James’s self overlaps with the older conception of will espoused by 
Calvinists like Ames and Edwards. Yet James thought of will as only a small part of the 
self, which is further evidence that the “Arminian” will was shrinking in the late 
nineteenth century.
Consistent with the American tradition, James began his discussion of the self by 
making recourse to introspection. As Coon (2000) has argued, James avoided 
metaphysical discussion concerning the reality of the soul by simply asserting that we are 
aware of a self, and so assuming the existence of a self is a reasonable thing to do.
Indeed, it should be added that James frequently affirmed that psychology must start with
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the data of consciousness, and that a failure to do so is equivalent to abandoning the 
subject matter of psychology. The self that is found through introspective analysis is “the 
empirical self.” He defines the empirical self broadly: “The Empirical Self of each of us 
is all that he is tempted to call by the name of me. But it is clear that between what a man 
calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw.” To illustrate this 
principle, he notes that certain apparently external things become incorporated into our 
identity. “In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total o f all that 
he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, 
his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and 
horses, and yacht and bank-account.” Since these things become in some sense part of 
the self, the successes and failures associated with these things are felt personally: “If 
they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if  they dwindle and die away, he feels cast 
down...” (1.291).
Given this broad imderstanding of the self, James then discussed the 
“constituents” of the self, which shows how closely James linked will to the notion of the 
self. The empirical self is divided into the material, the social, and the spiritual selves. 
The material self consists of body, clothes, family, home. “All these different things are 
the objects of instinctive preferences coupled with the most important practical interests 
of life. We all have a blind impulse to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of an 
ornamental sort, to cherish parents, wife and babes, and to find for ourselves a home of 
our own which we may live in and ‘improve’” (1.292-293). This language reveals that 
James thought of the different kinds of selves in instinctive or impulsive terms. We have 
the “impulse” toward these things. Likewise, we possess “an equally instinctive
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impulse...to collect property...” (1.293) that is part of the material self.
The “Social Self’ (1.293) is driven toward “...the recognition which he gets from 
his mates,” for we possess “...an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed 
favorably, by our kind.” Ever the pluralist, James argued that we possess ‘\..as many 
social selves as there are individuals who recognize [us] and carry an image of [us] in 
their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him” (1.294). The social 
self desires fame, honor and reputation. In the older, Edwardsean sense of the term, the 
material and social selves, being impulsive, would have been understood as having to do 
with will. Yet, as James’s comments on instinct make clear, this too is an area that James 
removed from the dominion of will.
The “Spiritual Self’ is less instinctual, and, in James’s mind, more clearly related 
to will. Indeed, in the chapter on will, James portrayed the quintessential moral struggle 
as that between the desire for instinctual objects and the conflicting (and usually weaker) 
desire for more ideal objects. The spiritual self is “...a man’s inner or subjective being, 
his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely; not the bare principle of personal 
Unity, or ‘pure’ Ego, which remains still to be discussed.” James seems to think of the 
spiritual self as the innermost person^^, the real person, “..the most enduring and intimate 
part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be.” Moral judgment and conscience 
are parts of the spiritual self. The “indomitable will” is also part of the spiritual self (I. 
296). Once again, it is clear that James’s Arminian will is a subset of the Calvinistic will 
of Ames and Edwards. All impulses and desires would have been included in the
^®James was a bit inconsistent concerning what constituted the innermost self. He initially indicates that the 
spiritual self is iimermost. In another passage, he indicates that the innermost self has to do with 
physiological “adjustments” which are distinct from the spiritual self(I. 302-305). In yet another passage, 
James refers to the social self as innermost (I. 316). It is not my intention here to work out these points of  
tension in James’ theory o f self, but rather to simply show that his theory o f self was related to the will.
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Amesian and Edwardsean conception of will, while James’s will is the “indomitable” 
locus of human effort and striving.
In order to become aware of the spiritual self, one must abandon an outward way 
of considering the self, and to focus upon “...of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as 
thinkers” (I. 296). James considered this ability to look within and to identify ourselves 
with the inner workings of consciousness “...a rather mysterious operation...” and chose 
to merely describe it, and leave the mystery open. (1.296).
Further evidence that James’s spiritual self overlaps with other notions of will is 
found in his comment that “...it the active element in all consciousness...there is a 
spiritual something in him which seems to go out... ’’ Utilizing language reminiscent of 
Edwards’ broad definition of will, James asserted that the spiritual self “...is what 
welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or 
withholding its assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse” (I. 297-298).
But, moving away from a simple hedonic conception of volition, which Edwards favored, 
he thought of the spiritual self as “...the home of interest, - not the pleasant or the painful, 
not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the 
pleasant and the painful, speak.” In his chapter on will, James further clarifies that it is 
interest rather than pleasure which drives the will, and that pleasure and pain result from 
frustration or satisfaction of these interests. Additionally, James comments that the 
spiritual self “...is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to 
emanate the fiats of the will.” To avoid soxmding too spiritualistic, James translates this 
antiquated language into more contemporary terms, “A physiologist who should reflect 
upon it in his own person could hardly help, I should think, connecting it more or less
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vaguely with the process hy which ideas or incoming sensations are ‘reflected’ or pass 
over into outward acts.” The physiological process by which ideas are translated into 
outward acts was a crucial aspect of volition for James. Much like the soul of old, the 
spiritual self is ‘‘a sort of junction at which sensory ideas terminate and from which motor 
ideas proceed, and forming a kind of link between the two.”
James argued that human beings experience a “central principle” that can be 
distinguished from “...the rest of what they call themselves...” (I. 298). Some people will 
call this central principle the soul, some will call it a myth, and “...between these 
extremes of opinion all sorts of intermediaries would be formd.” James did discuss these 
various options, and, as I will argue below, his discussion is momentous for the 
psychology of will. But, since the empirical approach provided an ecumenical forum 
enabling discussion apart from metaphysical quagmire, James first focused upon the 
experience of this central principle or self. “...Let us try to settle for ourselves as 
definitely as we can, just how this central nucleus of the Self may feel, no matter whether 
it he a spiritual substance or only a delusive word” (1.298).
James’s discussion of this central part of the self should be taken as a discussion 
of the spiritual self. As quoted above, James thought the spiritual self is “...the most 
enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be.” Although 
James did not think one could accurately describe the “precise nature” (1.298) of “the 
central part” of the Self, i.e., if  it is the soul or some other metaphysical construction, he 
was certain that it could be felt. The spiritual self was not merely a cold and calculating 
intellect, but a sensible something. James’s introspections (and he admitted that they 
were merely his introspections, which reveals considerably more reticence in affirming
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conscious experience as universal than Upham and the antebellum mental philosophers) 
revealed that the feeling of the spiritual self
James’s consciousness was filled with the “...constant play of furtherance and 
hindrances in my thinking, of checks and releases, tendencies which run with desire, and 
tendencies which run the other way.’’ This “palpitating inward” process was a 
spontaneous and reactive “...welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving 
with or against, saying yes or no” (1.299). Again, this inward activity was, for Ames and 
Edwards, the activity of the will. For James it was not.
A crucial difference between Jamesean psychology and its 
theological/philosophical predecessors, was James’s determination to link consciousness 
to biology. Highly attuned to links between mental and bodily sensations, James 
admitted in his chapter on emotion that he could not distinguish the emotion fi*om the 
bodily states which accompany it. Similarly, James reported that “...it is difficult fo r  me 
to detect in the activity [of the central, spiritual self] any purely spiritual element at all. 
Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one 
o f these manifestations o f spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some 
bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head" (1.300). When thinking 
“in visual terms,” James reported that he was aware of “feeling a fluctuating play of 
pressures, convergences, divergences, and accommodations in my eyeballs. The direction 
in which the object is conceived to lie determines the character of these movements, the 
feeling of which becomes, for my consciousness, identified with the manner in which I 
make myself ready to receive the visible thing” (1.300). James description of “making a 
mental effort,” is revealing of the ArminianWictorian experience of willpower:
601
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In effort of any sort, contractions of the jaw-muscles and of those of respiration 
are added to those of the brow and glottis, and thus the feeling passes out of the 
head properly so ealled. It passes out of the head whenever the welcoming or 
rejecting of the object is strongly felt. Then a set of feelings pour in from many 
bodily parts, all ‘expressive’ of my emotion, and the head-feelings proper are 
swallowed up in this larger mass. (1.301)
James thus spoke with two minds concerning the spiritual self. In one breath he spoke in 
language reminiscent of the soul, the seat of eonscience and moral effort. In the next 
breath, the inmost self is simply museular strains and twitehes. For the reductionists in 
his reading audienee, James concluded that ''the 'Self o f  selves,' when carefully 
examined, is found to consist mainly o f the collection o f these peculiar motions in the 
head or between the head and throat” (1.301). He thought that is was not unreasonable to 
believe that "...our entire feeling o f spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that 
name, is really a feeling o f bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men 
overlooked” (1.301-302).
Although James offered his hody-oriented notion of the central self in only 
tentative language, he did believe that the implications of such a viewpoint were worth 
considering. These considerations are again relevant to the topie of the will.
Just as James argued that emotion is really indistinguishable from the 
physiological states that constitute emotion, the central self could also “...be a collection 
of activities physiologically in no essential way different from the overt acts themselves” 
(1.302). James thought it possible to divide physiological events into “adjustments” and 
“executions,” associating the central self with the adjustments, and the transitory
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“shifting” self with the exertions. Although both adjustments and executions are 
reflexive, the adjustments are “constant,” incessantly repeated,” operate below the level 
of consciousness and are the doorway determining what will appear before 
consciousness. The constancy of the adjustments is related to the sense of continuity that 
the self possesses. The adjustments are also “primary reactions” of the relevant facial 
muscles to “everything,” and determine what objects will be admitted to consciousness 
and what will be excluded. James uses the language of approval and disapproval to 
describe this process, i.e., language historically associated with volitional processes:
It is as if  all that visited the mind had to stand an entrance-examination, and just 
show its face so as to be either approved or sent back. These primary reactions are 
like the opening or the closing of the door. In the midst of psychic change they are 
the permanent core of tumings-towards and tumings-ffom, of yieldings and 
arrests, which naturally seem central and interior in comparison with the foreign 
matters, apropos to which they occur, and hold a sort of arbitrating, decisive 
position, quite unlike that held by any of the other constituents of the Me. It 
would not be surprising, then, if  we were to feel them as the birthplace of 
conclusions and the starting point of acts, or if  they came to appear as what we 
called a while back the ‘sanctuary within the citadel’ of our personal life. (1.302- 
303)
James concluded his discussion of the constituents of the self by arguing that the 
innermost self consists mainly in “...a collection of cephalic movements of ‘adjustments’ 
which, for want of attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as 
what they are; that over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something
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more...” although this “something more” remained undefined (1.305).
Self-Seeking and Self-Preservation. Self-seeking and self-preservation “ .. .cover 
a large number of our fundamental instinctive impulses,” and therefore also deal with 
territory associated with the older notion of the will. We have those of bodily self- 
seeking, those of social self-seeking, and those of spiritual self-seeking” (1.307). Bodily 
self-seeking would include impulses to make tools and hunt, for example, while social 
self-seeking drives us to please our friends and relatives, and to be associated with 
important people. Spiritual self-seeking encompasses traditionally religious themes.
This self-seeking includes the desire to make some sort of “...psychic progress, whether 
intellectual, moral, or spiritual in the narrow sense of the term.” In the spirit of 
Puritanism, James makes clear distinctions between true spiritual self-seeking and the 
fear of punishment. “It must be admitted, however, that much that commonly passes for 
spiritual self-seeking in this narrow sense is only material and social self-seeking beyond 
the grave. In the Mohammedan desire for paradise and the Christian aspiration not to be 
damned in hell, the materiality of the goods sought is undisguised” (1.309). Given his 
portrayal of the fear of damnation as a “Christian aspiration,” James may not have 
realized that he was reiterating the Puritans consistent denunciation of such a fear as 
falling far short of the love of God that was to motivate the saint’s desire for heaven. 
Either way, James’s probing into the quality of spiritual motives is highly consistent with 
the indigenous tradition (and it may have reflected Henry Sr.’s theology as well). 
Interestingly, however, James’s seemed to criticize the Christian desire for fellowship 
with God as merely social, and thought of a self-oriented desire for purity to be true 
“...spiritual self-seeking pure and undefiled” (1.309).
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What Self is Loved in ‘Self-Love’? In a discussion that places Janies firmly 
within the indigenous theological and philosophical context, James took on the topic of 
self-love. A topic which Edwards, Upham, and his own father considered to be of the 
utmost spiritual importance. For Edwards, self-love was a given in the sense that human 
beings will always seek their happiness. The issue for Edwards had to do with which 
Object would he the source of that happiness. Upham discussed the topic. For Henry 
James Sr., self-love was more of an unequivocal evil. Henry Sr. frequently denounced 
self-love in front of his children, and even thought that belief in an independent self 
contributed to this evil (Menand, 2001, p. 85).
James may have been grappling with personal theological ghosts in this section of 
the Principles. He first explained the common way of thinking about self-love. “A man 
in whom self-seeking of any sort is largely developed is said to be selfish. He is on the 
other hand called unselfish if  he shows consideration for the interest of other selves than 
his own” (1.317-318). James had, it seems been told to be on the “lookout” for self-love 
and to keep these impulses in check (1.319). James spent over 11 pages exploding this 
“proverbial philosophy” (1.319). Ironically, however, the “proverbial philosophy” which 
he imbibed was probably quite different than that of the indigenous tradition, because the 
answer he formulates is entirely consistent with the viewpoint of Ames, Edwards and 
Upham.
James’s desire was to understand the nature of “the selfish emotion,” and its 
“primary object.” The emotion centers upon our irmate concern for ourselves. We all 
feel this way. Although we remain indifferent to hear of the successes and failures of 
others, for example, we are never indifferent to our own: “/m ust not be a failure, is the
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very loudest of the voices that clamor in each of our breasts: let fail who may, I  at least 
must succeed” (1.318). James took this sentiment as universal, and concluded that self- 
concern animates us all. He related this phenomenon to an innate syllogism, the major 
premise always being “Whatever is me is precious...” Objects are seen as precious to the 
self to the extent that they are internalized as part of the self: “...this is me; therefore this 
is precious...” If an object fails to be internalized into the self, we remain indifferent or 
opposed to that object.
The objects that are involved in self-love are never the self or the soul or the ego 
(or whatever metaphysical term one may employ) per se. “To have a self that I can care 
for, nature must first present me with some object interesting enough to make me 
instinctively wish to appropriate it for its own sake, and out of it to manufacture one of 
those material, social, or spiritual selves...” We instinctively (as opposed to rationally) 
find strong interest in certain objects, and it is these objects that consciousness portrays as 
“the constituents of its Me.” This process is so basic that it sheds further light on the 
definition of the self. ""The words ME, then, and SELF, so fa r  as they arouse feeling and 
connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS 
which have the power to produce in a stream o f consciousness excitement o f a certain 
peculiar sort. ”
James takes the Augustinian and Puritan position that our loves define our selves. 
Consciousness, for example, typically experiences the body as part of the self because it 
loves the body. By way of contrast, and to refute the “proverbial” way of thinking about 
the matter, the body is not loved because it is somehow abstractly associated with the 
self. James thus demonstrates that the object of self-love is never the self. Each species
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is equipped with certain loves, or instincts, and desire and interest flow from these inhom 
instincts. “Our interest in things means the attention and emotion which the thought of 
them will excite, and the actions which their presence will evoke.”
James illustrated the principle that the object of self-love is never the self in 
another way: “When I am led hy self-love to keep my seat whilst ladies stand, or to grab 
something first and cut out my neighbor, what I really love is the comfortable seat, is the 
thing itself which I grab. I love them primarily, as the mother loves her babe, or a 
generous man an heroic deed.” As James does throughout the Principles. James saw this 
process as entirely necessary and deterministic. “Wherever, as here, self-seeking is the 
outcome of simple instinctive propensity, it is but a name for certain reflex acts. 
Something rivets my attention fatally, and fatally provokes the ‘selfish’ response.” 
Further, the more a person acts from this selfish principle, the less self-aware they 
become.
Neither is the self the object o f  social self-love.” When we care deeply about the 
opinions of others, this concern is focused on “...a set of objects external to my thought,” 
i.e., the other person’s thoughts. Here, as always, objects of self love are ''\..object[s] of 
regard...” (1.321). Likewise, the object of spiritual self-love is external.
Interestingly, James thought that putting his doctrine into “zoological” and 
Darwinistic terms shed considerable light on the topic of self-love. All of the instinctual 
objects of material, social and spiritual self-love somehow facilitate the survival of the 
organism. James expressed his characteristic agnosticism concerning the sufficiency of 
the Darwinistic mechanism (1.324), which he summarized frequently as “the survival of 
the fittest,” but he did argue that “the primitive object” of interest is always related to
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biological needs, and that other objects become incorporated into the self only as they are 
associated with these: “My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the 
primitive object, instinctively determined, o f my egoistic interests. Other objects may 
become interesting derivatively through association with any of these things, either as 
means or as habitual concomitants; and so in a thousand ways the primitive sphere o f the 
egoistic emotions may enlarge and change its boundaries.”
In light of this “zoological” notion of self-love, it becomes clear that James’s 
Augustinian-sounding doctrine of self-love is not intended to revive Augustinianism or 
Edwardseanism. Rather, he is concerned to refute the “...the old-fashioned sensationalist 
psychology...” which taught that altruism necessarily contradicts human nature, and 
therefore must at some level be “hypocritical” exercises (1.325). The evolutionary 
viewpoint, James countered, shows that any object may be taken into the self and 
therefore become an object of genuine interest. Evolutionary thinking, James argued, 
actually makes belief in altruism possible. In additional to being consistent with Puritan 
ways of thinking, the belief that self-love could result in altruistic action may have also 
been a contradiction of his father’s own ruminations against the evils of self-love.
More importantly, the zoological notion of self-love also implied a radical shift of 
metaphors vis-a-vis the indigenous tradition. Despite the continuity of interest in the 
determinative role of “loves,” the metaphoric referent for these loves underwent a radical 
break with James. In Ames, Edwards, and Upham, American psychology posited God as 
the primary metaphor for human nature. God has will and intellect (or will, intellect and 
sensibility in Upham). God loves the good and hates evil. Human beings likewise have 
will and intellect, and may love and hate. In the comparative and zoological approach.
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the metaphor switches. Animals have “loves” and “hates.” So too do human beings.
Yet, since animals are not typically thought of as possessing will, James’s choice of 
metaphor may have, in hindsight, unintentionally put the very construct of will in 
jeopardy.
In sum, from the perspective of the indigenous tradition, James’s view on self- 
love recapitulated the old idea (expressed by Edwards and others): self-love is simply the 
love of one’s own happiness. James’s own manner of arguing this point was, of course, 
different than the traditional theological interpretations. The fact that James would think 
of self-love as being a process largely outside of the will further speaks to the narrowing 
of the concept in James’s thought.
The Soul. To close this analysis of James’s notion of self and its relation to 
volition, a quick look at James’s thought on the topie of soul is helpful. In the earliest 
stages of his analysis of the self, James held off the “metaphysical” questions concerning 
the nature of the self, choosing instead to focus discussion on the testimony of 
consciousness (i.e., on the “empirical self’). Later in the analysis, however, James did 
consider the “spiritualist theory,” the “Associationist theory,” and the “Transcendentalist 
theory.” Most germane to a comparison of James to the indigenous tradition, and to the 
issue of the loss of will, is James discussion of will, in which he concludes that the notion 
of soul is not needed for psychology. Since the topic of volition had up to this point 
always been linked to the soul, James’s confidence that construct is disposable was 
certainly a bold conjecture.
The theory of the soul, James explained, posits a simple, substantial, individual, 
and immaterial agent to lay behind conscious experience. Two main consequences flow
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from this construct. First, the soul is incorruptible, so that none “...hut God’s direct fia t 
can annihilate it...” Second, moral culpability is held in tact such that a soul may be held 
responsible “...for whatever it may have ever done” (1.344). Although an honorable list 
of philosophers had held to this theory, James still argued that the concept was not 
necessary in psychology.
James argued that many of the things typically associated with the soul (i.e., 
unity, identity, individuality and immateriality) were accounted for in his theory, as 
described above. In addition to these things, however, the theory of soul also 
cumbersomely posits another unchanging substance that lies behind the ever-changing 
flow of thought in consciousness. The cumbersome nature of this assumption is 
highlighted when considering the relation between thought and brain processes. The 
simplest way of thinking simply posits a correspondence between brain and thought. The 
Soul theory affirms the same thing, but in a clumsier way. “The spiritualistic formulation 
says that the brain-processes knock the thought, so to speak, out of a Soul which stands 
there to receive their influence. The simpler formulation says that the thought simply 
conies’' (1.345). Although James thought that there may be something more than a simple 
correspondence between thought and brain^^, he did not think that positing a soul actually 
explained anything, and was therefore not needed for an empirical, scientific psychology.
James thought that other arguments do not help the cause, either. For example, 
“the argument from free-will...” which posited spontaneity to the soul as a foundation for 
freedom, “...can convince only those who believe in free-will...” (1.346). Telling,
^^Indeed, James was forthright about his beliefs in the matter: “For my own part I confess that the moment I 
become metaphysical and try to define the more, I find the notion o f some sort o f an anima mundi thinking 
in all o f us to be a more promising hypothesis, in spite o f  all its difficulties, than that o f  a lot o f  absolutely 
individual souls” (1.346). In chapter 6, James also gave arguments in favor o f a modified version o f a soul 
theory.
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however, is James affirmation that “Thought” in and of itself may be said to have 
spontaneity as well. This must have comforted James: the thought that he could remain 
“empirical” and remain committed to libertarian freedom. Further undermining the 
necessity of positing a soul was the fact that all that can be posited of the soul is derived 
from mental experience. Plus, it is impossible to know how a “thing” such as soul could 
possibly have thoughts. James corroborated his assertion that we cannot know anything 
about the soul by arguing that not only Locke and Kant admitted ignorance, but also the 
leading lights of the “Scotch school” also generally admitted ignorance of the soul. In a 
rare quote of an American writer, James cites Wayland, who “...begins his Elements of 
Intellectual Philosophy with the phrase ‘Of the essence of Mind we know nothing,’ and 
goes on: ‘All that we are able to affirm of it is that it is something which perceives, 
reflects, remembers, imagines, and wills; hut what that something is which exerts these 
energies we know not. It is only as we are conscious of the action of these energies that 
we are conscious of the existence of mind’” (1.347). James noted that most members of 
the Scottish school argued in the same line, which is evidence that James had actually 
spent at least some time reading these authors.
Given the preceding argumentation, it is not surprising that James concluded that 
the soul theory is, at least on scientific grounds, “...a complete superfluity...” (1.348). 
Since the Principles purported to be a scientific textbook, one might imagine that James 
would he willing to leave the topic of soul alone at this point. Yet, aware of the fact that 
the implications of abandoning the concept of soul would have appeared to many of his 
readers to transcend scientific considerations, James attempted to show that the concept 
did not necessarily meet its intended obligations. For example, many may have thought
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that the soul was necessary in order to safeguard the possibility for immortality. By way 
of contrast, the stream of consciousness is by nature transient and may at any moment 
cease. Despite this hesitation, James was not convinced that a substantial soul could 
“guarantee” the kind of eternal life that is typically desired, because it is not clear that a 
mere substance is capable of maintaining the stream of consciousness as we experience it 
in this life. This assertion is probably related to James’s identification of the stream with 
bodily sensation. Although the substantial soul would make divine retribution possible, 
James thought that modems were “less insatiate for retribution...” (1.349) than their 
forebears, and could therefore on theological grounds dispose of the soul.
James concluded that the substantial soul “...explains nothing and guarantees 
nothing” (1.348). The only things we can know are the stream of thoughts available to 
consciousness. Given the superfluity of the concept, James felt “...entirely free to discard 
the word Soul from the rest of this book...” Nevertheless, he offered his readers the 
dubious and condescending assurance that they were free to believe in soul if that 
provided comfort to them. He also rejected the associationist view and the 
transcendentalist view of the ego.
James’s approach to the soul was done in the irenical spirit of American mental 
philosophy, attempting to create space for a variety of beliefs, while simultaneously 
demarcating the proper boundaries of science. Yet, also continuing in the tradition of 
American mental philosophy, James’s approach to the self as a secular replacement for 
the soul (Coon, 2000) can be considered part of the departicularizing and anti-dogmatic 
impulse in American thought. Once again, the question of sufficiency arises. Could the 
nonsectarian replacements of traditionally theological terms sustain the interests for
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which they were designed? Just as the Jamesean will became more and more 
unsubstantial, so too did the Jamesean self lose its solidity. Although the will had always 
been considered a crucial faculty o f the soul in American thought, James appeared to 
believe that he could retain certain faculties of the soul while rejecting the soul as a mere 
superfluity. Such picking and choosing failed to recognize the coherence and sustaining 
power of the system that James helped to dismantle. And, since James’s psychology was 
intentionally anti-metaphysical, he could not offer an alternative theology or story to 
solidify his new arrangement.
James’s brief theological comments illustrate this point in another way. James 
admitted that a substantial soul was a logical inference of a theology that posited divine 
judgment. That is, the notion of the soul presupposed certain dogmatic or metaphoric 
formulations. Surely this is true of all psychological constructs, including will. (Or 
thumos, or nephesh, or “working memory”). The method of introspection allowed James 
to retain those constructs which seemed most necessary or weighty, and to reject those 
which seemed extraneous. Removed from the thick description and communal 
embeddedness of its theological past, however, the concept of the will was sustained by 
nothing else than the conscious experience of William James and other New 
psychologists with similar intuitions. Just as soul did not weigh heavily upon the 
consciousness of William James, so too will would fail to weigh heavily on the 
consciousness of suceeeding generations of American psychologists. By 1890, the 
concept of will was resting firmly on entirely subjective grormds.
Attention
James thought it interesting that the “English empiricist school,” did not pay
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much attention to the topic of selective attention, and attributed this to the school’s 
insistence that the “higher faculties of the mind” are produced through experience, 
passively understood. James found the notion of mental passivity extraordinarily wrong­
headed. At any given moment, James said, we are confronted with “millions of items” 
that could capture our fancy, but do not. This capturing of the fancy, or “interest” directs 
the mind to certain objects, and away from others. And the objects which one notices 
give shape to mind. Without this process of selective attention mental experience would 
be chaotic and paralyzing attempt to process millions of objects.
James appealed to the experience of his readers. “Every one knows what 
attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of 
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought” (1.403-404). 
People can also relate to the opposite of attention, “...the confused, dazed, scatterbrained 
state which in French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German.” This is the 
experience of staring off into space, which is usually accompanied by a heightened 
awareness of the entire body (as opposed to the head-centered experience of the attentive 
self). One can replicate this experience “...by fixing the eyes on vacancy.”
When we emerge from this state the attention is said to have been awakened. At 
this moment, “one principal object comes then into the focus of consciousness, others are 
temporarily suppressed.”
James addresses the question “how many things can we attend at once,” which is 
not quite so relevant to his psychology will. The following discussion on “the varieties of 
attention,” however, is quite relevant.
James made a distinction between kinds of attention vis-a-vis the kinds o f objects
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to which we attend. We pay attention to “objects of sense,” and so we have “sensorial 
attention,” and we pay attention to “Ideal or represented objects,” and so we have 
“intellectual attention.” Janies made a further distinction between kinds of attention 
based upon teleological considerations. When an object attracts our interest per se, 
attention is said to be “immediate.” When an object is interesting because it is linked to 
another immediately interesting object, attention is “derived.” James’s final distinction 
regarding attention had to do with the crucial distinction between what is voluntary and 
what is involuntary. His definition equates voluntary action with effortful action, which, 
as I have been arguing, is an aspect of the “loss” of will. Attention may be either 
“passive, reflex, non-voluntary, effortless...” or it may be effortful, “active and 
voluntary.”
In terms of the indigenous religious context, James’s definitions recall Edwards’ 
ruminations in his Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World. 
Edwards began this treatise making a distinction “...between the chief end for which an 
agent performs any work, and the ultimate end.” He went on to describe that “an ultimate 
end is that which the agent seeks, in what he does, for its own sake; what he loves, values, 
and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end.”
He contrasted this with “a subordinate end...” which “...is what an agent aims at, not at 
all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, of which it is 
considered as a means.” “A chief end, which is opposite to an inferior end, is something 
diverse from an ultimate end; it is most valued, and therefore most sought after by the 
agent in what he does...” I am not claiming that James derived his categories from 
Edwards. Nor am I claiming that Edwards was original in his formulations. This is.
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however, another example of the teleological and functional emphasis of American 
psychological thought which James inherited. Edwards’ functionalism was Augustinian, 
employing the language of love (saying that the ultimate end of an agent’s actions 
involve “what he loves, values, and takes pleasure in on its own account...’’). James’s 
functionalism not only employed the similar-sounding language of interest, but he also 
deliberately equated interest to love (see comments on self-love above). These 
consonances would seem to be further evidence that James partook, at least to some 
degree, of the “Augustinian strain of piety” (Miller, 1939).
After laying out these basic definitions, James noted that voluntary attention is 
never immediate, but is always derived, “...we never make an effort [i.e., a volition] to 
attend to an object except for the sake of some remote interest which the effort will 
serve.” Given Edwards’ comments, this is a curious caveat. Certainly Edwards thought 
that the chief Object of the Christian’s attention is interesting per se, i.e., is an object of 
“immediate” attention, to use James’s categories. Yet Edwards would have also 
considered God an object of voluntary attention, i.e., the Christian made an effort to focus 
upon this Object. Precisely what James accomplished by arguing that immediate and 
voluntary attention are necessarily opposed is an open question. He did, however, assert 
that “...both sensorial and intellectual attention may be either passive or voluntary” 
(1.416).
James explores the various permutations of attention. Passive immediate 
sensorial attention, i.e., effortless interest in an object of sense as an end in itself, has to 
do with “intense” or “sudden” stimuli, or else has to do with instinctual processes. This 
type of attention predominates in young people. Passive sensorial attention is not
616
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
immediate, i.e., is derived, an association is made between an otherwise uninteresting 
object and an interesting one. He gives the example of “a faint tap.” Ordinarily we pay 
little attention to faint taps, “but when it is a signal, as that of a lover on the window- 
pane, it will hardly go unperceived” (1.418).
Passive intellectual attention, i.e., effortless attention to objects of thought, occurs 
when the mind is carried along in the stream of thought concerning objects immediately 
or derivatively interesting. By way of example, “All revery or concentrated meditation is 
apt to throw us into this state” (1.419). James noted that effort is sometimes needed to 
“launch” oneself into such revery, indicating that voluntary intellectual attention often 
precedes passive intellectual attention.
James appealed again to his reader’s experience, utilizing vivid description to 
describe voluntary attention:
We get it in the sensorial sphere whenever we seek to catch an impression of 
extreme faintness, be it of sight, hearing, taste, smell, or touch; we get it whenever 
we seek to discriminate a sensation merged in a mass of others that are similar; 
we get it whenever we resist the attractions of more potent stimuli and keep our 
mind occupied with some object that is naturally unimpressive. We get it in the 
intellectual sphere under exactly similar conditions: as we strive to sharpen and 
make distinct an idea which we but vaguely seem to have; or painfully 
discriminate a shade of meaning from its similar... (1.420)
Voluntary attention applied to moral effort as well, being involved when we “...resolutely 
hold fast to a thought so discordant with our impulses that, if left unaided, it would 
quickly yield place to images of an exciting and impassioned kind.” James consistently
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pitted instinctual impulses with ideal impulses. As will become clear when we turn to 
discuss James’s chapter on will, James focuses upon holding fact to “a thought” because 
he believed thought was the springboard of all voluntary action. James pulled together 
these various forms of voluntary attention in a single humorous example:
All forms of attentive effort would be exercised at once by one whom we might 
suppose at a dinner-party resolutely to listen to a neighbor giving him insipid and 
unwelcome advice in a low voice, whilst all around the guests were loudly 
laughing and talking about exciting and interesting things. (1.420)
In sum, voluntary attention is effortful attention. Here, as elsewhere, James pairs the 
concepts of will and effort.
James also argued that voluntary attention can only be sustained for moments. To 
engage in prolonged periods of voluntary attention, the agent must continually bring back 
the desired topic of interest. Further, the view of the object must continually change and 
evolve in order to sustain attention. ‘Wo one can possibly attend continuously to an 
object that does not change’'' (p. 421). James here was speaking of an object 
psychologically considered, not as an “individual subject of existence” (1.275) which is 
something like the grammatical object of a sentence. James thought that the object 
psychologically considered includes all the circumstances, nuances, and other 
considerations the current perception. At first glance this argument, i.e., that we cannot 
continuously pay attention to an unchanging object, seems to contradict the 
Puritan/Amesian belief that God ought to he the ultimate Object of the believer’s 
attention. The Puritans insisted that God did not change. So how would it be possible, in 
light of James’s view, to attend to the Object? The answer, again, is that James thought
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of objects psychologically. The Puritan could not maintain exactly the same thought of 
God in his mind for more than a few moments. But, by considering various aspects of 
the divine nature and divine works, the Puritan mind could, and did, keep his mind fixed 
upon the proper Object. I think James’s principle here actually may to some extent 
explain the Puritan’s prodigious and “prolix” theological output. They were sustaining 
their attention upon the Object by continually exploring the mysteries of the godhead. 
James’s quote of Helmholtz illustrates this principle, “if  we wish to keep it upon one and 
the same object, we must seek constantly to find out something new about the latter...” 
(1.422).
The issue of sustaining attention to morally significant matters was not only of 
interest to Puritans, either. James thought that “...the faculty of volimtarily bringing back 
a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and 
will. No one is compos sui if  he have it not” (1.424). James therefore considered 
Helmholtz’s insights into the relation between will and attention “of fundamental 
importance” (1.423). Helmholtz thought that the will exercises “mediate control” on 
attention by asking new questions of an object with which we would otherwise lose 
attention. The questions arouse interest and allow the object to remain fixed in 
consciousness. James summarized, “The conditio sine qua non of sustained attention to a 
given topic of thought is that we should roll it over and over incessantly and consider 
different aspects and relations of it in turn” (1.423). James concluded these mediations 
with a consideration of genius. Since geniuses naturally and automatically see greater 
nuance in any given object of attention, their attention is more easily sustained. Yet, 
since this ability is involuntary, this also means that genius hinders the development of
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willpower: “...zY is their genius making them attentive, not their attention making geniuses 
o f them ” (1.423). On the other hand, “...moderate intellectual endowments are the soil in 
which we may best expect, here as elsewhere, the virtues of the will, strictly so called, to 
thrive.” Here, as elsewhere, James seems to speak of will as if  it were a muscle to be 
developed, and, given his own personal sense of a lack of willpower, perhaps James felt 
himself morally disadvantaged, and thereby excused, by his own genius. (That James 
thought himself a man of genius is probable, given his intoxicating but arrogant 
comparison of the “ordinary man” and the man of genius in his chapter on Reasoning, pp. 
370-371).
James then focused upon the “effects of attention,” which are enormous and 
existentially overwhelming. “...Each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to 
things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit.” When considered 
from a broad, phylogenetic perspective, the effects of attention are “incalculable.” “The 
practical and theoretical life of whole species, as well as of individual beings, results 
ffoni the selection which the habitual direction of their attention involves” (1.424). More 
immediately, attention shapes perception, conception, comparison and discrimination and 
memory, each of which received a separate chapter treatment in the Principles. To use 
memory as an example of the role of attention in shaping the self, “.:.an object once 
attended to will remain in the memory, whilst one inattentively allowed to pass will leave 
no traces behind.” In other words, memory is entirely dependent upon attentional 
processes. The principle of attention, then, sheds light on James’s entire psychology, and 
should be kept front and center in any discussion of it. And, given that will is a crucial 
aspect of attention, either in its presence or absence, it figures more prominently in
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James’s thought than the single chapter on the topic would seem to indicate.
In addition, James also reviewed Wundt’s experimental works on the effects of 
anticipation on reaction times, giving long quotations of the various permutations of 
experiments that showed that reaction times were shortened by particular kinds of 
preparation. He described the difference between sensorial and ideational adjustments, 
noticing that when objects of sense capture the attention, the body’s organs are directed 
outwardly, but intellectual objects are associated with a tuming inward of the bodily 
processes (e.g., our eyes are fixed straight ahead as we carefully read a book, but they 
may roll up as we take time to think about the point made). He also summarized the 
concept of “ideational preparation” (1.438), the way in which the imagination shapes and 
delimits our perceptual experience. “It is for this reason that men have no eyes but for 
those aspects of things which they have already been taught to discern” (1.443). James 
thought this concept was quite important in the psychic life: “In short, the only things 
which we commonly see are those which we preperceive, and the only things which we 
preperceive are those which have been labeled for us, and the labels stamped into our 
mind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst of the 
world” (1.444).
These phenomena raised a “speculative problem” (1.446) for James, to which he 
devoted a section in his chapter on Attention: “Is Voluntary Attention a Resultant or a 
Force.” In this section, James once again raised the issue of freedom and determinism. 
James did not doubt that ideational preparation was crucial in shaping perceptual 
experience, but what, in any given moment, determined ideational preparation? James 
thought there were two possible answers to this “psychologic myster[y]”: the brain or
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“spiritual force” (1.447). Only the latter could satisfy and preserve the human spirit from 
despair;
When we reflect that the turnings of our attention form the nucleus of our inner 
self; when we see (as in the chapter on the Will we shall see) that volition is 
nothing but attention; when we believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature 
depends on our not being pure effect, but a ca\x^&...,-Principium quoddam quod 
fa ti fozdera rumpat. Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur-we must admit that the 
question whether attention involve such a principle of spiritual activity or not is 
metaphysical as well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains we can 
bestow on its solution. It is in fact the pivotal question of metaphysics, the very 
hinge on which our picture of the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism, 
monism, towards spiritualism, freedom, pluralism, - or else the other way. (1.447- 
448)
This quote expresses the “Arminian” sentiment that Edwards’ Calvinistic conscience 
found most troubling: the desire for a “sovereign” will. In the Calvinistic scheme, all 
efficiency was God’s efficiency. Human volition was a gift of efficiency from the 
Creator. The motivation to posit a self-determined will, Edwards seemed to suspect, was 
a desire to have an efficiency of one’s own. To be god. This, I think, is the sentiment 
that James expresses here. The desire to possess “autonomy” and to be “a cause.” 
Certainly James was under no delusions about having an omnipotent will. He was 
acutely aware of human limitation. Yet he hoped to offer something uniquely his own. 
Something totally underived, totally uncaused. The only alternative to this secular 
Arminianism in James’s mind was “materialism, fatalism, monism.” Calvinism, of
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course, could never be an option.
James recalled his previous discussion of the automaton theory and the causal 
efficacy of consciousness. Feeling may simply he “an inert accompaniment...” of 
attention and volition, “...the fatally predetermined effect of exclusively material laws.” 
The feeling could he a cause, however, if  it “...reacts dynamically upon that activity, 
furthering or checking it...” But, James qualified, the causal efficacy of feeling does not 
require indeterminism, it simply rules out material (as opposed to mental) determinism. 
Although James would in other places openly advocate indeterminism, he left the issue 
open here. He clearly seemed to think that a psychological determinism was much to he 
preferred to a neurological one.
Once again, James concluded that one’s final opinion on the matter is a matter of 
personal metaphysical preference, “The question is of course a purely speculative one, for 
we have no means of objectively ascertaining whether our feelings react on our nerve- 
processes or not...whoever affirms either conception to he true must do so on 
metaphysical or universal rather than on scientific or particular grounds” (I. 448).
James freely admitted that certain types of attention operated upon purely 
deterministic principles (just as he thought four of five different “types of decision” did 
so too, see chapter 12). James thought human mind is so structured that immediate 
sensorial attention happens automatically. In this case, objects simply draw the attention 
without choice. Derived attention operates by similar mechanisms. Even voluntary 
attention per se is “...an effect, and not a cause, a product and not an agent” (1.450), 
because it does not actually produce ideas: “The things we attend to come to us by their 
own laws. Attention creates no idea; an idea must already he there before we can attend
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to it” (1.450). But when an idea is brought before consciousness, attention may either 
grab hold of (or “fix and retain”) it, or let it go. Usually, this voluntary fixing and 
retaining of an idea in consciousness is determined by the interest which accompanies a 
particular idea Indeterminism creeps in when the agent attends to an “...intrinsically 
very unwelcome...” idea through effort. Since these intrinsically unwelcome ideas are 
often the most morally important ideas, the role of indeterminism was quite significant. 
Since the attention cannot be said to be determined by the intrinsic interest that occasions 
the idea, it must therefore be the effort of the agent that determines and fixes the 
attention. Like Upham (and like Ward- see Bain, 1880) and many libertarians before 
him, James thereby utilized introspective evidence that seemed to contradict the idea that 
the strongest motive determines action, and suggested that the human agent may possess 
an intrinsic spontaneity of will:
In fact it is only to the effort to attend, not to the mere attending, that we are 
seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous power. We think we can make more of it 
i f  we will, and the amount which we make does not seem a fixed function of the 
ideas themselves, as it would necessarily have to be if  our effort were an effect 
and not a spiritual force. (1.451)
James continues in this vein:
Effort is felt only where there is a conflict of interests in the mind. The idea A 
may be intrinsically exciting to us. The idea Z may derive its interest from 
association with some remoter good. A may be our sweetheart, Z may be some 
condition of our soul’s salvation. Under these circumstances, if we succeed in 
attending to Z at all it is always with expenditure of effort. The ‘ideational
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prepararation,’ [sic] the ‘preperception’ of A keeps going on of its own accord, 
whilst that of Z need incessant pulses of voluntary reinforcement - that is, we 
have the feeling  of voluntary reinforcement (or effort) at each successive moment 
in which the thought of Z flares brightly up in our mind. (1.451)
Well aware of the deterministic refiitation of this line of reasoning, James added 
the cautious caveat: “But even here [in the case of apparent self-determination of effort] it 
is possible to conceive the facts mechanically and to regard the effort as a mere effect” 
(1.451). In this case, “Z” or the purportedly weaker motive (to use Edward’s language) 
only appears to introspection to be weaker (and James, like the libertarians before him, 
was convinced that, in cases of effort, the weaker motive really prevailed. Determinists 
like Edwards had no such experience). At a physiological level, however, it is actually 
stronger. The feeling of effort occurs when the mind is forced to deal with another 
motive of comparable, but lesser, strength. At the level of brain physiology, some of the 
force of the “associative processes” associated with Z are channeled into inhibiting and 
neutralizing the “brain-energy” connected to the weaker motive, A. This process of 
inhibition is translated into the feeling of effort.
James compared this neurological process to a stream. Ordinarily, our voluntary 
consciousness flows like a stream, effortlessly grasping onto objects that interest us the 
most. Sometimes the smooth flow of the stream is disturbed with rocks. The water then 
swirls around these hindrances. According to the determinists, James argued, the feeling 
of effort is an effect of these swirls. Yet, the feeling of effort remains only an effect: the 
direction of the water remains inevitable. If this is the case, then the feeling of effort or 
of conscious will may end up being an illusion (see Wegner, 2002, for a modern-day re-
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statement of this argument):
The feeling of effort may be ‘an accompaniment,’ as Mr. Bradley says,’ more or 
less superfluous,’ and no more contribute to the result than the pain in a man’s 
finger, when a hammer falls on it, contributes to the hammer’s weight. Thus the 
notion that our effort in attending is an original faculty, a force additional to the 
others of which brain and mind are the seat, may be an abject superstition. 
Attention may have to go, like many a faculty once deemed essential, like many a 
verbal phantom, like many an idol of the tribe. It may he an excrescence on 
Psychology. No need of it to drag ideas before consciousness or fix them, when 
we see how perfectly they drag and fix each other there. (1.452)
Needless to say, James did not agree with this way of thinking, and levied a moral 
criticism against it. “We m ay , ” James argued, “then regard attention as a superfluity, or 
a ‘Luxus,’ and dogmatize against its causal function with no feeling in our hearts but one 
of pride that we are applying Occam’s razor to an entity that has multiplied itself ‘beyond 
necessity.’” (1.452-453). The desire to dogmatize all-encompassing views of the universe 
was a function of human need. These systems were not, however, necessarily true. 
Further, as he would articulate in his Dilemma o f Determinism, they were (like the 
Calvinism his father rejected) morally repugnant ways of considering the universe. A 
good and gracious universe is an antinomian imiverse, a imiverse which refuses to exalt 
any law, including physical law, above the freedom of moral agents; which is really just a 
step away from Upham’s universe in which God will not and can not violate the free will 
of his creation. Indeed, the laws of nature may very well submit themselves to the laws 
of human spontaneity and freedom:
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The laws of stimulation and of association may well be indispensable actors in all 
attention’s performances, and may even be a good enough ‘stock-company’ to 
carry on many performances without aid; and yet they may at times simply form 
the background for a ‘star-performer,’ who is no more their ‘inert 
accompaniment’ or their ‘incidental product’ than Hamlet is Horatio’s and 
Ophelia’s. Such a star-performer would be the voluntary effort to attend, if it 
were an original psychic force. Nature may, I say, indulge in these complications; 
and the conception that she has done so in this case is, I think, just as clear (if not 
as ‘parsimonious’ logically) as the conception that she has not. (1.453).
James also approached this issue pragmatically. If we were to grant that human 
beings possess a degree of spontaneity, what would this spontaneity effect? For one, it 
would allow the agent to retain in consciousness the morally consequential ideas that 
would otherwise fall prey to their invisibility among the enumerable ideas which pass 
through consciousness and the paucity of interest which they naturally elicit. It is in this 
sphere of overwhelming uncertainty that the faculty of effort operates, clinging for a 
moment to one idea rather than another, and in the process sealing the “doom” of the 
agent. James referred his readers to the chapter on will, in which he promised to argue 
that, “...the whole drama of the voluntary life hinges on the amount of attention, slightly 
more or slightly less, which rival motor ideas may receive” (1.454).
James’s struggle to articulate a libertarian notion of free will for a scientific age 
reflects the profound anxieties of a post-Arminian secular culture which had grown 
accustomed to think of moral action in libertarian terms. For James, libertarianism meant 
indeterminism which, in turn, meant antinomianism. No laws of the universe could
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trump the laws of human freedom. But James’s antinomian universe, which threw all 
responsibility onto the shoulders of the agent, was a profoundly unforgiving universe.
The choice to attend to one idea over another for even a few moments could seal the 
“doom” of the agent, and could never be undone. This is the same fatalism that James 
expresses in his chapter on habit: once plasticity is lost, the person cannot change. For 
James, freedom exists in the moment (1.453) and, once the possibilities of the moment 
have passed, is forever and unforgivingly lost. Surely, other morally decisive moments 
may arise, but the moral failures of the past make these increasingly rare and increasingly 
difficult to embrace.
Like the existentialists that would follow him, free will was thus a burdensome 
reality. This burdensomeness can be detected in the following passage: “But the whole 
feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our 
sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is 
not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago.” The feeling 
that we are actually deciding things “...makes life and history tingle with such a tragic 
zest...” The sting and zest of human freedom is simultaneously and necessarily tragic. 
This way of thinking about the universe contrasted strongly with that of Edwards, who 
not only thought all events to be predetermined, but also believed the Universe to be on 
his side. The “chain that was forged innumerable ages ago” was anything but “dull” to 
Edwards. It was a source of hopeful expectation and a sense that a Being greater than 
himself buoyed his consciousness above the realities of sin and misery in this life.
James again relegated the issue to metaphysics and insisted that the issue could 
not be resolved on logical grounds. The intuitions of the libertarian, or the determinist.
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(or the Arminian or the Calvinist), do not and cannot derive from a dispassionate 
consideration of the evidence- for the evidence is simply nonexistent. The feeling of 
effort “...may not be an illusion.” Even the determinist must admit that this is the case. 
James took comfort in the impasse, “...the result is two conceptions of possibility face to 
face with no facts definitely enough known to stand as arbiter between them.” Since 
evidence cannot arbitrate, the psychologist has two options, first, to remain agnostic until 
science conclusively resolves the issue, or, second, to allow “...one’s general philosophy 
to incline the beam.” Since the determinists certainly allowed their worldview to “incline 
the beam,” James simply asked for right to do the same.
Association
James began his chapter on association reiterating the point he made in the 
preceding chapter on discrimination: that synthesis and analysis are both crucial 
psychological processes. “It is obvious that the advance of our knowledge must consist 
of both operations; for objects at first appearing as wholes are analyzed into parts, and 
objects appearing separately are brought together and appear as new compound wholes to 
the mind. Analysis and synthesis are thus the incessantly alternating mental activities, a 
stroke of the one preparing the way for a stroke of the other, much as, in walking, a 
man’s two legs are alternately brought into use, both being indispensable for any orderly 
advance.” So, after having offered his explanation of discrimination, he gave his account 
of syntheses, or of “the association of ideas.”
The phenomenon that the associationists desired to explain, i.e., the way thoughts 
are spontaneously connected to each other in consciousness, was an obvious and 
important empirical given to James He was impressed by the mysteriousness of these
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mental connections, and seemed somewhat ambivalent about the way attempts to 
explicate the rules of mental association bad actually served “...to banish something of 
the mystery...”
The rules of association did not attempt to explain the manifold connections 
between objects that can be conceived. These connections (such as “coexistence, 
succession, resemblance, contrast, contradiction, cause and effect, means and end, genus, 
and species, part and whole...., etc; 1.551) are innumerable and have more to do with 
logic than psychology. James, and the associationists were concerned not with 
cataloguing all of the ways a human mind can conceive of connections between objects. 
Rather, as psychologists, they desired to understand the basic laws that describe the way 
the mind makes comiections between thoughts. To put the issue differently, ''there 
are...mechanical conditions on which thought depends, and which, to say the least, 
determine the order in which is presented the content or material fo r  her comparisons, 
selections, and decisions” (1.553). By explicating the mechanics of thought, James was 
entering into potentially uneasy territory. As we have seen (and we shall see), James’s 
theory of free will depended a great deal upon freedom of thought. It is not surprising, 
then, that immediately after explicating the mechanics of spontaneous thought in this 
chapter, he immediately tried to carve out some space for free thought.
James reiterated his criticism of the notion of simple ideas. “...The whole historic 
doctrine of psychological association is tainted with one huge error— t^hat of the 
construction of our thoughts out of the compoimding of themselves together of 
immutable and incessantly recurring ‘simple ideas.’” (1.553). The basic “principles of 
association,” building upon this error, purported to explain the ways simple ideas
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combine into wholes. Despite the erroneous first principles of orthodox associationist 
psychology, James still thought associationist insights were a fundamental part of human 
psychology. His chapter is a kind of funetional re-interpretation of associationist 
principles.
Given the falsity of the doctrine of simple ideas, the first re-conceptualization that 
James offered concerned precisely what was associated. James had previously made the 
point that consciousness experience is object-centered, rather than idea-centered. Indeed, 
psychologically speaking, “simple ideas” were simply an unreal abstraction. Therefore, 
“we ought to talk of the association of objects, not of the association of ideas” And, in 
order to move beyond mere description to explanation, i.e., to think of assoeiation as a 
cause, James thought of association as occurring between brain processes.
James laid out “a few familiar facts” of association. For one, “the laws of motor 
habit in the lower centres of the nervous system...” (1.554) produce associative effects, 
and impressions from different senses may be associated just as easily as impressions 
from the same sense. He also addresses “the rapidity of association.”
With his object-centered approach to association in place, James defined the law 
of contiguity: ‘''objects once experienced together tend to become associated in the 
imagination, so that when any one o f them is thought o f  the others are likely to be 
thought o f also, in the same order o f sequence or coexistence as before” (1.561). He 
related this psyehological law to physiological laws of habit, and claimed that Descartes, 
Locke and Hartley, who had made similar physiological arguments, to be his intellectual 
predecessor in this matter.
The law of contiguity is of only limited helpfulness, however, because it does not
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explain precisely which associated object will be brought into consciousness upon 
consideration of another object. Most objects that are held in consciousness are 
associated with many objects. How does the mind select among the many possible 
associated objects? Although the associationists had attempted to derive other laws of 
association to fill in the gaps, James insisted, upon consideration of his knowledge of the 
brain, that there are no such laws. Only “the law of neural habit” (1.566) was effectual in 
associative processes. The other laws of association are simply post hoc explanations 
that depend upon the result of these neural mechanisms. On the face of it, this conclusion 
leaves association largely a mystery- which is precisely what an indeterminist wants.
James re-stated the problem in terms of brain physiology. “Let us then assume as 
the basis o f all our subsequent reasoning this law: When two elementary brain-processes 
have been active together or in immediate succession, one o f them, on reoccurring, tends 
to propagate its excitement into the other’’ (1.566). Although this principle is elegant, it 
oversimplifies the realities of association. Any given elementary brain-process has been 
associated with many other brain-process. The problem is: how is only one particular 
process activated when many are possible? James’s answer was relatively 
straightforward and mechanical. If the excitement of one brain process is insufficient to 
bring a particular object to consciousness, other brain-processes associated with this 
object (but not with the other possible objects) also need to be present.
James was content to remain mechanistic with “...spontaneous trains of thought 
and ideation, such as occur in revery or musing.” He thought, however, that “...the case 
of voluntary thinking toward a certain end...” was a different story, as is discussed below.
James noted that association does not usually involve “impartial redintegration,”
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or the “complete reproduction of all the items of a past experience” (1.571). Rather, 
particular facets of past experience are ordinarily brought into consciousness during 
association. To explain what precisely determines which facets are brought into 
consciousness, James turned to one of his favorite concepts, interest. The items which 
are associated are ‘'...those which appeal most to our INTEREST” (1.572). Since interest 
is the determinative factor, it is only when we find all things equally interesting that we 
may actually experience impartial redintegration. James challenged his readers to inspect 
their own trains to thought to see that this was the case.
This still left open the question regarding the precise content of an association. 
What determined which elements of a recalled object would determine the subsequent 
objects in the chain of association? The mere principle of habit could only explain so 
much, because an object of thought does not always elicit thoughts of the same object. 
James thought that other principles could fill in the gaps-to some extent. Recency of 
association, vividness of original experience, and emotional congruity also determine 
which representation is elicited rather than another.
Despite the basic predictability of these chains of thought, James, not 
surprisingly, called attention to the impossibility of perfectly predicting any chain. 
Although it is possible in hindsight to see how the particular objects in a chain were 
associated with one another, it is really impossible to know beforehand precisely which 
objects will emerge in the chain. Sometimes objects that seem less vivid, less recent, less 
congruent are remembered. James resisted the temptation to simply postulate 
indeterminism at this point, however. Instead, sticking to his naturalistic guns, he 
deterministically argued that the chain is “no doubt...determined by cerebral causes.
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[which are] too subtle and shifting for our analysis” (1.577). Indeed, he went so far as to 
argue that “...the order of presentation o f the mind’s materials is due to cerebral 
physiology alone” (1.593). But herein lay the foundations of the indeterminism of the 
system. The presentation of objects to consciousness is fatally determined. The selection 
of objects is not.
James, defending the great American tradition of indeterminism regarding acts of 
will, was, therefore, not content to allow determinism to reign freely over the entire mind. 
The preceding analysis applied only to “spontaneous” thought. As a human being allows 
thought to flow with out the deliberate intervention of will, the deterministic laws of 
association and habit will fatally determine the exact content of thought. Actions, which 
are always linked to thought, will therefore also fatally follow the thought. But James 
argued that there was another path to action, which, in some limited cases, trumped the 
laws of association and habit. This path had to do with “distinct purpose or conscious 
interest” (1.583).
When a person engages in such deliberate activity, a “modification” is made in 
the chain of association. This modification was, like spontaneous mental actively, rooted 
in the brain. When a given train of thought is characterized by purpose, this purpose is, 
physiologically speaking, “...the persistent activity of certain rather definite brain- 
processes throughout the whole course of thought” (1.583). This purpose-driven 
cognition is actually the typical mental activity. “Our most usual cogitations are not pure 
reveries, absolute driftings, but revolve about some central interest or topic to which most 
of the images are relevant, and towards which we return promptly after occasional 
digressions.” This is of course fully consistent with the thoroughgoing teleology of
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James’s psychology. James illustrated the crucial role of purpose in human thought in a 
number of ways. Returning, for example, to the question of which aspect of an object of 
thought will activate the next object in the train, James argued that purpose looms large in 
this determination. “If, for instance, I think of Paris whilst I am hungry, I shall not 
improbably find that its restaurants have become the pivot of my thought, etc., etc.” 
(1.384). Purposive thinking is also evident in problem solving (i.e., when the means to an 
end are not clear), and in the desire to recall a specific piece of forgotten information. 
James thought these processes to be linked to feeling: the desire to remember the 
forgotten item is manifested as “an aching void” which impels the thinker toward the 
missing information.
Most relevant, James thought that these mental activities were related to the will, 
and, by implication, indeterminist principles. When we attempt to recall a specific bit of 
information, the will “hover[s]” over consciousness, looking for the object of its desire. 
As it hovers, a non-volitional process occurs, bringing various associations and memories 
into consciousness. As the will follows those memories which seem closest to the goal, a 
sense of “that we are ‘warm’” is sensed. When the desired objeet is finally recalled, the 
tension and longing vanish and “the mind finds an inexpressible relief’ (1.586). Although 
the process of association is inextricably physiological and deterministic, the ability of 
the mind to “hover,” to attend certain elements of the stream and ignore others, was for 
James the domain of freedom. A theme to which James frequently returned was the 
causal efficacy of consciousness. If “will” was to make any sense to James (and the 
Arminian mental philosophers before him), it would have to have some power over and 
above the normal flow of automaticity and determination. The following paragraph
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summarizes the basic issues so well that it should be quoted in full:
The effects o f interested attention and volition remain. These activities seem to 
hold fast to certain elements, and by emphasizing them and dwelling on them, to 
make their associates the only ones which are evoked. This is the point at which 
an anti-mechanical psychology must, if anywhere, make it stand in dealing with 
association. Everything else is pretty certainly due to cerebral laws. My own 
opinion on the question of active attention and spiritual spontaneity is expressed 
elsewhere. But even though there be a mental spontaneity, it can certainly not 
create ideas or summon them ex abrupto. Its power is limited to selecting 
amongst those which the associative machinery has already introduced or tends to 
introduce. If it can emphasize, reinforce, or protract for a second either one of 
these, it can do all that the most eager advocate of free will need demand; for it 
then decides the direction of the next associations by making them hinge upon the 
emphasized term; and determining in this wise the course of the man’s thinking, it 
also determines his acts. (1.594)
The Perception of Reality
Belief
James begins his chapter on “the perception of reality” characteristically, with an 
appeal to experience: “EVERYONE knows the difference between imagining a thing and 
believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth”
(11.283). Like Ames and Edwards, James is careful to make a distinction between mere 
supposition and faith. Unlike Ames, however, who thought of faith as trust and reliance 
upon an object, James thought belief had more to do with the perception of reality. “In
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the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by the mind, but is 
held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or function of cognizing reality” 
(1.283).^^
Again consistent with Ames and Edwards, James locates belief (to use the 
antiquated language of faculty psychology) in the will rather than the intellect. As the 
American Puritans tended to think of the affections as belonging to the will, James 
associated belief with affect: “/« its inner nature, belief or the sense o f reality, is a sort o f  
feeling more allied to the emotions than anything else. ” He further associated this 
affective element with the will: “It resembles more than anything what in the psychology 
of volition we know as consent. Consent is recognized by all to be a manifestation of our 
active nature. It would naturally be described by such terms as ‘willingness’ or the 
‘turning of our disposition.’” Just as faith in Puritan psychology led to peace of mind and 
composure, James thought belief was accompanied by “...the cessation of theoretic 
agitation, though the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly 
to the exclusion of contradictory ideas” (11.282). Unbelief is of the same sort of 
phenomenon, accompanied by a lack of agitation, for the unbeliever is just as settled as 
the believer. In light of the similarities between belief and unbelief, James therefore 
thought that the opposite of belief, psychologically considered, is not unbelief. Rather, 
the opposite of belief would include a lack of the settledness of belief. It would include 
agitation. Therefore, the opposite of belief is doubt and inquisitiveness. A mind still 
unsure of what is true is a mind lacking peace. (James is here relying on introspection). 
The connection between the Puritan and the Jamesean view of belief becomes a bit 
clearer in this light. For Ames, belief was a resting of the soul a trust, a “lack of
Recall that Upham had briefly spoken o f belief in similar terms, Upham, 1869,1.178.
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agitation” concerning the trustworthiness of God. Further, just as Ames insisted that a 
human heart will believe in something, be it God, or “wisdom, power, friends, and their 
own riches” (Ames, 1968,1.iii.13) and, correspondingly, a belief in power or riches 
makes faith in God impossible, James too saw belief and unbelief in similar terms. “But 
we shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for he reason that we 
believe something else which contradicts the first thing” (James, 1890,11.284).
Another similarity between James and the American Puritan tradition is the link 
between belief and action. Like the writer of the biblical book of James, the American 
Puritans were strongly convinced that faith without works is no faith at all. William 
James, utilizing the logic of physiology rather than scripture, thought that action tended 
to follow belief as well. Yet, since James had a physiological point of view, he had a 
broader view of what constitutes action. For James, the mere twitching of a muscle was 
action, whereas the Puritans were more eoncemed with full outward acts of obedience.
The extent to which James found human belief and unbelief to be independent of 
cool, rational considerations, is found in the experimental materials that he selected to 
illustrate these principles. Both the quiet of belief and the tumult of inquiry may be 
“pathologically exalted.” In the case of drunkenness, belief is strengthened eonsiderably 
through “...the deepening of the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein”
(11.284). “Nitrous oxide intoxication” carries this principle “to a fully unutterable 
extreme...in which a man’s very soul will sweat with conviction, and he be all the while 
unable to tell what he is convinced of at all.” Doubt also has its pathological forms, such 
as “...the questioning mania,” which “...consists in the inability to rest in any conception, 
and the need of having it confirmed and explained ‘Why do I stand here where I stand ?’
638
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
‘Why is a glass a glass, a chair a chair’ ‘How is it that men are only of the size they are? 
Why not as big as houses,’ etc., etc.” (11.284). He also discussed cases in which nothing 
seems real at all. By laying out these extremes, and showing how they were related to 
physiological conditions, James was undermining the rationality of belief. Conviction is 
an emotional matter which has very little to do with the objective consideration of 
evidence. If James was an intellectualist, he was certainly one very different than 
Upham, who seemed rather convinced that human beings have the capacity to he 
objective in their reasoning.
Although I am arguing for a continuity between James’s psychology of belief and 
the indigenous Puritan psychology of will, it is clear that James did not cite William 
Ames or Jonathan Edwards to support these notions. As was the case particularly with 
Upham, James also borrowed explicitly from modem, European authors, who made 
much the same point, but without sectarian language. James approvingly citied John 
Stewart Mill, who argued that it is impossible to give an account for the distinction 
between holding a mere proposition in the mind and believing that proposition is tme. 
More to the point, James cited Brentano, who argued that every object which enters into 
consciousness does so in two ways. First, each object of consciousness is simply an 
object of thought. Second, this object is either accepted and embraced, or rejected.
James thought that certain elements characterize cases of belief and doubt. In both cases 
there is a proposition consisting of subject, a predicate, and the relation between the two. 
Yet, any given proposition may be believed or doubted, and, in either case, the content of 
the proposition does not change, i.e., it is the same proposition in both cases. What 
changes is “the psychic attitude” (11.287) with which the proposition is carried.
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Given the existence of human belief thus defined, and the difficulty of explaining 
its nature in consciousness, James then turned to the question regarding the conditions of 
belief. When does belief occur?
The Various Orders of Reality. James argued that a primitive or “new-hom 
mind” is not capable of doubt. A mind such as this, “...entirely blank and waiting for 
experience to begin,” is engrossed by the first sensations it encounters. If the new-born 
mind encounters “a lighted candle against a dark background, and nothing else,” then that 
candle “...constitutes the entire universe known to the mind in question.” Even if  the 
candle is imaginary, the naive mind will not know the difference. For this mind, “That 
candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of attention is absorbed by it. It is, it is that, 
it is there', no other possible candle, or quality of this candle, no other possible place, or 
possible object in the place, no alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable.” 
In this case, “...how can the mind help believing the candle real?” It is impossible that it 
could do anything else but believe that the candle which fills its conscious experience is 
real. It has no frame of reference to contradict the experience. (11.286). He cites Spinoza 
to this effect. So, just as belief can only be eradicated by belief in a contradictory 
proposition, so too “...the sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, 
when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. Any object which 
remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality. (11.288- 
289).
After spending some time discussing the ways in which contradictory 
propositions come to be held by the mind, he addresses the weighty moral issue 
concerning whieh of the contradictory ways of thinking is accompanied by the attitude of
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belief, i.e., which proposition is considered real. His answer is starkly indeterminist and 
even “Arminian:” belief is simply a matter of choice, “...we must choose which way to 
stand by...” James also seems to assert that humans have the ability to choose among 
contradictory propositions:”...we can choose which way o f thinking to adhere to and 
which to disregard'' (11.290). By choosing to “adhere” to a given object, that object 
becomes real:
The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes adhered to real 
attributes, the existence adhered to real existence; whilst the subjects disregarded 
become imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous attributes, and 
the existence disregarded an existence into men’s land, in the limbo ‘where 
footless fancies dwell.’ (11.290-291)
In other words, psychologically speaking, reality is predicated of objects of belief, while 
non-reality is predicated of objects of nonbelief.
When contrasted with the preceding voluntarist exposition (i.e., that belief and 
therefore will are a matter of affect), James’s explanation of how the mind selects one 
reality over another is quite abrupt and seemingly inconsistent. One might have expected 
him to say that belief is determined by those irrational processes that ordinarily 
accompany belief. That is, some objects are inexplicably connected with the “sting” of 
reality while others are not. James departs from his voluntarist psychology here, and 
echoes the Arminian psychology of Upham and the American mental philosophy 
tradition. One believes in one object over another simply because one chooses to believe. 
James’s explication of the “faculty of effort” similarly manifests this indeterminist 
formulation.
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The human mind does not perceive only one unified reality, but cognizes a 
plurality of (typically) disconnected “sub-universes” which are thought to have existence. 
James listed seven sub-universes which are “...commonly discriminated from each other 
and recognized by most of us as existing, each with its own special and separate style of 
existence...” These are “the world of sense, or of physical ‘things’,” “the world of 
science, or of physical things...,” “the world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed 
or believable by all...,” “the world of ‘idols of the tribe,’ illusions or prejudices common 
to the race,” “the various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and hell, the world of 
the Hindoo mythology, the world of Swedenborg’s visa et audita, etc.,” “the various 
worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are,” and “the worlds of sheer madness 
and vagary, also indefinitely numerous” (11.292-293).
We automatically refer or categorize our objects of thought as belonging to one of 
these worlds, and tend to be consistent in the way we designate them. Any given object 
of thought “...settles into...” the belief that it is a scientific object, or an object of sense, 
for example. Although the typical mind does not seek to understand the connections 
between these worlds, each mind believes the object of thought and its corresponding 
“world” to be “...real after its own fashion,” as long as one pays attention to it. “The 
reality lapses with the attention” (11.293).
In addition to these typical patterns of categorization (by which objects of 
attention are referred to particular sub-universes), human minds also typically have 
patterns of meta-perception. In other words, in the individual mind, one or two of the 
aforementioned sub-universes becomes ’‘the world o f  ultimate realities ” (11.293).
Objects of thought which fit into this world are perceived as being real, objects which do
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not fit are seen as unreal. James thought that for most people the world of sense was 
ultimate. For the “special man” scientific thought or theology or philosophy may be the 
ultimate reality but even these people are naturally equipped with a profound respect for 
things of sense.
The human tendency to live primarily in only one or two sub-universes is a 
function of human limitation. James interpreted this limitation theologically. God knows 
all aspects of the creation, knows precisely how they fit together, and therefore does not 
need to negate the existence of certain objects out of ignorance. “Finite creatures,” 
however, can only attribute reality to those objects which “...appear both interesting and 
important. The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat 
simply negatively, we brand them as unreal” (11.295). To appear interesting and 
important is to arouse the ''emotional and active life'' of the perceiver. In tension with his 
indeterminist statements, James portrayed this arousal as involuntary” whatever excites 
and stimulates our interest is real..." His language in this context is again Augustinian: 
“...whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or 
practically take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the 
contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it...” 
then the object is unreal. Typically, however, James did not refer these insights to 
religious sources, but rather David Hume’s insight that belief is a “lively and active” idea. 
James goes beyond merely speaking of lively and active ideas, but uses the language of 
love and hatred that was so popular to the Augustinian spirituality of American 
Puritanism.
By locating belief in “the affections” James utilized voluntarist language similar
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to Ames’s, who argued that the will is the sine qua non of belief. The pre-trichotomous 
faculty psychology of Puritanism did not draw a rigid distinction between affections and 
will. To engage the affections was to engage the will. James description therefore 
recapitulated the Puritan distinction between head and heart, and equated heart and will: 
As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give reality to whatever 
objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of our pausing 
thought, if nothing more. But, as thinkers with emotional reaction, to give what 
seems to be a still higher degree o f  reality to whatever things we select and 
emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL. These are our living realities; and not only 
these, but all the other things which are intimately connected with these. (1.297) 
James quoted Bain, who said much the same thing: “...as Prof. Bain puts it: ‘In its 
essential character, belief is a phase of our active nature — otherwise called the Will’” 
(11.296). The interesting thing about this quote is that James here seems to adopt the 
more organic, affectional definition of will which was common in the Puritan period, 
rather than the more narrow “Arminian” notion of deliberate and effortful choice among 
alternatives.
In the section entitled “THE PARAMOUNT REALITY OF SENSATIONS,” 
James continues in this deterministic vein, reminiscent of the Puritan tradition. He 
indirectly addresses the central question of Edwards’ Freedom of the Will, i.e.. What 
determines the will? by addressing the determinants of belief. Since belief determines 
volition in James’s psychology, the question regarding the determination of belief is the 
same as the determination of will.
James was impressed with the way certain objects capture our attention and
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affections, while other objects are ignored. He therefore attempted to explain what 
determines the believability of certain objects. His basic explanation sounds 
Edwardsean. “Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence o f a stronger relation, 
suffices to make an object reair  He referred back to bis example of the infant whose 
very first sensation is that of a candle. For this baby, the candle is ultimate reality, and, 
by implication, all actions will be fatally based upon this belief. As other objects of 
sensation enter into the conscious experience of this baby, contradictory messages may 
emerge. The question then becomes, which experience or object will be the stronger?
James’s dictum was: “As a, rule, the success with which a contradicted object 
maintains itself in our belief is proportional to several qualities which it must possess.” 
These qualities, which “run into each other” are, in descending order:
(1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess consciousness: then 
follow-
(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the way of exciting pleasure or 
pain;
(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, the 
more instinctive the better;
(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admiration, desire, etc.;
(5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation — unity, simplicity, 
permanence, and the like;
(6) Independenee of other causes, and its own causal importance. (11.299)
The similarities between this list, and Edwards’ discussion of the things which
contribute “...to the agreeableness of an object of choice” in Freedom of the Will are
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noticeable. For example, just as Edwards argued that the “idea” of “the sweet relish of a 
delicious fruit” is stronger when tasting than imagining, James argued that “sensations 
are more lively and are judged more real than conceptions...” Given the Augustinian 
flavor of this treatment of belief, it is not surprising that Edwards’ notion of 
“agreeableness” is similar to James’s understanding of what makes an object appear to be 
real. It is not important to summarize all of the things that James thought determined the 
“sting” or vividness or interest that a given object elicits. The important thing to note is 
that, like Edwards’ treatment, James thought that these relations could to some extent be 
understood and enumerated.
This is not to say that James and Edwards pointed to the same determinants. The 
more earthly-minded James put more stress on sensible experience in the creation of 
belief than Edwards. He thought (claiming to follow Hume) that any object of 
conception must be connected to a vivid sensational experience (which we by necessity 
believe whole-heartedly) in order to have the requisite “pungency” of belief. Indeed, 
James stressed this point as decisive in the determination of competing objects of belief 
(and therefore volition):
Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the 
conflict between objects, and the connecting o f them together in the mind, has 
begun. No object which neither possesses this vividness in its own right nor is 
able to borrow it from anjdhing else has a chance of making headway against 
vivid rivals, or of rousing in us that reaction in which belief consists. (1.301) 
Although this emphasis on the primacy sensation is different from Edwards (based as it is 
upon a different metaphor), it should be noted, again, that James is in this discourse
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wearing an “Augustinian” face, stressing the primary of affect (or “vividness”) over 
intellect. Along these lines, James also thought that humans have “...a tendency to 
helieve in emotionally exciting objects,” and that religious belief typically falls into this 
category. Although James does tend to make religious belief seem largely irrational here, 
(a view which the Protestant psychologists considered in this dissertation would 
disagree), the centrality of emotion in religious belief is certainly consistent with “the 
Augustinian strain of piety.” So too is the fundamentally inexplicable nature of who will 
believe and who will not.
James here stumbles upon the problem of Augustinian Christianity: the realization 
that belief and will are in some sense entirely outside of our control. And the quest for 
control, for “sovereignty” or “power” or “efficiency” over something, is an important 
aspect of both Arminianism and Enlightenment.
Belief in Objects of Theorv
It should be noted that James made a clear distinction between what objects ought 
to be believed and the psychological laws of actual belief. “The whole history of human 
thought is but an unfinished attempt...” to devise a satisfactory answer to the former 
question. (11.299). Yet, in the section entitled “belief in objects o f theory,"" James 
asserted that human experience, particularly moral experience, requires an “Object” of a 
particular kind. The corollary of this assertion is that without such an object human 
experience is unintelligible. Given the primacy of the object in the psychology of will, 
James’s thoughts here are particularly valuable in understanding the intellectual 
conundrum James faced as a “secular” “nonsectarian” psychologist who desired to 
preserve morality, meaning, and freedom. James believed passionately that there was an
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“Object...to press against” but could not say particularly what that object was. The 
failure of Janies, and, perhaps, the New Psychology, was, among other things, a failure to 
clearly name the object.
“Merely conceived” objects are” innumerable.” As stated above, these objects are 
understood as belonging to one of the various ‘sub-universes.’ The sub-universes, or 
“systems” often contradict. How do we choose which to believe? James offered a 
general rule: conceived system, to pass for true, must at least include the reality o f
the sensible objects in it, by explaining them as effects on us, i f  nothing more. The system 
which includes the most o f them, and definitely explains or pretends to explain the rest o f 
them, will, ceteris paribus, prevail” (11.312).
No system perfectly explains all the objects of conscious experience, but it is a 
deep human need to try to articulate such a system. When two or more systems do an 
equally good job explaining an object or phenomenon, how do we decide which to 
believe? In practice this is usually decided by the degree to which a given system appeals 
to “our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs” (11.312). He fleshes this out a bit more. A 
system may be logically coherent (such as materialism), but fail to capture “universal 
acceptance” if  it contradicts human needs or desires. Even worse, a theory may fail to 
supply an Object “to press against.” Materialism is such a theory because it “...denies 
reality to the objects of almost all the impulses which we most cherish.” The objects 
James had in mind here were not material objects, but objects of meaning or of theory, 
sueh as when a person declares “‘It is a glad world! how good is life!’ or ‘What a 
loathsome tedium is existence!”’ In either case, the person expressing these feelings 
assumes that goodness or badness can actually be predicated of the Universe. Any theory
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of the universe that denies this “...leaves the mind with little to care or act for” (11.313).
On a psychological level, human beings insist that “...the objects of those loves 
and aspirations which are our deepest energies” really exist as objects, and that our 
reaction to the “Cosmos” is consistent with the nature of the cosmos. The idea that the 
Cosmos makes no demands, or that the objects of our deepest longings are fictitious is a 
most existentially dreadful idea. Instead, a proper philosophy of life must be able to 
account for the full range of human experience, including “emotions” such as 
“...fortitude, hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness,” all of which presuppose the 
existence of a particular object.
James related this to the primacy of action in human psychology. Intellect is not 
primarily for merely speculative interests, but for action. As soon as one articulates what 
a person’s actions ought to be, however, one has said something about the Object. 
Similarly, comments about the character of life, e.g., that life is “real” or that it is 
“vanity,” also imply a description of the Object. Since our descriptions of the Object 
should cohere, “There is no more ludicrous incongruity than for agnostics to proclaim 
with one breath that the substance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the 
thought of it should inspire us with admiration of its glory, reverence, and a willingness 
to add our cooperative push in the direction towards which its manifestations seem to be 
drifting.”
James appears to have assumed that human beings have across the ages shared 
common experiences or “powers,” and that different philosophies of life emerge because 
they explain these experiences better than previous philosophies. “Primitive 
Christianity” was victorious because it affirmed the “weak and tender impulses” (such as
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repentance) which were denied by “paganism.” The Renaissance affirmed our aesthetic 
impulses and the Reformation our impulses of “faith and self-despair.” The 
Enlightenment affirmed our desire to believe that we are capable to do what the universe 
demands of us. In each example, James assumed that human beings possess universal 
“emotional and practical tendencies.” Preeminently, “...the impulse to take life strivingly 
is indestructible in the race” (11.315). Human beings will therefore adopt [i.e., believe in] 
philosophies that make sense of these impulses. Put another way, “Man needs a rule for 
his will, and will invent one if one be not given him.” In essence, then, James was 
arguing that subjectivity comes first. We invent objects to correspond to these 
subjectivities. If the opposite were the case, however, if our notions of objectivities 
actually shape our subjectivities, then James may have been presuming too much. Was 
the subjectivity that James called “will” really universal? Or was it a vestige of a 
tradition that had jealously sought first to articulate the moral Object of volition? James 
certainly thought that the object is crucial, yet he was also well aware that also thought 
that “...no general offhand answer can be given as to which objects mankind shall choose 
as its realities” (II.3I6). Therefore James hesitated to name an appropriate object of 
volition. James’s inability to “name the object” of volition may have actually contributed 
to the subsequent loss of the corresponding subjectivity, i.e., the will itself.
Although James thought it difficult to dogmatically assert the objects that humans 
ought to believe, he was willing to assert that materialism, a philosophy that negates all 
objects, needed to be rejected. Yet, although Materialism violently opposed the moral 
impulses of human nature, James also thought that it did appeal to the “purely intellectual 
interests” of human nature. It simply made a lot of sense to a lot of people. Bridging this
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gap between “science and sentiment” (as Noah Porter had once put it) seemed an 
impossible task for James. Articulating the “perfect object of belief ’ would require an 
explanation of all material and psychological events (such as the materialism of his day 
offered) while simultaneously affirming the universal need for transcendence. James 
described this object thus:
The perfect object o f belief would be a God or 'Soul o f the World, ’ represented 
both optimistically and moralistically (if such a combination could be), and withal 
so definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal experiences should be 
sent to us by Him in just the very way in which they come.
As noted above, the worldview of William Ames offered a solution to James’s problem. 
The God of Ames was the first cause of all events, assuring that all phenomena are 
determined and morally meaningful. But, like his father, and like the majority of 
religious Americans, James thought the Calvinist conception of deity failed to be 
sufficiently “optimistic.” Any notion of predestination was existentially unbearable. As 
he noted in his essay “the Dilemma of Determinism,” James could not believe that moral 
tragedy was fatally determined by the Universe. Just James’s father had rejected the 
Calvinistic predestinarian theology of his grandfather, James too rejected mechanistic 
predestination in favor of indeterminism. It seems that James could conceive of no other 
form of predestination. Since a predestined grace therefore could not be considered true 
grace, James thought that an ultimately indeterministic universe was the most gracious 
kind of universe. Yet, James sensed that this conception of the universe did violence to 
the scientific sentiment (i.e., “materialism”). Edwards might have claimed that James 
therefore longed for an impossible object, a determined indeterminate universe. It is not
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surprising that James did not think that an ultimately satisfying ‘object of theory’ could 
ever be articulated. Yet, James was so sure that this object would satisfy the needs of the 
human heart that “It is safe to say that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated, 
mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one alone as real” (11.317).
James closed his chapter on the perception of reality with a consideration of the 
“relations of belief and will.” Pointing forward to his chapter on the will, James defined 
will as “...a manner of attending to certain objects, or consenting to their stable presence 
before the mind.” The existence of these objects depends upon this attending, i.e., they 
will not come to pass unless the mind sustains attention upon them. Objects of belief, by 
way of contrast, do not depend upon this attention; their existence is independent of the 
thought. Yet, in both cases, the mind “...looks at the object and consents to its existence, 
espouses it, says ‘it shall be my reality.’ It tums to it, in short, in the interested active 
emotional way” (11.321). In this sense, both will and belief are the same psychological 
(but not physiological) phenomenon.
James dropped a hint at the free will question in this context. If we assume that 
the will is “indeterminate” then, since will and belief are the same psychological 
phenomenon, beliefs also are indeterminate. James concluded that “the first act of free­
will, in short, would naturally be to believe in free-will,” an argument that James would 
take up again in his chapter on will (11.321).
James recognized that this formula (that the first act of freedom is to believe in 
freedom) did not easily cohere with his affectional theory of belief. James blxmtly 
asserted that “we cannot control our emotions.” Since belief is our emotional reaction to 
a particular object, is it possible to simply believe in an object (like the ideational object
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of free will) if  we do not respond positively to that object? James thought that willpower 
could, if given enough time, and utilizing a “very simple method,” create belief: “we need 
only in cold blood ACT as i f  the thing in question were real, and keep acting as i f  it were 
real, and it infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will 
become real. It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be 
those which characterize belief’ (11.321). James applied this to religious and ethical 
belief. If a would-be believer simply “...make[s] a little sacrifice...ever day” to the object, 
belief will follow. Human efficiency may be meager, but, if properly utilized, it may 
create faith (a job that Ames and Edwards had insisted could only be God’s work, insofar 
that “faith” was true/saving faith in God). Further, James here seems to assume that there 
are objects that certain human beings would like to believe, but he doesn’t address the 
question of what would determine this desire. A person is not free to believe in God or 
any other object if  he or she does not even want to believe. But James, in this chapter at 
least, did not address this question. In some sense, then, James’s psychology of belief 
presupposes a religious or moral context in which individuals would actually desire to 
believe in certain objects. This validity of this presupposition, foundational to the 
formation of nonsectarian moral culture in American higher education, is an open 
question.
Summary and Conclusion 
After having argued that human efficiency is not threatened by the realities of 
physiology (chapter 10 in this dissertation), James moved on to psychology proper, the 
study of mental states. This chapter has therefore been a study of the way that James 
wove indeterminism into the most stubbornly deterministic psychological processes. The
653
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
quest for human efficiency is evident in his writing on the stream of thought, the self, 
attention, association, and belief (the perception of reality). James was always looking 
for that special place where freedom could be found, and that place was usually 
terrifyingly small. Still, a small space is “all that the.. .advocate of free will need 
demand” (1.594) in order to prove his Arminian point.
This chapter also provides evidence substantiating the nonsectarian thesis. In his 
writing on the stream of thought, James reveals a psychological pluralism, noting that 
different minds focus upon “a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations...” James did 
not assert that there was any particular object that needed to be singled out. Further, he 
presumed that the faculties as he understood them would be preserved. Yet, as I argued 
in the introduction to this dissertation, James desired to preserve the subject without its 
traditionally corresponding object: an experiment that may also have contributed to the 
loss of will in American psychology.
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CHAPTER XII
A LOSS OF WILL
In chapter 9 we were introdueed to the ironic possibility that the ‘Arminian’ 
veneration for the concept of the will may have actually contributed to the undermining 
of the concept. Not only did the psychology of Thomas Upham “shrink” the 
psychologieal territory attributable to the will, but it also rendered the faeulty rather 
useless in the case of moral virtue, whenever mental “harmony” ruled out the need for a 
special faculty to break the stalemate between natural desires and feelings of moral 
obligation.
In this chapter, which deals with what James called “the production of 
movement” (i.e., instinct, emotion and will), we find the identical conundrum. Further, 
the problem of “the shrinking will” finds its climax in James. James’s chapter on the will 
portrays the vast majority of voluntary life as automatic and determined—a far cry from 
the intentional deliberative glory of the Arminian will. Yet James does identify one type 
of voluntary action that can be understood as free: effortful choice in the face of 
altematives— t^he very phenomenon that shaped Upham’s entire system. Unlike Upham, 
however, James had a strong sense of what a small role this Arminian will has in our 
moment-to-moment conscious experience. Also unlike Upham, who did not have to 
eontend with the thoroughgoing naturalism of the late 19* century, James realized that if 
this Arminian will is “free” in the “Arminian” sense, then it simply could not be 
approaehed seientifically (since science was and is concerned with the causes of mental
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events). James’ monumental move, then, was to remove the fragile vestiges of the 
7\rminian will from the purview of science entirely. The will— insofar as the term had 
significant moral meaning—must, James insisted, he handed over to metaphysics. 
American psychology had lost its will.
The Production of Movement 
James concluded his consideration of “purely inward processes” with a discussion 
of reasoning in chapter 22 of the Principles. He then turned to the topic of “the 
production of movement,” drawing his readers back, once again, to the fact that internal 
processes inevitably result in “...some form of bodily activity due to the escape of the 
central excitement through outgoing nerves” (11.372). He reminds his reader that human 
neurology is “...but a machine for converting stimuli into reactions; and the intellectual 
part of our life is knit up with but the middle or ‘central’ portion of the machine’s 
operations.” The production of movement, by contrast, has to do with the resultant 
efferent impulses terminating in bodily movement. More specifically, any sensory input 
diffuses throughout the nervous organism, and thereby influences the entire body. James 
thought that three psychologieal phenomena were the chief examples of the production of 
movement: instinctive action, emotional expression, and voluntary action. The first two 
are worth considering briefly, for they again are related to the crucial voluntary/non­
voluntary distinction that is prevalent in the Principles.
Instinct
James thought that the typical understanding of instinct, as a tendency “...of acting 
in such away as to produce certain ends, without foresight o f the ends, and without 
previous education in the performance” (11.383) was fair enough. Although many would
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agree that instinet applies in “the animal kingdom,” James thought that instinctual 
behavior also characterized human action.
Particular Instinctive actions are brought about by particular stimuli. That is, 
instincts are reflexive acts. As such, they are fatally determined. For example, a cat is on 
a biological level “framed” in such a way that he “cannot help” but run after a mouse 
(11.384).
James thought it possible to understand the strange instinctual behavior of animals 
by consulting his own instinctual reactions. Through this analysis James concluded that 
the organism animated by an instinct is not consciously concerned with utility. Instead, 
the one propelled by instinct simply finds itself strongly attracted to certain objects. 
Consideration of adaptiveness is strictly philosophical and post hoc. Cuckoo birds, for 
example, which utilize other bird’s nests, are “...simply excited by the perception of quite 
determinate sorts of nest...” (11.389) not by any abstract consideration of function.
Instead, at the level of experience, instinctual impulses seem “...the only eternally right 
and proper thing to do,” and are ends in themselves (1.387). Instinctual impulses are like 
loves. The lion loves the lioness instinctualy, the bear loves the “she-hear.” Although 
not explicitly Augustinian in nature, the emphasis on love is, again, reminiscent of that 
tradition. The fact that when James interpreted animal instinct he saw them as loves is 
consistent with the idea that there is “an Augustinian strain of piety” in James. Again, the 
goal here is not to over-interpret or to posit some sort of causality, hut to merely highly 
similarities.
It was common in James’s day to say that humans do not have instincts but are, 
rather, rational creatures. Yet reason, James asserted (following Kant), includes the
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impulse “...to obey impulses of a eertain lofty sort, such as duty, or universal ends” 
(11.389). If “rational” human impulses such as these are included under the title of 
instinct, James thought, human beings then have many instincts, which, as I will show, he 
catalogued in this chapter.
James argued that higher mental processes such as memory complicate instinctual 
behavior, rendering it less fatal as the agent becomes consciously aware of ends pursued. 
Memory of past actions create expectancies for future results. These expectancies may or 
may not consist with present instinctual desires. If not, typically instinctual impulses 
may be overridden. Further, higher animals are endowed with contradictory impulses 
and instincts which naturally lead to a more cautious and less automatic way of 
responding to the world. Since reason has power to control and “set loose” certain 
instincts over others, it follows than human beings may actually possess a far greater 
number of instincts. Yet because of this controlling power of reason, humanity is 
“never...the fatal automaton which a merely instinctive animal would be” (11.393).
Ever interested in showing how the powers of inevitability may be thwarted, 
James discussed two other ways in which merely instinctual behavior may be overridden. 
James noted that “messrs. D. A. Spaulding and Romanes” had fastened their attention on 
two particular phenomena because they seemed to be “derangements in the mental 
constitution” and because they seemed to be cases in which “...the instinctive machinery 
has got out of gear” (11.394). It is significant that James would relish phenomena that 
were confounding respected European determinists. The two principles, James argued, 
are “...the inhibition o f instincts by habits, ” and “...the transitoriness o f instincts” 
(11.393). In the former case, early responses to instinctual impulses eventually override
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the instinctual impulses. For example, humans have an instinctual desire for food, but 
once we have found a few menu items we like, we tend to be content with those items. In 
the latter case, the ''law o f transitoriness ” has to do with the fact that some instincts 
emerge during definite points in the development of the organism and then fade away.
The thing that perplexed some thinkers was how instinctual impulses seemed to continue 
past the period in which the impulses were active. James thought that habit was a much 
better explanation than that of machinery getting out of gear. That is, an instinctual 
impulse may be repeated so often so as to become habitual, ensuring that the behavior 
continues after the impulse is gone. Given that James used strong deterministic language 
in discussing these two phenomena, it is clear that his purpose of discussing these 
phenomena was not to undermine deterministic processes per se, but rather to show that 
behavior is much more complex than a simple mechanistic scheme would allow.
James gave a lengthy discussion of human instincts. Although he admitted that 
enumerating instincts is “a somewhat arbitrary matter,” he also affirmed that humans 
have more instincts than any other speeies. Human instincts include the reflexes 
possessed in infancy, walking, vocalization, imitation, emulation or rivalry, 
pugnacity/anger/resentment, sympathy, hunting, fear, appropriation/aquisitiveness, 
constructiveness, play, curiosity, sociability/shyness, secretiveness, cleanliness, 
modesty/shame, love, jealousy, and parental love.
James ended the chapter with a moral exhortation to parents. It is crucial to 
provide growing children with objects that coincide with the various instincts that arise at 
different points in development. The developmental outcome for children undergoing a 
“starvation of objects” is dire;
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Compare the accomplished gentleman with the poor artisan or tradesman of a 
city: during the adolescence of the former, objects appropriate to his growing 
interests, bodily and mental, were offered as fast as the interests awoke, and, as a 
consequence, he is armed and equipped at every angle to meet the world. Sport 
came to the rescue and completed his education where real things were lacking.
He has tasted of the essence of every side of human life, being sailor, hunter, 
athlete, scholar, fighter, talker, dandy, man of affairs, etc., all in one. Over the 
city poor boy’s youth no such golden opportunities were hung, and in his man­
hood no desires for most of them exist. Fortunate it is for him if gaps are the only 
anomalies his instinctive life presents; perversions are too often the fruit of his 
unnatural bringing up. (11.441)
In a way reminiscent of his dire prognostications for youth with bad habits, James offered 
little hope for the adult who as a child was object-starved. This particular “...individual 
then grows up with gaps in his psychic constitution which future experiences can never 
fill” (11.441, Italics mine). The notion that there are objects that correspond to universal 
subjectivities is an idea we encountered in James’s thoughts on belief in his chapter on 
the perception of reality (chapter 11 in this dissertation).
Emotion
James thought it very difficult to separate instincts from emotions because 
instinctual reactions always contain some emotional element: “Objects of rage, love, fear, 
etc., not only [instinctually] prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke characteristic 
[emotional] alterations in his attitude and visage, and affect his breathing, circulation, and
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other organic functions in specific ways” (11.442). James also thought that emotions and 
instincts (like belief and will) are, at a physiological level, one and the same.
James thought that making a long list of types of emotions, which was the 
contemporary practice, was a tedious and unhelpful exercise. Instead, James offered a 
theory of emotions, a theory that he had in common with the “Danish physiologist” 
Charles Lange. This theory challenged the prevailing theory (like the one we saw in 
Thomas Upham): that emotions follow  some perception of an event, which, in turn, 
influence the body. James simply desired to equate emotion with the bodily arousal.
That is, "'...bodily changes follow directly the perception o f the exciting fact, and that our 
feeling o f the same changes as they occur IS the emotion''’ (11.449). These bodily 
reactions to perceptions add heat to otherwise cold cognitions. “Without the bodily states 
following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, 
destitute of emotional warmth” (11.450). James goes on for pages making the point that 
emotion and bodily responses are inextricably linked. He desired to stress “...how much 
our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame...” (11.467), and marshaled as much 
evidence as he could to make the point. Given that the prevailing opinion was that 
emotion was something other than physiology, it is understandable that he did so. But, 
from the perspective of volition, it is the automaticity of the emotional/physiological 
reactions to perception which is the central issue. James thought it beyond doubt that 
certain objects automatically issue in physiological responses. The body is a “sounding 
board” for the perceptions of the mind. In other words, emotions cannot be chosen. But, 
as we shall see, perceptions (or ideas), can be chosen.
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The Will
James began his chapter on the will utilizing language that Upham would have 
felt comfortable with, arguing that desire is different than will, and may or may not 
actually lead to volition. Yet, consistent with the somatic theme running through the 
Principles, James immediately relates the will to the body. “The only ends which follow 
immediately upon our willing seem to be movements of our own bodies.” Yet, even 
though Ames, Edwards, and Upham did not focus much on the body, the issue of the 
connection between the inward and the outward runs through the entire tradition. What 
set James apart, at least at first glance, was that he thought a responsible treatment of the 
will to include a discussion of “the mechanism of production” of voluntary bodily 
movements. (Also interesting is that James thought the elements of his treatment of the 
will “difficult to arrange in any continuous logical order.” (11.486; Upham was of course 
radically different from James in this regard). Up to this point, James had been 
discussing bodily movements that were “automatic and reflex” and “unforeseen by the 
agent” (11.486). To contrast, voluntary movements are those that are done “with full 
prevision” (11.487). Unlike the primary, involuntary “explosions” associated with 
reflexes, instincts, and emotions, voluntary movement is “secondary.” Further, all 
muscular movements are initially involuntary. We leam to perform these movements 
voluntarily only later. As will become clearer below, the execution of these voluntary 
movements is mediated through the “ideas” of these movements which are deposited in 
memory. These memorial ideas are sensory and may have optical, tactile, auditory, and 
other aspects. Most important are the “kinesthetic impressions” associated with the given
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movement. These impressions include the feelings associated with the various muscles, 
ligaments, “articular surfaces,” and skin as they engage in specific movements.
James quoted at length a number of experiments showing that “the successful 
carrying out of a concatenated series of movements” requires ‘^ guiding sensations.” 
Typically, the guiding sensations of movement are the kinesthetic impressions. The 
quoted experiments were of interest because they involved “anesthetic” subjects who had 
lost their kinesthetic impressions. As long as movements were continually guided by 
some remaining sense, the movements could he successfully completed. But without the 
input of this sense, the movements would fail to occur or fail to be sustained. For 
example, one anesthetic patient could move a limb only as long as he looked at the limb. 
The movement failed when he closed his eyes (11.490). Typically, of course, a movement 
can be completed with the eyes closed, but only because the kinesthetic impressions 
allow not only for the continuation but also the moment by moment adjustments requisite 
for the successful completion of the movement. James concluded that kinesthetic 
impressions^^ are “indispensable.. .for our voluntary activity” (11.492).
We may consequently set it down as certain that, whether or no there be anything
else in the mind at the moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental
In the full passage from which I quote in this sentence, James actually says that “passive sensations” are 
indispensable, not kinesthetic impressions. I think that the term kinesthetic impressions actually better 
expresses his point here. Passive sensations are the kinesthetic impressions associated with “passive 
movements” (11.488), i.e., “movements commimicated to oin limbs by others” (11.488). Yet, it seems to me 
that James’ broader point between pages 488-492 is that “kinesthetic impressions” (not just passive 
sensations) (11.488) are necessary for successful movement. “Kinesthetic impressions” is a broader term, 
defined above, o f which passive sensations are a species. Since not all o f the examples James uses to 
illustrate the importance o f kinesthetic impressions deal with passive movements, I conclude that it is not 
the “feelings o f  passive movement” (11.489), a term I take as synonymous with passive sensation o f  
movement) or the “passive sensations o f movement” (11.492) which are indispensable, but the kinesthetic 
impressions. This conclusion is supported by the idea that his summary o f his position on pages 492-493 
substitutes the broader word “kinesthetic” for the more narrow idea o f “passive sensation” indicating that 
he was using them synonymously at this point (and inconsistently in the passage).
663
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conception made up o f memory-images o f these sensations, defining which special 
act it is, must be there. (11.492)
James’s “fist thesis” concerning volition, therefore, was that . .there need be nothing 
else, and that in perfectly simple voluntary acts there is nothing else, in the mind but the 
kinesthetic idea, thus defined, o f what the act is to be’’ (11.492-493).
I would like to highlight two things in this quotation. First is the apparent 
narrowness of the definition of volition. James, at this point at least, reduces volition to 
the desire to carry out muscular movements. The “act” is simply the execution of certain 
muscular and bodily movements. Second is the apparent “intellectualism” of this 
passage. Remember, intellectualism was the idea that the will always follows the last 
dictate of the understanding. Here too James is arguing that the will follows the 
understanding (i.e., the kinesthetic idea). The issue is complicated by the fact that James 
was inconsistent on both of these issues. For example, James’s discussion of belief in his 
chapter on the perception of reality (see chapter 11) leaned in a voluntarist direction. 
Nevertheless, at this point, let us focus on the current form of Jamesean intellectualism 
expressed here.
The Feeling of hmervation
In positing this modem form of “intellectualism,” James had to contradict the 
leading European psychologists of his era. He was, at the same time, continuing the 
tradition of modified intellectualism that had characterized the indigenous mental 
philosophy tradition of the nineteenth century.
James began his challenge of Wundtian voluntarism (and more broadly, European 
determinism) by asking “Now is there anything else in the mind [besides kinesthetic
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ideas] when we will to do an actT’ To his chagrin, James noted that there currently was 
“a powerful tradition in Psychology” that posited that “something additional to these 
images of passive sensation is essential to the mental determination of a voluntary act” 
(11.493). To put the issue simply, this extra something was feeling. Like the voluntarists 
of old, the contemporary consensus was that voluntary actions were most closely aligned 
with affective states rather than intellectual ones.^°
To put the issue in its more complicated form, these European voluntarists posited 
“feelings of innervation,” i.e.,. the “feelings” associated with the “special current of 
energy going out from the brain into the appropriate muscles during the act” (11.493). 
James strongly agreed that there was an outgoing (efferent) current from brain to muscle, 
but he disagreed strongly with the idea that these currents per se have associated feelings. 
As if the feeling of innervation were a religious creed, James boldly proclaimed, “/  
disbelieve in its existence’’ (11.493). He therefore thought that a refutation of the concept 
was necessary, even if it were one of “tedious length.” Danziger (2001) corroborates this 
contention, noting that the concept of the feeling of innervation was “far more important 
to James than it was to Wundt” (p. 117) because of its relevance to James’s 
intellectualism and desire for free will.
At first glance, the feeling of innervation is plausible given our experiences of 
intentional activities, such as plajdng “ten-pins or billiards, or throw[ing] a ball.” We feel 
the exertion we are making, and the feeling seems to be the feeling of the nerves surging
Although this sounds similar to Upham, the cmcial difference between the European volimtarists (at least 
Wimdt— see Danziger, 2001), and Upham, who is, I think, best characterized as an intellectualist, was the 
radical distinction that Upham posited between intellect, sensibility, and will. Although sensibilities are 
most closely linked to the will, they do not have a strict determinative influence on the will in Upham’s 
thought. But the sensibilities, i.e., those aspects o f consciousness traditionally called “will,” are strictly 
determined by the intellect, which was the intellectualist position.
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forward toward the chosen object. But a careful consideration of the issue reveals that 
these feelings are nothing more “than mere vestiges of former passive sensibility 
accompany[ing] it [i.e., the movement]” (11.493). The “discharge into the motor nerves” 
must be “insentient,” and the “ideas of movement” and even the feeling of “effort” are 
simply images or ideas of the aforementioned sensations. There really was no “a priori” 
reason to think that a motor impulse would be sentient [that would be to speak of motor 
impulses as if they were sensory impulses], so James thought the burden of proof lay 
upon the Europeans to prove their point.
Still, James thought it best to lay out a detailed refutation of the feeling of 
innervation (pp. 494-518). The first point he desired to make was “that the assumption o f  
the feeling o f innervation is unnecessary" (11.494). James thought that the belief in the 
necessity of the feeling of innervation for voluntary activity was reminiscent of “the 
scholastic prejudice that ‘the effect must already in some way be contained in the cause.” 
Contrary to this maxim, which, stated differently, posited that there must be a similarity 
between cause and effect, James thought that there was a radical discontinuity between 
the cause of reflexive action or emotions and the reflexes or emotions themselves. These 
reflexes are “knocked out of us” by their respective stimuli, and sometimes the resultant 
reflexes or emotions “surprise us” (11.494). James thought the link between 
consciousness and movement in these cases seemed “essentially discontinuous” (11.495). 
Why should the body move in one particular way rather than another at a particular 
stimulus? Certainly not because we could feel it coming: the reactions surprise us. Since 
these reflexes and emotions neither required nor possessed the feeling of innervation, 
why should the voluntary actions, which are built upon the reservoir of memorial ideas of
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such events? Certainly the idea itself should be sufficient to produce the effect. No 
feeling of innervation is necessary. All that is necessary are “the kinesthetic ideas.. .or 
images of incoming feelings of attitude and motion” (11.495, italics mine).
Before moving to the empirical evidence, James outlined “u certain a priori 
reason why the kinesthetic images OUGHT to be the last psychic antecedents o f the 
outgoing currents, and why we should expect these currents to be insentient; why, in 
short, the soi-disant feelings o f innervation should NOT e x is f  (11.496). James reminded 
his colleagues of the well-accepted and “dominating law” that consciousness tends to 
drop awareness of all processes that do not aid the animal in achieving its ends. 
Sometimes this awareness is lost because of redundancy, i.e., there already is a sufficient 
sign in consciousness leading the animal to its end. In the case of purposive and efficient 
human actions, consciousness of “means” drops out entirely. “The marksman ends by 
thinking only of the exact position of the goal, the singer only of the perfect sound,” etc. 
(11.497). Now, James asked, which would be the more parsimonious explanation of 
volition, a path from idea to feeling to volition, or simply a link between idea to volition? 
As if to appease his determinist colleagues, James said that in this case “everything 
would then be unambiguously determined” (11.498). As we shall see, however, this did 
not make James’s psychology of volition entirely deterministic.
James argued that the introspective evidence contradicted the feeling of 
innervation as well. The thing we notice introspectively is the “afferent feelings coming 
from the muscles themselves and their insertions, fi'om the vicinity of the joints, and from 
the general fixation of the larynx, chest, face, and body, in the phenomenon of effort, 
objectively considered” (11.500). When a person wills a particular motor movement, the
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only thing preceding the movement is the thought of the sensations and the results of the 
sensations. In order to avoid sounding too deterministic here, James added that although 
“there is no room for any third order of mental phenomenon” between idea and volition, 
that there is still “indeed the fiat, the element of consent, or resolve that the act shall 
ensue,” which “constitutes the essence of the voluntariness of the act.” James promised 
to treat the fiat at a later point. Yet it is significant that James both denied and embraced 
a “third order of mental phenomenon” in his psychology of volition: “An anticipatory 
image, then, o f the sensorial consequences o f a movement, plus {on certain occasions) the 
fia t that these consequences shall become actual, is the only psychic state which 
introspection lets us discern as the forerunner o f our voluntary acts” (11.501). As we 
shall see, the “plus” in this quote is similar to the “plus” in the Arminian psychology of 
Thomas Upham: an indeterministic and “free” consent of a faculty of will thought to 
protect the actor from the evils of necessity. Yet, as we shall see, James did not argue 
that the fiat is always indeterminate, either.
James’s next argument was to challenge the “circumstantial evidence” used to 
advocate the feeling of innervation. One example was Wundt’s contention motor 
feelings cannot be due to afferent impulses because, if  they were, one would expect the 
feeling to correspond exactly to the actual muscular activity exerted in any act. Wundt 
cited the example of the “half paralyzed” in whom a feeling of great strain is 
accompanied with a normal exertion. James quoted Ferrier to show that the use of “half 
paralyzed” patients was problematic because their feelings of effort are always tied to 
some muscular activity. If only one arm is paralyzed, the effort to close the fist of the 
paralyzed hand is accompanied by actual muscular effort in the functioning hand. It is
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this afferent inputs from this muscular activity that serve as the source of the feeling of 
strenuous effort.
James also utilized experimental research on “optical vertigo” (the illusion of 
“movement in objects”) to illustrate the point. Typically, we perceive movement in two 
cases: when an image of a moving object moves across a stationary retina, or when the 
image of a moving object remains in the center of the retina as the eye follows the object. 
In either case, misjudgments about the status of the eye will result in illusory perceptions. 
For example, if we believe a moving eye is stationary, and the image moves across the 
retina, we may also perceive movement when there is none. Or, if we believe an 
unmoving eye is moving and the image remains centered, we may experience a 
perception of movement when there actually isn’t any. Helmholtz produced this latter 
type of illusion occurs by paralyzing “the external rectus muscle of the right eye” which 
removed the ability of the eye to move outward, away from the nose. So, with the left 
eye kept under a patch, the subject would at rest have his eye fixed on an image in front 
of the eye. The eye still and the object centered on the unmoving retina. A perception of 
an unmoving object follows. When the subject moves his eye to the left, the subject is 
able to do so. The image moves along the retina. A perception of an unmoving object 
results. When the subject is told to move his eye to the right, the subject is unable to do 
so, although the subject believes he can. The eye fails to move, the image fails to move, 
but, believing that the eye is moving to the right, the object appears to move to the right. 
Helmholz thought that the feeling of will or feeling of irmervation determined the 
perception. It could not have been an afferent feeling, of course, because there was no 
movement of the right eye to be reported back to the brain through the afferent nerves.
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James replied that what Helmholz failed to consider was the left eye. Since the left eye 
still could move to the right, the so-called feeling of innervation was really nothing more 
than the afferent feeling associated with the left eye. The visual system makes use of this 
information, thus producing the illusion.
After completing his survey of the “circumstantial evidence for the feeling of 
innervation,” concluding that this evidence “break[s] down like the introspective 
evidence,” James moved on to describe experiments which he thought positively 
demonstrated that these feelings do not exist. He quoted the work of “Messrs. Gley and 
Marillier” upon a patient whose “ .. .entire arms, and his trunk down to the navel, were 
insensible both superficially and deeply, but his arms were not paralyzed.” This patient 
was able to hold up various objects of differing weights, but was unable to perceive 
differences in weight. The efferent impulses were appropriate to the task, but this 
appropriateness had nothing to do with feeling them. The visual inputs were sufficient to 
the task. When these inputs were taken away, the ability was lost.
After completing this survey of evidence, James concluded, “on the whole, then, 
it seems as probable as anything can well be, that these feelings of innervation do not 
exist.” Instead, it appeared to James that “the entire content and material of our 
consciousness - consciousness of movement, as of all things else - is thus of peripheral 
origin, and came to us in the first instance through the peripheral nerves.” James then 
asked the question: “what [is it that] we gain by this sensationalistic conclusion...”? His 
first answer was scientific and conservative: “I reply that we gain at any rate simplicity 
and uniformity.” His second answer, however, was more bold and got to the heart of 
matters. James recounted the traditional concern with “sensationalistic” psychology, that
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it is “a degrading belief’ because it “abolishes all inward originality and spontaneity,” 
i.e., the hallmarks of free action. Yet, these “advocates of inward spontaneity” may not 
have realized that they were “turning their backs” on the “real citadel” of free will. “Let 
all our thoughts of movements be of sensational constitution,” James boldly asserted. 
“Still,” freedom of will can be found:
in the emphasizing, choosing, and espousing of one of them rather than another, 
in the saying to it, ‘be thou the reality for me,’ there is ample scope for our inward 
initiative to be shown. Here, it seems to me, the true line between the passive 
materials and the activity of the spirit should be drawn. It is certainly false 
strategy to draw it between such ideas as are connected with the outgoing and 
such as are connected with the incoming neural wave. (11.518)
Although feelings of innervation do not exist, and although kinesthetic ideas necessarily 
lead to outward actions, humans still possess freedom in choosing the kinesthetic ideas by 
which they will live. For James, this process was constrained only by previous 
experience and consciousness. Once the ideas existed in memory, and were suggested in 
consciousness, the will could freely choose whichever of these ideas would be “reality.” 
This selection is an indeterministic process, analogous to the choice of Upham’s faculty 
of will between natural or moral sensibilities. Both psychologies were “Arminian” in that 
they removed the will from the web of cause and effect.
James closes this section of his chapter on the will by considering the type of 
kinesthetic idea that activates movement. James had distinguished between '‘'‘remote" and 
"resident" ideas, the former having to do with distant impressions made by “the eye or 
ear,” for example, and the latter having to do with impressions made on one’s “muscles.
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joints, etc.” James thought that early on the resident ideas may be most important, but as 
behaviors grow in complexity and sophistication, the remote idea of the goal is usually all 
that is needed to activate the movement. James gave his own experience of writing as an 
example of how the remote “idea of the end” is sufficient to activate a chain of 
movements, as well as an explanation of how this chain develops:
As I write, I have no anticipation, as a thing distinct from my sensation, of either 
the look or the digital feel of the letters which flow from my pen. The words 
chime on my mental ear, as it were, before I write them, hut not on my mental eye 
or hand. This comes from the rapidity with which often-repeated movements 
follow on their mental cue. An end consented to as soon as conceived innervates 
directly the centre of the first movement of the chain which leads to its 
accomplishment, and then the whole chain rattles off ^ wa^i-reflexly [sic], as was 
described on pp.115-6 of Vol. I. (11.519)
His reference to the quasi-reflexive “chain” of movements was discussed in his chapter 
on habit, which is summarized in chapter 10. Because certain movements are chained 
together through experience, it is not necessary that the mind have a chain of distinct 
thoughts to activate each link in the chain. The thought of the goal is sufficient to 
activate the chain.
Ideo-Motor Action
James concluded his discussion on the types of ideas that activate movements 
acknowledging that “many readers” would find his discussion up to this point troubling 
because of its deterministic-sounding language. What his discussion up to this point 
lacked, James admitted, was a consideration of the “fiat” or “consent to the movement”
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that sometimes seems to be “required in addition to the mere conception” of the 
movement (11.521). So, having dispensed with the foregoing “tedious preliminary 
matter,” James moved on to consider this question a little more carefully. Yet, as we 
shall see, his first answer to the question concerning the role of the “fiat” was that this 
beloved aspect of the volitional life actually plays a very small role in most of our 
behaviors. By admitting this, however, James was at odds with himself as to the 
implications of this assertion. Did this mean that will itself (defined as fiat) has a very 
small role in our conscious life? Or was the “fiat” only a small part of our volitional 
activity? To put the question in other words: was the will a broad concept that included 
the fiat, or was the will defined in a more strictly “Arminian” sense as effortful fiat? 
James was, I believe, tellingly indecisive with his answer to this question.
James summed the question thus:
The question is this: Is the bare idea o f a movement’s sensible effects its sufficient 
mental cue (p. 497), or must there be an additional mental antecedent, in the 
shape o f a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous 
phenomenon o f consciousness, before the movement can follow] (11.522).
His answer to the question was “sometimes.” “Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but 
sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express 
consent, has to intervene and precede the movement” (11.522). James discussed the 
former case first. When the “bare idea is sufficient,” that is, “whenever movement 
follows unhesitatingly and immediately” the idea in the mind, we have the phenomenon 
of “ideo-motor action.” There is no conflict in the mind during ideo-motor action: “we 
think the act and it is done; and that is all that introspection tells us of the matter.” James
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thought that this is “the normal process” (11.522). As is the case when we mindlessly 
reach for a snack as we engage in conversation, our movements in this case are “fatally” 
determined, requiring “no express fiat” (11.523). For this reason, James wondered 
whether or not ideo-motor actions should actually be considered volitions at all. “ .. .It is 
often difficult to decide whether not to call them reflex rather than volitional acts.” To 
this same effect he quoted Lotze, who thought that “all the acts of our daily life” happen 
in a way that does not require “a distinct impulse of the will.” That is, since the normal 
activities of daily life do not require an explicit choice, the will need not be involved in 
these activities. Again, this would be a more narrow (and Arminian) way of defining 
will.
James indecision here is crucial in interpreting his psychology of volition, and, 
perhaps, understanding his role in the loss of will in American psychology. James, like 
Lotze (and like Upham), thought along with his “many readers” that “the express fiat” or 
explicit, deliberate and free choice constituted the essence of volitional activity. Yet 
here, confronted with the growing awareness of the fact that most human activity is to 
some degree automatic (an awareness that Upham possessed only dimly), James had to 
deal with the implication that his precious “Arminian” will perhaps had very little to do 
with daily life. The doctrine of ideo-motor action moved the secular “Arminians” toward 
Edwards’ conclusion: that the self-determined will was in reality a non-reality. In this 
section of the Principles we find James taking a surprisingly un-Arminian position, yet a 
position that he did not sustain throughout the Principles.
Given that fiat-less ideo-motor action is the norm, James moved on to consider 
the exceptions to this rule. What impedes the ideo-motor mechanism? To answer this
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question, James had to first answer the converse question: When does ideo-motor activity 
take place? James’s answer: whenever there is a lack of conflict on the ideational level. 
This lack of conflict may occur because there is only one idea present to the mind, or 
because the several ideas present to the mind all point in the same direction. James used 
the “hypnotic subject” to demonstrate the idea that ideo-motor action takes place when 
only one idea is in the mind. The reason hypnotic subjects are so responsive to the 
suggestions of others is that there are no competing thoughts in the hypnotized mind. 
Although I will not analyze James’s chapter on hypnotism (which interestingly follows 
his chapter on will), one can see that hypnotism was indeed important to James because 
of its relation to will. The implication of all this is that Ideo-motor action cannot take 
place when there is some sort of ideational conflict, yet cannot help but take place 
without conflict. For James, as for Upham, situations of mental conflict were the 
occasions of the will’s most valuable work. Indeed, Upham’s entire psychological 
system was designed to maximize conflict (between the natural and moral sensibilities) 
so as to maximize the usefulness of his otherwise useless and redundant will.
James summarized his argument up to this point: ''every representation o f  a 
movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is the object; and 
awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic 
representation present simultaneously to the mind’’ (11.526). It is interesting to note here 
in passing that James’s definition of the object of volition here is very similar to Edwards, 
i.e., the action itself, rather than some material or ideal object outside of the self. It also 
appears that there are some tensions with this formulation of the object and his earlier
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treatments in the Principles, although I will not subject these tensions to analysis at this 
point.
So where does the fiat fit in? Only in the ease of “antagonistic representation,” or 
when there is some conflict in the mind concerning which movement to execute. Yet 
James at this point still hesitated to explicate the doctrine of fiat because he wants to 
make the potentially unpopular implications of his thought clear at this point. The fact 
that a fiat is not normally required in motor activity (i.e., not required when “conditions 
are simple”), contradicted the “common prejudice that voluntary action without ‘exertion 
of will-power’ is Hamlet with the prince’s part left out...” (11.526). Yet this should not 
be of concern because consciousness itself if by ‘Hts very nature impulsive.” That is, a 
deliberate choice is not always needed to get the muscular machinery moving. Unlike 
what appears to have been the case in Upham’s psychology, consciousness is sufficient to 
that end. “We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add something 
dynamic to it to get a movement.” Still, the belief that there must be “some superadded 
‘will-force’” is understandable given the fact that there are “special cases” in which some 
effort is needed to overcome the antagonism between two opposing thoughts.
Given the ubiquity of ideo-motor action, however, James thought that it must 
therefore be the first reference-point in any psychology of volition. ''Movement is the 
natural immediate effect offeeling, irrespective o f what the quality o f the feeling may be. 
It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in the voluntary life.” 
Therefore, one must never “soften” or “explain away” the reality of ideo-motor action.
“It obeys the type of all conscious action, and from it one must start to explain action in 
which a special fiat is involved” (11.527).
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Two things are of interest concerning these comments. First, notice that James 
does in fact at this point, despite his earlier reticence, call ideo-motor activity volitional. 
Movement is the immediate effect of feeling “in the voluntary life” (11.527). His quote 
concerning “Hamlet with the prince’s part left out” is to the same effect. As we shall see 
below, his example of getting out of bed also seems to equate simple ideo-motor activity 
with volition. The reason this is important is that James at this point allows for a broader, 
“non-Arminian” conception of will. Will is not reduced to deliberate choice of “fiat.” 
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, James is not entirely consistent on this point, and this 
inconsistency is important.
Second, notice that James uses the word “feeling” in the quote above, where the 
reader has grown accustomed to hearing the word ‘idea’: ''Movement is the natural 
immediate effect offeeling... ” If we take this move as deliberate (and I would imagine it 
was), this would offer a link between James’s thoughts in this chapter, and his previous 
thoughts on belief in the chapter on the perception of reality. In that chapter, James 
spoke of beliefs as (to use a contemporary phrase) “hot” cognitions, affectively-loaded 
ideas which have power and “sting” for the individual. Perhaps James replaced the word 
idea with the word “feeling” here (as he does in the next paragraph: “Try to feel...” 
11.527) to signify that the “ideas” in ideo-motor action are not mere cognitions, but ideas 
infused with personal meaning and power. If this is the case, then James’s psychology 
can less easily be characterized as intellectualist, but takes on a decidedly more 
“voluntarist” hue. This would make James’s theory of will (i.e., theory of ideo-motor 
action) closer to that of Ames and Edwards (and Wundt—see Danziger, 2001) rather than 
Upham.
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We still have not answered the important question: What determines the outcome 
when there are conflicting ideas before the mind, hindering voluntary movement? James 
laid out two basic answers to this question. The most common occurrence is for there to 
be “a fortunate lapse of consciousness” in which one of the opposing ideas falls away, 
and the remaining idea activates the chain of movements. To illustrate this point James 
discussed the experience of getting out of bed “on a freezing morning in a room without a 
fire.” This is ultimate case of ideational ambivalence. On the one hand the person knows 
that duty dictates an immediate awakening, but, on the other, the warmth of the bed and 
the threat of the cold inhibit the just impulse. This can continue for hours until, suddenly, 
“the idea flashes across us, ‘Hollo! I must lie here no longer! -  an idea which at that 
lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions and consequently 
produces immediately is appropriate motor effects” (11.524). This scenario, in which the 
actual movement is carried out “without any struggle or decision at all,” James took as 
the normal way ideational conflict is resolved. Still, James did not hesitate to say that 
this case of decisionless activity “contain[s] in miniature form the data for an entire 
psychology volition” (11.525), again contradicting his other statements which indicate that 
deliberate and effortful choice is the essence of will. As for the other way in which 
conflict is resolved, James left that topic for the next section of the Principles.
Finally, at first glance, it may appear that James’s concept of will was more 
constricted than the theories of Ames and Edwards and even Upham, because James 
insisted (contra our earlier writers) that volition must result in some sort of movement. 
Yet this is probably not an accurate conclusion since James’s concept of movement was 
quite broad:
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from the physiological point of view a gesture, an expression of the brow, or an 
expulsion of the breath are movements as much as an act of locomotion is. A 
king’s breath slays as well as an assassin’s blow; and the outpouring of those 
currents which the magic imponderable streaming of our ideas accompanies need 
not always be of an explosive or otherwise physically conspicuous kind. (11.527- 
528)
This approach is consistent with James notion of emotion in which the physiological and 
muscular movements which constitute the essence of emotional activity may be very 
subtle indeed.
Action After Deliberation
After having argued that the vast majority of human activity is automatic, and 
entertaining the notion that such automatic behavior might be considered volitional, 
James finally turned to consider the situation in which ideational conflict is not resolved 
by “a fortunate lapse of consciousness” (i.e., a non-effortful shift in consciousness in 
which one of the conflicting ideas disappears or is made ineffectual). In these cases, 
which are rare compared to the normal flow of conscious experience, the impassive is 
settled through “deliberation,” “decision,” or “fiat.”
Prior to a decision comes “indecision.” Indecision is the subjective feeling that 
accompanies a conscious mind conflicted with antagonistic “motives.” The motives (or 
“reasons”) are the “reinforcing and inhibiting ideas” pushing and pulling consciousness 
in opposite directions. The object of consciousness during indecision is “extremely 
complex,” being composed of “the whole set of motives and their conflict” (11.528). The 
“oscillations of our attention” and the “‘associative’ flow of our ideas” are such that
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different aspects of this object stand out at different times. The motives pulling toward 
the decision may gain strength, but there are always countervailing motives pulling the 
other way. Indecision therefore remains. James’s description of this experience of 
indecision is vivid, perhaps arising from his own struggles over decisions in his life:
The deliberation may last for weeks or months, occupying at intervals the mind. 
The motives which yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life to-day 
feel strangely weak and pale and dead. But as little to-day as to-morrow is the 
question finally resolved. Something tells us that all this is provisional; that the 
weakened reasons will wax strong again, and the stronger weaken; that 
equilibrium is unreached; that testing our reasons, not obeying them, is still the 
order of the day, and that we must wait awhile, patient or impatiently, until our 
mind is made up ‘for good and all.’ (11.529)
“ .. .This condition, plainly enough,” James seemed to groan, “is susceptible of indefinite 
continuance.” If we do notice something of personal significance here to James, perhaps 
the psychology of Thomas Upham can actually help to describe it. If we take Upham’s 
veneration of “consistency of character” as indicative of the values of the moral culture of 
American higher education, perhaps James did feel a bit out of place. James’s discussion 
of the motives which seem to be universally “in play” during decision seems to 
corroborate this. We turn to this discussion now.
Before discussing the several actual ways that indecision is finally conquered (i.e., 
the “types of decision”), James described three “motives” which he thought to be “more 
or less constantly in play” in decision making. Each of these is telling. For one, James 
though that people are simply impatient “q/ ’the deliberative state” (11.529), preferring
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decision and action to “the tension of doubt and hesitancy” (11.530). Perhaps James 
looked down upon this human tendency as an unwillingness to confront the real 
uncertainties of life. Similarly, James thought that another motive involved here is “the 
impulse to persist in a decision once made.” This impulse characterizes those with 
“resolute” natures, the very kind of people that Upham seemed to admire so much.
James actually seems critical here, too. Although both “resolute and irresolute” people 
make rash decisions, the resolute suffer from the added folly of persisting in an unwise 
course “simply because we hate to ‘change our mind’” (11.530). Again, one wonders if 
James is not subtly criticizing the excesses of Victorian willpower here. James also may 
have been a bit critical of himself in describing a third kind of motive involved in 
decision making (or the lack of it): “the dread o f the irrevocable f  which is often found in 
“a type of character incapable of prompt and vigorous resolve.” Upham certainly was 
critical of this of “type of character” as well, while the concept seems absent from Ames 
or Edwards.
It is interesting that throughout this discussion, James used the language of 
motive, a type of language that Edwards was very comfortable with. Indeed, James like 
Edwards, does speak of motives as having weights, although he uses other metaphors 
such as “sharp” or “dim” or “extreme” (11.529, 530). The question we bring into the next 
section, then, is: does James think of motives as the Calvinist Edwards did, the 
“strongest” complex motive determining the volition, or did he articulate a more 
“Arminian” approach to motives where motive strength is trumped by the power of the 
will? To answer this question we turn to his discussion of “types of decision.”
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The Five Types of Decision
James discussed “five types of decision,” most of which I will not discuss here.
To give some indication of the flavor of this discussion, I briefly mention “the reasonable 
type” of decision in which the ideational impasse is bridged when “arguments” for both 
sides are weighed and considered. “Gradually and almost insensibly” the correct 
alternative becomes apparent to the mind, allowing an easy decision “without effort or 
constraint,” i.e., seemingly “ow[ing] nothing to our will” (11.531). The first four types of 
‘decision’ are like this, when the tension is resolved without effort.
The final type of decision is, however, quite important for the purposes of this 
dissertation. This is the type of decision in which “we feel, in deciding, as if we 
ourselves by our own willful act inclined the beam” (11.534). James chose to defer the 
metaphysical question of whether this “heave of the will” implies the existence of “a will­
power distinct from motives.” At this point James desired to remain scientific, relying 
only on the subjective testimony of consciousness. At a phenomenological level, this 
fifth type of decision is simply “the feeling o f effort.” Unlike other types of decision in 
which the final determination comes easily because the altemative drops out (entirely or 
mostly) of consciousness, this feeling of effort takes place when the agent is well aware 
of the loss involved in the choice. It is in this sense “driving a thorn into one’s flesh” 
(11.534).
Just as most movements are done apart from the fiat, most human decisions are 
devoid of this feeling of effort. James knew this contradicted popular beliefs about 
volition, and reiterated the point made earlier; “We are, I think, misled into supposing 
that effort is more frequent that it is, by the fact that during deliberation we so often have
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a feeling of how great an effort it would take to make a decision But the actual
decision is usually quite easy after the deliberative process is completed. Despite the 
rarity of effortful decisions, James felt confident that on a phenomenological level, these 
decisions most certain do exist. But consensus falls apart in terms of interpreting the 
meaning of these decisions. The implications of this question are enormous. “Questions 
as momentous as that of the very existence of spiritual causality, as vast as that of 
universal predestination or free-will, depend on its interpretation.” James thought it 
therefore crucial to understand “the conditions under which the feeling of volitional effort 
is found” (11.535).
The Feeling of Effort
James noted that “under ordinary circumstances” (II. 535) certain motives have a 
tendency to result in movement, while others have a tendency to fail to elicit movement. 
Among the ideas with the strongest tendency to move the will are “those that represent 
objects of passion, appetite, or emotion—objects of instinctive reaction, in short.” James 
also included “feelings or ideas of pleasure or of pain” in this category. The motives that 
typically fail to produce movement are those “foreign to the instinctive history of the 
race” such as “highly abstract conceptions” and “far-off considerations” (11.536). Among 
these considerations James would have placed the things of morality and religion.
Given the predilection of human nature to gratify the “instinctive” motives over 
the “abstract” ones, a remarkable and psychologically noteworthy event takes place when 
the abstract motives actually do produce movement. Yet, given the inherent feeble and 
weak tendency of these motives something needs to be added to them. This is where 
effort comes in. Whenever these higher but unnatural motives prevail it is only ''^with
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effort. J a m e s  here seems to repeat Upham’s notion that the will arbitrates between 
“natural” and “moral” sensibilities. Yet the enormous differenee is that James saw this 
conflict as occurring rarely. Upham built the psychic conflict into his system (although 
he did, of course, say that the ideal case is when the two major types of sensibility are in 
harmony). Indeed, then, the sphere of the self-determined will had shrunk considerably.
James thought that a healthy will was characterized by a proper balance or “ratio” 
of impulsive and inhibitive motives to action. In the special case of decisions made 
promptly, the healthy will still makes “ a sort of preliminary survey of the field” (11.536), 
taking into account all motives, and developing a proper “vision” of the situation at hand. 
A will can be “unhealthy” in several ways. The way that concerned James most was 
when the ratio of “impulsive and inhibitive forces” is “distorted.” In some cases the 
impulsive forces prevail (through strong positive impulses or weak opposing impulses), 
creating an “explosive will,” and in other cases the inhibitive forces prevail (through 
weak positive impulses or strong opposing impulses), creating an “obstructed will.” The 
explosive will belongs to “a normal type of character” (11.537) in whom impulsive forces 
seem to arise before the inhibitory forces can prevent the action. James thought this kind 
of will belonged to the ‘“dare-veiT and ‘mercuriaT temperaments’ so commonly found in 
“the Latin and Celtic races” (11.538). Although these people may seem to be “monkeys” 
to “us,” “we” appear “reptilian” to them. In other words, an explosive will is not always 
a bad thing, since this type of character can actually accomplish a great deal, propelled 
along with their energetic powers of volition. In this context, James discussed things 
such as “disorderly and impulsive conduct” (11.542) addictions and “the passion o f love,” 
(11.543), and what would call today obsessive compulsive symptomatology (11.545).
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The Obstructed Will
Given James’s historical context and well as his interest in the variety and 
plurality of the human condition, it is not surprising that he pays closer attention to 
different “types” of will than Upham. Although this pluralistic impulse is a very 
important part of James’s approach to psychology and therefore an important key in 
interpreting James, a careful consideration of James’s understanding of individual 
differences between “types” of will is not entirely relevant to the topic at hand. That said, 
James’s discussion of “the obstructed will” is relevant, because here James deals with 
issues of concern to Ames, Edwards and Upham.
Whereas the “explosive will” has to do with people whose impulses are too strong 
or their inhibitions too weak, the “obstructed will” is found in individuals with weak 
impulses or strong inhibitions. Although it is normal that certain objects will “fail to 
touch the quick or break the skin” in all of us, this is the default setting for a person with 
an obstructed will.
James portrayed the obstructed will as a moral condition. In the healthy state of 
will, James reminded his readers, the vision is right and the will follows its lead. But in 
this case, the intellect may possess a crystal-clear idea of what to do, yet the act does not 
follow. James used the quote from Ovid, ‘‘video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor” [I 
see the better course, but I do the worse] in a way similar to Upham, to describe a 
pathological condition. Recall that the Puritan authors thought this quote an apt 
description of their own experience and of human nature in general. So, from the 
perspective of Ames and Edwards, such a use of this phrase would be a pathologizing of
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sin; ascribing normal human moral weakness to a pitiful few, and, by implication, 
considering the rest a moral majority.
James quote of Guislain is another illustration of how the obstruction of will was 
seen in moral terms, and of the continuity of the voluntarist vs. intellectualist notions 
which had for centuries characterized theory concerning human volition. These 
patients, Gaislain wrote ‘“are able to will inwardly, mentally, according to the dictates of 
reasoning. They experience the desire to act, but they are powerless to act as they 
should.” The idea that the will follows the “dictates of reasoning” is analogous to the old 
“intellectualist” position on the will. Gaislain’s position seems to imply that departure 
from the intellectualist will is an anomaly.
Although James, like Upham, seemed to conceive of the obstructed will as a 
special case of pathology, he did seem to identify with this condition in a way that 
Upham did not. Here again is what I have called the “Augustinian strain of piety” found 
in James, and is typical of the tension between secularized “Calvinist” and “Arminian” 
impulses. He recalled his discussion in his chapter on the perception of reality that 
objects which have most “efficacy as a stimulus to the will” are perceived to be most real 
to the agent. On the other hand, objects which “fail to get to the will, fail to draw blood” 
(11.547) appear unreal. James expressed his “Augustinian” impulses thus: “the moral 
tragedy in human life comes almost wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured which 
normally should hold between vision of the truth and action, and that this pungent sense 
of effective reality will not attach to certain ideas” (11.547). In the next sentence, 
however, James seems to have abandoned this Calvinistic sentiment to embrace the more 
self-righteous idea that this “moral tragedy in human life” really applies to someone else:
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Men do not differ so much in their mere feelings and conceptions. Their notions 
of possibility and their ideals are not as far apart as might be argued from their 
differing fates. No class of them have better sentiments or feel more constantly 
the difference between the higher and the lower path in life than the hopeless 
failures, the sentimentalists, the drunkards, the schemers, the ‘dead-beats,’ whose 
life is one long contradiction between knowledge and action, and who, with full 
command of theory, never get to holding their limp characters erect. (11.547)
These poor sinners certainly possess “moral knowledge,” but this knowledge “never 
wholly resolves, never gets its voice out of the minor into the major key.” Yet, again, 
James seemed to speak from experience when he said, “ .. .the consciousness of inward 
hollowness that accrues from habitually seeing the better only to do the worse, is one of 
the saddest feelings one can bear with him through this vale of tears” (11.547-548).
A Formula for Willpower
Having discussed the tendency for instinctive impulses to dominate ideal 
impulses, and the varieties of “unhealthiness of will,” James thought the stage properly 
set: “We now see at one view when it is that effort complicates volition.” Effort comes to 
the rescue in precisely these conditions. Recalling Edwards’ comments on the moral 
necessity of the will of God, Christ, and the angels, James noted that “the child of the 
sunshine” has little need of effort in order to walk the proper path in life. Instead, it is 
“the hero and the neurotic” that need to make Herculean efforts to overcome their native 
and destructive predispositions.
On a phenomenological level, people think of effort as “an active force adding its 
strength to that of the motives which ultimately prevail.” James is arguing here, like
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upham, that the will must act in view of motives, but is not determined by them. The 
process is not deterministic like the way “outer forces impinge on a body” producing 
motion according to the “line of least resistance, or of greatest traction.” Seemingly 
critical of the notion that the strongest motive always prevails, James noted that if the line 
of least resistance is simply defined as the path finally followed, one cannot argue with it. 
Yet, James seemed to imply that not much is gained from such definitional gymnastics 
(Upham made the same argument in 1834). It is the phenomenology that matters, James 
insisted, and the [purportedly universal] phenomenology is of weaker motives prevailing 
over strong ones through the additional strength of effort: “But we feel, in all hard cases 
of volition, as if  the line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives prevail, were the 
line of greater resistance, and as if the line of coarser motivation were the more pervious 
and easy one, even at the moment when we refuse to follow it” (11.548). James was an 
“Arminian” indeed.
Just as he pathologized the tendency to “see the better and do the worse,” James 
here also by implication laid the moral blame on these sinners for their lack of willpower. 
The fact that it is the instinctive impulses that require effortful resistance is evidenced by 
the fact that “ .. .the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward, never talk of their conduct.. .[as 
an effort to] overcome their sobriety, conquer their courage, and so forth” (11.548).
Instead, “the sensualist” experiences a lack of effort—a failure to live up to his “ideals” 
and sense of “duty.” Since James never talked about individual differences in amount of 
available ‘effort-power,’ we can infer that he thought that all people are given this ability 
to overcome their strongest motives and that the blame for failures to overcome could be 
laid upon the shoulders of the “sluggards’ of this world for their unwillingness to utilize
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their native psychological resources. Whatever moral criticisms have been historically 
levied against the theologies of Ames and Edwards, it is the “Arminian” notion of self- 
determination found in Upham and James that actually seems more likely to create an 
environment of victim-blaming and finger-pointing.
Despite the potential for self-righteousness, James’s psychology also seems to 
have a secular notion of original sin that is lacking in the psychology of Thomas Upham. 
James repeatedly argues that the instinctive impulses are naturally stronger than the ideal 
impulses. In other words, human beings are by nature inclined to be selfish. One may 
easily see how his fondness for a Darwinistic view of people may have contributed to this 
perspective. What is less clear is why James thought “ideal impulse[s]” arise in the first 
place. Nevertheless, he took these ideal impulses for granted, and saw them as the basis 
for the moral life. Moral action was therefore defined as ‘'‘action against the line o f the 
greatest resistancef i.e., action against powerful and instinctive impulses. This moral 
action is only possible through the combination of ideal impulses and effort. When these 
ideal impulses (“I”) inexplicably appear in consciousness they are inevitably 
comparatively weak relative to the instinctive “propensities” (“P”). James put this truth 
in a formula; “I per se < P,” that is, ideal impulses are by themselves necessarily weaker 
than instinctive propensities. But effort (“E”) when added to the ideal impulses creates a 
situation when the line of greatest resistance is overcome: “I + E > P” (11.549).
James closed this section of the Principles with a summary that confirms his 
belief in the universal availability of people to exercise “effort,” as well as the 
indeterminate nature of this effort:
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But the E does not seem to form an integral part of the I. It appears adventitious 
and indeterminate in advance. We can make more or less as we please, and i f  we 
make enough we can convert the greatest mental resistance into the least. Such, at 
least, is the impression which the facts spontaneously produce upon us.
Here one may recall Edward’s criticism of Arminian writers for positing a purportedly 
universal experience of indeterministic freedom of choice. Here James does the same 
thing, using the universal “us” to describe the possession of this “Arminian” experience. 
Pleasure and Pain as Springs of Action
In the next section of the Principles. James attempted to dismantle the idea that 
pleasure and pain are the only “springs of action.” On the surface of things this is not 
surprising for the indeterminist James, given that this notion tended to be associated with 
strongly deterministic varieties of psychology. On a deeper level we find James here not 
trying to reject the hedonic assumption because it is deterministic, but because it did not 
fit the psychological data as James saw it.
James did not deny the power that pleasure and pain possess as impulses to 
action. He simply thought that they were responsible for only a small segment of human 
behavior. His opinion in this matter was shaped by the fact that he conceived of the 
hedonic assumption as positing that pleasure and pain are the objects of action (a 
conception I don’t think all hedonic psychologists would embrace). Therefore, since 
human beings frequently act without “the thought of pleasure” (11.552) or “mental 
reference to pleasure and pain” or “represented pleasure” (11.553), we may conclude that 
pleasure and pain are not the only springs of activity. This way of interpreting hedonic 
psychology is consistent with his belief that ideas are always the springboard to
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movement. If pleasure or pain is to lead to movement, it must therefore do so through the 
ideational route. In this sense, James’s refutation makes great sense.
Still, James recognized that pleasure and pain are intimately connected to our 
voluntary activities. To illustrate this point he gave the example of frustrated impulses, 
such as the impulse to breath. Although we do no obviously pursue pleasure while 
breathing, we are very pleased and relieved when we are able to catch our breath after a 
period of forced respiratory restriction. By extension, it is true that “round all our 
impulses, merely as such, there twine, as it were, secondary possibilities of pleasant and 
painful feeling...” Further, we experience pleasure when we reach our goals, and pain 
when they are fhistrated. Even more, although we may not be explicitly pursuing 
pleasure in a given act, “the act itself may be the pleasantest line of conduct when once 
the impulse has begun.” The distinction was between “ .. .apleasant act and an act 
pursuing a pleasure''" (11.556). Perhaps that is all the hedonist is saying. If so, then 
James’s psychology is once again surprisingly deterministic. James’s belief that the word 
“interest"" could be used as “a single name” describing the thing that constitutes “the 
impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects” further shows how comfortable James was 
with deterministic mechanisms of behavior. As he had argued in his chapter on the 
perception of reality, this interest is “the urgency [of an idea]...wh/z which it is able to 
compel attention and dominate in consciousness."" James never argued that this interest 
could be freely chosen. Still, because “the mere thinking of reasons to the contrary” can 
act as a check upon this impulsive process, James held out hope for the freedom that his 
own psychology seemed to jeopardize.
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Will as a Particular Relation Between-the Mind and its ‘Ideas’
Earlier in this chapter it was noted that James seemed a bit unclear concerning his 
definition of volition. He admitted to some confusion as to whether he should consider 
ideo-motor action volitional, and at that point least temporarily appeared to embrace 
ideo-motor action as volitional. In his section “Will is a Relation Between the Mind and 
its ‘Ideas,’” James finally offered the crucial clarification. He began this section 
indicating that he was finally “closing.. .all these preliminaries” and finally moving 
toward a discussion of “the more intimate nature of the volitional process” (11.559). 
Perhaps we can consider his indecision regarding the status of ideo-motor action as being 
due to the fact that it is a less “intimate” species of volitional activity.
“The psychology of volition properly stops” when the motive idea finally prevails. 
Prior to an act of will it is possible for the inhibitory and impulsive motives to conflict 
with each other. The motive idea prevails at the moment that movement ensues. Once 
the movements begin, we leave the domain of psychology and enter into physiology. “In 
a word, volition is a psychic or moral fact pure and simple, and is absolutely completed 
when the stable state of the idea is there. The supervention of motion is a supernumerary 
phenomenon depending on executive ganglia whose function lies outside the mind” 
(II.560). The phrase “psychic or moral fact” is reminiscent of Edwards’ contention that 
volition is concerned with “moral causes,” i.e., inclinations and desires, as opposed to 
“natural causes.” It appears that both James and Edwards saw volition as a psychological 
and moral process. James illustrated this distinction between volition and its outward 
manifestations through examples of various pathologies in which volition remains intact, 
but the physiological correlates are disordered. For example, the aphasiac “has an
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image” (11.560) of the words he desires to speak, but is shocked at what actually proceeds 
from his mouth. The fact that the aphasiac may feel rage or discouragement is proof that 
his will remains “intact” (11.561). James then comes to a reasonable conclusion: “We 
thus find that we reach the heart o f our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process 
it is that the thought o f any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind.’’
This conclusion does not say quite enough, however, because James did not 
believe volition was simply a matter of an object coming to “prevail stably in the mind.” 
He had discussed examples of prevalence elsewhere: “where thoughts prevail without 
effort, we have sufficiently studied in the several chapters on sensation, association, and 
attention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of their stay.” Therefore, the 
“heart of our inquiry” into volition has to do with more than simply a motive thought 
prevailing in consciousness. So it is in the next several sentences that James reveals the 
true heart of his psychology of volition:
Where, on the other hand, the prevalence of the thought is accompanied by the 
phenomenon of effort, the case is much less clear. Already in the chapter on 
attention we postponed the final consideration of voluntary attention with effort to 
a later place. We have now brought things to a point at which we see that 
attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies. The essential 
achievement o f the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary, ’ is to ATTEND to a 
difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat, and it is a 
mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate 
motor consequences should ensue. (11.561)
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For James, then, as we might have suspected, it is really that fifth, effortful, “type of 
decision” that really constitutes the activity of will, that is the true “fiat.” All of the other 
effortless activities may approximate volition, but remain, still, automatic and therefore 
outside of the true domain of the Arminian will. James’s clearest statement follows 
shortly after the comments quoted above: '^Effort o f attention is thus the essential 
phenomenon o f will.’' True to American and Arminian form, James thought it obvious 
that “every reader must know by his own experience that this is so....” Although this 
comment may not have been true in the days of Edwards, it was perhaps commonplace in 
James’s America to define the will in these narrow terms, as the effortful choice to do the 
right thing in the face of temptation.
James’s description of the activity of the effortful will, then, might be taken as 
perhaps the best description of what the will had really become in late nineteenth-century 
American thought. This activity takes place when the agent is in “some fiery passion’s 
grasp” (11.562). James lays out the scenario in eerily Edwardsean-sounding terms. There 
is no “physical difficulty” in doing the right thing when the fiery passion takes hold (a 
very Edwardsean comment, indicating that the agent possessed natural ability to do the 
right thing). Still, there is great “mental” difficulty. Or as Edwards would say, “moral” 
difficulty, i.e., a lack of inclination to do the good: when in the grip of passion, “the 
tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come up” (11.563). The 
tendency of the mind in such a state is to resist all reasonable suggestions, which seem 
like a “cold-water hath” a “minister of death” and a “corpse-like finger.”
It is, however, “the strong-willed man” who embraces the voice of reason, who 
“hears the still small voice unflinchingly, and who, when the death-bringing
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consideration [i.e., the weak but moral voice of reason] comes, looks at its face, consents 
to its presence, clings to it, affirms it, and holds it fast, in spite of the host of exciting 
mental images which rise in revolt against it and would expel it from the mind” (11.563). 
As this “difficult object” is “by a resolute effort” held before the mind, it grows in its 
impulsive power until the object takes possession of the mind. At that point the victory is 
won, and the virtuous motor effects follow automatically.
Reiterating the point made earlier, James reminded his readers that “this strain of 
attention is the fundamental act of will” (11.564). Since “the whole drama is a mental 
drama” (11.564), James put the issue in terms that could serve as a moral guidepost, and a 
scientific sanctioning of “Arminian” moral striving. The basic point that the earnest 
moral striver needed to embrace was that “the saving moral act” (11.565) is to keep the 
difficult and non-instinctual idea before the mind until it begins to have a motor effect. 
“The idea to be consented to must be kept from flickering and going out. It must be held 
steadily before the mind until it fills the mind.” The will is to hold the idea in the mind 
until the mind consents to its presence: “Consent to the idea’s undivided presence, this is 
effort’s sole achievement” (11.564).
This consent is hard won, and people would prefer to follow their impulses.
James referred back to the case of the “reasonable type of decision” (described above). 
Usually, movement follows effortlessly once the “right conception” is ascertained (which 
reinforces the idea that the will is not in its most fundamental sense involved in this “type 
of decision” because it is effortless). When the right conception is “anti-impulsive,” 
what usually follows is a process of rationalization in which “the whole intellectual 
ingenuity of the man.. .goes to work to crowd it out of sight, and to find names for the
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emergency, by the help of which the dispositions of the moment may sound sanctified, 
and sloth or passion may reign unchecked” (11.565). Surely James did not have a rosy 
view of human nature. How much stronger, then, is the desire of “the drunkard” to 
utilize his “intellectual ingenuity” to resist the ideal suggestions of reason. When the 
temptation to drink comes, he would rather call that condition anything but ‘‘'being a 
drunkard'.”
It is a new brand of liquor which the interests of intellectual culture in such 
matters oblige him to test; moreover it is poured out and it is sin to waste it; or 
others are drinking and it would be churlishness to refuse; or it is but to enable 
him to sleep, or just to get through this job of work; or it isn’t drinking, it is 
because he feels so cold; or it is Christmas-day; or it is a means of stimulating him 
to make a more powerful resolution in favor of abstinence than any he has 
hitherto made; or it is just this once, and once doesn’t count, etc., etc., ad 
libitum... (n.565)
Yet if  the moral drama of the failure to resist temptation is a mental drama, so too 
is the moral drama of temptation conquered a moral drama. Although the “drunkard’s” 
entire being seems to resist the conception that he actually is a drunkard, his fortunes will 
change i f  he only begins to actually embrace that conception. If he “unwaveringly” holds 
that difficult conception before the mind until the mind submits (or “eonsents”) to it, “he 
is not likely to remain [a drunkard] long.” This intellectual effort is therefore truly “his 
saving moral act” (11.565). And this moral principle applies not only to the drunkard, but 
to all people, and all morally challenging situations. ‘To sustain a representation, to 
think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and
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lunatics alike.” If one is to become a moral victor, one must leam to say of those “objects 
naturally so insipid,” “Let these alone be my reality!” (11.566). James took it for granted 
that people would actually want to struggle so intensely for such objects.
Before moving on to the topic of the freedom of the will, James made a few 
comments on the “consent” of the will. James summarized the preceding considerations 
by arguing that “the only inward volitional act which we ever perform” (11.567) is to 
attend to resistant and difficult ideas. James confessed that he put the matter “in this 
ultra-simple way” because he desired “more than anjdhing else” (11.567) to show that will 
is not a relation between the self and some “extra-mental matter” but rather a relation 
“between our Self and our own states of mind” (11.568).
James also wanted to qualify what he said about the will as consisting in attending 
to difficult objects. The only reason attention is so critical is that it is necessary in order 
to cause the mind to “consent” to the reality of the object. When attention is total, i.e., 
when no other idea is present to consciousness to create inhibition, consent necessarily 
follows, and, consequently, so too does movement. If attention is not total, i.e., when 
competing ideas have not yet vanished, it is still possible for the mind to consent to the 
idea. This is precisely that which distinguishes the “fifth type” of decision from all the 
others. Yet there are cases in which the attention may bring the mind to the point of 
volition, but the mind shrinks back from executing the movement in question. That is, 
the mind still does not “consent” to the idea. In this case additional effort is needed to 
overcome the “hesitation.” James concluded: “So that although attention is the first and 
fundamental thing in volition, express eonsent to the reality o f what is attended to is often 
an additional and quite distinct phenomenon involved.” Sounding much like Upham
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whenever he approached an indefinable “simple idea,” James confessed to being unable 
to define this consent. It is that experience which we have when we inwardly say, “/et it 
be a reality” (11.569).
The Freedom of the Will (From the Scrutinv of Science)  ^^
James began his discussion of free will with a rather complex discussion of the 
nature of the object and the “dynamic power” of thought. Conceming the object, James 
reiterated points made in Volume I about the complex and ever-changing object of 
thought. “Ideas” from the perspective of the psychologist are not separate entities at war 
with each other, but are rather “parts of the total object of representation” (11.569). Prior 
to decision, the object is characterized by the impulsive and inhibitory ideas discussed 
above. Yet at the moment of decision, the object had changed in such a way that this 
tension is sufficiently resolved. The resolution may be “hard” when effort is involved, or
James did not finish his chapter on the will with a consideration o f the will’s freedom. Instead he 
appended a consideration o f “the education o f the will” which is striking for its lack o f continuity with the 
section immediately preceded by it.
Further confirming the fact that James saw the will as a moral faculty, James defined the education 
o f the will as “the whole o f  one’s training to moral and prudential conduct,” but also included the broader 
issues o f “adapt[ing] means to ends, involving the ‘association o f ideas,’ in all its varieties and 
complications, together with the power o f inhibiting impulses irrelevant to the ends desired, and of 
initiating movements contributory thereto.” James’ “narrow “goal in this section was to consider these 
“powers” o f  inhibition and initiation.
“Since a willed movement is a movement preceded by an idea o f  itself, the problem o f the w ill’s education 
is the problem o f how the idea o f  movement can arouse the movement itself’ (11.580). James reminded his 
readers that the activity o f the will is always “secondary,” i.e., dependent upon previously involuntary 
actions the ideas o f  which are stored in memory and become the basis for future possible activities. To 
clarify this distinction, James explained that “on the movement’s original occurrence the motor discharge 
came first and the sensory process second; now in the voluntary repetition the sensory process (excited in 
weak or ‘ideational’ form) comes first, and the motor discharge comes second.” In this section o f the 
Principles, James aimed to explain “how this comes to pass,” which “would he to answer the problem of 
the education o f the will in physiological terms” (11.580).
Throughout the Principles, James maintained a strict distinction between the physiological and the 
psychological, usually trying to limit his discussions to the psychological. It is interesting here, however, 
that James breaks this rale and enters into what he eleven pages later confessed to being “protracted 
physiological speculations” (11.591). Perhaps James thought that his section on the freedom o f the will was 
a but too ethical to receive the last word in a scientific textbook on psychology. Surely his section on the 
education on the will, complete with technical diagrams and careful attention to the niceties o f physiology, 
would make up for his pietistic digression. Yet, since this dissertation concerns itself more with the 
“theological” aspects o f  James’ work, his “physiological speculations” do not add very much to this work.
I will not, therefore, attempt to summarize these speculations. For such a summary see Woodward, 1984.
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easy, when the requisite changes in thought occur without effort. We will quickly return 
to this “total object of representation” in a moment. First, we shall quickly address 
James’s thoughts concerning the power of thought.
James probably thought it necessary to address contemporary questions about the 
“dynamic power” of thought, i.e., the ability of thoughts to influence other thoughts and 
to produce movements, because the question of the freedom of the will, particularly as 
James understood it, makes no sense apart from the belief that thought has this ability. 
James thought that most psychologists were comfortable with the existence of thought, 
yet some doubted its power. If we admit that thought exists, however, we should accept 
these thoughts for what they appear to be, i.e., “things.. .that supervene upon each other, 
sometimes with effort and sometimes with ease...” (11.571). This defense of the efficacy 
of thought is reminiscent of James’s arguments in his chapter on the automaton theory 
(see chapter 10) and is indeed relevant to the loss of will in American psychology. If 
psychologists would continue to harbor doubts of about the importance and power of 
thought, certainly the role and even the reality of the will would be included in these 
doubts.
With these qualifications in place, James was able to finally frame the free will 
issue. Consistent with the contention that effortful striving is the fundamental act of will, 
the freedom of the will problem also deals exclusively with the nature of this effortful 
activity. The question is, simply, “Is the effort where it exists a fixed function of the 
object [of representation].. .or is it such an independent ‘variable’ that with a constant 
object more or less of it may be made?” (11.571). James thought that the effort (which is, 
remember, the fundamental act of will) “appears to us indeterminate,” (relying once again
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on the ambiguous “us.”) If this experience of indeterminism is authentic, then human 
activity is “unpredestinate” and free. In addition to the theological language (of 
predestination) employed here, James defines freedom like Upham, in libertarian terms. 
He also relies on introspective evidence to substantiate his belief in sueh freedom.
Unlike Upham, however, James does not even try to engage or refute the compatibilist 
notion of freedom (i.e., the notion possessed by Ames and Edwards).
James put forward some of the arguments that Upham used in defense of the idea 
that “we” experience libertarian freedom. For example, the fact of remorse implies that 
we could have done otherwise. The limitations of scientific methods are also utilized to 
advance the cause of libertarian freedom. Since it is impossible to take the 
“measurements” necessary to solve the freedom of the will, one must fall back on “the 
crude evidences of introspection...” Still, James admitted that human beings are liable to 
believe that they could have done otherwise even in those “'effortless volitions” that are 
certainly “mechanically determined.” If we are deluded in this case (which is the 
majority of “volitions,” after all), then “why is it not a delusion everywhere?” In the end, 
James thought the question to be “insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds” (11.572).
But there are pragmatic reasons to find a solution. Admittedly, some people do 
not feel any need to resolve the issue. They enjoy the debate, and look forward to 
gaining more and more knowledge about the topic in order to increase the sophistication 
of the discussion. “But if our speculative delight be less keen,” James conceded, and our 
need for answers is paramount, “then, taking the risk of error on our head, we must 
project upon one of the alternative views the attribute of reality for us; we must fill our 
mind with the idea of it that it becomes our settled creed.” It is commonly known that
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James settled on the side of indeterminism, and that he did indeed fill his mind with this 
notion, particularly during his spiritual crisis in the 1860s.
Referring his readers to his essay “The Dilemma of Determinism” for a fuller 
explication of his views, James still explained some of his basic reasons for embracing 
indeterminism and rejecting determinism. Contrary to Edwards, and consistent with the 
“Arminians” Edwards had tried to refute, James framed the “logic” of the issue in such a 
way that indeterminism is the only moral option in the debate. “The most that any 
argument can do for determinism is to make it a clear and seductive conception, which a 
man is foolish not to espouse, so long as he stands by the great scientific postulate that 
the world must be one unbroken fact, and that the prediction of all things without 
exception must be ideally, even if  not actually, possible” (11.573). Determinism, as a 
“seductive conception,” is clearly portrayed as an idea which allures people into an 
immoral stance. Further, since determinism is portrayed as a “scientific postulate” which 
allows for perfect prediction of future events, James’s definition excludes the very kind 
of determinism that Ames and Edwards had espoused—a divine determination of all 
things which is not perfectly predictable because God works not only through lawful 
“secondary causes,” but also miracles. If James’s argument reflects contemporary 
sentiments, the fact that naturalism is portrayed as “the most that any argument can do 
for determinism” shows that the Calvinistic universe had by this time been thoroughly 
rejected in scientific quarters. The irony of this rejection is that it may have been the only 
resource (theological resource, at least) for marrying determinism to morality. Indeed, 
Edwards had argued that between Calvinism and Arminianism, only the divinely
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determined universe of the Calvinists could sustain and make sense of morality at all. 
Such a possibility does not appear to be on James’s radar screen.
Instead, James, like the Arminians before him, argued that indeterminism is 
requisite to morality. As opposed to the “seductive” but destructive postulate of 
determinism, indeterminism is understood as “a moral postulate about the Universe, the 
postulate that what ought to be can be, and that bad acts cannot be fated, but that good 
ones must be possible in their place” (11.573). Although philosophers and theologians 
(like Edwards) may have taken such a statement to task on logical grounds (Is it possible 
for an act to be “bad” or “good” without being morally necessary? Can possibility be 
necessary?), James insisted that the “scientific and moral postulates” are engaged in 
irresolvable war because there is no “objective proof’ to settle the issue once and for all. 
By avoiding these logical questions, James failed to address the moral challenge to 
indeterminism posed not only by Edwards, but by contemporary ethicists (see below).
Still, James’s arguments make sense, “if  indeterminism be a fact” (11.573). If 
indeed the universe (and therefore also the will) is free in the libertarian sense, “it would 
seem only fitting that the belief in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from 
amongst other possible beliefs.” Believing in, submitting to, the reality of free will 
should therefore he “Freedom’s first deed” (11.573).
James was particularly critical of what he called the 'fatalistic argument for 
determinism.” James contrasted this fatalistic argument with existential despair or 
“fatalism,” which can look similar to and even utilize the language of fatalism. “When a 
man has let himself go time after time,” (apparently referring to the condition of the 
obstructed will which sees the good but does the bad), “he easily becomes impressed”
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with the enormous variety of factors which determine his behavior. (Although Ames and 
Edwards might have said that this sort of situation may prepare a soul to concede his 
moral powerlessness and embrace God, James thought that one must never relinquish the 
belief of a native source of power and effort). The obstructed person gradually begins to 
say, ‘“all is fate.. .it is hopeless to resist the drift, vain to look for any new force coming 
in; and less, perhaps, than anywhere else under the sun is there anything really mine in 
the decisions which I make” (11.574). Yet, at this point, the person has not yet flilly 
affirmed a full and genuine determinism. It isn’t that they deny the reality of effort so 
defined, they just sense its “''impotence” to effect the desired moral results. Yet this very 
groaning consciousness of the shortcomings of effort affirms that one has hopes for its 
possibilities as an “independent power.”
James contrasted this condition of faltering faith with “genuine determinism,” 
which feels “not the impotence but the unthinkability of free-will” (11.574). Although 
determinism affirms that the feeling of effort “which seems to breast the tide” certainly 
exists, it further affirms that this feeling is only “a portion o f the tide.” The idea that 
“effort” can exist as an “absolutely independent variable” is nonsense to this frame of 
mind. “The variations of effort carmot be independent.. .they cannot originate ex nihilo, 
or come from a fourth dimension; they are mathematically fixed functions of the ideas 
themselves, which are the tide” (11.574). The phrase “fourth dimension” would seem to 
be consistent with the approach of Ames and Edwards, if  we conceive of God as the 
fourth dimension. Yet James seems to consistently portray indeterminstic effort as 
something that has its source in the self. Perhaps he thought of the self as possessing 
some fourth dimension. As we will see below, James probably would have considered
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characterizing his psychology of volition as effort ex nihilo a caricature of his true 
system.
James did not deny the parsimony of some deterministic formulations and neither 
did he exclude all determinism from effortful choice. James began by noting how 
difficult it is to draw the line between determined and non-determined events. 
Indeterministic “decisions with effort merge so gradually into those [determined 
decisions] without it [i.e., effort] that it is not easy to say where the limit lies.” Further, 
the lines between effortless decision and ideo-motor action, and between ideo-motor 
action and reflexive action are vague. The deterministic case is further strengthened by 
the fact that the “machinery of association” is responsible for the ideas that are “brought 
before the mind” in both determined and undetermined action. The temptation, then, is to 
be parsimonious and simply consider all things under the deterministic umbrella.
Along these lines, James was particularly impressed with the formulations of 
“Professor Lipps,” who thought of effort not as an exertion of force, but as “a sign that 
force is lost” (11.575). In Lipps’ words, “ .. .effort and counter-effort signify only what 
causes are mutually robbing each other of effectiveness” (11.575). We think of the 
stronger ideas as the effort, and the weaker ideas as the counter-effort, but the 
“identification of our s e l f  with one of these clusters is really an arbitrary “illusion” 
(11.576). These arguments were strong enough for James to conclude, “I do not see how 
anyone can fail.. .to recognize the fascinating simplicity of some such view as his.” 
Neither was James entirely threatened by such a formulation: “Nor do I see why fo r  
scientific purposes one need give [this formulation] up even if  indeterminate amounts of 
effort really do occur.” It is here that James laid down the Arminian gauntlet, a
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proposition whose implications seem wide and deep: “Before their indeterminism, 
science simply stops"' That is, science has no access to the most fundamental act of the 
human will. Psychology had just lost its will.
To support this strict separation between science and effort, James made some 
comments about the limits of science that would have pleased Ames, Edwards, and 
Upham:
Psychology will be Psychology, and Science Science, as much as ever (as much 
and no more) in this world, whether free-will be true in it or not. Science, 
however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not the only 
purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, and is 
therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which she 
has no claims at all. (11.576)
Declaring the limits of science and reason had been a common practice of pious natural 
philosophers since the Scientific Revolution (e.g., Wojcik, 1997), and so James places 
himself here within that tradition of religious thinkers. Still, it is significant that the 
“wider order” for James had some serious limitations imposed upon it. The wider order 
for James could not include any foreordination or predetermination. The wider order 
could not therefore include the God of Ames and Edwards. The only deity that this wider 
order would allow was a deity like Upham’s, who, “ .. .in giving man the mighty and 
crowning power of the will,” gave to man “ .. .a power which He could not violate.” 
(Upham, 1869,11.248).
Feeling at liberty, then, to “leave the free-will question altogether out of our 
account,” James closed his section on free-will with a helpful and revealing definition of
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free will, a criticism of the critics of free will, and what amounts to a two-page sermon 
identifying “our worth as men” (11.579) with the efforts of our wills. First, the definition 
of free will. Reiterating a point made in Chapter IV, James summarized his position on 
“free effort.” If free will exists, this freedom “ .. .could only be to hold some one ideal 
object, or part of an object, a little longer or a little more intensely before the mind” 
(11.576, italic mine). I italicize the word “only” here to show how much of the will 
insofar as the will may be considered a moral category had already been depleted in its 
sphere and status. From its original stature as a broad and imprecise term signifying that 
the entirety of humanity’s “active powers” are of a moral significance given by God, the 
term will (again, considered as a moral category) had in James’s mind come to signify a 
comparatively tiny sphere of human activity deriving its moral significance from itself.
James’s criticism of the critics of determinism is directly related to Edwards’ 
criticisms of Arminianism. Freedom consists in the will’s holding “some one ideal 
object, or part of an object” before the mind a bit longer than another (probably 
instinctual) part of the object. The freedom of this will is limited by the object 
immediately present to the mind. “Amongst the alternatives which present themselves as 
genuine possibles, it would thus make one effective.” Again, these “genuine possibles” 
are limited by the complex object before the mind. As James might have said, if the 
complex object is for example eating-or-not-eating-a-cookie-that-will-delight-the-palate- 
but-will-add-fat-and-will-bring-condemnation-from-certain-on-lookers, the agent is not 
free to go for a drive. That possibility is not contained in the object. But certainly eating 
the cookie is a possibility, as is not eating the cookie. James thought that this crucial 
distinction between “the possibles which really tempt a man and those which tempt him
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not at all” (11.577) was the distinction that at least some determinists failed to make in 
their critiques. To illustrate the point James included a lengthy quote from “John Fiske’s 
Cosmic Philosophy,” in which Fiske argues that indeterminism prohibits the framing of 
any “theory of human actions whatever” (11.577). If behavior is free in an indeterminist 
sense, then we ought never be surprised when “a mother.. .strangle[[s] her first-born 
child” or “the miser may cast his long-treasured gold into the seas...” (11.577). Further, if 
indeterminism be true, “the cardinal principles of ethics” are destroyed.
There are indeed similarities between the argumentation of Edwards and Fiske on 
this point, particularly the concern with the “cardinal principles of ethics.” The insistence 
of Arminians that motives always occasion an act of will is also made more intelligible in 
light of James’s comments. Yet, a question that James does not address here is the 
criticism that Edwards levied against Whitby, that the very notion of motives loses its 
coherency when the strength of motives is made irrelevant to the actual volitional 
outcome. So, while James was arguing that the “Arminian” doctrine of motives does 
limit volitional options (and is therefore meaningful), Edwards argument perhaps still has 
life in it: that motive strength is rendered rather meaningless.
Finally, James closed his section on free will with a sermonic discourse aimed, 
perhaps, to encourage those poor obstructed souls who had given up hope in their own 
efficiency. The topic of this section was “ .. .the extraordinarily intimate and important 
character which the phenomenon of effort assumes in our own eyes as individual men” 
(11.578). As such, this section also perhaps tells us quite a bit about the “Arminian” 
moral sentiments that characterized the late nineteenth century.
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. .We measure ourselves by many standards.” “Strength,” “intelligence,” and 
“wealth” are among these standards. But at root, the most important thing we hring to 
life, the “deeper” standard which is “able to suffice” without these other accoutrements, 
“is the sense of the amount of effort which we can put forth.” Unlike the outward 
trappings of wealth and success, “effort seems to belong to an altogether different realm, 
as if it were the substantive thing which we are. ..” (11.578). Our very identity is tied to 
the effort we put forth.
Perhaps human “worth” (11.579) is tied to individual effort because “the purpose 
of this human drama” may very well be “the ‘searching of our heart and reins,’” i.e., the 
end is ourselves. Given this over-arching purpose, our individual purposes terminate in 
ourselves, i.e., in “what effort we can make.” These purposes provide a framework in 
which useful and useless individuals may be differentiated: “He who can make none [i.e., 
no effort] is but a shadow; he who can make much is a hero.” The world around us 
“tests” us in many ways, and our worth as people depends upon how well we meet the 
challenge. “When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its dark 
abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their hold on the situation 
altogether...” These “worthless ones” in James’s thought seem to be the sole repository 
of what Edwards called ‘moral inability,’ “The effort required for facing and consenting 
to such objects is beyond their power to make.” Thankfully, the world has its share of 
heroes, and since “.. .the heroic mind does differently,” the world may also have hope. 
The heroic mind faces the difficulties of life without falling away. “The world thus finds 
in the heroic man its worthy match and mate; and the effort which he is able to put forth 
to hold himself erect and keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of his worth and
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function in the game of human life” (11.578-579). The heroic man “can stand’ while “his 
weaker brethren” are laid low.
Although this pietistic ethic may have been extremely individualistic, James 
thought that the heroic man is the one who will make the biggest impact on the world. 
Those who stay in the game authentically (the existentialism of this passage is striking) 
and do not hide in ‘“ostrich-like forgetfulness,’” those who face the difficulties of life 
squarely, are the ones who become “the masters and the lords of life” (11.579). These 
heroes live “on the perilous edge,” while the shadows avoid risk. The heroes set the 
example that the flocks follow.
Finally, effort is at the root of the religious and moral life. James thought that 
religious life in his day required a willingness to live “on the perilous edge” more than 
ever before. Perhaps he was here referring to the crumbling of the certitudes of 
Protestantism among intellectual elites. If so, the fact that human beings can no longer 
trust in a sovereign and efficient God to effect good in the world meant that “ .. .not only 
our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend on the effort which 
we can make. Will you or won ’tyou have it so?’ is the most probing question we are 
ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day...” We answer these questions not by 
words but by ‘’’consents or non-consents” (11.579).
Recall that Edwards had concluded The Freedom of the Will with a quote from 1 
Corinthians, expressing the desire that “no flesh glory in his presence.” The quote was an 
expression of the Calvinist desire to proclaim God as the source of all efficiency and of 
all good. How differently does James conclude his writing on the freedom of the will.
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proclaiming the power and the possibilities of the heroic, autonomous, efficient human 
will:
What wonder that these dumb responses [our “consents and non-consents” or acts 
of free will] should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of 
things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the measure of our worth 
as men! What wonder if the amount which we accord of it be the one strictly 
underived and original contribution which we make to the world! (11.579, italics 
mine).
Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter has dealt with those chapters which James subsumed under the term 
“the production of movement,” i.e. habit, emotion, and will. The vast majority of this 
chapter focused on the will. In this chapter I hoped to show along with Danziger (2001), 
that James had “intellectualist” leanings (i.e., that the will is determined by the intellect), 
and, that his prolonged discussion of the “feeling of innervation” was related to justifying 
this belief. I also argued that this “intellectualism” was related to his belief in the will’s 
freedom.
One of the most significant aspects of the chapter on will is James’s wavering 
concerning the status of ideo-motor actions, i.e. actions which follow automatically after 
the appropriate idea comes to mind. He similarly outlines five different types of 
“decision,” but, since four out of the five types of decision are the result of deterministic 
processes, James wonders about the voluntary status of these determined decisions. 
James’s “Arminian” sentiments are most clearly expressed when he affirms that the most 
essential act of will is the effortful and undetermined act, a species of the fifth “type of
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decision.” And, since these acts are indeterminate, they do not even belong to the science 
of psychology. Although James did provide a framework for thinking of volitional 
processes from a deterministic standpoint, he simultaneously removed the topic of 
volition from psychology insofar as will had been understood by “Arminians ” to be a 
morally consequential idea. Even before chapters on will had disappeared from 
psychology textbooks, American psychology had lost its (Arminian) will.^^
Some questions that remain, then, are: What kind o f “will” remained in the American psychology 
textbooks that followed James? Did post-James New Psychology textbook writers also have “Arminian” 
sensibilities? To what extent did New Psychology chapters on will deal with moral issues? My own 
superficial analysis o f post-Jamesean textbooks indicates that the New Psychology seemed to follow James 
in his insistence that “free will” cannot be studied by empirical psychology but that the broader (what I’ve 
called the “Edwardsean”) notion of will could be studied. Indeed, even the “Arminian” feeling of effort 
could continue to be studied, but only through Jamesean introspection. American mental philosophers like 
Upham sensed and boldly proclaimed the w ill’s libertarian freedom based upon their confident 
introspections. To contrast, the New Psychology, following James, would not be able to make any 
libertarian affirmations since introspection could never directly observe the conditions o f free action. 
Although shorn o f its Arminian glory, it is clear that the concept of will did retain some o f its moral 
meaning in the New Psychology. I hope in future research to explore the contours of the remaining faculty, 
the nature o f its moral meaning to the New Psychology, and how and why these vestiges were sustained for 
over a quarter-century in American psychology textbooks only to be (finally) “lost” in the 1930s.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation research began with a simple observation. The concept of will 
had heen a dominant component of the moral psychology taught in American college 
textbooks for approximately three centuries. Even the self-consciously naturalistic “New 
Psychology” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had chapters on the topic. 
As one who had taught introductory psychology a few times in the twenty-first century, 
however, 1 was also well aware of the fact that contemporary psychology no longer 
speaks of will or volition with any discemable regularity. 1 wondered what had 
happened. Why did American psychology lose its concept of will?
The received history of American psychology conveyed in introductory textbooks 
suggested one answer. The introspective New Psychology (which was comfortable with 
inner psychological processes such as volition) was defeated by behaviorism (which 
insisted that a scientific psychology must study observable phenomena). Unobservable 
mental states, including volitions, would have to be removed from the picture.
Although there is certainly some truth to the received view, this dissertation took 
a broader view, examining textbooks used during the 300 or so years before behaviorism. 
The four textbooks, William Ames’s (1629) Marrow of Theologv, Jonathan Edwards’ 
(1754) Freedom of the Will, Thomas C Upham’s (1869) Mental Philosophv. and William 
James’s (1890) Principles o f  Psvchology. revealed that changes were underway in 
American psychological thought that had weakened the concept of will considerably—so 
much that William James felt compelled to remove the concept (insofar as the concept 
was of moral importance) from the purview of scientific psychology entirely. American
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psychology had lost its will two decades before Watson’s (1913) famous ‘Behaviorist 
Manifesto’ and some forty years before the heyday of behaviorism.
The analysis of texts in this dissertation is detailed, multifaceted, and difficult to 
reduce to only a few themes. Yet, for simplicity’s sake, one might say that two 
“impulses” in American intellectual and institutional history can partially explain the loss 
of will. These are the “nonsectarian impulse” of American higher education, and the 
“Arminian impulse” in American moral psychology. The nonsectarian impulse is the 
decision among leaders in American higher education in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century to deal with the problem of Protestant pluralism by taking a “lowest common 
denominator” approach to theological and/or moral truth. Since the idea of a faculty of 
will had emerged and been sustained in the context of sectarian theology, the eviseeration 
of this theology also compromised the vitality and coherence of the faculty.
The “Arminian impulse” among moral psychologists is not the theological 
position of Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius, but rather the general tendency to believe 
that moral agency requires self-determination. In order for actions to be considered 
subject to moral judgment (i.e., “free”), they must not be the result of any force (or 
“efficiency”) except one’s own will. Although this position was meant to elevate the 
status of the will, it actually ended up diminishing its role. One of Thomas Upham’s 
main contributions in this regard was to constrain the sphere of mental events that could 
be considered volitional. Inadvertently, the result of this maneuver may have been to 
shrink the moral side to human nature (e.g., the morality of the affections tended to be 
diminished) and to render the faculty of will a redundancy in certain circumstances (i.e., 
in circumstances in which there is no conflict between “natural desires” and “feelings of
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moral obligation”). The Arminian impulse also permeates William James’s Principles of 
Psychology. In chapter after chapter James attempted to find eyidence for non-deriyed 
efficiency in human actions. Most significantly, James argued that the faculty of the will 
(insofar as it was a morally consequential notion—i.e., as considered from the yantage 
point of ‘free will’) could be handed oyer to metaphysics. Since moral agency was an 
indeterministic process, American psychology (committed as it was to deterministic 
explanation) could no longer study human beings as moral agents.
An irony of all this, as 1 haye noted aboye (following Graham Richards), is that 
American psychology is still highly moralistic in many of its incarnations. Fields such as 
deyelopmental psychology and social psychology are infused with implicit and explicit 
moral messages. The thing that seems to be lacking in contemporary American 
psychology’s moral message, howeyer, is that human beings are culpable or praiseworthy 
moral agents. Instead, we tend to yiew human beings as the products of seyeral 
determinants: genetics, enyironmental influences, neurotransmitters, eyolutionary 
adaptations, personality traits, attitudes, whateyer. Guided as we are by “Arminian” 
assumptions, we assume (along with James) that determinism-talk somehow oyerrules or 
negates agency-talk. After all, we belieye, a truly moral agent must be the self- 
determined cause of his or her actions.
So how might American psychology regain its ability to consider people as 
responsible moral agents? This is obyiously a question of great complexity and a 
satisfactory answer is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Still, the nonsectarian and 
“Arminian” theses are releyant to this discussion.
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Mainstream American psychologists are still moral/religious/political 
nonsectarians. Certainly psychologists are allowed to be scientific sectarians, 
participating within particular sub-disciplines in psychology, employing the methods and 
theoretical assumptions peculiar to that sub-discipline. But we assume that one’s own 
moral, religious, or political convictions should not guide one’s research. Likewise, 
one’s own situatedness in moral, religious, or political communities should not influence 
one’s research. Although very few arguably believe that this wall of separation is 
implemented very well (particularly in the more “moral” sub-disciplines like social 
psychology), the wall is still valued and diligently guarded. We do not want another’s 
moral/religious/political agenda imposed upon us.
I would suggest that the fear of imposition of agendas is an outgrowth of the 
nonsectarian impulse. Since we need to keep our (often semi-conscious) ‘agendas’ 
hidden under the wraps of objective methodologies and value-neutral theories, there is 
good reason to go looking for subtle agendas. But suppose psychologists were actually 
encouraged to he explicit about their moral/religious/political convictions. Further, 
suppose they were encouraged to think deeply about the implications of these convictions 
for psychology. Further still, suppose American psychology began to embrace true 
diversity of moral/religious/political opinion and conceived of itself as a “marketplace of 
ideas” rather than an advocate for certain viewpoints which are assumed (by the powers 
that be) to be worthwhile. If this diversity were allowed, we might find that more robust 
and meaningful moral psychologies would develop (meaningful, of course, to those who 
share that viewpoint). In the process, more satisfactory notions of moral agency might 
arise. For this to happen, however, we would have to reject the unrealistic and implicit
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requirements that all be on the same moral/religious/political page. Given our long­
standing need for “unification,” however, it is highly unlikely that such an agenda could 
ever be successfully implemented in mainstream American psychology.^^ It is much too 
messy.
For all this espousal of true diversity, the Arminian thesis has less irenical 
implications. I have argued, along with Edwards, that the Arminian impulse actually 
tends to undermine the very things it hopes to sustain (such as responsibility and moral 
inducement). One way that it undermines itself is by insisting that voluntary processes 
(insofar as they are morally significant) exist outside of the realm of causality to which 
all other earthly creatures and things are bound. This implies that a science of 
psychology is not able to study “free” voluntary processes. It implies that psychology 
cannot consider human beings as moral agents.
Philosopher Owen Flanagan (2002) has recently addressed the problems with the 
Arminian view of free will (although he prefers to speak of the Cartesian soul^^). 
Flanagan argues that “belief in free will is a central component of the dominant 
humanistic image in the West” (Flanagan, 2002, p. 111). This widespread notion of free 
will is identical to what I have been calling the “Arminian” notion of moral agency; 
“many people think they need a notion of free agency that involves a self-initiating ego in 
order to undergird the idea that they are free” (p. 112). Along with Edwards, Flanagan
On a superficial level, one might argue that the “divisions” o f  the APA are an instantiation o f the 
diversity that I recommend. Although the divisions do allow for a diversity o f interests, it is also true that 
the activities within each division are still morally nonsectarian. Division 36, which deals with the 
psychology o f religion, affirms simply that: “the division is nonsectarian” (American Psychological 
Association, 2003, October 6).
Owen Flanagan portrays the Cartesian soul in ways that sound very much like the “Arminian” notion of 
free will. This opens, I think, interesting historical questions about the relations between the two 
formulations.
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takes the compatibilist position^"  ^that self-determination is not needed for moral agency. 
Further, along with Edwards, Flanagan shows the many incoherencies that inhere in the 
“Arminian” view of moral agency.^^ Unfortunately, along with Edwards, Flanagan also 
tends to carieaturize the Arminian will as an unconstrained, unmoved mover. Both 
Upham and James argued that free choices are always constrained by motives (Upham) 
or the object of choice (James).
Although I would agree with Flanagan’s assessment of the shortcomings of the 
Arminian will, this dissertation problematizes some of his most basic assumptions. Most 
importantly, Flanagan seems to argue that belief in a personal God constrains one to posit 
an Arminian, self-determined will (Flanagan, 2002, p. 107). Likewise, he assumes (along 
with James) that one must he a materialist to be able to embrace both universal causation 
and moral agency (i.e., to embrace compatibilism). Certainly our first two authors (Ames 
and Edwards) would not have agreed with these contentions. Their belief in a personal 
God did not comer them in to believing in a self-determined will. Their belief in 
universal causation did not lead them to abandon the idea that human beings are moral 
agents. So, for those who are suspicious of the moral adequacy of naturalism, there are 
historical altematives to naturalistic compatibilism. Our ability to utilize such models, 
however, is necessarily constrained by the communities of discourse to which we belong.
For reasons that are not relevant to this discussion, Flanagan prefers to call his position “neo- 
compatibilism” (p. 127).
For example, Flanagan offers the following challenge to those who would embrace (what I am calling) an 
“Arminian” notion o f moral agency: “Explain to me what it is you are doing when you engage in moral 
education. Why do you attempt to influence the young to leam what is right and good? .. .If free will is a 
prime mover umnoved, why are you attempting to move it?” (Flanagan, 2002, p. 151). This argument very 
clearly echoes Edwards’ argument that God’s use o f commands makes no sense given Arminian 
presuppositions, since the commands are meant to have a causal influence on the human will (III.7).
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